The Implications of the Changing Status of Picketing on Labor Unions (1827-1963). by Newkirk, Wayne Eugene
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1965
The Implications of the Changing Status of
Picketing on Labor Unions (1827-1963).
Wayne Eugene Newkirk
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Newkirk, Wayne Eugene, "The Implications of the Changing Status of Picketing on Labor Unions (1827-1963)." (1965). LSU
Historical Dissertations and Theses. 1020.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/1020
This dissertation has been 65-6417
microfilmed exactly as received
NEWKIRK, Wayne Eugene, 1933- 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING STATUS 
OF PICKETING ON LABOR UNIONS (1827-1963).
Louisiana State University, Ph. D ., 1965 
Economics, general
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, M ichigan
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING STATUS OF 
PICKETING ON LABOR UNIONS (1827-1963)
A D is s e r ta t io n
Subm itted  to  th e  G raduate F ac ility  o f  th e  
L ou isiana  S ta te  U n iv e rs ity  and 
A g r ic u l tu ra l  and M echanical C ollege 
in  p a r t i a l  f u l f i l lm e n t  o f  th e  
req u irem en ts  f o r  th e  deg ree  o f  
D octor o f  Philosophy
in
The Departm ent o f  Economics
by
Wayne Eugene Newkirk 
B . S . ,  Oklahoma S ta te  U n iv e rs ity , 1956 
M . S . , Oklahoma S ta te  U n iv e rs ity . 1957 
January , 1965
ACKMOWLBDQMKHTS
The w r i t e r  would I lk *  to  acknowledge * d eb t o f  g r a t i tu d e  to  
th o se  who have c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  p re p a ra t io n  o f  t h i s  s tudy .
P a r t i c u la r  th an k s  a re  due to  th e  numbers o f  my g rad u a te  
com m ittee whose co n tin u ed  encouragem ent and su p p o rt c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  
developm ent o f  t h i s  s tu d y .
E sp e c ia l thanks go to  my a d v is e r  Dr. R obert Smith who re a d  th e  
e n t i r e  m an u scrip t th rough  i t s  s e v e ra l  d r a f t s  and who made many v a lu a b le  
c r i t i c i s m s  and h e lp fu l  su g g e s tio n s  f o r  im proving th e  q u a l i ty  o f  th e  
study .
Thanks a re  due a ls o  to  L il l ie *  my wife* who p a t i e n t ly  and c h ee r­
f u l ly  bo re  th e  ty p in g  burden  and whose encouragem ent in  tim es o f  d i f f i ­





TABLE OP OASES 
ABSTRACT
I .  INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................  1
Th» P r o b l e m .................................................................................................. 2
The scope and l l n l  t a t  i o n s ..............................................................  3
R a tio n a le  f o r  th e  S t u d y ......................................................................   *+
D e f ln i t io n s  .................................................................................................. 5
The P r o c e d u r e .............................................................................................  10
I I .  PICKETING AND FREE SPE E C H .......................................................................  11
P ic k e tin g  a s  a  T o r t ................................................................................  16
P ic k e tin g  Under th e  C layton A c t .....................................................  29
P ic k e tin g  A f te r  th e  N orris-L aG uard ia  A c t .................................... *+3
The T h o rn h ill  D o c t r i n e ...........................................................................  33
I I I . THE STATUS OF PICKETING UNDER THE LMRA............................................. 76
The P ic k e tin g  R e s t r ic t io n s  ................................................................... 78
I n te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  P ic k e tin g  R e s t r ic t io n s  ........................... 80
E ffe c ts  o f  S e c tio n  8 (b ) LMRA....................................................................101
The S ta tu s  o f  N e u tra ls  Under th e  LM R A ............................................. 108
P ic k e tin g  and Secondary A c t i o n ............................................................... 113
At th e  p rim ary  p r e m i s e s ........................................................................11*+
At th e  se p a ra te  n e u tr a l  p r e m is e s ...................................................... 116




At th e  ro v in g  prwri.ee i n  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ................................... 121
At th e  rov ing  prem ise in  e o n s t r a c t i o n ........................................125
P ic k e tin g  by a M inority  O n i o n ............................................................... 131
The P re ce p tio n  Q u e s t i o n ............................................................................ 135
A n a ly sis  o f  S e c tio n  8(b) R e s t r i c t i o n s ............................................ 140
IV. THE STATUS OF PICKETING UNDER THE LMRDA............................................ 144
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  P io k e tin g  R e s t r ic t io n s    . 145
J u d ic ia l  I n t e r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  P ic k e tin g  R e s t r ic t io n s  . . 152
P io k e tin g  f o r  a  N o n reco g n itio n a l M otive .................................... 159
R e s t r ic t io n  o f  P ic k e tin g  Under S ubsec tion  (C)   171
A n a ly sis  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )  R e s t r ic t io n s  .................................... 192
The L egal S ta tu s  o f  P ic k e tin g  (1963) ............................................. 198
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING STATUS OF PICKETING ON
UNIONSi SUMMART AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................... 201
BIBUOORAPHY.........................................................................................................................218




Coononwealth M o o r e .............................................................................................  12
Jo h n sto n  H a ry es to r Go. ▼. M e i n h a r d t .................................................................  16
S herry  P e r k i n s ......................................................................................................  18
Vegelahn ▼. G unter ......................................................................................................  20
C larege v. L u p h r i n g e r .............................................................................................  27
Wood Mowing and R epairing  Company v . Toohey ..............................................  2?
American S te e l  F oundries v . T r i-C ity  T rades Council ..............................  30
Truax y. C o r r i g a n ......................................................................................................  35
S t .  L ou is y . G l o n e r .................................................................................................. 44
JEx P a r te  S t o u t ...............................................................................................................  44
W alte rs  v . I n d i a n a p o l i s ......................................................................................... 45
Exchange Bakery v . R if  k in ........ ............................................................................. 46
S t i l lw e l l  T h ea te r v . Kaplan ...............................................................................  46
K inase y . A d l e r .......................................................................................................... 47
Senn v. T ile  L ayers P ro te c t iv e  U n io n .................................................................  47
P eople  v . H a r r l s s ......................................................................................................  51
Ex P a r te  B e l l ...............................................................................................................  51
People v . G i d a l y .......................................................................................................... 51
P eople v . Q a r c i a ..........................................................................................................  52
Ex P a r te  L y o n s ...............................................................................................................  52




T h o rn h ill  v . A lab am a ..................................................................................................  53
Sohenek ▼. O.S.................................................................................................................. 56
T hom s ▼. C o l l i n s ...................................................................................................... 56
Carson v . C a lifo rn ia  .................................................................................................  59
A .P .L . v . S t r i n g ..........................................................................................................  59
Milkwagon D riv e rs  Union r .  Meadowmoor D a i r i a s .......................................... 61
Bakery D riv e rs  v . W o h l......................................................, ...................................  67
C a rp en te rs  Union v . R i t t e r  ..................................................................................... 69
Qiboney v . Empire S to rag e  I c e  Co.......................................................................... 82
Hughes t .  S u p e rio r  C ourt o f  C a l i f o r n i a ..........................................................  89
B uild ing  S e rv ic e s  ta p lo y e e s  v . Q a z z a m ..........................................................  90
I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  T e a n s te rs  v . Hartke .  ...........................  95
I n te r n a t io n a l  R ice M illin g  Co................................................................................  102
NLRB v . Denver B u ild in g  and C o n s tru c tio n  T r a d e s ......................................... 108
Douds v . M e tro p o litan  F e d e ra tio n  o f  A rc h ite c ts ,  e t c .....................................I l l
Wadsworth B u ild ing  Co....................................................................................................... 116
O il W orkers I n te r n a t io n a l  Union v. The Pure O il Co.......................................120
U nited  E le c t r i c a l  W orkers Union v. Ryan C o n s tru c tio n  C o rpo ra tion  . 120
I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f T e a n s te rs  v . S ch u ltz  R e fr ig e ra te d
S e rv ic e , I n c . ..........................     122
S ailo r*  s  Union o f  th e  P a c if ic  v . Moore Dry Dock Co.......................................123
Amalgam te d  Meat C u tte rs  and B utcher Workmen v. W estern, In c . . . 125
I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  B oilerm akers v . R ic h f ie ld  O il
C o r p o r a t i o n .....................................................................................................................125
v i i
NAM1 PA.QE
C h auffeu rs , T eam sters, Warehousoman, and H e lp ers  v. H oosier
Petro leum  Co....................................................................................................................... 126
U nited  A sso c ia tio n  o f  Journeyman Plum bers and S ta a m f it te r s  v .
O rah am .................................................................................................................................. 128
Pappas r .  S tacey   ...............................................................................................129
I n te r n a t io n a l  T eam sters ▼. V o g t .............................................................................130
I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  T eam sters v . C u r t is  B ro th e rs , In c . 133
I n te r n a t io n a l  A sso c ia tio n  o f  M ach in is ts  v . A lloy  Mfg. Co..............................134
G arner v . T eam sters Union ..................................................................................... 136
Farnsw orth  and Chambers v . E le c t r i c a l  W orkers Local 4 2 9 ............................136
UAW v. R u s s e l l .....................................................................................................................137
Guss v. Utah Labor R e la tio n s  B o a r d ........................................................................ 138
P h i l l i p s  v. I n t e r n a t io n a l  L ad ies Garment W orkers Union ......................... 147
B linne  C o n s tru c tio n  Co..................................................................................................... 152
B ahia M otor H o t e l ............................................................................................................154
Bachman F u rn i tu re  Co..........................................................................................................155
A lton  tty e rs  B r o t h e r s ........................................................................................................163
F a n e l l i  Ford S a l e s ............................................................................................................167
M ission V a lley  I n n ............................................................................................................168
McLeod ▼. Local 89 Chefs U n io n ................................................................................. 176
Crown C a f e t e r i a ................................................................................................................ 178
B a rte n d e rs  and H otel and R e s ta u ra n t W orkers Union v. Fow ler H o te l. 182
A tla n t ic  M aintenance Co...................................................................................................183
Y p s ila n t i  P re s s , I n c ..........................................................................................................184
v i i i
NAME PAGE
Jay  Jacobs Downtown, I n c .................................................................................................184
H a r t ln o 's  Hone F u r n i s h i n g s .......................................................................................... 185
Graham ▼. R e ta i l  C lerk s A s s 'n ..................................................................................... 186
Greene ▼. NLRB.....................................................................................................................189
P en e llo  v . R e ta i l  S to re  Employees .....................................................................  189
ABSTRACT
T his study examines th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  changing s t a tu s  o f  p ic k ,  
e tin g  on th e  conduct o f  s t r ik e s ,  b o y c o tts , c e r t i f i c a t i o n  and d e c e r t i f i ­
c a tio n  e le c t io n s ,  and th e  s ta tu s  o f union and nonunion enployees. I n  
an a ly z in g  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  p ic k e tin g , a t t e n t io n  i s  g iven  to  the  
h i s t o r i c a l  development o f th e  law o f  p ic k e tin g .
Chapter I I  in c lu d e s  a review o f th e  t o r t  theo ry  o f p ic k e tin g  
(Vegelahn v. P u n te r) and an a n a ly s is  o f p ic k e tin g  as a form o f  f r e e  
speech (ThoraM JJ v. Alabama) . The im portance o f  th e se  two p e rio d s  in  
th e  law o f  p ic k e tin g  i s  r e f le c te d  by th e  co n tin u in g  debate  a s  to  w hether 
p ic k e tin g  should be p ro te c te d  a s  a le g i t im a te  form o f  p r o te s t  o r  w hether 
p ic k e tin g  should be condemned a s  an unlaw ful in te r f e r e n c e  w ith e s ta b ­
l is h e d  r ig h t s .  With th e  r e je c t io n  o f  th e  id e a  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  was a 
form o f  f r e e  speech, th e  le g a l  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  became a due p ro cess  
q u estio n  where th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  i s  dependent on th e  purpose o f  th e  
p ic k e tin g , th e  re a c tio n  o f  prim ary and secondary employees, and th e  
economic e f f e c t s  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g . The d i f f i c u l t y  o f developing  a 
uniform  code o f p ic k e tin g  under th e se  c ircum stances i s  f u r th e r  com pli­
c a te d  by S ection  8 (b )(7 ) o f  th e  LMRDA which e s ta b l is h e s  new re g u la tio n s  
l im it in g  re c o g n ltio n a l a n d /o r  o rg a n is a tio n a l  p ic k e tin g . Chapter I I I  
p ro v id es  an a n a ly s is  o f  th e  im p lied  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p ic k e tin g  under 
S ec tio n s 8 (b )(1 )(A ) and (B) and S ec tions 8 (b )(4 )(A ) and (B) o f th e  LMRA. 
These l im i ta t io n s  on p ic k e tin g  produced fundam ental changes in  th e  
t a c t i c s  o f  un ions and em ployers. The d i f f i c u l t y  o f d e fin in g  th e  s ta tu s
o f n eu tra ls , d istingu ish ing  between primary and secondary ac tion , and the 
r e s tr ic t io n s  on p icketing by a m inority union severely jeopardized the 
a b i l i ty  of unions to engage in  picketing as a foim o f peaceful p ro te s t.
Chapter IV presen ts an ana lysis and evaluation of the e f fe c t of 
Section 8 (b )(7 ) on the s ta tu s  o f pioketing. The in te rp re ta tio n  of 
whether picketing i s  recognitions! in  purpose—a v io la tio n  of Section 
9 ( b ) ( 7 ) - -or inform ational in  purpose—as pro tected  by Section 8 (b )(7 )
(C)—i s  o f paramount s ig n if ic a n c e  in  re p re s e n ta t io n  oases . The im pact 
o f  S ec tion  8 (b )(7 )  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  reco rd  o f  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  and 
d e c e r t i f ic a t io n  e le c t io n s  s in ce  1959- The in c re a s in g  p e rcen tag e  o f 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e le c t io n s  l o s t  by unions and th e  num erical in c re a s e  in  
d e c e r t i f ic a t io n  p e t i t io n s  among u n a f f i l i a t e d  un ions have encouraged 
n e u tr a l  employers to  adopt an a n tiu n io n  a t t i t u d e ,  and have served  to  
f o s t e r  a  ph ilosophy  o f  re-an trenchm ent among nonunion em ployers.
Chapter V e v a lu a te s  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  to  S ec tion  8 (b ) (7 ) . From 
th e  s ta n d p o in t o f th e  ju d ic ia l  experience  i t  would seem p la u s ib le  
e i th e r  to  ban a l l  forms o f p ic k e tin g  o r  to  p ro te c t  p e ac e fu l prim ary and 
secondary p ic k e tin g . I f  th e  p re s e rv a tio n  o f  th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  i s  h e ld  
to  be p re fe ra b le  to  a p roposa l outlaw ing p ic k e tin g , i t  I s  recommended 
th a t  Congress amend S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )  o f  th e  LMRQA (1) to  enable la b o r  
unions to  engage in  p eace fu l prim ary  o r  seoondary p ic k e tin g  prov ided  (a) 
th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  does n o t i n t e r f e r e  w ith  d e l iv e r ie s  o r  (b) w ith  th e  
prim ary employees' in g re s s  o r  e g re ss  to  th e  p la n t  o r  e s tab lish m en t, and 
(2) to  p rev en t th e  s t a te s  from e s ta b l is h in g  c o n f l ic t in g  laws which 
enab le  s t a t e  c o u rts  to  e n jo in  p ic k e tin g  a s  a v io la t io n  o f  p u b lic  p o lic y .
t
x i
The development o f a uniform  code o f p ic k e tin g  re g u la tio n s  would p e rm it 
un ions to  a d v e r t is e  th e  source and reason  o f  t h e i r  d is p u te  w ith  employ­




On September 14, 1939* th e  P re s id e n t signed  in to  law  The Labor* 
Management-Reporting and D iso lo su re  Act (LMRDA). The re le v a n t s e c t io n  
o f  th e  LMRDA fo r  th e  pu rposes o f  t h i s  study i s  S ec tio n  704, T i t l e  V II. 
S ec tio n  704, "B oycotts and R ecogn ition  P ic k e t in g ," amends th e  u n f a i r  
la b o r  p r a c t ic e s  s e c tio n  o f  th e  Labor Management R e la tio n s  Act, 1947 
(LMRA) (S e c tio n  S /b7 ). The f i r s t  p a r t  o f  S ec tion  704, which amends 
S ec tio n  8 (b ) (4 ) ,  i s  an a ttem p t to  c lo se  th e  lo o p h o le s  in  th e  secondary 
b o y c o tt p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  LMRA. P r io r  to  1959 la b o r  un ions, in  some 
c ase s , were a b le  to  avo id  th e  sa n c tio n s  o f  th e  secondary b o y o o tt p ro v i­
s io n s  (S e c tio n  8/S7/S7) by v i r tu e  o f  in s e r t in g  a "ho t-ca rgo"  c la u se  in  
t h e i r  c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  c o n tra c ts  which enabled them to  p a r t i c ip a te  
i n  secondary b o y c o tts  by re fu s in g  to  hand le  goods o f nonunion em ployers •
In  a d d it io n  to  th e  "h o t-ca rg o "  p ro v is io n , S e c tio n  704 amends the  
LMRA by adding paragraph ( 7 ) to  th e  u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e s  S ec tio n  8 (b ) . 
Paragraph (7 ) and i t s  p ro v iso s  (A), (B), and (C) e s ta b l is h  new fe d e ra l  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  r i g h t  to  p ic k e t  by d e fin in g  th e  l im i t s  w ith in  which 
a union  may le g a l ly  engage i n  o rg a n isa tio n a l, re c o g n itio n , and p u b l ic i ty  
p ic k e tin g . Paragraph (7) p ro v id es  th a t  i t  s h a l l  be an u n f a i r  la b o r  
p r a c t ic e  f o r  a un ion  o r  i t s  ag en ts :
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(7) to  p ic k e t  o r  cause to  be p icketed*  o r  th r e a te n  to  p ic k e t  o r  
cause  to  be p icketed*  any em ployer where an o b je c t  th e re o f  i s  f o r c ­
in g  o r  re q u ir in g  an em ployer to  re c o g n ise  o r  b a rg a in  w ith  a  la b o r  
o rg a n is a t io n  a s  th e  r e p re s e n ts  t i r e  o f  h i s  employees* o r  fo rc in g  o r  
r e q u ir in g  th e  employees o f  an  em ployer to  aooep t o r  s e l e c t  such 
l a b o r  o rg a n is a t io n  a s  t h e i r  c o l l e c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  re p re se n ta tiv e *  
u n le s s  such la b o r  o rg a n is a t io n  i s  c u r r e n t ly  c e r t i f i e d  a s  th e  r e p re ­
s e n ta t iv e  o f  such em ployees:
(A) where th e  em ployer h as  la w fu lly  reco g n ized  in  acco rd ­
ance w ith  t h i s  Act any o th e r  la b o r  o rg a n is a t io n  and a q u e s tio n  
concern ing  re p re s e n ta t io n  may n o t a p p ro p r ia te ly  be r a is e d  under 
s e c t io n  9 (o ) o f  t h i s  A ct.
(B) where w ith in  th e  p reced in g  tw elve  months a  v a l id  e le c ­
t io n  under s e c t io n  9 (c ) o f  t h i s  Act h a s  been conducted , o r
(C) where such p io k e tin g  h as been conducted w ith o u t a 
p e t i t i o n  under s e c tio n  9 (c )  be ing  f i l e d  w ith in  a rea so n ab le  
p e rio d  o f  tim e n o t to  exceed t h i r t y  days from th e  commencement 
o f  such p ic k e tin g :  Provided* T hat when such a  p e t i t i o n  has been 
f i l e d  th e  Board s h a l l  fo r th w ith , w ith o u t reg a rd  to  th e  p ro v i­
s io n s  o f  s e c tio n  9 (c ) (1 )  o r  th e  absence o f a showing o f  a  
s u b s ta n t ia l  i n t e r e s t  on th e  p a r t  o f th e  la b o r  o rg an isa tio n *  
d i r e c t  an  e le c t io n  in  such u n i t  a s  th e  Board f in d s  to  be app ro ­
p r i a t e  and s h a l l  c e r t i f y  th e  r e s u l t s  th e re o f :  P rovided f u r t h e r . 
T hat n o th in g  i n  t h i s  subparagraph (C) s h a l l  be co n stru ed  to  
p r o h ib i t  any p io k e tin g  o r  o th e r  p u b l ic i ty  f o r  th e  purpose o f  
t r u th f u l l y  a d v is in g  th e  p u b lic  ( in c lu d in g  consum ers) t h a t  an 
em ployer does n o t employ members of* o r  have a c o n tr a c t  w ith ,
a la b o r  o rg a n isa tio n *  u n le s s  an e f f e c t  o f  such p ic k e tin g  i s  to  
induce  any in d iv id u a l  employed by any o th e r  pe rson  in  th e  co u rse  
o f  h i s  employment* n o t to  p ic k  up, d e l iv e r  o r  t r a n s p o r t  any 
goods o r  n o t to  perform  any s e r v ic e s .*
I . THE PROBLEM
The prim ary  t e s t  f o r  d e te rm in in g  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  p ic k e tin g  under 
S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )  depends upon (1 ) th e  m otive behind  th e  p ic k e tin g , and 
(2 ) th e  re a c t io n  o f p rim ary  employees, secondary  em ployers o r  em ployees.
^-United S ta te s  Congress, P u b lic  Law 86-257* 86 th  Cong., S. 1555* 
Septem ber I 1*, 1959 (W ashington, D .C .: U.S. Government P r in t in g  O ff ic e ,
1959).
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and consumers to  th a  economic im p lic a tio n s  o f  p ie k a tln g . As a  r e s u l t  
th e  o o u r ts  a r e  p laced  in  th a  d i f f i c u l t  p o s i t io n  c?  d ec id in g  w he ther th e  
p io k e tin g  in  q u e s tio n  i s  suppo rted  by a law fu l m otive and w hether th e  
r e a c t io n  to  th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  overcone th e  m otive t e s t .  
Thus, i f  th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  n o t p re so r lb e d  by parag raph  (7) 
o r  i t s  p ro v iso s  and i f  th e  e f f e c t  i s  to  t r o th f u l l y  a d v e r t is e  to  th e  
p u b lic  t h a t  th e  em ployer i s  u n fa ir*  th e  a c t i v i t y  i s  p ro te c te d  by th e  
C o n s ti tu tio n  u n le s s  a  secondary employee re fu s e s  to  c ro s s  th e  p ic k e t  
l i n e .  I n  th e  f i n a l  a n a ly s is*  th e re fo re *  th e  s t a tu s  o f  p io k e tin g  nay be  
determ ined  by th e  l e t t e r i n g  on th e  sign* th e  a c t io n s  o f  th e  p ic k e t ,  and 
th e  tes tim ony  o f  th e  secondary employee.
The im p lic a tio n s  which r e s u l t  from th e  u n c e r ta in  s t a tu s  o f  
p io k e tin g  re p re s e n t  a s ig n i f ic a n t  problem  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
r e l a t i o n s .  The im p lic a tio n s  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  th e  con* 
d u c t o f  c o l l e c t iv e  b a rg a in in g , s t r ik e s *  union  s e c u r i ty ,  and th e  a b i l i t y  
o f  th e  u n ion  to  p la c e  economic s a n c tio n s  on th e  employer th rough  th e  
m aintenance o f  an  e f f e c t iv e  b o y c o tt.
The scope and l im i t a t i o n s . Many o th e r  f a c to r s  have been 
im p o rtan t in  th e  ohanging n a tu re  o f u n io n s and th e  c h a lle n g e  fa c in g  
th e  la b o r  movement i n  th e  U nited S ta te s .  T h is study  i s  n o t d i r e c t l y  
concerned w ith  q u e s tio n s  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  economic im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  
power o f  u n io n s , b u t w ith  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  changing s t a tu s  o f  
p ic k e tin g  on th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  u n io n s. The purpose  o f  t h i s  study 
w i l l  be (1) to  examine th e  background and th e  developm ent o f  p ic k e t-  
in g  p r i o r  to  th e  LMRDA* and (2) to  e v a lu a te  th e  e f f e c t  o f
S e c tio n  8 (b )(7 )  on th e  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  by a n a ly s in g  th a  l e g a l  and 
econoKlo im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  c a se s  an p io k e tin g  s in c e  1959* W ith in  th e  
soope o f  th e s e  object!Y es*  a t t e n t i o n  w i l l  be g iven  to  th e  fo llo w in g  
q u e s tio n s t  What was th e  s t a tu s  o f  p io k e tin g  p r i o r  to  th e  C layton  Act 
o f  191**? What was th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  C layton  Act and th e  K o rr is -  
LaGuardia Act on th e  s t a tu s  o f  p io k e t ir* ?  What was th e  e f f e c t  o f  
T h o rn h ill  v . Alabama on th e  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g ?  What was th e  e f f e c t  
o f  th e  LMRA on th e  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g ?  What has been th e  e f f e c t  o f  
S e c tio n  8 (b ) (7 )  o f  th e  LMRDA on th e  s t a tu s  o f  p io k e tin g ?  What e f f e c t  
have th e  p io k e tin g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  had on th e  conduct o f s t r i k e s ,  b o y c o tts ,  
union s e c u r i ty ,  union  re c o g n itio n , and th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  c o l le c t iv e  
b a rg a in in g ?  What s te p s  a re  n e ce ssa ry  i n  o rd e r  to  develop  a p o s i t iv e  
approach to  th e  problem?
I I .  RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY
The d i f f i c u l t y  enoountered  in  d e te m in in g  w hether o r  n o t a 
p a r t i c u l a r  type  o f  p io k e tin g  should  be p ro te c te d  from le g a l  s a n c tio n s  
has been a c o n tin u a l  sou rce  o f  c o n tro v e rsy  s in c e  th e  famous case  o f  
T h o rn h ill  v . Alabama (19^0). The d e c is io n  o f  th e  Supreme C ourt In  th e  
T h o rn h ill  c a se  te m p o ra r ily  equated  p ic k e tin g  w ith  th e  r i g h t  o f  f r e e  
speech a s  gu a ran teed  by th e  F i r s t  Amendment to  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n  and th e  
r i g h t  o f  due p ro c e ss  under th e  F o u rte en th  Amendment. The l e g a l i t y  o f  
th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  was debated  in  th e  le g a l  p e r io d ic a ls  f o r  a p p ro x i­
m ately  te n  y e a rs , and th e  i s s u e  d id  n o t su b s id e  u n t i l  th e  Supreme C ourt 
began to  l im i t  th e  th eo ry  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  under th e  p ic k e tin g
r e s t r i c t i o n #  inposed  by th e  LMRA (1 9 4 7 ).2 The e f f e c t  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )  
on th e  s ta tu e  o f  p ic k e tin g  has r e s u l te d  i n  a  m n b e r  o f  a r t i c l e s  which 
d isc u ss  paragraph  (7 ) i n  l i g h t  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D octrine  a s  nodi f le d  by 
th e  Court d e c is io n s  under th e  LMRA. Although th e  d isc u ss io n s  o f  th e  
T h o rn h ill D octrine  and th e  a r t i c l e s  on th e  e f f e c t  o f  paragraph  (7 ) pro* 
v id e  an i n te r e s t in g  ooaaen tary  on s p e c ia l i s e d  a sp e c ts  o f  p icke ting*  
th e se  s tu d ie s  a re  in ad eq u a te  a s  a neans o f  in te r p r e t in g  th e  o v e ra l l  
problem . The o b je c tiv e  o f  t h i s  study* th e re fo re , w i l l  be to  conduct an  
ax te n s iv e  review  o f  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  s t a tu s  o f  p io k e tin g . This h i s t o r i c a l  
review  w i l l  p ro v id e  th e  n ecessa ry  background to  examine th e  c u rre n t  
oases on p ic k e tin g , and to  determ ine th e  eoonomic e f f e o t s  o f  th e  LMRA, 
a s  amended, on th e  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g .
I I I .  DEFINITIONS
The te r n  p io k e tin g  has been s u b je c t  to  a  v a r ie ty  o f
See Ludwig T e l le r ,  "P ick e tin g  and F ree S peech ," H arvard Law 
Review, LVI, No. 2 (O ctober, 1942), 160*218; M errick Dodd, *P ic k e tin g  
and Free Speech: A D is s e n t ," H arvard Law Review. LVI, No. 4 (Januaxy, 
1943), 513-531; T e l le r ,  "P io k e tin g  and F ree Speech: A R ep ly ,"  H arvard 
Law Review, LVI, No. 4 (Januaxy, 1943)* 532-540; W illlaw  Sherwood, fcThe 
P ic k e tin g  Cases and How They Grew, ” The George W ashington Law Review. X, 
No. 7 (May, 1942), 763-798; S y lv e s te r  P e tro . P i eke t in g  and Fre edom o f  
Speech," Labor Law Jo u rn a l. I ,  No. 9 (June , 1950), 675-748; A rthu r W eis, 
"Proa T h o rn h ill to  Hanke, ” Labor Law J o u rn a l . I I ,  I s .  8 (August, 1951), 
587-594; Edgar Jones, "The ftig h t i s  p ic k e C -T w ilig h t  Zone o f  th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n ," U n iv e rs ity  o f  £nBl£LX I9i&  Review, CHI, No. 8 (June , 
1954). 995-1029; M orris Forkosch, "An Analysis a n d le - e v a lu a t io n  o f  
P ic k e tin g  i n  Labor R e la tio n s ."  Fbidhaa Law Review. XXVI, No. 3 (Autumn,
1957), 391-440; B. L. S aao ff, "p ic k e tin g  and th e  F i r s t  A asndaent: 'F u l l  
C ir c le 1 and 'Form al S u rre n d e r ,1" Labor Law Jo u rn a l. IX, No. 12, D eceaber,
1958), 889; Guy Farmer and C harles W ll ia n s o n ,  ^P ioketing  and th e  
In ju n c t iv e  Power o f  S ta te  C ourts—Froa T h o rn h ill to  V o g t," U n iv e rs ity  o f  
D e tro it  Law J o u rn a l , XXXV, No. 4 (A p ril . 1958). 431-455-
I n te r p r e ta t io n s  and d e f in i t io n s  i n  th e  s t a tu t e s ,  c o u r ts ,  and in  
sc h o la r ly  s tu d ie s .  B lack1s  Law D ic tio n a ry  d e f in e s  p io k e tin g  a s  a c t i v i t y  
by members o f  a t r a d e  un ion  on s tr ik e *  i n  p o s tin g  members a t  a l l  
approaches to  th e  p lan t*  " . . .  f o r  th e  purpose o f  observ ing  and re p o r t­
in g  th e  workmen going to  o r  coning from th e  works, and o f  u sin g  such 
in f lu e n c e  a s  nay be in  t h e i r  power to  p rev e n t th e  workmen from a cc ep t­
in g  work th e r e .
P ic k e tin g , which may tak e  a number o f  forms, i s  th e  most e f f e c ­
t iv e  avenue o f  co n su n io a tio n  f o r  th e  s t r ik in g  union, a lthough  th e
e x is te n c e  o f  a s t r i k e  i s  n o t a  n ecessa ry  p r e r e q u is i te .  W ithout reg a rd  
to  c ircum stances o f th e  o b je c tiv e , p ic k e tin g  i s  a means o f  p u b lic a t io n  
between th e  employer, h i s  employees, o r  th i r d  p a r t i e s .  Pure p ic k e tin g
o r  p e ac e fu l p ic k e tin g  may be d e fin ed  a s t
. . .  a f a o t  s i tu a t io n  in  which one o r  more in d iv id u a ls  u t te r in g  no 
s la n d e rs , la p  re c a t io n s ,  o r  u n tru th s ,  c a rry in g  a reasonab ly  s iz ed  
p la c a rd  o r  s ig n  and perhaps handing o u t throw-aways which lik e w ise  
c o n ta in  no u n tru th s , walk n o t slow ly o r  ra p id ly  to  and f ro  in  f r o n t  
o f  th e  em p loyer's  p laoe  o f  b u s in e ss , w ith o u t b lock ing  t r a f f i c ,  
causing  a iy  congestion , o r  o th erw ise  does n o t ooeroe, and does n o t 
seek p r im a r ily  to  in ju r e  anyone, i s  n o t to  compel anyone to  break  
any law s o r  o b l ig a t io n s  and i s  to  o b ta in  b e n e f i ts  f o r  th e  p io k e te rs  
o r  t h e i r  p r in c ip le s ,  f a c tu a l ly  o r  l e g a l ly ,  d i r e c t ly  o r  i n d i r e c t l y .^
With some e x ce p tio n s , pure p ic k e tin g  i s  p ro te c te d  by th e  c o u r ts  and th e
C o n s titu tio n . Pure p ic k e tin g , however, i s  seldom found i n  f a c t ;  and i t
i s  c le a r  from an exam ination  o f th e  case s  on p ic k e tin g  t h a t  " . . .  th e re
i s  and can  be no such th in g  a s  p e ac e fu l p ic k e tin g , any more th an  th e re
^Henry Black, B lack1s Law Dic tio n a ry  (T h ird  E d itio n ; S t. P au lt 
West P u b lish in g  Company, 1933)• p. I3o0.
f o r k o s c h ,  0 2 *  c i t . , pp. *K)6-407*
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" can be  c h a a te  v u lg a r i ty ,  o r  p e a c a fu l ro b b in g , o r  la w fu l ly n ch in g .
P rim ary p ic k e tin g  develops whan th a  w orkara i n  a p ro d u c tio n  
u n i t  p a t r o l  to  and f ro  o u ts id e  th a  e s ta b lish m e n t and in f o r a  secondary  
em ployees and th a  p u b lic  t h a t  th a  em ployer i s  u n f a i r .  "Hie g i s t  o f  th e  
p rim ary  p ic k e t  i s  a d is p u te  w ith  th a  em ployer whose e s ta b lish m e n t i s  
be ing  p a t r o l le d .
Secondary p ic k e tin g , which i s  d e riv e d  from th e  secondary 
b o y o o tt, in v o lv e s  th e  p a t r o l l in g  o f  th e  p la c e  o f  b u s in e s s  o f  a s u p p l ie r  
o r  custom er o f  th e  employer w ith  idiom th e  un ion  has a d is p u te .  Second­
a ry  p ic k e tin g  i s  sometimes r e f e r r e d  to  a s  s t r a n g e r  p ic k e tin g . S tra n g e r  
p ic k e tin g , whioh i s  secondary i n  n a tu re , may be d e fin e d  a s  th e  p e a c e fu l 
p ic k e tin g  o f  any em ployer by t h i r d  p a r t i e s  (an o u ts id e  un ion) which 
re p re s e n t  none o r  o n ly  a m in o rity  o f  th e  em p lo y er's  em ployees.?
S tra n g e r  p ic k e tin g  i s  norm ally  conducted e i t h e r  f o r  o rg a n iz a ­
t io n a l ,  re c o g n itio n , o r  f o r  p u b l ic i ty  pu rp o ses. O rg a n isa tio n a l 
p ic k e tin g  o o n s is ts  o f  p a t r o l l in g  th e  em p lo y er 's  p la n t  f o r  th e  purpose 
o f  a d v e r t is in g  to  h i s  employees th e  advan tages o f  un ion  membership. 
R ecogn ition  p ic k e tin g  o o n s is ts  o f  p a t r o l l in g  th e  em p lo y er's  p la n t  f o r  
th e  purpose  o f  p la c in g  p re s su re  upon th e  em ployer to  rec o g n ise  th e  un ion  
a s  th e  b a rg a in in g  a g en t f o r  h i s  em ployees. P u b l ic i ty  o r  oonsumer
^A tgjtigsgn, Toneka and Santa  Fe Railway Company v . Gee, 139 F. 
582 (D&A, 1905)-
^Stephen M ueller, Labor Law and L e g is la t io n  (Second E d it io n ;  
C in c in n a ti t  Southw estern  P u b lish in g  Company, 1956), p . 197*
7I b l d . . p . 198.
p ic k e tin g , which i s  o lo s e ly  s s s o c is t s d  w ith  o rg a n iz a t io n a l  and re c o g n i­
t io n  p ic k e tin g , c o n s is t s  o f  p a t r o l l in g  th e  p rem ises o f  th e  em ployer o r  
t h a t  o f  h i s  s u p p l ie r s  f o r  th e  purpose o f  a d v e r t is in g  to  th e  p u b lic  t h a t  
th e  em ployer i s  u n f a i r  to  o rg an ized  la b o r .  P u b l ic i ty  p ic k e tin g  nay 
h a re  th e  e f f e c t  o f  p lao in g  i n d i r e c t  p re s su re  on th e  em ployer th rough  
h i s  custom ers to  reco g n ize  th e  un ion  a s  a b a rg a in in g  a g en t.
O ther ty p e s  o f  p io k e tin g  which nay o ccu r on o ccasio n  in c lu d e  
f ra u d u le n t  p ic k e tin g , mass p ic k e tin g , ow ner-w orker p ic k e tin g , and 
J u r i s d i c t i o n a l  p ic k e tin g . F rau d u len t p ic k e tin g  e x i s t s  where circum ­
s ta n c e s  in d ic a te  a s e r io u s  m is re p re se n ta tio n  o f  f a c t ,  f ra u d , o r  th e  u se  
o f  ap p ro b io u s language. P ic k e tin g  o f  t h i s  ty pe  i s  n o t c lo th e d  w ith  
e i t h e r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  immunity. Mass p ic k e tin g  e x i s t s  
when th e  p io k e ts  a re  so "massed a s  to  c o n ta in  e lem en ts o f  im p l ic i t
Q
c o e rc io n  growing ou t o f  th e  fo rc e  o f  num bers." The l e g a l i t y  o f  mass 
p io k e tin g  depends upon th e  c ircu m stan ces , th e  number o f  p ic k e ts  p e r  
s t a t io n ,  and th e  manner o f  t h e i r  a c t io n s .  As a g e n e ra l r u le  most c o u r ts  
have h e ld  mass p ic k e tin g  to  be un law fu l, a lth o u g h  o th e r s  have o c ca s io n ­
a l l y  p e rm itte d  mass p ic k e tin g  a s  long  a s  th e  a c t i v i t y  rem ained p e a c e fu l 
in  c h a ra c te r .  Owner-worker p ic k e tin g  i s  norm ally  c a r r ie d  o u t f o r  th e  
purpose o f  fo rc in g  th e  owner-worker and h i s  employees to  Jo in  th e  un ion . 
A lthough t h i s  type  o f  p ic k e tin g  i s  r e l a t i v e ly  in s ig n i f i c a n t ,  i t  has 
p layed  an im p o rtan t r o le  in  th e  le g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  s in c e  th e  
T h o rn h ill  c a se .
^ I b ld . ,  p . 225*
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J u r isd ic tio n a l p icketing , which r e s u l ts  from a d ispu te  between 
two o r  more r iv a l  unions, may be div ided in to  two c la s s i f ic a t io n s t  (1) 
p icketing  by r iv a l  unions contesting  th e  r ig h t  to  rep resen t an 
em ployer's employeesj and (2) p ioketing  by two o r  more lab o r organiza­
tio n s  who a re  d ispu ting  in s ta l la t io n  r ig h ts  on a construc tion  p ro je c t. 
J u r is d ic tio n a l p icketing  of the f i r s t  type i s  an u n fa ir  lab o r p rac tic e  
(Section 8/b7/57/c7. LMRA) i f  the em ployer's employees a re  cu rren tly  
represen ted  by a c e r t i f ie d  union. I f  the Ju r isd ic tio n a l p icketing  
involves a nonunion p la n t, the employer may p e t i t io n  fo r  an e lec tio n  
(Section 9 /o7 /i7 /b 7 . LMRA) where one o r  more o f the  in d iv id u a ls  or 
unions have presented olaims fo r  recogn ition . However, i t  i s  not 
necessary to  hold an e le c tio n  o r to  ob ta in  c e r t i f ic a t io n  by the N ational 
Labor R elations Board (NLRB) in  o rder fo r  th e  union to  be le g a lly  
reoognized by the employer. J u r is d ic tio n a l p ioketing fo r  organiza­
tio n a l o r recognition  purposes has been fu r th e r  r e s t r ic te d  by paragraph 
(7) o f  the  LMRDA, which req u ires  an expedited e le c tio n  w ith in  th i r ty  
days o f  the in i t i a t io n  of p icketing . I f  the  employees vote ag a in st the 
unions, the p a r t ie s  to  the o r ig in a l d ispu te  lo se  the r ig h t  to  p icket 
fo r  o rg an iza tio n a l o r recogn ition  purposes fo r  a period o f one year.
J u r i s d i c t i o n a l  p ic k e tin g , i n  su p p o rt o f  a  d is p u te  o v e r i n s t a l l a ­
t io n  r i g h t s ,  i s  an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  u n d er S ec tio n  8(b)(*f-)(D), LMRA. 
The NLRB, however, has p ro fe s se d  i t s  i n a b i l i t y  to  en fo rc e  t h i s  s e c t io n  
o f  th e  LMRA. The p re v is io n  h as n o t been i n  c o n f l i c t  because  c o n s tru c ­
t io n  em ployers and un ions have e s ta b l is h e d  p r iv a te  m achinery to  re s o lv e  
and e n fo rc e  J u r i s d ic t io n a l  s e t t le m e n ts .
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IV. THE PROCEDURE
Although th e  M ajor emphasis o f  t h i s  study w i l l  be concerned w ith  
th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  changing s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  on un io n s. I t  w i l l  
be n e ce ssa ry  a s  a M atte r o f  In tro d u c tio n  to  reexam ine and develop th e  
law o f  p ic k e tin g  a s  a  c o ro l la ry  to  th e  c e n t r a l  problem . C hapter I I  i s  
concerned w ith  th e  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  under th e  conson law . th e  a n t i ­
t r u s t  laws* and th e  a ttem p t to  equate  p ic k e tin g  a s  a means o f  f r e e  
speech du rin g  th e  19*40's . C hapter H I  examines th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  LMRA 
on th e  d o c tr in e  o f  f r e e  speech and review s th e  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  p r io r
to  th e  LMRDA o f  1959* C hapter IV an a ly zes  th e  e f f e c t  o f  S ec tion  8 (b )(7 )
on th e  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g . T h is c h a p te r  in c lu d e s  an exam ination o f  th e
c ase s  on p ic k e tin g  s in c e  1959 and a d isc u ss io n  o f  th e  r e le v a n t  i s s u e s
which evolve from th e  new r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t .  C hapter 
V p re s e n ts  a summary o f  th e  study  in c lu d in g  a synopsis  o f  th e  im p lica ­
t io n s  o f  th e  changing s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  in  re s p e c t to  th e  conduct o f 
s t r i k e s ,  b o y c o tts , union s e c u r i ty ,  and th e  o v e ra l l  d e c lin e  o f  th e  la b o r  
movement s in c e  19*47. and p re s e n ts  an a l t e r n a t iv e  p roposa l to  th e  c u rre n t 
re g u la tio n s  a s  p re sc r ib e d  under S ec tion  8 (b )(7 )*
CHAPTER I I
FTCKEnNQ AND PRES SPEECH
Por pu rposes o f  a n a ly s is  th e  h is to r y  o f  p ic k e tin g  p r io r  to  th e  
IMRA o f  1947 nay be d iv id e d  in to  two se p a ra te  p e r io d s . B efore 1940 th e  
la v  o f  p io k e tin g  was g e n e ra lly  oonsidered  to  be a  branch o f  th e  la v  o f  
t o r t s .  With few ex cep tio n s  p ic k e tin g  v as h e ld  to  be a  c i v i l  in ju r y  
I n te r f e r in g  w ith  th e  p ro p e r ty  r ig h ts  o f  em ployers o r  t h e i r  employees.
In  1940 in  th e  case  o f  T hornh ill v . A labana. th e  Supreme C ourt over­
tu rn ed  th e  t o r t  th eo ry  o f  p ic k e tin g  by s e t t in g  a s id e  an Alabana la v  
p ro h ib it in g  p u b lic a t io n  o f  a la b o r  d isp u te  a s  a d e n ia l  o f  f r e e  speech 
guaran teed  by th e  F i r s t  and F ou rteen th  Aaendnents to  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n . 
Although th e  T h o rn h ill  D octrine  has s in ce  f a l l e n  in to  decay* th e se  two 
p e rio d s  i n  th e  h is to r y  o f  th e  la v  o f  p ic k e tin g  have con tinued  to  {day an 
im p o rtan t r o le  i n  de te rm in ing  th e  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  under S ec tio n  8(b) 
(7) o f  th e  LMRDA. S ince  1959 th e  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  c o u r ts  have demon­
s t r a te d  a s tro n g  tendency to  reap p ly  th e  t o r t  th e o ry  o f  p io k e tin g  in  
la b o r  d is p u te s .  W hile re se rv in g  th e  f i n a l  d e c is io n  a s  to  what p ic k e t­
in g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  w i l l  be  perm itted* th e  Supreme Court has con tinued  to  
frame i t s  d e c is io n s  to  a llow  fe d e ra l  and s t a t e  Judges an e v e r- in c re a s in g  
a rea  o f  to le ra n c e  in  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  p r a c t ic a l  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  problem .
I n d u s t r i a l  p ro g re ss  in  th e  U nited S ta te s  ach ieved  a r e l a t i v e ly
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h igh  degree  o f  s p e d a l i i a t i o n  by th e  m iddle o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c en tu ry .
The ra p id  development o f  s p e c ia l i s a t io n  coupled w ith  th e  e ls e  and g eo . 
g ra p h ic a l d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  Market served  to  l i n i t  th e  o rg a n is a t io n  o f  
t ra d e  un ions to  th e  s k i l le d  t r a d e s .*  The u n io n is a tio n  o f  th e s e  t r a d e s  
to g e th e r  w ith  th e  b roadening  o f  th e  m arket c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  u t i l i s e -  
t io n  o f  th e  s t r i k e  and th e  b o y c o tt a s  ljq p o rtan t in s tru m e n ts  i n  prom oting 
th e  cause o f  labor*  In  t h i s  environm ent p io k e tin g  soon became an 
Im portan t means o f  expanding th e  a re a  o f  th e  work d ispu te*  E s ta b l i s h ,  
s e n t  o f  p ic k e t  l i n e s  d l  soon raged  th e  use  o f  s t r ik e b re a k e rs  by th e  
employer* and p ic k e tin g  served  a s  an  e f f e c t iv e  method o f  ex tend ing  th e  
boyoo tt to  th e  realm  o f  p u b lic  p r o te s t .
The f i r s t  known in s ta n c e  o f  p io k e tin g  in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
occu rred  i n  1827 i n  th e  case  o f  Comsonweelth v . Moore when a group o f  
journeymen t a i l o r s  p ro te s te d  th e  d isch arg e  o f  e ig h t  fe llo w  employees.
To e f f e c t  t h e i r  purposes th e  s t r i k e r s  assem bled d a i ly  n e a r  th e  s to re  o f  
th e  employer and m ain tained  a system o f esp ionage to  id e n t i f y  a l l  o f  
those  who passed  in to  and o u t o f  th e  e s tab lish m en t. "On one o ccasio n  a 
p a r ty  o f  them was observed i n  th e  r e a r  o f  a b u ild in g  re o o m o ite r ln g  th e  
workshops w ith  a te le sc o p e  * • . / f o r  th e  purpose o f  d e te ra d n in g j * • * 
who th e  new journeymen w ere*"2 Having th u s  i d e n t i f i e d  th e  new hands*
1There were a  number o f  a ttem p ts  to  o rg an ise  th e  se m isk ille d  and 
u n s k il le d  w orkers d a rin g  th e  n in e te e n th  century* b u t th e se  o rg a n is a tio n s  
were u n ab le  to  su rv iv e  th e  m isfo rtu n e  o f  eoonomic d e p re ss io n . The un ion  
movement* in  a p r a c t i c a l  sense* was th e re fo re  l im ite d  to  th e  s k i l le d  
t r a d e s ;  i . e .*  th e  oordw ainers. p r in te rs *  ta i lo r s *  and c ig a r  m akers.
2
John R. Commons and A ssociates*  £  Documentary H is to ry  o f  Ameri­
can I n d u s t r i a l  S o c ie ty  (d e v e la n d t  A rthu r H. C lark  Cosqpany), IV, 99* HO.
th ey  l a t e r  I n te rc e p te d  th e e  on t h e i r  way hone and i n  one in s ta n c e  
. l a i d  v io le n t  hands on t h e n ."3 I n  a d d it io n  to  p ic k e tin g  th e  
em ployer, th e  t a i l o r s  sought, and i n  some in s ta n c e s  s u c c e s s fu l ly  a p p lie d , 
i n d i r e c t  p re s su re  by fo rc in g  secondary  em ployers n o t to  a c c e p t work from  
th e  p r ln a ry  enployer* I n  two in s ta n c e s  th ey  p re v a i le d  upon th e  jo u rn ey ­
men o f  secondary  em ployers to  r e f r a i n  f ro n  working on goods o f  t h e i r  
employer* The journeym en s tru c k  a t  b o th  shops and one em ployer was 
fo rc e d  to  r e tu r n  th e  u n f in is h e d  goods and th e  o th e r  was com pelled to  
send th e  work e lsew here  to  be  com pleted. To a t h i r d  em ployer th e  
Journeymen s e n t  a l e t t e r  . . th re a te n in g  to  bu rn  h i s  house and d i s ­
pose o f  h i s  fam ily  u n le s s  he re tu rn e d  th e  u n f in is h e d  goods* I n  ap p ly ­
in g  th e  p re c e d e n ts  o f  oommon la v .  th e  C ourt found l i t t l e  sympathy w ith  
th e  p l ig h t  o f  th e  t a i l o r s  and h e ld  them g u i l ty  o f  o rg a n is in g  and p a r t i c i ­
p a tin g  i n  a  c r im in a l co n sp iracy  a g a in s t  th e  em ployer.
The employment o f  p ic k e tin g  in  t h i s  e a se , a s  in  o th e r  in s ta n c e s  
to  fo llo w , was reco g n ized  a s  a  p r a c t i c a l  method o f  ex ten d in g  th e  l a b o r  
d is p u te  in  pursuance o f  a  oommon o b je c t iv e :  th e  o b je c t iv e  o f  economic 
p re s s u re . P ic k e tin g , a s  i t  i s  known i n  th e  U nited  S ta te s ,  i s  o n ly  
m eaningful when i t  se rv e s  to  prom ote th e  a tta in m e n t o f  th e  p rim ary  
o b je c t iv e .  The l e g a l i t y  o f  p ic k e tin g , th e r e fo re ,  should  be determ ined  
by th e  r e l a t io n s h ip  o f  p io k e tin g  to  i t s  a s s o c ia te d  a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  th e  
o p p o s ite  case , th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  p io k e tin g  may be de te rm ined  by th e
^ Ib id . . p . 111.
**I b i d . ,  p . 112.
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oonduot o f  p ick etin g  a s a s p e c if ic  fu n ction  indapandant o f  tha s tr ik e  or
b o y c o tt. Tha l e g a l i t y  o f  th a  s e p a ra ta  fu n c tio n  th eo ry  o f  p i  o Ice t in g  i s
derived fro* th a  concept of tha "free Market" a s  developed by classical
eoonon!os• The characteristics o f  th e  f r e e  labor Market in c lu d e  t
. . . th e  r ig h t  to  work o r  n o t to  work, to  h i r e  o r  n o t to  h i r e ,  to  
produce o r  no t to  produoe. to  s e l l  o r  n o t to  s e l l ,  to  buy o r  n o t  to  
buy. . . . ^ fn  o th e r  w ordj7 . . .  i t  was an acoeptad  r u le  o f  th a  
gane th a t  an  em ployer oould h i r e  o r  re fu s e  to  h i r e  a p p lic a n ts  f o r  
employment la r g e ly  a s  ha wished* E qually  acoep tad  was th a  p ro p o s i­
t io n  th a t  w orkers oould app ly  o r  re fu s e  to  ap p ly  f o r  employment. 
ag a in  la r g e ly  a s  th ey  w ished. 5
Although th e  f r e e  m arket th eo ry  In c lu d e s  th e  r ig h t  to  s t r i k e , ^ 
th e  r i g h t  to  p ic k e t  i s  considered  to  be a  d i r e c t  ln te r f e re n o e  w ith  th e  
guaran ty  o f  due p ro cess  under th e  C o n s ti tu tio n , f o r  pu rposes o f  i l l u ­
s t r a t i o n  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  p ic k e tin g  under th e  f r e e  m arket th e o ry  may be 
se p a ra te d  in to  th r e e  d i f f e r e n t  c a te g o r ie s . In  th e  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  i t  i s  
conce ivab le  to  adop t th e  concept o f  th e  f r e e  m arket a s  a fundam ental 
requ irem ent and to  a ttem p t to  implement th e  p r in c ip le  a s  a gu ide  b o th  
in  th eo ry  and p r a c t ic e .  Second, th e  f r e e  m arket th e o ry  nay be  fo llow ed 
in  p r in c ip le  b u t supplem ented in  f a c t .  I n  t h i s  type o f  economic system 
i t  i s  an accep ted  maxim th a t  r e a l  problem s may re q u ire  s p e c ia l  con­
s id e r a t io n  and in d iv id u a l  ad justm en t w ith in  th e  system  a s  a  whole.
T h ird , th e  f r e e  M arket th e o ry  may be r e je c te d  and th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e  
s t a t e  s u b s t i tu te d  a s  an agency o f  c e n tr a l  d i r e c t io n  and c o n tro l .
-’Sy Iv e s  t o r  P e tro . "P ic k e tin g  and th e  F ree Market— Vegelahn 
R e-exam ined." Labor Law Jo u rn a l . I I*  No. 6 ( June. 1951). h03-40h.
^Except a s  re g u la te d  by th e  UfRA.
I n  th e  above i l l u s t r a t i o n  th e  o h a r a e te r ls t io a  o f  p io k e tin g  a s  a  
o o ro l la ry  to  th e  f r e e  m arket p r in c ip le  n e c e s s a r i ly  e lim in a te s  c o n s id e r­
a t io n  o f  th e  t h i r d  o ase . I n  th e  rem aining two oases th e  q u e s tio n  o f  
w hether p io k e tin g  should  o r  should  n o t be p e rm itte d  depends n o t o n ly  on 
th e  oase to  which i t  i s  applied* b u t w hether i t  i s  aooepted  a s  an 
i n te g r a l  p a r t  o f  th e  common o b je c tiv e  o r  a s  a se p a ra te  fu n c tio n  r e q u ir ­
ing  s p e c ia l  c o n s id e ra tio n . H is to r ic a l ly  th e  oourts* w h ile  g e n e ra lly  
a o cep t in g  th e  f r e e  m arket p r in c ip le  a s  d e fin ed  under oase two* have s e t  
p io k e tin g  a s id e  a s  a s p e c ia l  ca teg o ry  under oase one* I n  essence  th e  
courts*  w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f  a b r i e f  p e rio d , have a p p lie d  th e  th eo ry  
th a t  w orkers who v o lu n ta r i ly  choose to  lea v e  t h e i r  jo b s In  c o n c e rt, w ith  
th e  ex cep tio n s  a s  d e fin ed  under S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )*  do no t have th e  r i g h t  
to  in f lu e n c e  s tr ik e b re a k e rs  and th e  p u b lic  through p ic k e tin g .
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  which r e s u l t  from t h i s  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  have 
im p o rtan t economic and l e g a l i s t i c  r a m if ic a t io n s .  Econom ically th e  un ion  
i s  den ied  th e  use  o f  one o f  i t s  prim ary  weapons f o r  g e n e ra tin g  eoonomio 
p re s s u re . JLs a r e s u l t  th e  union  i s  fo rc e d  to  r e ly  on supplem entary 
means o f  secondary p re s su re  to  a s su re  th e  achievem ent o f  i t s  common 
o b je c t iv e .  I f  un ions a re  p ro h ib ite d  by law from engaging i n  p ic k e tin g , 
an u n fo r tu n a te  e f f e c t  o f  th e  law may be to  fo rc e  un ions to  app ly  second- 
a ry  p re s su re  which i s  u n d e s ira b le  i n  bo th  form and r e s u l t . r Thus by 
le g a l  n ecess ity *  un ions a r e  com pelled to  engage i n  a c t i v i t i e s  which
7For example* see th e  C ongressional Record o f  th e  M cClellan 
Committee h e a r in g s .
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f u r th e r  th e  development o f  b u reaucracy  end c o n tro l  by u n d e s ira b le  e le ­
ments o u ts id e  th e  le g i t im a te  un ion  movement. Fron a le g a l  v iew poin t th e  
se p a ra te  fu n c tio n  th eo ry  o re a te s  s e r io u s  d e f in i t io n a l  problems* The 
o o u rts  a re  p laced  in  th e  d i f f i c u l t  p o s i t io n  o f  t ry in g  to  determ ine 
w hether th e  a c t i v i t y  in  q u e s tio n  i s  p ro te c te d  under th e  banner o f  peace­
f u l  p ic k e tin g  o r  w hether th e  a c t i v i t y  i n  q u e s tio n  i s  beyond th e  soope o f  
n o n v io le n t a c t io n .  A review  o f  th e  p a t te r n  o f  th e  d e c is io n s  i n  p io k e t­
in g  o ases  in d ic a te s  t h a t  in  most case s  th e  c o u rts  have assumed th e  
p o s i t io n  o f  q u a s i - le g is la t iv e  b o d ie s  i n  d e fin in g  th e  l im i t s  o f  p e a c e fu l 
p ic k e tin g .
PICKETING AS A TORT
The s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  betw een 1827 and 1880 was in terw oven 
w ith  th e  problem s o f  prim ary and secondary p ressu re*  P io k e tin g  o ccu rred  
in  a  number o f  in s ta n c e s  in  oonJunction  w ith  th e  oonduct o f  s t r i k e s  • and 
se v e ra l s t a t e s  passed  a n t ip ic k e t in g  l e g i s l a t i o n .  The f i r s t  case  in  
which p ic k e tin g  was a c e n t r a l  elem ent took p la c e  In  New York in  1880.
Q
I n  Johnston  H arv es to r Company v . M einhardt. a  group o f  i ro n  m oulders 
conducted a s t r i k e  f o r  h ig h e r  wages a g a in s t  th e  Johnston  H arv es to r Com­
pany. I n  th e  p ro c e ss  o f  th e  s tr ik e *  th e  workman* on s e v e ra l occasions* 
had massed abou t th e  p la n t  i n  such a  fa sh io n  a s  to  d issu ad e  th e  non­
s t r ik in g  workmen fro n  e n te r in g  th e  p la n t  and p rev en tin g  o th e r  employees 
from a cc ep tin g  jo b s . The s t r ik in g  employees were a c tin g  under a New
®60 How. P r. 168 (N.Y. Supreme Court* 1880).
York law  which p ro te c te d  th e  r ig h t  o f  p e ac e fu l assem bly f o r  a  law fu l 
purpose; i . e . *  a s t r i k e  fo r  h ig h e r  wages. For th e  employer to  o b ta in  
re d re s s  under th e  law  i t  would have been n e ce ssa ry  to  show (1 ) t h a t  th e  
s t r i k e  was n o t f o r  th e  purpose o f  im proving wages, o r  (2) t h a t  th e  
a c t io n s  o f  th e  s t r i k e r s  were i n  some way beyond th e  realm  o f  p e a c e fu l 
a c t i v i t y .  I n  an e f f o r t  to  avoid  th e  le g a l  im p lic a tio n s  n e c e s s i ta te d  by 
p ro se c u tio n  under th e  s t a tu t e ,  th e  em ployer a p p lie d  f o r  an  in ju n c t io n  
a g a in s t  th e  s t r i k e r s .  I n  review ing th e  p la in t i f f *  s p le a  f o r  an in ju n c ­
t io n ,  Judge Kacomber s ta te d  t h a t  th e  conduct o f  th e  p ick e ts*  i f  n o t 
p r iv i le g e d  by th e  a c t  o f  1870, was to r t io u s  in  n a tu re ; t h a t  p ic k e tin g  
when accompanied by s u f f i c i e n t  ev idence o f  in t im id a t io n  ". • . i s  h a rd ly  
d is t in g u is h a b le  from an a c t  which should  I t s e l f  in ju r e  o r  d e s tro y  th e  
p ro d u c t . . . Jot laboj*/ • - . I t  i s  a  d i r e c t  in ju ry  to  p ro p e rty  r ig h ts ."9
The Court was unab le  to  f in d  s u f f i c i e n t  ev idence o f  in t im id a t io n  
on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  i ro n  m oulders and den ied  th e  motion f o r  an in ju n c ­
tion*  I n  th e  d ic ta  o f  th e  oase Judge >Sa comber review ed th e  du ty  o f  th e  
c o u rts  i n  re s p e c t  to  th e  problem  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  by reoogn lz ing  
th a t  th e  accum ulations o f  c a p ita l*  when ” . . .  d i r e c te d  tow ards th e  
developm ent o f  th e  re so u rce s  o f  n a tu re  . . . having a l l  th e  advantages 
o f  agg regated  wealth* would probably* i f  n o t c e r ta in ly ,  have a tendency 
to  induce  la b o re r s  to  combine f o r  t h e i r  own p ro te c tio n . Accum ulation
^ P e tro , "P ick e tin g  and th e  F ree  M arket—Yegelahn Re-exam ined,”
p . 172.
1QI b ld . * p . 176.
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o f  c a p i t a l  th e r e fo re  la a d s  to  th a  c ra a t io n  and developm ent o f  t r a d a  
un io n s. "The com bination o f  workingmen undoubtedly  p e rm its  th a  d ev e lo p - 
■ an t o f  more p ro longad  c o n ta c ts  w ith  c a p i ta l  th an  fo rm erly : b u t c a p i t a l ,  
by com bination  a ls o ,  th r e a te n s  to  ba s tro n g e r  th an  b e fo re . I n  t h i s  
complex and d iv e rg e n t o p p o s itio n  o f  i n t e r e s t s ,  i t  i s  th e  d u ty  o f  th e  
c o u r ts  to  sea  t h a t  th e  c o n tro v e rsy  betw een th e  p a r t i e s  does n o t r e s u l t  
i n  b reach es  o f  th e  peace o r  v io la t io n  o f  c o n tra c tu a l  o b l ig a t io n s .  Beyond 
t h i s ,  th e  o o u r ts  must be c o n te n t to  ". . . l e t  th e  law o f  supp ly  and 
demand govern th e  p a r t i e s . 1,12
The d e c is io n  in  th e  M ainhardt c a se  e s ta b l is h e d  th e  r u le  th a t  
p ic k e tin g  by a c o n fe d e ra tio n  o f p e rso n s i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  t o r t i o u s  and 
may be p ro te c te d  u n le s s  ev idence o f  in t im id a t io n  i s  p re s e n t .  The ques­
t io n  o f  d e te rm in in g  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  in t im id a t io n , however, i s  n o t 
e a s i ly  re so lv e d . I n  some c a se s  even p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  has been con­
s tru e d  to  c a r ry  an im p lied  t h r e a t  o f  in t im id a t io n . In  o th e r  c a se s  p ic k ­
e tin g  h as been h e ld  to  be un law fu l u n le s s  th e  p a t r o l  i s  accompanied by 
an o v e r t  a c t  o r l ib e lo u s  s ta te m e n t. The q u e s tio n  o f  w hether p io k e tin g  
i s  in t im id a to ry  p e r  se was f i r s t  co n sid ered  in  th e  case  o f  S herry  v.
P e rk in s , ^  and th e  i s s u e  o f in tim id a t io n  was th e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e  in
lhVegelahn v. S u n te r .
In  S herry  v. P e rk in s  an a s s o c ia t io n  o f  shoe l a s t e r s  employed by
11I b i d . . p. 177.
1 2I b i d . ,  p . 178.
13147 Mass. 212 (1888).
1416? Mass. 92 (1896).
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th e  p l a i n t i f f  (P . P . S herry ) s tru c k  f o r  h ig h e r  wages. On two d i f f e r e n t  
oooaalons th e  l a s t e r s  engaged a  boy to  p ic k e t  th e  p rem ises  o f  th e  
p l a i n t i f f .  On th e  f i r s t  o ccasio n  th e  banner c a r r i e d  " . . .  th e  fo l lo w , 
ln g  I n s c r ip t io n i  'L a s ta r s  a re  re q u e s te d  to  keep away from P. P- S h e rry 's*  
P e r o rd e r  L .P .U . '" 15
A f te r  th e  c e s s a t io n  o f  th e  o r ig in a l  d is p u te ,  th e  l a s t e r s 1 u n io n  
" . . . caused  a n o th e r  ban n er to  be  c a r r ie d  b e fo re  th e  f a c to ry  w ith  th e  
fo llo w in g  in s c r ip t io n :  'L a s te r s  on s t r i k e  and l a s t e r s  a re  re q u e s te d  to  
keep away from P. P . S h e r ry 's  u n t i l  th e  p re s e n t  t r o u b le  I s  s e t t l e d .  P e r 
o rd e r  L .p .U . ' At th e  tim e o f  th e s e  o c cu rren c es  th e  d is p la y  o f  
b an n ers  caused crowds o f  p eo p le  to  g a th e r  a t  th e  f a c to r y ,  and th e  
l a s t e r s  who c o n tin u ed  to  c ro s s  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e s  were c o n tin u a l ly  
h a ra sse d  and in tim id a te d  by th e  p ic k e ts .
Speaking f o r  th e  C ourt. J u s t i c e  A llen  h e ld  t h a t  th e  a c t io n s  o f  
th e  l a s t e r s '  un ion  in  d isp la y in g  ban n ers  accompanied by t h r e a t s  and a c t s  
o f  in t im id a t io n  r e s u l te d  in  d i r e c t  in ju r y  to  th e  p l a i n t i f f  and was 
i l l e g a l  a t  common law . I n  r e s p e c t  to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  i n te n t ,  th e  C ourt 
ru le d  t h a t  " . . .  th e  banner was a  s tan d in g  menace to  a l l  who were o r  
w ished to  be in  th e  employment o f  th e  p l a i n t i f f  . • . m ain ta in in g  i t  was 
a co n tin u o u s un law fu l a c t .  i n ju r io u s  to  th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  b u s in e s s  and 
p ro p e r ty . A lthough i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  re g a rd  th e  d e c is io n  i n  S herry  
v . P e rk in s  a s  th e  f i r s t  d e c la ra t io n  th a t  p ic k e tin g  i s  in t im id a to ry  p e r
Mass. 212. 
l 6I b l d . , p . 213-
1? I b ld .
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se , th e  d e c is io n  n s  an im p o rtan t p re lu d e  to  th e  landm ark case  o f  
Vegelahn ▼. Q nntor.
Vayelehw t . Q unter was f i r s t  co n sid ered  by J o s t l e s  Holmes o f  th e  
M assachuse tts Supreme C ourt. The low er c o u r t  had is s u e d  a  p re lim in a ry  
in ju n c t io n  o rd e rin g  th e  d e fen d an ts  to  cease  and d e s i s t  from p ic k e tin g  
th e  p rem ises o f  th e  em ployer. According to  th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  c a se  p re ­
sen ted  a t  th e  p re lim in a ry  h e a rin g . J u s t i c e  Holmes found th a t  th e
d e fen d an t (G unter and o th e r s )  had ". . . e s ta b l is h e d  a p a t r o l  o f  two men
18
i n  f r o n t  o f  th e  p l a i n t i f f ' 3 f a c to ry  . . ."  f o r  th e  purpose o f  fo rc in g  
th e  p l a i n t i f f  (Vegelahn) to  a cc ep t a  l i s t  o f  p r ic e s  subm itted  by th e  
un ion . I t  appeared  from th e  ev idence t h a t  th e  number o f  p ic k e ts  v a r ie d  
from tim e to  tim e and th a t  th e  p a t r o l  a t  tim es showed some " . . .  
i n c l in a t io n  to  stop  a t  th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  d o o r . A f t e r  co n s id e rin g  th e  
ev idence. Holmes m odified  th e  o r ig in a l  in ju n c t io n  ho ld in g  " . . .  th a t  
th e  employment o f  th e se  means f o r  th e  s a id  purpose was la w fu l . . . 
/e x c e p t  w herein  th©7 • • • means f o r  accom plish ing  th e  d e s ire d  ends 
. . . /Lncludejl.7 • * • th r e a ts  o f  p e rso n a l in ju r y  o r  un law fu l harm . . . 
conduct o f  t h i s  k ind  d io u ld  be e n jo in e d ." 20
Holmes' o rd e r  was t h e r e a f t e r  re p o r te d  f o r  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  
f u l l  c o u rt , and th e  m a jo r ity  o f  th e  c o u r t  w ith  J u s t ic e  A llen  w rit in g  th e  
o p in io n  e lim in a te d  Holmes' m o d if ic a tio n s  and re s to re d  th e  f u l l
18l6 ?  Mass. 96.
1 9 m & -
20I b ld . . pp. 95-96.
21
In ju n c t io n . Judge A llan  was p r in c ip a l ly  concerned w ith  th e  q u e s tio n  o f
. . w hether th e  d e fen d an ts  should  be  en jo in ed  a g a in s t  m a in ta in in g  th e
p a t r o l .  The r i g h t  o f  th e  union  to  engage i n  p icke ting*  A llen  argued*
depends upon th e  deg ree  o f  in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  th e  r i g h t  o f  th e  em ployer
and th e  r ig h t s  o f  h i s  employees.
An em ployer h as a r i g h t  t o  engage a l l  p e rso n s who a re  w il l in g  to  
work f o r  b in  a t  such p r ic e s  a s  nay be M utually agreed  upon; and 
pe rso n s employed o r  seek ing  employment have a corresponding  r i g h t  
to  e n te r  in to  o r  rem ain i n  th e  employment o f  any person  o r  co rp o ra ­
t io n  w i l l in g  to  employ them. These r ig h ts  a re  secured  by th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n .22
The e s s e n t ia l  i s s u e  i n  de term in ing  th e  p e rm iss ib le  degree  o f  i n t e r f e r ­
ence w ith  th e se  l i g h t s  depends upon th e  elem ent o f  in t im id a t io n  o r  fo rc e  
which i s  in v o lv ed . The p re s c r ib e d  form o f 11. . . in t im id a t io n  i s  n o t 
l im ite d  to  t h r e a t s  o f  v io le n c e  o r  o f  p h y s ic a l in ju r y  to  person  o r 
p ro p e r ty ." 23 The m aintenance o f a p a t r o l  c o n ta in s  elem ents o f  in tim id a ­
t io n  which c o n s t i tu te  an un law fu l in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  th e  r ig h ts  o f  th e  
em ployer and whioh c o n s t i tu te  a p r iv a te  n u isance . The c o n te n tio n  o f  th e  
defendan t union t h a t  th e  p a t r o l  was J u s t i f i a b l e  f o r  th e  reason  o f  
o b ta in in g  an improved wage schedule  d id  n o t. i n  th e  o p in io n  o f  Judge 
A llen , p rov ide  a s u f f i c i e n t  m otive to  p e rm it th e  de fendan ts to  commit 
in ju r io u s  a c t s  a g a in s t  th e  p l a i n t i f f ;  n o r was th e  a re a  o f p e rm iss ib le  
oonduot l im ite d  to  th o se  who were under same c o n tra c tu a l  o b l ig a t io n  to
a X b id ., p . 97-
22J b id .
23IW Id . ,  p. 98.
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th e  p l a i n t i f f .
A co n sp iracy  to  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  th a  p l a i n t i f f ' s  b u s in e ss  . . .  by 
m ain ta in in g  a  p a t r o l  in  f ro n t  o f  h i s  p ro v iso s  i n  o rd e r  to  p rev e n t 
p a rso n s f ro n  e n te r in g  h i s  snp loynan t, o r  i n  o rd a r  to  p ro ro n t parsons 
who a ra  in  h i s  snp loynant f ro n  co n tin u in g  th e re in ,  i s  un law ful even 
though such parsons a ra  n o t bound by c o n tra c t  to  e n ta r  in to  o r  to  
oontinuo  In  h is  snp loynan t.
According to  Judga A l la n 's  in to rp ro ta t io n ,  th a  na in tananca  o f  a 
p a t r o l  was n o t a c o ro l la ry  to  th a  r ig h t  to  buy* th a  l i g h t  to  s e l l ,  and 
th a  r i g h t  to  s tr ik a *  b u t was a fo m  o f  in tim id a t io n  which served  to  
n u l l i f y  th a  r ig h ts  o f  th a  f r s o  m arkat d o c tr in s .  By i t s  vary  n a tu re  
p ic k e tin g  must ba t r e a te d  in  a ca teg o ry  se p a ra te  fro n  o th e r  ty p es  o f 
economic co e rc io n . Tha id ea  th a t  p ic k e tin g  m ight be p r iv ile g e d  under 
s p e c i f ic  c o n d itio n s  was in o o n p a tib ia  w ith  Judga A l la n 's  view o f  th a  
connon law . P ic k e tin g  was no th ing  more o r  no th ing  l a s s  than  an a ttem p t 
to  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  a  body o f p r iv ile g e d  r ig h ts  and was th e re fo re  in h e r ­
e n tly  in tim id a to ry .
There ware two d is s e n ts  w r i t te n  by C hief J u s t ic e  F ie ld  and 
J u s t ic e  Holmes to  th e  m a jo rity  op in ion . Both F ie ld  and Holmes d isa g ree d  
w ith  th e  m a jo r i ty 's  p o s i t io n  th a t  p ic k e tin g  was in tim id a to ry  p a r  se . 
J u s t ic e  F ie ld  o b je c te d  to  th e  im p l ic i t  assum ption th a t  th e  a c t s  o f  p ick ­
e tin g  n e c e s s a r i ly  amounted to  in tim id a t io n . The ru le  o f  th a  m a jo r ity  
op in ion  would seem to  convey th a t  th e  m aintenance o f  a  p a tro l  i s  a c t io n ­
a b le  w hether o r  n o t such a c tio n  i s  accompanied by m alice  on th e  p a r t  o f 
th a  p ic k e ts .  The le g a l  d i f f i c u l t y  in  p ic k e tin g  cases  depends on th e
24I b id . , pp. 99-100.
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d e te rm in a tio n  o f  ■ • what c o n s t i t u t e s  J u s t i f i a b l e  cau se?"2^
J u s t i c e  F ie ld  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  ooncerned w ith  th e  th e o ry  th a t  
th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  p io k e tin g  was dependent on th e  q u e s tio n  o f  n a l io e .  I t  
seems e v id e n t t h a t  when p e rsu a s io n  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h r e a t s  and l ib e lo u s  
s ta te m e n ts , th e  a c t i v i t y  may be p ro sc r ib e d  u n le s s  somehow p r iv i le g e d ;  
b u t  when p e rsu a s io n  c o n s is ts  o f  an a tte m p t to  d issu a d e  an  employee from  
e n te r in g  th e  p la c e  o f  employment by a d is p la y  o f  b an n ers  su p p o rted  by 
t r u th f u l  s ta te m e n ts  concern ing  th e  em ployer o r  h i s  b u s in e ss , th e  ques­
t io n  o f  im p lied  in t im id a t io n  seems i r r e l e v a n t .
In  th e  p re s e n t  ca se , i f  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  a p a t r o l  i s  u s in g  
in t im id a t io n  o r  fo rc e , o r  fo rc e  w ith in  th e  meaning o f  o u r s t a tu t e s ,  
i t  i s  i l l e g a l  and c r im in a l;  i f  i t  doee n o t  amount to  in t im id a t io n  o r  
fo rc e , b u t  i s  c a r r ie d  to  such a  deg ree  a s  to  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  th e  u se  
by th e  p l a i n t i f f  o f  h i s  p ro p e r ty , i t  may be i l l e g a l  and a c t io n a b le ,  
b u t  som ething more i s  n e c e ssa ry  to  J u s t i f y  i s s u in g  an In ju n c t io n  
. . . i f  i t  i s  m ere ly  a p e a c e fu l node o f  f in d in g  o u t  th e  p e rso n s who 
in te n d  to  go to  th e  p l a i n t i f f 1 s  p rem ises to  app ly  f o r  work, and o f  
in fo rm ing  them o f  th e  a c tu a l  f a c t s  o f  th e  oase  In  o rd e r  to  induce  
them n o t to  e n te r  in to  th e  p l a i n t i f f  s  employment. I n  th e  absence  
o f  any s t a tu t e  r e l a t i n g  to  th e  s u b je c t  I  doubt i f  i t  i s  i l l e g a l .
Holmes ag reed  w ith  F i e l d 's  d i s s e n t  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  was no t
in h e r e n t ly  in tim id a to ry , b u t th e  th eo ry  behind  Holmes' reaso n in g  was
q u i te  a p a r t  from t h a t  o f  C h ief J u s t i c e  F ie ld .  Holmes' g e n e ra l th eo ry  o f
t o r t s  a s  sp e lle d  o u t in  a t r e a t i s e  p r i o r  to  th e  Vegelahn case  h e ld :
. . . t h a t  th e  in te n t io n a l  i n f l i c t i o n  o f  to n p o ra l damage, o r  th e  
do ing  o f  an  a o t  m a n ife s tly  l i k e l y  to  i n f l i c t  such damage and 
i n f l i c t i n g  i t ,  i s  a c t io n a b le  i f  don# w ith o u t J u s t  cause . . . • / i f  
th e  conduct i s  p e rm itte d , th e  o o u rt must f in d  J u s t  c a u s e d  • • •
25I b l d . .  p . 102. 
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There a ra  v a r io u s  J u s t i f i c a t i o n s  • • .
But w hether, and how f a r ,  a  p r iv i l e g e  s h a l l  be  a llow ed  I s  a  
q u e s tio n  o f  p o l l  ay . Q uestions o f  p o l ic y  a re  l e g i s l a t i v e  q u e s tio n s  
and Judges a r e  shy o f  rea so n in g  on such grounds, , • .
When th e  q u e s tio n  o f  p o l ic y  i s  fac ed  i t  w i l l  be  seen  to  be  one 
which canno t be  answ ered by  g e n e r a l i t i e s ,  b u t  Must be  dete rm ined  by 
th e  p a r t i c u l a r  o h a ra c te r  o f  th e  o ase , even i f  everybody a g re e s  what 
th e  answ er should b e , • , • T h ere fo re  th e  c o n c lu s io n  w i l l  v a ry  and 
w i l l  depend on d i f f e r e n t  rea so n s  aooord lng  to  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e
a f f a i r . *7
The th e o ry  o f  t o r t s  a s  d e fin e d  by Holmes would p r o h ib i t  th e  i n te n t io n a l  
I n f l i c t i o n  o f  tem poral damage ex cep t i n  th o se  c a s e s  where th e  a c t io n  may 
be J u s t i f i a b l e .  The d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  grounds f o r  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  a 
l e g i s l a t i v e  fu n c t io n ;  i f  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch does not p ro v id e  a 
remedy, th e  c o u r ts  a re  re q u ire d  to  de te rm ine  th e  b a s is  o f m easurea»nt.
I n  th e  Vegelahn case  Holmes o b je c te d  to  th e  m a jo r i ty 's  c o n s t iu c -  
t io n  a s  a p p lie d  to  th e  t h r e a t s  which accom panied th e  conduct o f  th e  
p a t r o l .
. . . The words and " th re a ts "  i s  o f te n  used  a s  i f ,  when i t  appeared  
t h a t  t h r e a t s  bad been made, i t  appeared  t h a t  u n law fu l conduct had 
begun. But i t  depends on what you th re a te n .  As a  g e n e ra l r u le ,  
even i f  s u b je c t  to  some e x c e p tio n s , what you nay do in  a c e r t a in  
e v e n t you nay  th r e a te n  to  do, t h a t  i s  g iv e  w arning to  y o u r in te n t io n  
to  do i n  t h a t  e v en t, and th u s  a llo w  th e  o th e r  p e rso n  th e  chance o f  
avo id ing  th e  consequences. So a s  to  "com pu lsion ," i t  depends on how 
you "com pel." . . . So a s  to  "annoyance" o r  " in t im id a t io n ." 28
W hile J u s t ic e  Holmes' rea so n in g  on th e  q u e s tio n  o f  in t im id a t io n  
was s im i la r  to  t h a t  o f  J u s t i c e  F ie ld ,  Holmes' p r in c ip a l  o b je c tio n  was to  
th e  oonsequenoes o f  th e  m a jo r ity  d e c is io n . J u s t i c e  A l le n 's
2^ 0 1 iv e r  W endell Holmes, J r . , "P r iv ile g e , M alice and I n te n t ,  " 
H arvard Law Review. V III  (1894-1895). 3-
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  i e  in tim id a to ry  l e f t  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t
in d iv id u a ls  who engaged in  a  form o f  group p r o te s t  a g a in s t  u n fav o rab le
p o l ic i e s  were n e c e s s a r i ly  un law fu l com binations i f  they  took p a r t  i n  any
form o f  a c t i v i t y  o th e r  th an  a r e f u s a l  to  work. Holmes concluded t h a t  a s
a m a tte r  o f  p u b lic  p o l ic y  and a s  a b a s is  o f  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  th a t !
. . .  i t  i s  p la in  from th e  s l i g h t e s t  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  p r a c t ic a l  
a f f a i r s ,  o r  th e  most s u p e r f ic ia l  read ing  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  h is to ry ,  t h a t  
f r e e  co m p e titio n  means com bination, and t h a t  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  th e  
w orld  now going on so f a s t ,  means an e v e r in c re a s in g  m ight and soope 
o f  com bination . I t  seems to  me f u t i l e  to  s e t  o u r fa c e s  a g a in s t  t h i s  
tendency . W hether b e n e f ic ia l  on th e  whole, a s  I  th in k  i t .  o r  d e t r i ­
m ental. i t  i s  in e v i ta b le ,  u n le s s  th e  fundam ental axioms o f  s o c ie ty , 
and even th e  fundam ental c o n d itio n s  o f  l i f e ,  a re  to  be  changed.
One o f  th e  e te r n a l  c o n f l i c t s  o u t o f  w h ic h  l i f e  i s  made up i s  
t h a t  between th e  e f f o r t  o f  every  man to  g e t  th e  most he can f o r  h i s
s e rv ic e s  . . . Combination on th e  one s id e  i s  p o te n t  and pow erfu l,
com bination on th e  o th e r  i s  th e  n ecessa ry  and d e s ir a b le  c o u n te rp a r t , 
i f  th e  b a t t l e  i s  to  be c a r r ie d  on i n  a f a i r  and eq u al way. . . .
I f  i t  be t r u e  t h a t  workingmen may combine w ith  a  view, among 
o th e r  th in g s , to  g e t t in g  a s  much a s  they  can f o r  t h e i r  la b o r , J u s t  
a s  c a p i ta l  may combine w ith  a view to  g e t t in g  th e  g r e a te s t  p o s s ib le  
r e tu rn ,  i t  must be t r u e  t h a t  when combined th ey  have th e  same 
l i b e r t y  t h a t  combined c a p i ta l  has to  su p p o rt t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  by 
argum ent, p e rsu as io n  and th e  bestow al o r  r e fu s a l  o f  th o se  advan tages 
which th ey  o th erw ise  la w fu lly  c o n tro l .  . . . The f a c t ,  t h a t  th e  
im m ediate o b je c t  o f  th e  a c t  by ifcich  th e  b e n e f i t  to  them selves i s  to  
be ga ined  i s  to  in ju r e  th e  a n ta g o n is t ,  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  make i t
u n la w fu l. . . . °
The words o f  Holmes, w r i t te n  a t  th e  c lo s e  o f  th e  n in e te e n th  cen­
tu ry . may i n  r e s t ro s p e c t  seem p ro p h e tic  to  th e  p re s e n t s t a t e  o f  develop­
ment o f  com binations on bo th  s id e s  o f  th e  m arket. Holmes' d is s e n t  se rved  
a s  a tim e ly  warning to  th e  v e s te d  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry  t h a t  
t r a d i t i o n ,  custom, and p reced en t a re  weak su p p o rts  a g a in s t  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f
2? r b id . ,  pp. 108-109.
la b o r  which has an  equal r i g h t  to  p a r t i c ip a te  i n  th e  d iv is io n  o f  eco­
nomic w ea lth . Holmes foresaw  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  p ro v id in g  a framework f o r  
in s u r in g  th e  su c c e ss fu l m aintenance o f  f r e e  co m p e titio n  c o n tin u a lly  
th re a te n e d  by c o n f l ic t in g  i n t e r e s t s .  Holmes was concerned w ith  e s ta b ­
l i s h in g  a means o f  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  which would p e rm it th e  opposing 
i n t e r e s t s  to  re so lv e  t h e i r  d i f f e re n c e s  w ith o u t r e s o r t in g  to  v io le n c e .
Holmes' d i s s e n t  i n  th e  Vegelahn case  t h a t  p e ac e fu l p ic k e tin g  i s  
a p e rm iss ib le  in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  p ro p e rty  r ig h t s  has been c r i t i c i z e d  on 
th e  grounds t h a t  i t  i s  in c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  n a tu re  o f  p ic k e tin g . I t  
h as been argued th a t  i t  would have been more lo g ic a l  f o r  Holmes to  m ain­
t a i n  t h a t  p ic k e tin g , a lth o u g h  in tim id a to ry , i s  a  J u s t i f i a b l e  in ju r y  a t  
common law . T h is c r i t ic i s m  evo lves from th e  le g a l  s ta tu s  o f  p io k e tin g  
a f t e r  th e  Vegelahn case  which adopted  th e  th eo ry  th a t  p e ac e fu l p ic k e t­
in g  i s  a le g a l  f i c t i o n .  By i t s  c h a ra c te r  p ic k e tin g  i s  co n sid ered  to  be 
an in tim id a to ry  a c t .  Any a ttem p t, th e re fo re , to  se p a ra te  p e ac e fu l 
p ic k e tin g ;  i . e . ,  in fo rm a tio n a l, p eace fu l p e rsu as io n , o r  consumer p io k e t­
in g  from v io le n t  p ic k e tin g ;  I . e . ,  o v e r t  a c t s  o f  a s s a u l t ,  in t im id a tio n , 
o r  l ib e lo u s  s ta tem en ts , would seem to  be lo g ic a l ly  in c o n s is te n t .
A lthough i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  defend Holmes' d i s s e n t  a g a in s t  th e  c r i t i ­
cism  o f  im p lied  in c o n s is te n c y , a c a re fu l  read ing  o f  Holmes' op in io n  
in d ic a te s  t h a t  he was in te r e s te d  i n  e s ta b l is h in g  a s a t i s f a c to r y  method 
o f  re s o lv in g  c o n f l ic t in g  economic p re s su re  and no t w ith  q u e s tio n s  o f
■^°Petro, "P ick e tin g  and th e  Free M arket—Vegelahn Re-exam ined," 
pp. i*08, h72, and
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d e f in i t i o n .
The d e c is io n  o f  th e  M assachuse tts  Supreme Oourt i n  Vegelahn ▼. 
P u n te r c o d if ie d  th e  l e g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p io k e tin g  a t  common la v .  A f te r  th e  
V egelahn oase* d e c is io n s  o f  s t a t e  and f e d e r a l  o o u r ts  e i t h e r  d e c la re d  
p io k e tin g  to  be i l l e g a l  o r  h e ld  t h a t  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  p ic k e tin g  was 
dependent upon th e  conduct o f  th e  p ic k e ts .  Under th e  l a t t e r  theory* 
"p eace fu l p ic k e tin g "  was u s u a l ly  p e rm itte d ; b u t  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  
what c o n s t i tu te d  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  was an ex trem ely  d e l io a te  ta s k . 
W hile th e  m a jo r ity  o f  th e  c o u r ts  r e je c te d  th e  concep t t h a t  p ic k e tin g  
was in h e r e n t ly  in tim id a to ry *  th e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  was to  e f f e c t iv e ly  l im i t  
th e  employment o f  p ic k e tin g  to  t h a t  o f  a  nom inal v a r ie ty .  I n  d a r a a e  v. 
L u o h rln g e r. 31 a M ichigan case  v h e re  th e  em p lo y er 's  p la n t  had been 
p ic k e te d  w ith o u t t h r e a t s  o r  a c t s  o f  in tim id a t io n , th e  o o u rt h e ld  t h a t  
". . . i t  i s  th e  d u re s s  and no t th e  p e rsu a s io n  t h a t  should  be p ro ­
h ib i t e d  . . • and i f  ev idence  o f  d u re ss  e x i s t s  th e  a c t i v i t y  i s
proscribed.33
A New fo rk  o o u r t i n  Wood Mowing and R ep airin g  Oompanv v.
Toohey, 3^ n o tin g  th e  problem  o f  d e f in in g  th e  word p e rsu a s io n , s a id i
If*  th en , i t  i s  th e  law  i n  t h i s  s t a t e  t h a t  s t r i k e r s  on p ic k e t  d u ty  
may u se  "p e rsu a s io n * " what i s  persuasionT  What language i s  p e r­
m itted ?  What i s  p ro h ib ite d ?  The nom enclature  o f  th e  s t r i k e  i s  n o t  
th e  language  o f  th e  p a r lo r .  Men become e a rn e s t  and e x c i te d  and
31168 N.W. 440 (1918).
3 2I b l d .
^C om pare th e  r e s u l t  i n  Lyons and H ealv v . P iano W orkers Union.
12h M.S. Uh3 (1919).
34186 N.T. Supp. 95 (1921).
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v ig o ro u s a t  suoh t i n e s .  A v i t a l  p r in c ip le  I s  a t  s ta k e . I t  i s  n o t  
w ith in  th e  U n i t s  o f  hunan n a tu re  to  r e n a ln  e a ln  and g e n tle  u n d er 
suoh c ircu m stan ces . The f u r o r  o f  th e  argum ent i s  upon th e n ; th e  
s tim u lu s  o f  th e  b a t t l e .  They fo r g e t  e t i q u e t t e  and g ra n a a r . They 
•■ p loy  s tro n g  language. Sometimes th ey  go beyond th e  b o rd e rs  o f  
deoorun. But so do men i n  a l l  w alks o f  l i f e .  I n s t ig a te d  by em otion 
and Im p elled  by deep c o n v ic tio n  non alw ays employ s tro n g  words.
T h is happens d u rin g  p o l i t i c a l  cam paigns, and on e le c t io n  day and 
even i n  th e  courtroom  w h ile  law yers a r e  a d d re ss in g  th e  bench. Men 
g e s t i c u la t e  on suoh o c ca s io n s , and become e x c i te d  and d e m o n s tra tiv e .
Must la b o r in g  non be  h e ld  down to  a more s t r in g e n t  r a le ?  Mast 
th ey  be under c o n s ta n t  r e s t r a i n t?  Are th e y  fo rc e d  to  be  p lac ed  in  
th e  hour o f  c o n te n tio n ?  I t  i s  w e ll, p e rh ap s , to  be  so , b u t  does th e  
law  demand i t ?  I  th in k  n o t .  S t r ik e r s  t a l k  t h e i r  own lan g u ag e: th e  
p la in ,  cosnon, s tro n g , everyday language o f  th e  la b o r in g  man.™
Throughout th e  f i r s t  th r e e  decades o f  th e  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry , th e  t r e n d  in
p ic k e tin g  c a se s  co n tin u ed  to  fo llo w  th e  r u le  o f  th e  Vegelahn ca se  which
sa n c tio n ed  th e  conduct o f  p ic k e tin g  in  name o n ly . O cca s io n a lly , a s  i n
Wood v . Toohgy. th e  c o u r ts  would d e p a r t  from th e  m a jo r ity  o p in io n , b u t
th e s e  in s ta n c e s  were i s o l a t e d  and had l i t t l e  e f f e c t .
The l e g a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p io k e tin g  proved to  be a  s e r io u s  
hand icap  to  u n ion  o rg a n iz in g , campaigns f o r  employee re c o g n itio n , and 
th e  conduct o f  s t r i k e s  and b o y c o tts .  In  an e f f o r t  to  remove th e  burden 
o f  le g a l  r e s t r a i n t ,  th e  American F e d e ra tio n  o f Labor (AFL) and a l l i e d  
p o l i t i c a l  I n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  p ro g re s s iv e  e ra  lo b b ie d  in  Congress and i n  
th e  s t a t e s  in  su p p o rt o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  which would reco g n ize  th e  c o l le c ­
t i v e  r i g h t s  o f  em ployees. Samuel CJompers, p re s id e n t  o f  th e  AFL, was 
e s p e c ia l ly  concerned w ith  th e  n u l l i f y in g  e f f e c t  o f  c o u r t  in ju n c t io n s  on 
p ic k e tin g  and b o y c o ttin g  a c t i v i t i e s .  Gompers p ro te s te d  a g a in s t  th e
3^Thid. . p . 98.
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common law  assum ption th a t  p ick s  t in g  was in tim id a to ry  p s r  se , s t a t in g  
th a t  " . . .  j5 7 en  do form p ic k e t  l in e s  f o r  p e rsu a s iv e  pu rposes a s  w e ll 
a s  f o r  th e  purpose o f  g a th e rin g  and oonveying in fo rm a tio n  about s t r i k e s  
to  th o se  In  charge o f  them. I t  I s  n o t t r u e  t h a t  s t r i k e s  fo llo w  p ic k e t­
in g  a s  n ig h t  fo llo w s day.
PICKETING UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT
The e ra  o f  p o p u la r p r o te s t  a g a in s t  r e s t r i c t i v e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f
th e  Sherman Act by th e  Supreme Court in  th e  Dahberry H a tte rs  case37 and
th e  is su a n c e  o f  in ju n c t io n s  by s t a t e  and fe d e ra l  c o u r ts  r e s t r a in in g  th e
conduct o f  a s t r i k e  when supported  by p ic k e t  l i n e s  cu lm inated  in  th e
passage o f  th e  C layton A e t^  i n  191^- The C layton A ct. w h ile  av o id in g
s p e c if ic  re fe re n c e  to  p ic k e tin g , was in te n d ed  to  r e s t r i c t  u se  o f  th e
in ju n c t io n . S ec tio n  20 o f  th e  C layton Act p rov ided  in  p a r t :
. . • no . . . r e s t r a in in g  o rd e r  o r  in ju n c t io n  s h a l l  p ro h ib i t  any 
person  . . . from te rm in a tin g  any r e la t io n  o f  employment, o r  f ro n  
ceasin g  to  perform  any work o f  la b o r , o r  from recommending, a d v is ­
in g . o r  pe rsuad ing  o th e rs  by p e a c e fu l means to  do so ; o r  from 
a tte n d in g  a t  any p la c e  where any such person  o r  p e rso n s may la w fu lly  
be . f o r  th e  purpose o f  p e a c e fu lly  o b ta in in g  o r  communicating in f o r ­
m ation. o r  fro n  p e a c e fu lly  persuad ing  any person  to  work o r  to  
a b s ta in  from w orking, o r  from ceasin g  to  p a tro n is e  o r  to  employ any 
p a r ty  to  suoh d isp u te , o r  from recommending, ad v is in g  o r  pe rsuad ing  
o th e rs  by p e ace fu l and law fu l means so to  do . . . 3°
-^American F e d e ra tio n  o f  Labor, X III (1906), 28.
37408 U.S. 2?h (1908).
3838 S ta t .  730. P a r t  1 (191*0.
39Ib id . , p. 738.
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The ambiguous wording o f  S ec tio n  20 se rv ed  to  d is g u is e  th o  
in te n t  o f  th o  law j however, a o a ro fo l read in g  o f  th o  so o tio n  soons t o  
suggest t h a t  th o  a c t i v i t y  which o o n s is ts  o f  "reooaM ndlng, a d v is in g  o r  
p e rsu ad in g  o th o rs - i s  e n t i r e ly  p r iv i le g e d  i f  th o  noans doos n o t oxcood 
th o  l im i ta t io n  o f  a  la w fu l o b je c t .  As a g e n e ra l ru lo  th o  d e f in i t io n  o f  
a  law fu l o b je c t  depends upon th o  words and a c t io n s  o f  th o  p a r t i e s .  As 
a  r o s u l t  th o  o o n rts  woro a b le  to  av o id  th o  in te n t  o f  th o  C layton Act by 
r o a t r io t in g  th o  d o f ln i t io n  o f  a la w fu l o b je c t .
Tho moaning o f  a  "p ea c e fu l and law fu l ob joo t"  undor Sootion 20 
was f i r s t  co n sid ered  i n  American S to o l F oundries v . T r i-C i ty  Trados 
Q ounell.^  and th o  im p lic a tio n s  o f  t h i s  d e c is io n  reg a rd in g  s t a t e  a n t i -  
in ju n c t io n  s t a tu t e s  was dooidod i n  a oompanion case  T ruax Q o rr iia n »^l 
The T r i-C i ty  oaso r e s u l te d  from a d isp u te  betw een th o  defendan t ( T r i -  
CSLty T rados C ouncil) and th o  p l a i n t i f f  over th o  im p o sitio n  o f  wage o u ts  
t o  c e r ta in  s k i l l e d  employees who were r e c a l le d  a f t e r  a  g e n e ra l shutdown 
o f  th o  p la n t .  Tho company had sought to  reem ploy 350 men o u t o f  a work 
fo rc e  o f  1600. In  o p p o s itio n  to  th o se  wage o u ts , th o  union e s ta b l is h e d  
a  p ic k e t  l in o  to  d lsoourage  employees from e n te r in g  th o  p la n t .  The 
p ic k e tin g  was p e ac e fu l i n  n a tu re  w ith  th e  normal amount o f  t h r e a t s  and 
c o u n te r th re a ts  on bo th  s id e s .  S ev era l w itn e sse s  f o r  th o  p l a i n t i f f  
t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  th e y  were th re a te n e d  and a s s a u l te d  by th e  p ic k e ts ,  and
*°257 U.S. 184 (1921). 
ifl257 U.S. 321 (1921 ).
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th e  p ic k e t*  t e s t i f i e d  " . . .  t h a t  s t r ik e b re a k e rs  a ttem p ted  to  shoo t th e  
s t r ik in g  em ployees, and were u rged  to  do so by re p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  • • •
su c c e ss fu l and th e  employer i n s t i t u t e d  a  s u i t  a g a in s t  th e  Trades Council 
a l le g in g  p o te n t ia l  in ju r y  and d e s tru c t io n  to  i t s  b u s in e ss  i n  th e  amount 
o f  $1 ,000,000.
The I n i t i a l  h earing  took p la c e  in  May. 191^. and th e  D i s t r i c t  
Court g ran te d  a  p re lim in a ry  o rd e r  e n jo in in g  th e  p ic k e tin g  in  suppo rt o f 
th e  d is p u te . The T r i-C ity  T rades Council appealed  th e  ru l in g  o f  th e  
D i s t r i c t  Court to  th e  C ir c u i t  Court o f  A ppeals which review ed th e  case  
i n  December, 1916. Although th e  C ir c u i t  Court d id  n o t m ention th e  
C layton Act in  i t s  o p in io n , th e  am biguity  o f  S e c tio n  20 was a p p a re n tly  
s u f f i c i e n t  to  cause th e  Court to  re v e rse  th e  a c t io n  o f  th e  D i s t r i c t  
C ourt. The unanimous o p in io n  w r i t te n  by Judge Evans observed  th a t  th e  
purpose o f  th e  low er c o u r t 's  r e s t r a in in g  o rd e r  was ". . . t o  p rev e n t a l l  
p ic k e tin g  by th e  d e fen d an ts  o r  o th e rs  s im ila r ly  in te r e s te d  and to  
p rev e n t th e s e  p a r t i e s  from persuad ing  t h e i r  fe llo w  employees to  jo in  
them in  t h e i r  e f f o r t  . . . The Court gave p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t io n  to  
th e  q u e s tio n  o f  d u re ss  a s  a c o n d itio n  se p a ra te  from p e rsu a s io n  r e s u l t in g  
from th e  p ic k e tin g . The problem  o f  de term in ing  w hether o r  n o t th e  
a c t i v i t y  should be p ro h ib ite d  depends upon w hether th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  
designed  to  communicate w ith  th e  new employees. I f  d u re ss  i s  used in
/ th * 7  * * • p l a i n t i f f . T h e  purpose o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  was a p p a re n tly
^ 2238 F. 730.
th e  p ro o ess  o f  t h i s  com m unication, i t  i s  th o  d u re s s  which should  be 
r e s t r a in e d  and n o t p e rs u a s io n  by p io k e tin g  which i s  a la w fu l I n t e r ­
fe re n c e  w ith  th e  r i g h t s  o f  th e  em ployer. Judge Evans was c a r e fu l  to  
p o in t  o u t  t h a t  w h ile  th e  in ju n c t io n  d id  n o t:
. . . p r o h ib i t  p ic k e tin g  p e r  se  . . . / t h e  e f f e c t  was to  p re v e n t th e  
d e fe n d an t from  engaging i n  a j  • • • c o n sp irac y  to  d e s tro y  th e  
p l a i n t i f f ' s  b u s in e s s t  t h a t  in  o rd e r  to  p re v e n t th e  d e fe n d a n ts  f ro n  
accompl i shin g  th e  u n law fu l o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  oon sp lrao y  i t  was n e ce s­
sa ry  . . .  to  r e s t r a i n  th e  d e fe n d an ts  from p ic k e tin g  . . .
The o b je c tio n  o f  th e  C ir c u i t  C ourt, th e r e f o re ,  was n o t  so much to  th e
th e o ry  o f  th e  In ju n c t io n  a s  to  i t s  e f f e o t  on th e  law fu l pu rpose  o f  th e
d e fe n d an t. In  th e  words o f  th e  C ourt i t  would be im p ra c t ic a l  to  oontend
t h a t  th e  a c t  o f  p ic k e tin g  and p e rs u a s io n  does n o t I n t e r f e r e  w ith  th e
em p lo y e r 's  b u s in e s s . I t  would be  e q u a lly  f o o l is h  to  m a in ta in  t h a t  th e
s t r i k e  does n o t c o n s t i tu t e  a  s im i la r  form o f  I n te r f e r e n c e .  The l e g a l i t y
o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  o r  o f  th e  s t r i k e  ". . . canno t be t e s te d  by . . . / T t a j
. . . I n c id e n ta l  e f f e c t .  . . . The la b o r e r  may be  s t r i c t l y  w ith in  h i s
r ig h t s ,  a lth o u g h  he o b s t r u c ts  ' t h e  f r e e  and u n re s tra in e d  c o n tro l  and
o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  e m p lo y e r 's  b u s i n e s s . ' " ^
The r i g h t  to  p ic k e t  and th e  r ig h t  to  s t r i k e  i f  c a r r i e d  to
su c c e s s fu l  Im plem entation  must by n e c e s s i ty  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  th e  conduct
o f  th e  e m p lo y er 's  b u s in e s s . The f a u l t  o f  th e  r e s t r a in in g  o rd e r  i s  t h a t
i t  f a i l s  to  d is t in g u is h  betw een th e  la w fu l and u n law fu l means which a re
a v a i la b le  to  th e  d efen d an t u n io n . The a c t io n s  o f  th e  un ion  may be
^>Tbid.. p. 733.
h a ra fo l  to  th e  em ployer, b u t th e  pursuance  o f  th e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  i s  
n e c e s s a r i ly  p ro te c te d  " . . .  because suoh methods a r e  in c id e n ta l  to  th e  
r i g h t  o f  th e  employee, which r i g h t  shou ld  be  and i s  reco g n ised  a s  e q u a l 
to  th e  r i g h t  o f  th e  em ployer. A lthough th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  C i r c u i t  
C ourt d id  n o t r e f e r  d i r e c t l y  to  th e  C lay ton  Act* th e  re c o g n itio n  o f  th e  
p r in c ip le  t h a t  employees may have r i g h t s  in  a  com bination  equal to  
th o se  o f  em ployers amounted to  an  im p lied  accep tan ce  o f  th e  p h ilo so p h y  
o f  S e c tio n  20.
The ru l in g  o f  th e  C i r c u i t  C ourt o f  A ppeals i n  th e  T r i-C i ty  c a se  
was f i r s t  co n sid e red  by th e  Supreme C ourt i n  January . 1919. and th e  
d e c is io n  was n o t  handed down u n t i l  December. 1921. some seven y e a rs  
a f t e r  th e  passage  o f  th e  C layton  A ct. The p l a i n t i f f  i n  e r r o r  ap p ea led  
on th e  b a s i s  t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  by th e  T rades C ouncil c o n s is te d  o f  
t h r e a t s  and un law fu l in t im id a t io n  and could  n o t be co n stru ed  a s  a means 
o f  le g i t im a te  p e rsu a s io n . The Supreme Oourt. w ith  C hief J u s t i c e  T a f t  
w r i t in g  th e  o p in io n , a ccep ted  th e  reaso n in g  o f  th e  p l a i n t i f f  s  advoca te  
and h e ld  t h a t  S ec tio n  20 o f  th e  C lay ton  Act d id  n o t p r o h ib i t  th e  employ­
ment o f  a  r e s t r a in in g  o rd e r  i f  th e  conduct o f  th e  p ic k e ts  exceeded th e  
scope o f  a la w fu l o b je c t .  W hile th e  Court d id  n o t w ish to  p r o h ib i t  th e  
r i g h t  to  p ic k e t .  J u s t i c e  T a f t  h e ld  t h a t  i f  th e  methods adop ted  by la b o r  
". . . however la w fu l in  t h e i r  announced purpose in e v i ta b ly  le d  to  
In t im id a t io n  and o b s tru c tio n , th e n  i t  i s  th e  court*  s d u ty  . . .  to  l i m i t
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"what th a  p ro p ag a n d is ts  do a s  to  tim e, manner and p lac e  . . . I f  th e  
du ty  o f  th e  Court i s  to  a s c e r ta in  w hether th e  p e rsu as io n  amounts to  
unlaw ful in tim id a tio n *  to  what e x te n t  may p ic k e ts  go w ith o u t v io la t in g  
th e  boundary o f  le g i t im a te  p e rsu asio n ?  I n  an unusual p r e s c r ip t io n  o f  
le g a l  r ig h ts ,  J u s t ic e  T a f t  s ta te d  t h a t  "In  going to  and from work, men 
have a  r i g h t  to  a s  f r e e  passage w ith o u t o b s tru c tio n  a s  th e  s t r e e t s  
a f fo rd  . . . I n  term s o f  p ic k e tin g , th e  r ig h t  to  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  th e  
passage o f  a n o th e r  o r  fe llo w  employee i s  to  be  p e rm itte d  i f  th e  p ic k e t  
c o n fin e s  h i s  rem arks to  an  in fo rm a tio n a l c h a ra c te r .  The co n d itio n s  
under which t h i s  type  o f  p ic k e tin g  would be p e rm itte d  were o u tl in e d  by 
th e  C ourt.
We th in k  t h a t  th e  s t r i k e r s  and t h e i r  sym path izers . . • shou ld  be  
l im ite d  to  one re p re s e n ta t iv e  f o r  each p o in t  o f  In g re s s  and e g re s s  
in  th e  p la n t  o r  p la c e  o f  b u s in e ss  and t h a t  a l l  o th e r s  be en jo in ed  
from congregating  o r  l o i t e r i n g  a t  th e  p la n t  o r  in  th e  ne ighboring  
s t r e e t s  by which a cc ess  i s  had to  th e  p la n t ,  t h a t  suoh re p re s e n ta ­
t iv e s  should have th e  r ig h t  o f  o b se rv a tio n , communication and 
p e rsu a s io n  b u t w ith  s p e c ia l  adm onition t h a t  t h e i r  communication, 
argum ents and ap p ea ls  s h a l l  no t be ab u siv e , l ib e lo u s  o r  th re a te n in g , 
and th a t  they  s h a l l  n o t approach in d iv id u a ls  to g e th e r  b u t s in g ly , 
and sha l l  n o t i n  t h e i r  s in g le  e f f o r t s  a t  communication o r  p e rsu a s io n  
o b s tru c t  an u n w illin g  l i s t e n e r  by im portunate  fo llo w in g  o r  dogging
h is  s te p s . ^
S u rp r is in g ly  enough, a f t e r  d e fin in g  t h i s  uniform  code o f  f r e e  co m p e titio n  
f o r  employees. J u s t ic e  T a f t  san c tio n ed  a form o f  s tr a n g e r  p io k e tin g  by 
suggesting  th a t  un ions, i n  seeking  to  e s ta b l is h  e f f e c t iv e  com binations,
^ 2 5 7  U.S. 203-204. 
^ b i d . .  p . ^04. 
^ I b l d . , pp. 206-207-
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. . . beyond one shop. I t  I s  h e lp fu l  to  have a s  many a s  nay b s  i n  
th e  Sams t r s d s  i n  th e  sans community u n ite d , because  i n  co m p e titio n  
betw een en p lo y e rs  th e y  a re  bound to  be  a f f e c te d  by th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  
wages i n  t h e i r  t r a d e  in  th e  neighborhood. T herefo re , th ey  nay u se  
a l l  propaganda to  e n la rg e  t h e i r  membership e s p e c ia l ly  among th o se  
whose la b o r  a t  low er wages w i l l  in ju r e  t h e i r  whole g u ild .-* 1
The t e s t  o f  th e  s tan d a rd  e s ta b l is h e d  by th e  Supreme C ourt i n  th e  
T r i-C ity  case  was f i r s t  a p p lie d  by th e  Court i n  Truax ▼. C orrigan . The 
Truax ease  a ro se  from a s t r ik e  by th e  employees o f  th e  p l a i n t i f f  (Truax) 
o v e r term s and c o n d itio n s  o f  employment in  th e  p l a i n t i f f 1 s  r e s ta u r a n t ,  
th e  "E ng lish  K itch en ."  Truax re fu se d  to  concede to  th e  employees' 
demand, and th e  t r a d e s  assem bly c a l le d  a s t r i k e  a g a in s t  him. The s t r i k e  
was supported  by mass p ic k e tin g  accompanied by a "d isp la y  o f  banners" 
and " c i r c u la t io n  o f  h a n d b ills"  co n ta in in g  s ta tem en ts  l ib e lo u s  to  th e  
c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  p l a i n t i f f .  The banners c a r r ie d  by th e  p ic k e ts  con­
ta in e d  ch arg es t h a t  Truax " . . .  was ty ra n n ic a l  w ith  h i s  h e lp  and chased 
them down th e  s t r e e t  w ith  a b u tc h e r k n ife  . . . H an d b ills  were 
d i s t r ib u te d  to  p o te n t ia l  custom ers w ith  such e x p re ss io n s  as " 'A l l  ye who 
e n te r  h e re  le a v e  a l l  hope b e h in d , ' and 'D o n 't  be a t r a i t o r  to  
hu m an ity .1 "53
Truax v. C orrigan  was i n i t i a l l y  t r i e d  under an A rizona a n t i -  
in ju n c t io n  la v  s im ila r  to  th e  C layton Act which w ith h e ld  th e  r i g h t  to
5° I b l d - . p . 209-
5L257 U.S. 321.
j 2I b i d . . p . 326 .
53Ibid-
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i s s u e  in ju n c t io n s  i n  th o se  a re a s  where th e  u n io n  employed p e a c e fu l means
f o r  a  la w fu l pu rpose . The Supreme C ourt o f  A rizona in te r p r e te d  th e  a c t
a s  a  ban a g a in s t  a l l  p re v io u s  "un law fu l a c t s '11
. • . i t  i s  q u i te  d e a r  t h a t  th e  s t a t u t e  re o o g n ise s  th e  r i g h t  o f  
s t r i k in g  em ployees to  c a r ry  on a campaign o f  p ic k e tin g  . . . fu n d e r  
th e  s t a t u t e  th e  em ployer/ . . .  i s  re q u ire d  to  s e t  f o r th  f a c t s  s u f f i ­
c ie n t  to  o o n s t i tu te  such a c t s  a s  amount to  un law fu l a c t s  and s u s ta in  
such . . .  by s u b s ta n t ia l  e v id e n c e .^
A lthough th e  p ic k e tin g  i n  th e  Truax oase  was c h a ra c te r iz e d  by 
a b u s iv e  language  and l ib e lo u s  s ta tem en ts!  th e  conduct o f  th e  p a t r o l  d id  
n o t produce any a c t s  o f  v io le n c e . C onsequently , th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  a p p ea l 
to  th e  Supreme Court was l im i te d  to  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  w hether p ic k e tin g  
which i n t e r f e r e s  w ith  th e  em p lo y er 's  custom ers c o n s t i tu t e s  an  i n f r in g e ­
ment on th e  due p ro c e ss  c la u s e  o f  th e  F o u rte en th  Amendment. J u s t i c e  
T a f t , speak ing  f o r  th e  m a jo rity !  d i r e c te d  h i s  a t t e n t io n  to  th e  conduct 
o f  th e  p ic k e ts .
The p a t r o l l i n g  o f  th e  d e fe n d a n ts  im m edia te ly  i n  f r o n t  o f  th e  
r e s ta u r a n t  . . . c o n tin u o u s ly  d u rin g  b u s in e s s  h ou rs . • . th e  
a tte n d a n c e  by th e  p ic k e te r s  a t  th e  e n tra n c e  to  th e  r e s ta u r a n t  and 
t h e i r  i n s i s t e n t  and loud  a p p e a ls  a l l  day lo n g , th e  c o n s ta n t  c i r c u ­
l a t i o n  by them o f  th e  l i b e l s  and e p i th e t s  a p p lie d  to  sm ployees, 
p l a i n t i f f s  and custom ers* and t h r e a t s  o f  in ju r io u s  oonsequences to  
f u tu r e  custom ers, a l l  l in k e d  to g e th e r  i n  a  campaign, w ere an  unlaw­
f u l  annoyance and a  h u r t f u l  n u isan ce  i n  r e s p e c t  to  f r e e  a c c e s s  to  
th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  p la c e  o f  b u s in e s s .* *
The le g itim a c y  o f  p ic k e tin g , r e g a rd le s s  o f  i t s  la w fu l pu rpose , 
canno t overcome th e  in e q u i ty  wrought by a c t s  o f  o o e rc lo n  and im p lied  
t h r e a t s .  The o b s t ru c t io n  c a r r ie d  on by th e  d e fe n d an ts  was a  c o n sp irac y
^ 7 6  P. 570 . 572 (1918).
55257 U.S. 327.
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in te n d e d  to  i n f l i c t  s u b s ta n t ia l  in ju r y  on th o  p l a i n t i f f .  Tha law  o f  th a  
S ta te  o f  A rizona which o p e ra to o  to  p r o te c t  a o t s  by th e  d e fen d an ts  which 
would o th e rw ise  be un law fu l le a v e s  th e  em ployer w ith o u t an adequate  
remedy a t  law . The q u e s tio n , th e r e fo re ,  i s  w hether "• . . th e  s t a t e  may 
w ithdraw  a l l  p r o te c t io n  to  a p ro p e r ty  r i g h t  by c i v i l  o r  c r im in a l a c t io n  
f o r  i t s  w rongfu l in ju r y  i f  th e  in ju r y  i s  n o t caused  by v io le n c e .
Under th e s e  o ircu m stan ees  th e  s o lu t io n  depends upon th e  e x te n t  to  which 
th e  s t a t e  s h a l l  be p e rm itte d  to  r e g u la te  th e  p r o te c t io n  o f  p ro p e rty  
r i g h t s .  W hile th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power o f  th e  s t a t e  may be e x e rc is e d  w ith  
c o n s id e ra b le  d i s c r e t io n  in  r e g u la t in g  th e  u se  o f  p o l ic e  pow ers, th e  
power " . . .  can o n ly  be e x e rte d  in  su b o rd in a tio n  to  th e  fundam ental 
p r in c ip le s  o f  th e  r i g h t  o f  J u s t i c e  which th e  g u a ran ty  o f  due p ro ce ss  i n  
th e  F o u rte e n th  Amendment i s  in te n d e d  to  p re s e rv e  . . . The p ro te c ­
t io n  o f  due p ro c e ss  u n der th e  F o u rte en th  Amendment i s  n o t concerned w ith  
th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  o r  th e  a re a  o f  J u r i s d ic t io n ,  b u t  i t  o n ly  
r e q u ir e s  t h a t  a l l  p e rso n s  s h a l l  be t r e a te d  equal a t  law . The s t a t e  w i l l  
n o t be p e rm itte d  to  e n a c t l e g i s l a t i o n  e s ta b l is h in g  such l im i ta t io n s  and 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  on r i g h t s  o f  in d iv id u a ls  a t  law , r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  p ro te c ­
t io n  o f  th e  due p ro c e ss  c la u se  a s  though i t  was a  "rope o f  s a n d ."
The m a jo r ity  o p in io n  t h a t  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power o f  a s t a t e  to  
r e g u la te  th e  u se  and enjoym ent o f  p ro p e r ty  i s  su b o rd in a te  to  th e  Four­
te e n th  Amendment was v ig o ro u s ly  c o n te s te d  by th e  m in o rity , r e s u l t in g  i n
^ I b i d . , p. 329-
57I b l d .
th r e e  s e p a ra te  d is s e n t in g  o p in io n s  by J u s t i c e s  Hollies, B ran d eis , and 
P itn e y  w ith  J u s t i c e  C lark  c o n cu rrin g  w ith  th e  d is s e n t  o f  J u s t i c e  P itn e y . 
J u s t ic e  Holmes o b je c te d  to  th e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  b u s in e ss  i n  th e  sane 
c a te g o ry  a s  t h a t  o f  land* which r e s u l t s  i n  th e  c o n c lu sio n  t h a t  a  s t a t e  
cannot s u c c e s s fu lly  r e s t r i c t  p r e e x is t in g  r i g h t s .  The a s s o c ia t io n  o f  a  
b u s in e ss  w ith  a d e f i n i t e  o b je c t  c re a te s  th e  i l l u s i o n  th a t  i t  i s  somehow 
beyond th e  scope o f  r e g u la tio n , th a t  any a tte m p t to  r e s t r i c t  "p ro p e rty  
r ig h ts "  m ust meet th e  t e s t  o f  th e  due p ro c e ss  c la u se  which u l t im a te ly  
l i m i t s  . th e  making o f  s o c ia l  experim en ts t h a t  a r e  an im p o rtan t
p a r t  o f  th e  connranity d e s i r e s  . • . even though th e  experim ents may seem 
f u t i l e  o r  even noxious . . .
J u s t i c e s  B randeis and P itn e y  o b je c te d  to  J u s t ic e  T a f t 's  c o n s tru c ­
t io n  o f  th e  due p ro c e ss  c la u se  th a t  a l l  men m ust be t r e a te d  equal b e fo re  
th e  law  re g a rd le s s  o f  c la s s  o r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o r  d i r e c t io n  o f th e  p u b lic  
i n t e r e s t .  B randeis d isa g re e d  w ith  T a f t 's  reaso n in g  th a t  th e  F o u rte e n th  
Amendment i s  In ten d ed  to  p re se rv e  and p r o te c t  th e  body o f  p e rso n a l 
r ig h t s  and p ro p e rty  r ig h ts  from l e g i s l a t i v e  encroachm ent.
T h is r ig h t  to  c a r ry  on b u s in e ss—.be i t  c a l le d  l i b e r t y  o r  p ro p e r ty — 
has v a lu e ; and, he who i n t e r f e r e s  w ith  th e  r i g h t  w ith o u t cause 
re n d e rs  h im se lf  l i a b l e .  But f o r  cause th e  r i g h t  nay be in te r f e r e d  
w ith  and even be d e s tro y e d . Such cause  e x i s t s  when, i n  th e  p u r s u i t  
o f  an equal r ig h t  to  f u r th e r  t h e i r  s e v e ra l  i n t e r e s t s ,  h i s  com peti­
to r s  make in ro a d s  upon h i s  t r a d e , o r  when s u p p l ie r s  o f  m erchandise 
o r  o f  la b o r  make in ro a d s  on h i s  p ro f i ts *  What methods and means a re  
p e rm is s ib le  in  t h i s  s t ru g g le  o f con tend ing  fo rc e s  i s  de term ined  in  
p a r t  by d e c is io n s  o f  th e  c o u r ts ,  in  p a r t  by a c t s  o f  l e g i s l a t u r e s .
58I b i d . . p . y * b .
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The m l* s  govern ing  th e  c o n te s t  n e o e s s a r i ly  change f ro *  t i n e  to  
t i n e .  F o r c o n d it io n s  change; and fu rth e rm o re , th e  r u le s  evolved* 
b e in g  n e re ly  experim en ts i n  go v em n en t, n a s t  be  d isc a rd e d  when th e y  
p rove  to  be  f a i l u r e s .™
The due p ro c e ss  c la u se  i s  n o t In ten d ed  to  s t r i k e  down l e g i s l a t i o n  J u s t  
because  th e  l a v  i n  q u e s tio n  " . . .  aay  in v o lv e  in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  th e  
e x is t in g  l i b e r t y  o r  p ro p e r ty  . . . b u t  o n ly  i f  th e  e f f e c t  i s  a r b i ­
t r a r y  o r  i f  th e r e  i s  no co rrespond ing  r e l a t i o n  to  a  p e rm is s ib le  end.
W hether a  la v  en ac ted  i n  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  p o l ic e  power i s  
J u s t ly  s u b je c t  to  th e  charge  o f  b e in g  u n rea so n a b le  o r  a r b i t r a r y ,  can  
o r d in a r i ly  be  determ ined  by a  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  contem porary  con­
d i t i o n s ,  s o c ia l ,  i n d u s t r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l ,  o f  th e  community to  be 
a f f e c te d  th e re b y . R e so rt to  such f a c t s  i s  n e c e ssa ry , among o th e r  
th in g s ,  i n  o rd e r  to  a p p re c ia te  e v i l s  sought to  be  rem edied and th e  
p o s s ib le  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  remedy p ro p o sed .”
A su rvey  o f  p r i o r  l e g i s l a t i o n  and c o u r t  d e c is io n s  i l l u s t r a t e s  
th e  p ro c e ss  o f  c o n tin u in g  s o c ia l  experim ent to  develop  a body o f  la v s  
which w i l l  be  a d a p ta b le  to  th e  p u b lic  needs v e rs u s  p r iv a te  r i g h t s .  The 
h i s to r y  o f  l a b o r  un ions se rv es  a s  a d ram atic  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
s t ru g g le  f o r  p u b lic  and l e g a l  re c o g n itio n . The r i g h t  to  o rg a n iz e , th e  
r i g h t  to  s t r i k e ,  and th e  r i g h t  to  b a rg a in  a r e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  th e  
ach ievem ents o f  o rg an ized  la b o r  in  i t s  c o n tin u in g  co m p e titio n  w ith  th e  
fo rc e s  o f  c a p i t a l .  Each o f  th e s e  e s ta b l is h e d  r i g h t s  were a t  one tim e  o r  
a n o th e r  c o n s id e re d  to  be v io la t io n s  o f  l i b e r t y  o r  p ro p e r ty  and were h e ld  
to  be  a c o n sp irac y  in  c r im in a l la v  o r  i l l e g a l  and a c t io n a b le  i n  t o r t .
59& * d . .  pp. 35^-355-
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The p ro c e ss  o f  ju d ic ia l  end l e g i s l a t i v e  d e te rm in a tio n  i s  u n fo r tu n a te ly  
slow end may e x h ib i t  ten d e n c ie s  to  proceed In  th e  o p p o s ite  d ire c tio n *  
b u t th e  w eight o f  p n b lie  op in io n  end th e  p re s su re  o f  economic and 
s o c ia l  c o n d itio n s  w i l l  e v e n tu a lly  persuade th e  c o u r ts  to  i n t e r p r e t  th e  
tem per and s p i r i t  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  w ithou t th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  e x e rc is ­
ing  a u th o r i ty  a s  a q u a s i - le g is la t iv e  body.
The Supresw Court o f  A rizona, having . . . /d e te rm in ed / • • * 
t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was p e a c e fu l and* hence, l e g a l  under s t a tu t e  
/w h e th e r  o r  n o t i t  was a t  common law7 n e c e s s a r i ly  d en ied  th e  in ju n c ­
t io n  . • . / f o r  i t  seem j/ • > • c le a r  t h a t  th e  r e f u s a l  o f  an e q u i t ­
a b le  renedy f o r  a t o r t  i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  a d e n ia l  o f  due p ro c e ss  o f 
law  . . .  I t  i s  f o r  th e  l e g i s l a tu r e  to  say—w ith in  th e  broad  U n i t s  
o f  d is c r e t io n  which i t  p o sse sse s—w hether o r  no t th e  renedy f o r  a 
wrong s h a l l  be bo th  c rim in a l and c i v i l  and w hether o r  n o t i t  s h a l l  
be bo th  a t  law  and in  e q u ity . 2
J u s t ic e  Pitney* s d i s s e n t  o b je c te d  to  Taft* a c o n te n tio n  th a t  th e
d e c is io n  o f  th e  Supreme Court o f  A rizona r e s t r i c t e d  th e  e q u a lity
requ irem en ts o f  th e  F o u rteen th  Amendment.
Exam ination shows th a t  i t  . . . / t h e  A rizona la v 7  • • • does n o t 
d is c r im in a te  a g a in s t  th e  c la s s  to  which p l a i n t i f f s  belong in  fa v o r  
o f  any o th e r  . . • / t h e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  m a jo rity  op in ion7  . . .  i s  to  
tran sfo rm  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  th e  F o u rteen th  Amendment from guaran ty  
o f  th e  "p ro te c tio n  o f  equal law s" in to  an in s is te n c e  upon law s com­
p le te .  p e r fe o t  and sym m etrical. ^
The d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  r i g h t  to  i s s u e  an in ju n c t io n  i s  w ith in  th e
p o lic e  power o f  th e  S ta te  o f  A rizona. J u s t  a s  th e  s t a t e  has th e  power
to  re g u la te  th e  Issu an ce  o f  in ju n c t io n s  i t  may p ro p e rly  s in g le  o u t a
form o f  p e rsu as io n  f o r  a p p ro p r ia te  trea tm e n t a s  long a s  th e  remedy o r
63I b i d . . pp. 372-373-
63I b i d . . pp. 3*9-351.
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p ro te c t io n  i s  " • • • c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  doe p ro cess  o f  law .
The d is s e n ts  o f  J u s t ic e s  Koines. Brandeds. and P itn e y  in  th e  
Truax case  o b je c te d  to  th e  m a jo rity  op in ion  on d i f f e r e n t  grounds.
Holmes and P itn e y  r e je c te d  th e  ph ilosophy  t h a t  th e  A rizona la v  was an 
in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  th e  due p ro c e ss  c la u se  a s  guaran teed  under th e  Four­
te e n th  Amendment ho ld ing  th a t  th e  s t a t e  h as th e  r ig h t  to  e s ta b l is h  
s p e c ia l  c a te g o r ie s  o f  r ig h t s  and o b l ig a t io n s  a t  law. B randeis , w h ile  
a c c e p tin g  t h i s  argum ent, recogn ised  th e  n e c e s s i ty  o f  e s ta b l is h in g  
s u f f i c i e n t  grounds f o r  ju s t i f y in g  th e  r ig h t  o f  employees to  engage in  
p ic k e tin g . B randeis sought to  show by h i s t o r i c a l  p reced en t and ju d ic i a l  
reason ing  th a t  th e  p re s e rv a tio n  o f  th e  r ig h t  to  s t r i k e  and th e  r i g h t  to  
p ic k e t  was a n ecessa ry  p r e r e q u is i te  to  th e  m aintenance o f  th e  ba lan ce  
o f  power i n  a co n tin u in g  s o c ia l  experim ent; and th a t  p ic k e tin g  a s  a 
means o f  ad v ertisem en t and p u b lic  n o t ic e  should be and must be p ro te c te d  
from th e  p ro c e ss  o f  ju d ic i a l  r e s t r a i n t .
The d e c is io n  o f  th e  Supreme Court in  th e  T r i-C ity  case  and In  
Truax v. C orrigan  served  to  c o d ify  th e  law  o f p ic k e tin g  in  two re s p e c ts t  
(1 ) t h a t  p ic k e tin g  was p ro te c te d  in  name on ly , i . e . ,  a s  p e ac e fu l p ic k e t­
in g ; and (2) t h a t  th e  s t a te s  could  n o t e s ta b l is h  laws whose p ro v is io n s  
were more r e s t r i c t i v e  th an  th o se  o f  th e  C layton  A ct. The Supreme Court 
re fu se d  to  re l in q u is h  th e  r ig h t  to  fu n c tio n  a s  a q u a s i - l e g i s la t iv e  body 
in  r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  le g a l  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g . Although a few c o u rts  
re fu sed  to  conform to  th e  ru l in g s  o f th e  Supreme C ourt, th e  e x ce p tio n s
6**IWid., p. 353-
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were a  d e f i n i t e  m in o rity  and th e  M ajo rity  con tinued  to  app ly  th e  
ph ilo sophy  o f  th e  Vegelahn case  th a t  p ic k e tin g  i s  in tim id a to ry  p e r  se . 
The l e g a l i t y  o f p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g , th e re fo re ,  con tinued  to  be p ro . 
te c te d  in  name only*
With th e  excep tion  o f  th e  N orrls-L aG uardia A c t ^  th e  le g a l  
s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  a s  e s ta b l is h e d  in  Vegelahn v. G unter remained 
u n d is tu rb ed  u n t i l  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  Supreme Court in  Sann v. T ile  
L ayers P ro te c t iv e  Onion. ^  The N orrls-L aG uardia Act passed  by Congress 
in  1932 was in ten d ed  to  se v e re ly  r e s t r i c t  th e  is su a n c e  o f  in ju n c t io n s  
by s t a t e  and d i s t r i c t  c o u rts  and fe d e ra l  c o u r ts  o f  appea l. S ince i t s  
in tro d u c tio n  during  th e  l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c en tu ry , th e  
in ju n c t io n  had become an e f f e c t iv e  union b u s tin g  in s tru m e n t. Employers 
could  secu re  an in ju n c t io n  from a c o u r t ^  which would p r o h ib i t  th e  union 
from engaging i n  co n certed  a c t i v i t i e s  ( s t r ik e s ,  p ic k e tin g , and b o y c o tts )  
u n t i l  such tim e a s  th e  c o u r t  could a s c e r ta in  th e  t r u e  m e rits  o f  th e  
case . The tim e ly  in te r f e r e n c e  by th e  c o u rt was p a r t i c u la r ly  advantageous 
to  em ployers and served  to  d e s tro y  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  o f th e  union  to  p re s s  
i t s  advantage a g a in s t  th e  employer. The employment o f  t h i s  pow erful 
d ev ice  was w idely  abused by th e  c o u rts , and th e  in ju n c t io n  became th e  
u ltim a te  weapon in  n u l l i f y in g  th e  economic p re s su re  o f p ic k e tin g . The
6^4? S t a t . 70 (1932).
66301 U.S. 468 (1937).
^ M o s t o f  th e  in ju n c t io n s  were u su a lly  d ra f te d  by th e  e n p lo y e r 's  
counsel and i n  some c a se s  were Issu ed  w ithou t b e n e f i t  o f  le g a l  counsel 
f o r  th e  defendan t union.
C layton Act a ttem pted  to  r a a t r l e t  th e  scope o f  tho  b la n k e t in ju n c t io n .
b u t th e  wording o f  S ec tio n  20 was too  vague, l im i t in g  th e  issu a n o e  o f
in ju n e t io n a  to  th o se  case s  where th e  naans were " u n la w fu l." C ognisant
o f  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  S ec tio n  20 o f  th e  C layton Aot. th e  a u th o rs  o f  th e
N orrls-L aG uardia Aot d e fin ed  a la b o r  d isp u te  to  in c lu d e  th o se  who n ig h t
be . . engaged in  th e  sane in d u s try , t r a d e , c r a f t ,  o r  occupation
. . . / o r  h av in g / * • • a  d i r e c t  o r  in d i r e c t  I n t e r e s t  th e r e in  . . .
P eace fu l p ic k e tin g  a s  p rev io u s ly  d e fin ed  was p ro te c te d  by S ec tio n  4 (e )
which p ro h ib ite d  o o u r ts  from is s u in g  r e s t r a in in g  o rd e rs  in  any case
where th e  p a r t i c ip a n ts  were engaged in t
. . * g iv in g  p u b l ic i ty  to  th e  e x is te n c e  o f . o r  th e  f a o ts  invo lved  
in .  any la b o r  d is p u te , w hether by a d v e r t is in g ,  speaking , p a t r o l l in g ,  
o r  by any o th e r  nethod n o t in v o lv in g  frau d  and v io le n c e  . . . / t h a t  
no c o u r t  s h a l l  r e s t r a in  p lo k e tin g  aoooupanied by th r e a t s  and s im ila r  
d is o rd e rs ,  ex cep t a f t e r  f in d in g s  o f  f a c t  I t  i s  e v id e n t th a£ ?  • * * 
g r e a te r  in ju ry  w i l l  be  I n f l i c t e d  upon com plainant by th e  d e n ia l  o f 
th e  r e l i e f  th a n  w i l l  be i n f l i c t e d  upon d efen d an ts  by th e  g ra n tin g  o f  
r e l i e f  . . . and . . . That th e  p u b lic  o f f i c e r s  charged w ith  d u ty  to  
p ro te c t  complainant* s o r o p e r ty  a re  unab le  o r  u n w illin g  to  fu rn is h  
adequate  p ro te c tio n . *
PICKS IT NO AFTER THE NORRIS-LaOUARECA ACT
The passage o f  th e  N orrls-L aG uardia A ct served  to  r e s t r i c t  
j u d ic i a l  abuse o f  th e  in ju n c t io n , b u t th e  law  o f  p eace fu l p lo k e tin g  con­
tin u e d  to  fo llow  th e  ru l in g  o f  th e  Truax case . I f  th e  m aintenance o f  
th e  p a t r o l  exceeded th e  s t r i c t u r e  o f  "p e ac e fu l"  conduct, th e  a c t i v i t y
^47 3tat. 73* 
69Ibld .. p. 71*
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was a  v io la t io n  o f  th e  due p ro o aas c la u se  and cou ld  bo onJo ined .
A lthough a m a jo r ity  o f  th o  o o u r ts  acooptod  th o  th e o ry  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  was 
a v io la t io n  o f  duo p ro c e ss , a  m in o rity  su b aerib ed  to  th e  th e o ry  t h a t  
p ic k e tin g , even though in tim id a to ry , may be p ro te c te d  by th e  C o n s titu ­
t io n .  The v ig o ro u s  d is s e n t  o f  J u s t ic e  B randeis  i n  Truax v . C o rrigan  was 
fo re  shadowed i n  s e v e ra l  d e c is io n s  b e fo re  1921 and was adop ted  by a 
m in o rity  o f  s t a t e  c o u r ts  in  th e  e a r ly  1 9 3 0 's .
I n  th e  u su a l s i t u a t i o n  th e  c a se s  under c o n s id e ra tio n  r e s u l te d  
from p ic k e tin g  i n  v io la t io n  o f  a  c i t y  o rd in an ce  o r  a  s t a t e  law  p r o h ib i t ­
in g  a l l  form s o f  p ic k e t in g .  T h is  form o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  was co n sid e red  to  
be an  encroachm ent on th e  freedom  o f  speech and was g e n e ra lly  h e ld  
u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l  by th e  c o u r ts  i f  th e  a o t i v i t y  was n o t o th e rw ise  unlaw­
f u l .  The q u e s tio n  in  th e s e  c a se s  was w hether th e  s t a tu t e  v io la te d  th e  
r i g h t  to  engage i n  p e a c e fu l p r o t e s t  a s  g u aran teed  by th e  C o n s t i tu tio n .
In  S t. L ouis v . Q lonar70 th e  p ic k e tin g  was i n  v io la t io n  o f  a c i t y  
o rd in an ce  p r o h ib i t in g  loung ing  o r  l o i t e r i n g  a s  a misdemeanor. Upon 
ap p ea l o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  c o n v ic tio n  th e  c o u rt  h e ld  t h a t  w h ile  th e  c i t y  
had th e  r i g h t  to  r e g u la te  th e  u se  o f  i t s  s t r e e t s ,  th e  r i g h t  o f  r e s t r i c ­
t io n  may n o t be  c o n s tm e d  to  deny " . . .  th e  r i g h t  o f p e rso n a l l i b e r t y  
g u a ra n tee d  to  every  c i t i z e n  . . . rt7^ I n  Bx P a r te  S to u t. 72 a Texas ca se , 
th e  S ta te  C ourt o f  C rim inal A ppeals upheld  a  c o n v ic tio n  f o r  p ic k e tin g  in
70109 S.W. 30 (1908).
^ I b i d . . p . 32.
72198 S.W. 96? (1917).
v i o la t io n  o f  a  c i t y  o rd in an c e  on th e  grounds t h a t  p ic k e tin g  was d esig n ed  
to  c r e a te  d is o rd e r ,  and th e  i n s t i g a t o r s  w ere n o t e n t i t l e d  to  u se  th e  
p u b lic  conveyance a s  a  naans o f  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  e x p re ss io n .
The ru l in g  o f  th e  Texas c o u r t  was suppo rted  by th e  In d ia n a  
Supreme C ourt i n  W alte rs  v . I n d ia n a p o l is . ^  The a p p e l la n t  (W alte rs) was 
co n v ic te d  o f  v io la t in g  an o rd in an ce  by  w alk ing  up and down in  f r o n t  o f  a  
b a rb e r  shop w earing  a s h i r t  b ea rin g  th e  i n s c r ip t i o n  "B arber Shop U n fa ir  
to  O rganised  Labor. The In d ia n a  Supreme C ourt upheld  th e  c o n v ic tio n , 
r u l in g  t h a t  w h ile  th e  o rd in an ce  d id  n o t r e s t r i c t  " . . .  th e  r i g h t  o f  
f r e e  in te rc h a n g e  o f  th o u g h t and o p in io n  o r  th e  l i g h t  to  speak, w r i te  o r  
p r i n t  f r e e ly  . . . t h i s  does n o t mean th a t  . . . / t h e  a p p e l la n t /  • . . 
nay do a s  he p le a s e s  on a p u b lic  s t r e e t  . . . HT 5  Although th e  d e c is io n s  
i n  W a lte rs  v . In d ia n a p o lis  and in  Ex P a r te  S to u t were i n  c o n f l i c t  w ith  
th e  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  M issou ri Supreme C ourt in  £ t .  L ouis v . d o n e r , 
th e s e  c o u r ts  d id  n o t deny " . . .  th e  a s s o c ia t io n  o f  p lo k e tin g  w ith  f r e e  
s p e e c h .“76
The a s s o c ia t io n  o f  p ic k e tin g  w ith  f r e e  speeoh which l a t e r  p ro ­
v ided  a p a r t i a l  b a s i s  f o r  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  nay be t ra c e d  to  two 
d e c is io n s  o f  th e  New York C ourt o f  A ppeals, Exchange Bakery v .
Thy* N.E. h82 (1922).
7** Ib id . . p . ^83-
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Joseph Tannenhaus, "P ic k e tin g  a s  P ree  Speech) E arly  S tag es i n  
th e  Growth o f  th e  New Law o f  P lo k e t in g ,“ U n iv e rs ity  o f  P i t ts b u rg h  Law 
Review. XXIV, No. 3 (S p r l i« .  1953). 399-
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R lfk ln 77 and 2 iiil3 !l2 A  T hea te r v . K aplan. 7® I n  th e  Exchange Bakery ease  
a  w a itre s s e s  an ion  had been en jo in ed  from p lo k e tin g  a lo c a l  bakery . The 
p lo k e tin g  c o n s is te d  o f two women w alking in  th e  s t r e e t  n e a r  th e  r e s ta u ­
r a n t  w earing p la c a rd s  "W aitresses S tr ik e  P ic k e t . " The p lo k e tin g  was 
n o n v io le n t and th e r e  was no evidence o f  i n t i s i d a t i o n .  Speaking f o r  th e  
c o u r t .  Judge Andrews s ta te d  th a t :
Economic o rg a n is a tio n  today  i s  n o t based  on th e  s in g le  shop . . . 
/ w e  un ion / • • • Bay c a l l  a  s t r i k e  and p ic k e t  th e  p re v is e s  o f  th e  
employer w ith  th e  i n t e n t  o f  inducing  h ia  to  employ on ly  un ion  la b o r .  
P ic k e tin g  w ith o u t a s t r i k e  i s  no store un law fu l th a n  a  s t r i k e  w ith o u t 
p lo k e tin g . Both a re  based on a ^ a w fu l  purpose* R e su ltin g  in ju r y  i s  
in c id e n ta l  and must be endured .™
F ive y e a rs  l a t e r  i n  th e  S t i l lw e l l  case , which a ls o  in v o lv ed  n o n v io le n t
p lo k e tin g , J u s t i c e  Pound h e ld  th a t i
The f a c t  th a t  such a c t io n  / p ic k e t i n g /  way r e s u l t  i n  in c id e n ta l  
in ju r y  to  th e  eup loyer does n o t i n  i t s e l f  c o n s t i tu te  a J u s t i f i c a ­
t io n  f o r  is s u in g  an in ju n c t io n  a g a in s t  such a c t s .  The i n t e r e s t s  
o f  c a p i ta l  and la b o r  a re  a t  t i n e s  in im ic a l  and th e  c o u r ts  nay n o t 
d ec id e  c o n tro v e rs ie s  betw een p a r t i e s  so long  a s  n e i th e r  r e s o r t s  to  
v io le n c e , d e c e i t ,  o r  m is re p re se n ta tio n  to  b rin g  abou t d e s ire d  
r e s u l t s .  • • . A cts m ust be le g a l  b u t  th e y  nay be le g a l  o r  i l l e g a l  
acco rd ing  to  th e  c ircum stances.
The g rad u a l s h i f t  in  J u d ic ia l  op in ion  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in  th e s e  
two c a se s  amounted to  an accep tance  by th e  c o u r ts  th a t  p ic k e tin g  was a  
p e rm iss ib le  e x e rc is e  o f  c o l le c t iv e  r ig h t s  designed  to  r e in fo rc e  th e  p ro ­
ce ss  o f  economic p re s su re . With th e  passage o f th e  N o rris  LaOuardia Act
77157 N.E. 130 (1927). 
7 ^ 8 2  N.E. 63 (1932). 
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and th e  N ationa l Labor R e la tio n s  Act* th e  c o a r ts  began to  look p a s t  th e  
fo rm a l is t ic  design  o f th e  law  to  th e  p r a c t ic a l  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  circum ­
s ta n ce s  i n  an e f f o r t  to  p ro te o t  th e  r ig h t  o f  p u b lic  p r o te s t .  I n  K irase  
v. A d l e r t h e  Supreme Court o f  Pennsylvania extended th e  a s s o c ia t io n  
betw een p ic k e tin g  and f r e e  speech by in f e r r in g  th a t  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  
i s  11. . . secured  to  th e  c i t i z e n  by th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro v is io n  t h a t :  
/A r t .  1, S ec tio n  27 'The f r e e  communication o f  though ts and o p in io n s i s
one o f  th e  in v a lu a b le  r ig h ts  o f man, and every  c i t i z e n  may f r e e ly  speak,
8?w rite  and p r in t  an any s u b je c t . . . ' "
The equation  o f  p ic k e tin g  w ith  f r e e  speech by th e  Pennsylvan ia  
Supreme Court was fo rm alized  by J u s t ic e  B randeis in  Senn v. T ile  L ayers 
P ro te c t iv e  Union and re s u l te d  in  a d o c tr in e  o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c tio n  
in  T h o rn h ill  v. Alabama. ^  When th e  Senn case  reached th e  Supreme Court 
in  1937* th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l i ty  o f  th e  N orrls-L aG uardia Act and th e  
Wagner Act was s t i l l  undecided and th e  Court had only re c e n tly  re fu sed  
to  sa n c tio n  th e  N .I.R .A . The t e s t  o f  th e  Senn case  th e re fo re  came a t  a 
tim e o f  c o n s id e ra b le  so c ia l  and economic u n re s t  which undoubtedly p ro­
duced a m easurable e f f e c t  on th e  I n te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  C ourt. The Senn 
case  a ro se  under a W isconsin a n t i - in ju n c t io n  s t a tu te  which p rov ided  th a t  
p e ace fu l p ic k e tin g  was law fu l as w e ll a s  n o n en jo in ab le . Senn, a t i l e  
c o n tra c to r  who u su a lly  worked as a p a r t  tim e c o n tra c to r  and t i l e  la y e r .
8 ll6 6  A tl. 566 (1933). 
82I b i d . . p . 569.
®^310 U .S .  8 8 .
was re q u e s te d  by th e  T ile  L ayers Union to  s ig n  an agreem ent r e q u ir in g  
Senn to  be  a  u n io n  c o n tr a c to r  and to  employ un ion  t i l e  la y e r s .  Senn 
co n sen ted  to  s ig n  th e  c o n tr a c t  i f  th e  p ro v is io n  r e q u ir in g  a l l  un ion  t i l e  
l a y e r s  was e lim in a te d . The u n io n  would n o t e lim in a te  t h i s  c la u se  from  
th e  c o n tr a c t  and Senn re fu s e d  to  s ig n ; co n seq u en tly , th e  un ion  e s ta b ­
l i s h e d  p ic k e t  l i n e s  around Senn1s  p la c e  o f  b u s in e s s . The p ic k e tin g  was 
p e a c e fu l w ith o u t in t im id a t io n  o r  o th e r  un law fu l a c t s ,  and Senn a p p lie d  
f o r  an  in ju n c t io n  on th e  grounds t h a t  th e  W isconsin s t a tu t e  " . . .
c o n tra v en e s  th e  g u a ran ty  o f  th e  F o u rteen th  Amendment a g a in s t  th e  d e p r l -
Sixv a tio n  o f  p ro p e r ty  w ith o u t due p ro c e ss . The Supreme C ourt o f
W isconsin  re fu se d  to  e n jo in  th e  p ic k e tin g  h o ld in g  t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  o f
a nonunion em ployer was w ith in  th e  law fu l r i g h t  o f  th e  union  to  in fo rm
th e  p u b lic  t h a t  th e  em ployer was u n f a i r .
J u s t i c e  B randeis, speak ing  f o r  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  th e  Supreme C ourt
i n  a  f iv e  to  fo u r  d e c is io n , r e je c te d  S e im 's ap p ea l s t a t in g  t h a t ;
. . . p ic k e tin g  and p u b l ic i ty  . . . a re  n o t p ro h ib ite d  by th e  Four­
te e n th  Amendment. Members o f  a u n ion  m ight, w ith o u t s p e c ia l  
s t a tu to r y  a u th o r i s a t io n  by  a  s t a t e ,  make known th e  f a c t s  o f  a la b o r  
d is p u te ,  f o r  freedom o f  speech i s  p ro te c te d  by th e  F e d e ra l C o n s titu ­
t io n .  The s t a t e  may, i n  th e  e x e rc is e  o f . i t s  p o l ic e  power r e g u la te  
th e  methods and means o f  p u b l ic i ty  . . . ■*
B ran d eis  d is t in g u is h e d  th e  Truax case  on th e  b a s is  t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  by
th e  T rades C ouncil was t o r t i o u s  i n  n a tu re  and exoeeded th e  concep t o f
p e a c e fu l p r o te s t .  I f  th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  p e a c e fu l, th e  s t a t e  may r e g u la te
^ 3 0 1  U.S. ^ 9 . 
85I b l d . . p . h78.
th e  conduct o f  th o  p ic k e ts  th rough  i t s  p o l ic e  powers and such r e g u la t io n  
I s  n o t a  v io la t io n  o f  due p ro c e ss  guaran teed  under th e  C o n s t i tu tio n . 
J u s t i c e  B u tle r , f o r  th e  M in o rity , adhered  to  th e  argum ent o f  C hief 
J u s t i c e  T a f t  I n  Truax v. O orrlgan  h o ld in g  th a t  " . . . th e  F o u rteen th  
Amendment . . . fo rb id s  th e  s t a t e  . . . /f ro m  ta k in g  a c t io n s  which w i l l
t a k e /  • • • from th e  In d iv id u a l  th e  r i g h t  to  engage i n  com on occupa-
■86t lo n s  o f  U f e .  The l e g i s l a t i v e  power o f  th e  s t a t e  may n o t be 
e x e rc is e d  in  such a way a s  to  I n t e r f e r e  w ith  " . . .  th e  g u a ra n te e s  o f  
th e  due p ro c e ss  and equal p ro te c t io n  c la u se s  o f  th e  F o u rteen th  Amend­
m ent. W hile one may assume th a t  p e a c e fu l p lo k e tin g  m ight be la w fu lly  
u sed  a s  a means o f  p ro te s t in g  a  la b o r  d is p u te , th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  th e  means
depends upon th e  s u b je c t .  "The o b je c t  be ing  u n law fu l, th e  means and
■88ends a re  condemned a l ik e .
The m a jo r ity  d e c is io n  i n  th e  Senn case  r e p re s e n ts  a c o n s id e ra b le  
d e p a r tu re  from th e  p o s i t io n  o f  th e  Oourt In  Truax v . O orrlgan . P re v i­
o u s ly  th e  C ourt had been u n w illin g  to  p e rm it th e  s t a t e s  to  e r e c t  s o c ia l  
and economic l e g i s l a t i o n  which d id  n o t c o in c id e  w ith  th e  C o u r t 's  concep­
t io n  o f  r i g h t  and wrong. B eginning w ith  Senn' a case , th e  C ourt, I n  a 
s e r i e s  o f  d e c is io n s , began to  p e rm it a  b ro ad e r co n cep tio n  o f  what m ight 
be re g u la te d  w ith o u t in c u r r in g  a v io la t io n  o f  due p ro c e ss . W hile th e  
e x a c t e f f e c t  o f  J u s t ic e  B ra n d e is ' e q u a tio n  betw een p ic k e tin g  and f r e e
^ I b i d . . p . 486.
87I b l d . . p . 489.
88I b ld .
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speech l e f t  muoh In  doub t, I t  soon became c l e a r  t h a t  th e  C ourt, a t  l e a s t  
f o r  a p e r io d  o f  t in e ,  was w i l l in g  to  a llo w  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  and c o u r ts  
to  e s t a b l i s h  a code o f  p r o te c t io n  a p a r t  from t h a t  o f  th e  Truax d e c is io n . 
The q u e s tio n  o f  w hether p ic k e tin g  was equal to  f r e e  speech, was a  form  
o f  f r e e  speech, o r  a  r i g h t  U n i t e d  to  J u d ic ia l  c o n s id e ra tio n  re u a in e d  
undeterm ined . The d ic ta  o f  th e  m a jo r ity  o p in io n  i n  th e  Seim case  f a i l e d  
to  s p e l l  o u t  th e  c o n d it io n s  under which p ic k e tin g  n ig h t  be  p ro te c te d  a s  
f r e e  speech , and J u s t i c e  B randeis d id  n o t d i s t in g u is h  th e  ends f o r  which 
th e  employment o f  p ic k e tin g  n ig h t  be p ro te c te d . The d e c is io n  i n  th e  
Senn c a se  le d  to  no re  co n fu s io n  th an  en lig h ten m en t and a t  th e  same t i n e  
produced a new e ra  i n  th e  le g a l  s t a tu s  o f p ic k e tin g .
Although th e  r e s u l t  i n  th e  Senn case  was n o t  e n t i r e l y  u n a n t ic i ­
p a te d , th e  e f f e c t  o f th e  m a jo r i ty 's  o p in io n  c re a te d  c o n s id e ra b le  dism ay 
and a s to n ish m e n t in  th e  s t a t e  c o u r ts  and among le g a l  w r i t e r s .  Begin­
n ing  w ith  th e  Vegelahn ca se , th e  low er c o u r ts  g ra d u a lly  e s ta b l is h e d  a 
body o f  p ro c e d u ra l l i g h t s  govern ing  th e  conduct o f  p ic k e tin g  c a se s .
T h is s e t  o f  p ro c e d u ra l r i g h t s  was reo o g n ised  a t  oomnon law  and founded 
on e s ta b l is h e d  J u d ic ia l  p re c e d e n ti p ro te c t io n  o f  th e  f r e e  m arket doc­
t r i n e .  Any in te r n a t io n a l  in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  t h i s  body o f  r i g h t s ,  such a s  
p ic k e tin g , u n le s s  o th e rw ise  p r iv i le g e d ,  was t o r t i o u s  I n  n a tu re  and 
a c t io n a b le  a t  common law .
The d e c is io n  In  th e  Senn case  q u e s tio n e d  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  
t o r t  th e o ry  o f  p ic k e tin g , s t a t in g  by im p lic a tio n  t h a t  p ic k e tin g
^ S e e  C harles 0 . G re g o ry 's  Labor and th e  Law (R evised  E d itio n , 
New Yorki W. W. Norton, I n c . ,  1959). P- 296.
c o n ta in e d  an  e lem ent o f  f ro *  speech . As a consoquence o f  th e  Senn 
d e c is io n , th e  q u e s tio n  b e fo re  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  and s t a t e  c o u r ts  was 
w hether th e  s t a t e s  oould  p r o h ib i t  p lo k e tin g  by U n i t i n g  th e  ends f o r  
which p ic k e tin g  n ig h t  be u n d e rtak en  o r  w hether th e r e  w ere c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
U n i t s  on th e  power o f  th e  s t a t e s  to  r e g u la te  p ic k e tin g .
Between th e  Senn d e c is io n  (1937) and th e  ca se  o f  T h o rn h ill  v . 
Alabama (1940), a  number o f  s t a t e  and f e d e ra l  c o u r ts  a ttem p ted  to  formu­
l a t e  a  b a s i s  which m ight be s u b s t i tu te d  f o r  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  th e
90Vegelahn c a se . I n  P eople  v . H a r r ls s  th e  Supreme C ourt o f  C olorado, 
reo o g n iz in g  th e  dictum  i n  th e  Senn case , s ta te d  t h a t  "where a law  . . . 
under c o n s id e ra tio n , im p a irs  freedom  o f  speech . . .  we h a re  no doubt 
t h a t  i t  c o n s t i tu t e s  an  in v a s io n  o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  g u a ra n te e s  . . • p ro ­
h ib i t in g  . . . law s im p a irin g  th e  freedom o f  speech. "9^ I n  Ex P a r te  
B e ll92 th e  D i s t r i c t  C ourt o f  A ppeals su s ta in e d  a C a lifo rn ia  o rd in an ce  
which outlaw ed o n ly  v io le n t  p ic k e tin g .
T here i s  no doubt t h a t  p ic k e tin g  i s  reoogn lzed  a s  law fu l under th e  
F o u rte en th  Amendment. . . . The r i g h t  to  p io k e t by law fu l means 
. . . may be  en joyed fay a l l  in d iv id u a ls .  . . .  I t  i s  . . .  a law fu l 
e x c is e  o f  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  g u a ran ty  o f  freedom  o f  speech, p re s s  
and assem b lag e .9 -*
94I n  P eople  v . Q id a lr  th e  C a lifo rn ia  S u p e rio r C ourt expanded
9091 P. 2d. 989 (1939).
91I b l d . , p . 994.
92100 P. 2d. 339 (1940).
93I b l d . . p . 340.
^ 3 5  C al. App. 2. 758 (1939).
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B ran d e is1 f r e e  speeoh dictum  by d e c la r in g  a Los Angeles c i t y  o rd inance  
r e s t r i c t i n g  p ic k e tin g  to  nbona f id e "  employees who had been employed a t  
l e a s t  t h i r t y  days to  be  a d e n ia l  o f  a  fundam ental c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r i g h t .  
In Qarcla. 95 a companion case  under th e  same o rd inance , th e
o o u rt n u l l i f i e d  a p ro v is io n  o f  th e  a c t ,  r e s t r i c t i n g  p io k e ts  from d i s ­
p lay in g  p la c a rd s  " . . .  c o n ta in in g  any words, l e t t e r i n g  o r  d esig n  
. . . which were o th e r  th an  in fo rm a tio n a l in  c h a ra c te r .  The p la c a rd s  
c a r r ie d  by th e  p ic k e ts  d id  n o t conform p re c is e ly  to  th e  l im i ta t io n s  o f  
th e  o rd in an ce  and th e  p io k e ts  supplem ented th e  s ig n  by say ing , nT his 
p la c e  i s  on s t r i k e .  D on 't work h e re ." 97 Speaking f o r  th e  c o u rt . Judge 
Shausr h e ld  t h a t  " th e  language t h a t  was d isp la y e d  by th e  d efen d an ts  
. . . does n o t c o n s t i tu te  a d e a r  and p re s e n t  danger to  government and 
i s  n o t  o th e rw ise  o b je c tio n a b le . . . . The c a rry in g  o f th e  sign  i s  a
manner o f  e x e rc is in g  freedom o f  speech . . .  a  p u b lic a t io n  o f  id e a s
*98
In  Ex P a r te  Lyons, 99 an o th e r C a lifo rn ia  case , th e  D i s t r i c t  Court
I n te rp r e te d  th e  dictum  o f  th e  Senn case  a s  p ro v id in g  p ro te c tio n  f o r
s t r a n g e r  as w ell as prim ary p ic k e tin g .
We canno t see  how th e  r ig h t  to  p e a c e fu lly  p ic k e t, under th e  gu a ran ty  
o f  f r e e  speech, cou ld  be confined  to  c a se s  in  which th e re  e x i s t s  a
9% 8 P. 2d. 26$ (1939).
96M 3 -  . p. 267.
97I b id . . p. 268.
98I b ld . .  p . 270.
" 8 1  P. 2d. 190 (1938)-
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d is p u te  betw een an  em ployer and o rg an iz ed  l a b o r  o v e r  h o u rs  o r  cond i­
t io n s  o f  employment. . . . The g u a ran ty  o f  th e  r i g h t  o f  f r e e  speech 
i s  g e n e ra l and e x ten d s  to  every  c la s s  o r  group o f  c i t i z e n s .
C ourts i n  sons ju r is d ic t io n s *  however, re fu se d  to  uphold  p ic k e t -
#
in g  which d id  n o t  conform to  t h e i r  co n cep tio n  o f  r i g h t  and wrong. As a  
g e n e ra l r u le  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  s t a t e  c o u r ts  view ed th e  f r e e  speech doc­
t r i n e  a s  a  q u a l i f ie d  r i g h t  which must be equated  to  o th e r  r i g h t s  
e s ta b l is h e d  a t  law . I n  most o f  th e s e  o ases  th e  t e s t  depended on w hether 
th e  p ic k e tin g  was in  pursuance  o f  a la w fu l p u rpose . I f  th e  purpose o f  
th e  p ic k e tin g  was n o t a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  c o u r t ,  th e  a c t i v i t y  was 
c o n s id e re d  to  be an  in fr in g e m e n t on th e  r i g h t  to  a c q u ire  and p o sse ss  
p ro p e r ty . A m in o rity  o f  s t a t e  c o u r ts  re fu se d  to  fo llo w  th e  im p lie d  r u le  
o f  th e  S em  ease  and co n tin u ed  to  e n jo in  a l l  form s o f  p ic k e t in g  e x ce p t 
th o se  o f  a  nom inal v a r i e ty .
I n  r e t r o s p e c t  th e  dictum  o f  th e  Senn case  proved to  be a con fus­
in g  gu ide  f o r  de te rm in in g  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s t a tu s  o f  p lo k e t in g . I f  
th e  r u le  o f  S e n n 's  c ase  was to  be  e ffe c tiv e *  i t  was q u i te  obv ious, i n  
view  o f  th e  c o n f l ic t in g  d e c is io n s , t h a t  i t  would be n ecessa ry  f o r  th e  
U nited  S ta te s  Supreme C ourt to  develop  a  body o f  r u le s  which would perm it 
th e  low er c o u r ts  to  d isp e n se  w ith  p ic k e tin g  c a se s  i n  a c o n s is te n t  manner*
THE THORNHILL DOCTRINE
I n  November. 1937. Bryon T h o rn h ill  was co n v ic te d  by th e  C ir c u i t  
Court o f  A ppeals o f  v io la t in g  an Alabama s t a t e  law  p ro h ib i t in g  p ic k e tin g
1WW .  p. 193-
i n  any f o r a .  The Alabama Supreme C ourt upheld  th o  C i r c u i t  Court* s 
ru l in g ,  and T h o rn h ill p e t i t io n e d  on c o n s t i tu t io n a l  grounds to  th o  U nited  
S ta te s  Supreme C ourt. A ccording to  tho  f a o t s  o f  th o  oaso . T h o rn h ill  was 
ono o f  s e v e ra l  p io k o ts  who had p a t r o l le d  th o  o n tran eo  to  th o  em ployer' s  
p la n t  in  su p p o rt o f  a  s t r i k e  by th o  em ployee 's un ion . S ince th o  day o f  
th o  s t r i k e  tho  union had m ain ta in ed  a p io k e t  l i n o  o f  s ix  to  e ig h t  men 
around th o  p la n t  f o r  tw e n ty -fo u r h ou rs a day. T h o rn h ill  and th o  o th e r  
p io k e ts  inform ed th o se  who w ished to  r e tu r n  to  work t h a t  ". . . th ey  
were on s t r i k e  and d id  n o t want anybody to  go up th e re  to  work. ■101 In  
comm unicating t h i s  in fo rm a tio n  T h o rn h ill  and h i s  fe llo w  p io k e ts  made no 
th r e a t s  o r  any a tte m p ts  to  in t im id a te  th e  o th e r  em ployees. T h o rn h ill 
was a r r e s t e d  and su b seq u en tly  co n v ic te d  on th e  grounds t h a t  he w i l f u l ly  
engaged i n  p ic k e tin g  w ith  th e  i n t e n t  o f  in ju r in g  th e  em ployer. The 
co u n se l f o r  th e  S ta te  o f  Alabama adopted  th e  r u le  o f  th e  Vegelahn ca se , 
a rg u in g  t h a t  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  i s  t o r t i o u s  i n  n a tu re  and c o n s t i tu t e s  
an in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  p ro p e rty  r i g h t s .
I n  an e ig h t  to  one d e c is io n  w ith  J u s t i c e  McReynolds d i s s e n t ­
in g , th e  Supreme C ourt re v e rse d  th e  low er c o u r t1 s d e c is io n  d e c la r in g
103th e  s t a t e  law u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l .  J u s t i c e  Kurphy, speaking  f o r  th e  
m a jo r ity , chose to  fo llo w  th e  dictum  o f  th e  Senn case  h o ld in g  t h a t :
101310 U.S. 9^.
102J u s t i c e  McReynolds was th e  on ly  su rv iv in g  j u s t i c e  o f  th e  fo u r  
man m in o rity  i n  Senn* s c a se .
^ - ^ J u s t ic e  Murphy was one o f  th e  new appo in tm en ts to  th e  Supreme 
Court by P re s id e n t  R ooseve lt. The J u s t i c e  was a  form er governor o f 
M ichigan and was c o n sid e red  to  be p ro - la b o r  i n  h i s  view s.
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F ree  d ieousslom  concern ing  th e  o o n d itlo n s  I n  In d u s try  and th e  omuses 
o f  l a b o r  d is p u te s  a p p e a rs  to  u s  In d isp e n sa b le  to  th e  e f f e c t iv e  and  
I n t e l l i g e n t  u se  o f  th e  p ro c e s s e s  o f  p o p u la r  governm ent to  d u p e  th e  
d e s t in y  o f  modern i n d u s t r i a l  s o c ie ty .  . . .  We concur i n  th e  o b se r ­
v a tio n  o f  H r. J u s t i c e  B ran d eis  . . .  i n  Senn1 s  c a se  • . . / t h a t / .
. • freedom  o f  speech i s  g u a ran teed  by th e  F e d e ra l C o n s t i tu t io n .
W hile th e  s t a t e  nay r e g u la te  economic a f f a i r s .  J u s t i c e  Murphy a rgued , i t
does n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  fo llo w  t h a t  th e  s t a t e  nay unduly r e s t r i c t  th e  r i g h t
o f  p u b lic  p r o t e s t .  The p en al code o f  th e  S ta te  o f  Alabama p r o h ib i t s
n e a r ly  every  p r a c t i c a l  means o f  communicating th e  n a tu re  and cause  o f  an
i n d u s t r i a l  d is p u te .  Under th e  o p e ra tio n  o f t h i s  s t a t u t e  th e  p u b lic  i s
p rev e n ted  from se cu rin g  in fo rm a tio n  which may be In d isp e n sa b le  to  th e
fo rm a tio n  o f  an ed u ca ted  p u b lic  o p in io n , i s  a  p u b lic  e n t i t y  i t  i s  th e
d u ty  o f  th e  s t a t e  to  sa feg u a rd  th o se  means which a r e  e s s e n t ia l  to  th e
p re s e rv a t io n  o f  a  dem ocratic  s o c ie ty , and th e  s t a t e  m ust c o n tin u a l ly
guard  a g a in s t  p r iv a te  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  seek  to  u se  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f  th e
s t a t e  to  su p p re ss t
. . . peaoefU l and t r u th f u l  d is c u s s io n  o f m a tte r s  o f  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  
m erely  on th e  lo w in g  t h a t  o th e r s  may th e re b y  be  persuaded  to  ta k e  
a c t io n  in c o n s is te n t  w ith  i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  Abridgm ent o f  th e  l i b e r t y  
o f  such d lso u s s lo n  can  be j u s t i f i e d  o n ly  where th e  c le a r  danger o f  
s u b s ta n t iv e  e v i l s  a r i s e s  u n d er o ircu m stan ces a ffo rd in g  no epportu iw  
l t y  to  t e s t  th e  m e r i ts  o f  id e a s  by c o m p e titio n  f o r  accep tan ce  in  th e  
m arket o f  p u b lic  o p in io n .
The language  o f  th e  C ourt t h a t  p ic k e tin g  oould be r e s t r i c t e d  i f  i t  con­
s t i t u t e d  a " c le a r  danger" caused  many a u th o r i t i e s  to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e  
C ourt in te n d e d  to  ban a l l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a g a in s t  p ic k e tin g . The r i g h t  to
10**310 U.S. 103. 
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p ic k e t  was a p p a re n tly  accep ted  a s  a means o f  p u b lic  p r o te s t  p ro te c te d  by 
th e  F i r s t  and F o u rteen th  Amendments to  th e  C o n s titu tio n .
The e q u a l i ty  o f  p ic k e tin g  w ith  f r e e  speech in  th e  T h o rn h ill  case  
embraced th e  d e a r  and p re s e n t danger t e s t  f i r s t  e n o u n d a te d  by J u s t ic e  
Holmes i n  Schenck v. U.S.^®8 Schenck, a s o c i a l i s t ,  was co n v ic ted  o f  
d i s t r ib u t in g  pam phlets through th e  m a lls  designed  to  o b s tru c t  th e  
r e c r u i t in g  and e n lis tm e n t o f  p e rso n n e l In  th e  m i l i ta r y  fo rc e s . In  deny* 
ing  Schenck*s ap p ea l Holmes s ta te d  t h a t  " th e  q u e s tio n  . . .  i s  w hether 
th e  words used  a re  . . .  o f  such a n a tu re  a s  to  c re a te  a d e a r  and 
p re s e n t  danger t h a t  w i l l  b rin g  abou t su b s ta n tiv e  e v i l s .  . . .  I t  i s  a 
q u e s tio n  o f  p ro x im ity  and d e g re e . " ^ 7  under th e  t e s t  o f  th e  Schenck 
case  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  could  n o t be r e s t r i c t e d  by 
fe d e r a l  o r  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n  u n le s s  th e  conduct o f  th e  p ic k e ts  c re a te s  
a danger which r e s u l t s  In  " su b s ta n tiv e  e v i l s . " In  a l a t e r  case  Thomas 
v. C o llin s* 08 th e  Court d e fin ed  th e  broad a sp e c ts  o f  th e  d e a r  and 
p re s e n t danger t e s t  by ru l in g  a Texas s t a t e  law re q u ir in g  th e  r e g i s t r a ­
t io n  o f  la b o r  o rg a n is e rs  to  be an u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l  e x e ro ise  o f  th e  
p o l ic e  powers o f  th e  s t a te .
I f  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  r ig h t s  o f  f r e e  speech and f r e e  assem bly 
canno t be made a crim e . . . / s a i d  th e  0ourt7  . . .  we do n o t th in k  
t h a t  t h i s  can be accom plished by th e  dev ioe~of re q u ir in g  p rev io u s  
r e g i s t r a t i o n  a s  a c o n d itio n  f o r  e x e rc is in g  them and making such a
1062h9 U.S. k ?  (1919).
1Q7I b i d . . p . 52.
108323 U.S. $16 (19h4).
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c o n d itio n  tho  fo u n d a tio n  f o r  r e s t r a in in g  i n  advance t h o i r  e x e rc is e  
and fo j^ m p o s in g  a p e n a lty  f o r  v io la t in g  each a r e s t r a in in g
The d i f f i c u l t y  o f  lm p la n w tln g  th e  c l e a r  and p re s e n t  danger t e s t  
r e s u l t s  f ro n  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  what c o n s t i tu te s  a s u b s ta n tiv e  e v i l .  
A lthough th e  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  Court have n o t fo llow ed a c o n s is te n t  
p a t te rn ,  i t  nay be in f e r r e d  th a t  e x is te n c e  o f  s u b s ta n tiv e  e v i l  c o n s t i ­
tu te s  an In te r f e re n c e  w ith  th e  r ig h t  o f  so v e re ig n ty . I f  th e  a c t  o f th e  
o ffe n d e r  i s  such to  v io la te  o r  s e r io u s ly  th r e a te n  th e  p re s e rv a tio n  o f  
p u b lic  o rd e r , i t  i s  co n sid ered  to  be e v i l  i n  I t s e l f .
In te r f e re n c e  w ith  th e  p u b lic  peace . . . in c lu d e s  n o t  on ly  v io le n t  
a c t s  and words l i k e l y  to  produce v io le n c e  i n  o th e r s .  No one would 
have th e  hard ihood  to  su g g e s t t h a t  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  fre e d c n  o f  
speech sa n c tio n s  i n d t e n a n t  to  r i o t .  . . . When c le a r  and p re s e n t  
danger o f  r i o t ,  d is o rd e r , in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  t r a f f i c  upon th e  p u b lic  
s t r e e t s ,  o r  o th e r  im m ediate th r e a t  to  p u b lic  s a fe ty , peace o r  
a p p ea rs , th e  power o f  th e  s t a t e  to  p re v e n t o r  punish  i s  o b v io u s .^ -0
The Oourt, th e re fo re ,  was w il lin g  to  condone c e r ta in  l im i ta t io n s  
on th e  r i g h t  o f f r e e  speech which could  se rv e  to  r e s t r i c t  th e  s t a tu s  o f 
p ic k e tin g  a s  a fo ra  o f  speech. Though th e  r ig h t  o f  f r e e  speech i s  c a re ­
f u l ly  p ro te c te d  under th e  C o n s ti tu tio n , th e re  a re  c e r ta in  c la s s e s  o f  
speech which by t h e i r  very  n a tu re  n . . . I n c i t e  an  l w e d ia t e  b reach  o f  
th e  p e a c e . I t  i s  a p p a ren t t h a t  such form s o f  speech a re  obnoxious 
p e r  se  and re q u ire  no code o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c tio n . However, t h i s  
p ro s c r ip t io n  should  n o t be  in te r p r e te d  a s  a s t r i c t  l im i ta t io n  on th e
. ,  p . 5*K).
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r i g h t  to  engage i n  d eb a te  and d is p u te . The r ig h t  to  d eb a te  p u b lic  
d i f f e r e n c e s  must be je a lo u s ly  p ro te c te d , and i t  i s  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  t h i s  
r i g h t  " . . .  t h a t  s e t s  u s  a p a r t  f ro *  t o t a l i t a r i a n  re g im e s ."^ -2 The pro­
te c t io n  o f  f r e e  speech i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  o u r very  e x is te n c e , indeed  f r e e  
communication o f  id e a s  i s  a p r e r e q u is i te  to  a  s ta b le  democracy. The 
f r e e  flow  o f  d eb a te  augments th e  d isc u ss io n  o f  r i v a l  p ro p o sa ls  e s ta b ­
l is h in g  a b a s is  f o r  p u b lic  i n te r p r e ta t io n  and sy n th e s is . The r e s u l t in g  
co n c lu sio n  th u s  becomes a s e t t l i n g  in f lu e n c e  and p ro v id es  a  framework 
f o r  p u b lic  accep tan ce . R e s tx ic tio n s  on th e  r ig h t  o f  f r e e  speech must be 
c a r e fu l ly  guarded " . . .  f o r  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  . . . / f r e e  debate7  • • • 
would le a d  to  s ta n d a rd is a tio n  o f  id e a s  e i t h e r  by l e g i s l a tu r e s ,  c o u r ts , 
o r  dom inant p o l i t i c a l  o r  covnunity  groups.
D esp ite  th e  aforem entioned  d e c is io n s  o f th e  Supreme Court i n  
d e fin in g  th e  l im i ta t io n s  o f c le a r  and p re s e n t  danger, th e  a p p lic a t io n  o f 
t h i s  p r in c ip le  a s  a means o f  de te rm in ing  th e  le g a l  s ta tu s  o f  p lo k e tin g  
was a d i f f i c u l t  and t ry in g  p ro ce ss . I n  th e  m a jo r ity  o f th e  oases i t  was 
n ecessa ry  f o r  th e  Supreme Court to  ru le  w hether th e  f a c t s  c o n s t i tu te d  a 
c le a r  and p re s e n t  danger to  p u b lic  o rd e r . C lear and p re s e n t  danger 
proved to  be j u s t  a s  in ta n g ib le  a s  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  a law fu l means 
under th e  C layton A ct. I n  a d d it io n  to  th e se  problem s th e  b a s ic  
ph ilo sophy  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill case  was v ig o ro u s ly  p ro te s te d  by th e  s t a t e s  
a s  an unprecedented  in v a s io n  o f  t h e i r  p o lic e  power, and w ith in  th e  space
C ity  o f  Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 , h (19J+9)-
n 3lb ld .
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o f  two y o o ra  th o  e a r ly  prom ise o f  th o  T h o rn h il l  D oc trine  be cane 
encumbered w ith  nmnerous le g a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  which s e r re d  to  l im i t  i t s  
e f f e o t i r e n o s s .
O n th e  m m  day a s  th e  d e c is io n  in  th e  T h o rn h ill  e a se , th e  C ourt 
is su e d  a ru l in g  in  a  companion e a se  Carson r .  C a l i f o r n ia , I n  th a t  
e a se  C arson was c o n v ic te d  o f  v io la t in g  a  C a lifo rn ia  o rd in an ce  which made 
p ic k e tin g  u n law fu l. The counsel f o r  th e  S ta te  o f  C a lifo rn ia  sought to  
d is t in g u is h  th e  Carson ca se  from th e  T h o rn h ill  c ase  on th e  grounds t h a t  
th e  o rd in an ce  o p e ra ted  on ly  a g a in s t  p ic k e tin g  a s  a s p e c i f ic  type o f  
conduct which " . . .  i n  i t s  ve ry  n a tu re  i s  in im ic a l  to  th e  p u b lic  w el­
f a r e  . . The C ourt re fu se d  to  a c c e p t th e  argum ent o f  th e  a p p e lle e ,
h o ld in g  t h a t i
The c a r ry in g  o f  s ig n s  and b an n ers , no l e s s  th an  th e  r a i s in g  o f  a 
f l a g ,  i s  a  n a tu r a l  and a p p ro p r ia te  means o f  conveying in fo rm a tio n  
on m a tte r s  o f  p u b lic  concern  . . . p u b l ic is in g  th e  f a c t s  o f  a la b o r  
d is p u te  i n  a  p e a c e fu l way th rough  a p p ro p r ia te  naans • . . must now 
be reg a rd ed  a s  w ith in  t h a t  l i b e r t y  o f  oouaunLoation which i s  
secu red  to  ev ery  p e rso n  by th e  F o u rte en th  Amendment a g a in s t  
abridgm ent by a S ta te .
I n  February . 19*H. th e  Supreme C ourt supplem ented th e  dictum  o f  
th e  T h o rn h ill  c a se  i n  two se p a ra te  p ic k e tin g  d e o is io n s . In  A .F .L . v . 
Swing11? a b e a u t ic ia n s ' un ion  had r e s o r te d  to  nonenployee p ic k e tin g  o f  
a beau ty  shop owned by th e  d e fen d an t. Swing o b ta in ed  an  in ju n c t io n
n i f 310 U.S. 106 (19**0).
115I b i d . . p . 107.
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a g a in s t  th e  p lo k e tin g  on th e  b a s is  t h a t  tho  a c t iv i t y  o f  th e  p ic k e ts  was 
a  v io la t io n  o f  th e  due p ro ce ss  c la u se . J u s t i c e  f r a n k f u r te r ,  speaking 
f o r  th e  C ourt, s ta te d  t h a t  "a s t a t e  canno t exclude  workingmen from 
p e a c e fu lly  e x e rc is in g  th e  r i g h t  o f  f r e e  co m u n i c a t io n  by drawing th e  
c i r c l e  o f  economic com petition  between em ployers so s n a i l  a s  to  c o n ta in  
on ly  an employer and th o se  d i r e c t l y  employed by him. "H® i n  th e  e x e r­
c is e  o f  i t s  p o l ic e  power a  s t a te  nay no t l im i t  th e  r ig h t  o f  p u b lic  p ro ­
t e s t  In  o rd e r to  b a r  th e  union  from p u b lic iz in g  a work d is p u te . The 
economic i n t e r e s t s  o f  em ployers and employees a re  so c lo s e ly  drawn t h a t  
an undue re g u la tio n  by th e  s t a t e  w i l l  se rve  to  d is ru p t  th e  p a t te r n  o f 
i n d u s t r i a l  communication. The r i g h t  to  p ic k e t  i s  p ro te c te d  by th e  
F ed era l C o n s titu tio n , and t h i s  r i g h t  may n o t be in te r f e r e d  w ith  u n le s s  
a c le a r  danger e x i s t s . ^
W ithout b e n e f i t  o f  subsequent r e f le c t io n ,  th e  Swing d e c is io n  
seemed to  re p re se n t  a co n s id e ra b le  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e . 
I n  th e  T h o rn h ill case  th e  Supreme Court in v a l id a te d  a s t a t e  law which 
outlaw ed a l l  forms c.f p ic k e tin g , ru lin g  th a t  th e  s t a t e  cannot p r o h ib i t  
p ic k e tin g  p e r  se . In  th e  Swing case  th e  Court h e ld  t h a t  a s t a t e  may n o t 
p r o h ib i t  p lo k e tin g  even in  th e  absence o f  a d isp u te  between th e  p a r t i e s .  
T h is i s  to  say th a t  s t ra n g e r  p ic k e tin g  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  c o n s t i tu te  a 
s u b s ta n tiv e  e v i l  to  th e  so v e re ig n ty  o f  th e  s t a te .  Aside from i t s
U 8 312 U.S. 321.
seems ap p aren t from th e  f a c t s  o f th e  Swing case  th a t
J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r  d id  n o t c o n s id e r  th e  p ic k e tin g  to  be e i t h e r  a c le a r  
o r  p re s e n t  danger.
endorsem ent o f  s t r a n g e r  p lo k e tin g  th e  broad a sp e c ts  o f  th e  Swing d e c i­
sion  l e f t  some lo o se  ends i n  th e  la v  o f  p ic k e tin g . Fro* th e  dictum  o f  
th e  o p in io n  i t  ap p ea rs  t h a t  th e  C ourt d id  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  in te n d  to  
sa n c tio n  a l l  fb ra s  o f  s tra n g e r  p lo k e tin g , i . e . ,  p ic k e tin g  i n  su p p o rt o f  
an  un law fu l purpose. As a consequence o f  t h i s  loopho le  In  th e  f r e e  
speech d o c tr in e , s t a t e  and fe d e ra l  c o u r ts  were t h e r e a f t e r  a b le  to  
e n jo in  even p e ac e fu l p ic k e tin g  i f  th e  o b je c t  was in  c o n f l i c t  w ith  s t a te  
o r  f e d e ra l  la v s .  Secondly, th e  ru le  o f  th e  Suing case  was l im ite d  by 
th e  term inology  o f  th e  m a jo rity  op in ion  th a t  th e  s t a t e  may no t draw th e  
c i r c l e  "so  sm all a s  to" l im i t  th e  scope o f  p ic k e tin g . The obvious 
I n te n t  o f  th e  Court was to  p e rm it th e  s t a t e s  to  draw a c i r c l e  la r g e  
enough to  r e s t r i c t  p ic k e tin g  "o u ts id e"  th e  sphere  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  com peti­
t io n .  T h is le g a l  am biguity  l e f t  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  t h a t  s t a t e  c o u r ts  cou ld  
circum vent th e  T h o rn h ill D octrine  on th e  b a s i s  t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was 
n o t a  p a r t  o f th e  la b o r  d isp u te .
I n  Sw ing 's companion case  handed down th e  same day, Mllkwagon 
D riv ers  Union ▼. Meadowmoor D a ir ie s . 120 th e  Court r e s t r i c t e d  th e  r u le  o f 
th e  T h o rn h ill case  by upholding  an in ju n c t io n  r e s t r a in in g  th e  employment 
o f  p ic k e tin g  In  su p p o rt o f  a  la b o r  d isp u te . The d e c is io n  in  th e  M ilk- 
vagon D riv e rs ' case, which s i r e d  some s tro n g  d is s e n ts  by J u s t ic e s  B lack 
and Reed w ith  J u s t ic e  Douglas co n cu rrin g , was th e  f i r s t  in d ic a t io n  t h a t  
th e  T h o rn h ill D oc trine  m ight n o t  c o n s t i tu te  a b la n k e t endorsem ent o f 
p ic k e tin g  a s  f r e e  speech.
120312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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The M ajo rity  op in ion  o f  th e  Supreme C ourt found tho  conduct o f  
th e  d r iv e r s ' un ion  to  be beyond th e  saope o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c t io n . 
The f a c ta  o f  th e  ease  showed ". . . t h a t  th e r e  had been v io le n c e  on a 
c o n s id e ra b le  s c a le .  "^2-L Windows were swashed, e x p lo s iv e  bombs and 
s ten ch  bombs were thrown* tru c k s  were upset* burned and d r iv e n  in to  th e  
r i v e r ,  nonunion d r iv e r s  were stopped  a t  gun p o in t  and in v i te d  " to  jo in  
th e  un io n "; c a r lo a d s  o f  p ic k e ts  pursued th e  nonunion d r iv e r s  and 
a ttem p ted  to  d is r u p t  d e liv e ry  by th re a te n in g  and b e a tin g  up th e  d r iv e r s  
. . and in  one in s ta n c e  sh o t a t  th e  tru c k  and d r iv e r .
Mr. J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r , speaking f o r  th e  m a jo rity  (which 
in c lu d ed  J u s t ic e  Murphy)* fo rm ula ted  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  law a s  " . . . 
w hether a  s t a t e  can choose to  a u th o r is e  i t s  c o u r ts  to  e n jo in  a c ts  o f  
p ic k e tin g  in  them selves p e ace fu l when they  a re  enmeshed w ith  contempo­
ran eo u sly  v io le n t  conduct which i s  concededly outlaw ed. Xn answ ering
t h i s  q u e s tio n  J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r  review ed th e  e v o lu tio n  o f  th e  l e g a l  
s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  beg inn ing  w ith  T h o rn h il l1s case . Freedom o f  speech. 
F ra n k fu r te r  argued* im p lie s  a code o f  rea so n ab le  conduct. The C o n stitu ­
t io n  i s  n o t  an  a b so lu te  g u aran tee  a g a in s t  a l l  forms o f  conduct, i . e . *  "a 
man who sh o u ts  f i r e  i n  a crowded th e a te r "  may n o t r e ly  on th e  B i l l  o f  
R ig h ts . Die same code o f  rea so n ab le  conduct must be a p p lie d  to  th o se  
fo n ts  o f  communication which se rve  a s  a means o f  p u b lic  p r o te s t .  The
m I b ld . ,  p. 291.
122I b l d . ,  p. 292.
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r i g h t  to  p ic k e t  i s  U n i t e d  by th e  seme r u le  o f  reason t p ic k e tin g  which 
l i e s  beyond th e  scope o f  j u s t i f i a b l e  oonduct cannot be p ro te c te d . 
"P eacefu l p ic k e tin g  i s  th e  workingman1 s weans o f  o o enun ica tion  b u t . . . 
/ t h e  u se  o f  p ic k e t in g /  . . .  i n  a  c o n te x t o f  v io le n ce  can lo s e  I t s  s ig ­
n if ic a n c e  a s  an appea l to  reaso n  and beeowe p a r t  o f  an in s tru m en t o f  
fo rc e . Sadi u t te r a n c e  was no t meant to  be s h e l te re d  by th e  C o n stitu ­
t io n .  "12J* The p ic k e t  l i n e  i s  c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  p ro te c te d  a s  long  a s  th e  
p ro c e ss  o f  inform ing th e  p u b lic  i s  conducted i n  a reaso n ab le  manner. 
P ic k e tin g  a s  a form o f  f r e e  speech i s  q u a l i f ie d  by th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  
s t a t e  to  p rev en t co n tin u in g  th r e a ts  o f v io le n ce  and m isconduct. The 
s t a t e ,  however, must e x e rc is e  reaso n ab le  c a re  i n  th e  employment o f  i t s  
p o l ic e  powers; e .g . .  " . . .  th e  r ig h t  o f  f r e e  speech cannot be den ied  
by drawing from a t r i v i a l  rough in c id e n t  . . . Nor may a s t a t e  e n jo in  
p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  m erely because i t  way provoke v io len ce  i n  o th e rs .
Noting th e  c o n te n tio n  o f  th e  m in o rity  th a t  th e  d e c is io n  i n  t h i s  
case  made s e r io u s  in ro a d s  on th e  law  o f  p ic k e tin g  as e s ta b l is h e d  in  th e  
T h o rn h ill  and C arlson  d e c is io n s . J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r  rea ffirm e d  th e  f r e e  
speech d o c tr in e , p o in tin g  o u t t h a t  th e  p r io r  oases invo lved  s ta tu te s
which outlaw ed a l l  p ic k e tin g  " . . .  and th e re fo re  we s tra o k  then
1d o w n . J u s t  a s  t h e  F o u r te e n th  Amendment r e s t r i c t s  t h e  s t a t e  i n  t h e  
e x e r c i s e  o f  i t s  a u t h o r i t y ,  t h e  sam e am endm ent p e r m i t s  t h e  s t a t e  t o
12i* lb ld . . p . 293-
I2 ^ I b ld . . pp. 293-296. 
126I b i d . ,  p . 297.
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c o n tro l  " . . .  c ircu m stan ces  • . . /w h ioh  m ight r e s u l t  in 7  • • ■ I m I -
n e n t and ag g ra v a te d  danger . . . 1,127
The d is s e n t in g  J u s t ic e s  B lack and Reed o b je c te d  to  th e  m ajor­
i t y '  s o p in io n  on th e  grounds t h a t  i t  inposed  a se v e re  r e s t r i c t i o n  on th e  
T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e . J u s t i c e  B lack em phasized t h a t  F r a n k f u r te r 's  o p in io n
den ied  th e  r i g h t  o f  p r o te s t  to  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  th e  un ion  members who
w ere i n  no way connected  w ith  th e  v io le n c e . I n  th e  p ro ceed in g s o f  th e  
t r i a l  th e  un ion  m ain ta ined  t h a t  a m in o rity  o f  i t s  members was resp o n s­
i b l e  f o r  th e  v io le n c e , and th e  union* s counsel in d io a te d  th a t  th e re  
would be no o b je c tio n  to  a  deo ree  c o n tr o l l in g  th e  v io le n t  a s p e c ts  o f  th e  
p ic k e tin g . But th e  scope o f  th e  r e s t r a in in g  o rd e r  upheld  by th e  m ajo r­
i t y .  a rgued  J u s t i c e  B lack, i s  u n lim ite d  in  i t s  e f f e c t .  The e lem ent o f  
v io le n c e  was co n sid ered  to  be c o n tr o l l in g  and h as r e s u l te d  i n  an o rd e r  
which r e s t r a i n s  th e  in ju n c t io n  and th e r e f o re  r e s t r i c t s  any and a l l  
p u b l ic a t io n  o f  th e  d is p u te .  I n  com paring:
. . . th e  language o f  th e  s t a tu t e s  i n  th e  T h o rn h ill  and C arlson  
c a se s  w ith  t h a t  o f  th e  in ju n c t io n  . . . / i n  t h i s  oase  i t  becomes 
a p p a re n t t h a t  th e re  i s  l i t t l e  d if f e r e n c e  i n  th e  scope o f  th e  
r e s t r i c t i o n /  • * .
T h o n iia i l  S ta tu te  Mfaflowpopr IfljS flp& on f t  r i g ?
g o / in a /  n e a r  to  o r  w alking up and down i n  l o i t e r / D ^ /  i n  f r o n t  
l o i t e i j n g j  abou t th e  f r o n t  o f  s a id  s to r e s  o f  . . . any p la c e  o f
p rem ises o r  p la c e  . . .* d isc o u rag in g  b u s in e ss  . . . ;
o f  b u s in e ss  . . . ;  . . .  p e rso n s  . . . in f lu e n c in g  . . . any
in f lu e n c in g  . . . co n tem p la tin g  p u r-  p e rso n  to  r e f r a in
p e rso n s  n o t to  t r a d e  ch asin g  . . . s i n t e r -  from p u rch asin g  . . . ;
. . . ;  p i c k e t / l n g 7  f a r i n g ,  h i n d e r i n g ,  o r  i n t i m i d a t i n g ,  t h r e e t -
t h e  w o rk s  o r  p l a c e  . . . d i v e r t / i n g 7  • • • e n in g  o r  c o e r c in g  . . .
1 2 7 I b l d .
Thnwih^n statute Meadownoor Injunction Carlson Statute 
"of business . . . "  "persons desirous of "any P*^*a * * •*
. . . purchasing . . display/ingT any
us/Ing7 signs, banners banner . . * badge 
or placards . . .  la  or aign in front of
front o f aald stores • * . any place, of
. . . "  b u s in e ss  . . . 1,128
The d e c is io n  o f  th e  m a jo r ity  has th e  e f f e c t  o f  ln p o sin g  a  sweeping 
d ecree  on th e  r ig h t  o f  f r e e  speech which s e t s  a s  a sa n c tio n  o f  p r io r  
cen so rsh ip  on a l l  o f  th o se  who d e s ir e  to  ex p ress  t h e i r  v iew s. The 
censorship*  however* i s  l im ite d  to  th o se  who d e s ire  to  p r o te s t  a c n t r a te  
method o f  d i s t r ib u t io n .  There i s  no com parable l im i ta t io n  on th o se  who 
wish to  encourage t h i s  form o f  d i s t r ib u t io n .  W hile th e re  i s  some e v i­
dence t h a t  s  few union members p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  v io lence* th e re  was 
no testim ony  t h a t  th e se  in d iv id u a ls  were fo llow ing  o rd e rs  o f  union 
o f f i c i a l s #  As a  m a tte r  o f  record* th e re  i s  ev idence t h a t  th e  d is p la y  o f  
v io le n c e  was in  d i r e c t  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  in s t r u c t io n s  g iven  to  th e  
p ic k e ts  by th e  union# W hile th e  s t a t e  may p ro p e rly  punish  th o se  who a re  
g u i l ty  o f  la w le ss  conduct* i t  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  fo llow  th a t  th e  c o u r t  
may i s s u e  an in ju n c t io n  so com prehensive in  i t s  scope th a t  i t  d e s tro y s  
r ig h t s  g u a ran teed  by th e  C o n s titu tio n . Even those  who have been con­
v ic te d  o f  a  c rim in a l o ffe n se  a re  p e rm itte d  to  engage in  p u b lic  p r o te s t .
J u s t io e  R eed 's d is s e n t  o b je c te d  to  th e  m a jo r i ty 's  op in ion  on th e  
grounds t h a t  ev idence o f  p a s t  v io le n c e  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  im ply r e p i -  
t i t i o n  o f  t h i s  p a t t e n  i n  th e  fu tu r e .  " I f  th e  f e a r  engendered by p e s t  
m isconduct c o erces  s to re k e e p e rs  du ring  p e ac e fu l p icketing*  th e  remedy
12^tbid ., p. 309#
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" l i e s  In  m aintenance o f  o rd o r, n o t i n  d e n ia l  o f  f ro o  speech. There
was no ev idence  th a t  th e  an io n  engaged in  a c rim in a l p lo t  to  d is ru p t  
co m p e titio n . I n  f a c t ,  th e  f in d in g s  in d ic a te  t h a t  th e  v io le n ce  r e s u l te d  
from  a s e r i e s  o f  sp o rad ic  and u n re la te d  o ccu rren ces between sons 
p ic k e ts  and s t r i k e s  o f  farm ers who wished to  s to p  th e  flow  o f  m ilk . The 
in v e s t ig a t io n  by th e  M aster rev ea led  t h a t  th e  a o ts  o f  v io le n c e  a ro se  
under c o n d itio n s  n o t w holly a n t ic ip a te d  and in  a c h a ra c te r  n o t u n l ik e  
s im ila r  d is p u te s  between th e  fo rc e s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  com petition . Indus­
t r i a l  and commercial com petition* a lthough  com parable in  th eo ry , a re  
spawned in  q u i te  o p p o site  c lim a te s  and may on occasion  e x h ib i t  p e c u l ia r  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  I f  th e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  co m p e titio n  i s  d e tr im e n ta l to  
th e  p u b lic  good, s p e c ia l  re g u la tio n s  may be re q u ire d  to  p r o te c t  and 
p re se rv e  p u b lic  o rd e r. " In  th e  l a s t  a n a ly s is  we must ask  o u rse lv e s  
w hether t h i s  p ro te c tio n  . . .  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  J u s t i f y  th e  suspension  o f 
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  g u a ran tee  o f  f r e e  speech.
The d e c is io n  i n  Meadowmoor's case  which s u b s t i tu te d  th e  r u le  o f 
reason  f o r  th e  c le a r  and p re s e n t danger te s t*  and th e  im p lic a tio n  in  
Sw ing 's case  t h a t  some forms o f p ic k e tin g  m ight be o u ts id e  th e  scope o f  
a la b o r  d ispu te*  caused some s t a t e  and fe d e ra l  c o u rts  to  c a s t  doubts on 
th e  v a l id i ty  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill D o c trin e . W ith in  a  y e a r  a f t e r  th e  
Meadownoor and Swing decisions*  a s e r ie s  o f  a n tip ic k e tin g  in ju n c t io n s  
were is s u e d  r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  l im i t s  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  d e c is io n . Two such
129I b i d . .  p. 319.
130 lb ld . . p . 320.
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c a se s  Bakery P r lT T s  ▼. Wohl1^  and C a rp en te rs  Onion ▼. B i t t e r . 1 -*2 which 
v a ra  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  th e  now tre n d  i n  th e  law  o f  p ick e tin g *  ware 
revlow ed by th e  Supremo C ourt I n  March, 19h2. Wo h i ,  a  Now Tork c a se , 
a ro s e  o u t  o f  a d is p u te  betw een a bakery  wagon d r i v e r s ' un ion  and a  group 
o f  nonunion p e d d le rs . The bak ery  u n io n  was engaged i n  n e g o tia t in g  and 
se cu rin g  c o l l e c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  c o n tr a c ts  i n  Hew York C ity . F ive  y e a rs  
p r io r  to  th e  beg in n in g  o f  th e  d is p u te  th e r e  were ap p ro x im ate ly  f i f t y  
s o - c a l le d  nonunion p e d d le rs  in  New York C ity . With th e  im p o s itio n  o f  
th e  s o c ia l  s e c u r i ty  and unemployment com pensation law s in  th e  New York 
a re a , th e  number o f  p e d d le rs  g ra d u a lly  In c re a se d  to  abou t 500 a t  th e  
tim e o f  th e  d is p u te .  As a r e s u l t  o f  th e  co m p e titio n  o f  nonunion d r iv e r s ,  
th e  bakery  com panies n o t i f i e d  th e  u n ion  t h a t  th ey  would no lo n g e r  employ 
un ion  d r iv e r s  b u t  th e  d r iv e r s  m ight c o n tin u e  to  d i s t r i b u t e  th e  goods a s  
" independen t c o n tr a c to r s ."  In  th e  I n t e r e s t  o f  av o id in g  f u r t h e r  d e te r io ­
r a t io n  o f  th e  term s o f  employment, th e  un ion  t r i e d  to  persu ad e  th e  
p e d d le rs  to  beoome un ion  members. When th e  p e d d le rs  f a i l e d  to  jo in ,  th e  
u n ion  began to  p ic k e t  th e  p rem ises o f  th e  b a k e rs  who so ld  p ro d u c ts  to  th e  
nonunion d r iv e r s .  I n  response  to  th e  p ic k e tin g , Wohl, a p e d d le r , sought 
an  in ju n c t io n  to  r e s t r a i n  th e  p ic k e tin g  a s  an In v a s io n  o f  due p ro c e ss  o f  
law . Upon h e a r in g  th e  ev idence  th e  t r i a l  c o u r t  is s u e d  a r e s t r a in in g  
o rd e r  h o ld in g  t h a t  th e  c o n tro v e rsy  d id  n o t conform to  th e  req u irem en ts  
o f  a l a b o r  d is p u te  under New York law . The t r i a l  c o u r t 's  d e c is io n  was
131315 U.S. 769 (19^2).
132315 U.S. 722 (19^2).
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subsequon tly  a ff irm e d  by th e  C ourt o f  A ppeals. A ccepting  th e  ca se  on 
appeal* th e  U nited  S ta te s  Supreaie C ourt re v e rse d  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  
a p p e l la te  c o u r ts  h o ld in g  t h a t  "we . . . can p e rc e iv e  no s u b s ta n t ia l  e v i l
o f  such m agnitude a s  to  mark a l i m i t  to  th e  r i g h t  o f  f r e e  speech
133. . . 11 a s  e x e rc is e d  by th e  un ion  d r iv e r s .  The c u r io u s  p a r t  o f  th e  
Wohl d e c is io n  was th e  Im p lied  ru l in g  o f  th e  m a jo r ity  t h a t  th e  t e s t  o f  
w hether a  s t a t e  may r e g u la te  a l a b o r  d is p u te  depends on th e  e f f e c t iv e ­
n e ss  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g . J u s t i c e  Jackson , speaking  f o r  th e  C ourt, s a id , 
nA s t a t e  i s  n o t re q u ire d  to  t o l e r a t e  i n  a l l  p la c e s  and i n  a l l  circum ­
s ta n c e s  even p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  . . . / t h e  l e g a l i t y /  • • • depends on 
th e  means employed and th e  e f f e c t  o r  . . . re p e rc u s s io n s  upon th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  s t r a n g e r s  to  th e  i s s u e . *13^ The co n cu rrin g  J u s t i c e s  i n  
W ohl's c a se  o b je c te d  to  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  m a jo r ity  ru l in g  s t a t in g  
i n  a se p a ra te  o p in io n , " I f  th e  o p in io n  . . . means th a t  a  s t a t e  can 
p r o h ib i t  p ic k e tin g  when i t  I s  e f f e c t iv e  b u t may n o t p r o h ib i t  when i t  I s  
I n e f f e c t iv e ,  th en  . . .  we have made a b a s ic  d e p a r tu re  from T h o rn h ill  v. 
Alabama. "^35 ■ftie co n cu rrin g  J u s t ic e s  o b je c te d  to  th e  im p lic a tio n  t h a t  
th e  s t a t e  a s  a fu n c tio n  o f  due p ro c e ss  m ight draw an a r b i t r a r y  l i n e
which would en ab le  th e  s t a t e  " . . .  to  accom plish  i n d i r e c t ly  what I t  may
136n o t accom plish  d i r e c t l y . "
133315 U. s . 775- 
134I b i d .
136I b ld . . p. 777-
The im p lie d  c o n tro v e rsy  i n  th e  Wohl c a se  m s  c a r r ie d  ov e r to  
C a rp en te rs  Onion r .  R i t t e r , a  Texas ca se , where th e  Supreme C ourt by a 
f iv e  to  fo u r  d e c is io n  upheld  an in ju n c t io n  e n jo in in g  th e  p ic k e tin g  o f  
R i t t e r ' s  Cafe. I n  t h i s  case  S i t t e r  and one P l a s t e r  e n te re d  i n to  a  
c o n tr a c t  i n  which P l a s t e r  ag reed  to  c o n s tru c t  a  b u ild in g  f o r  R i t t e r .  
P l a s t e r  re fu se d  to  esxploy un ion  la b o r  i n  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th e  b u ild *  
ln g . I n  o rd e r  to  fo rc e  R i t t e r  to  b rin g  p re s s u re  a g a in s t  P l a s t e r  to  
employ u n ion  la b o r , th e  c a rp e n te r s  began to  p ic k e t  R itte r*  s  Cafe which 
m s  ap p rox im ate ly  a  m ile  and a h a l f  away from th e  c o n s tru c t io n  s i t e .
I n  a d em o n s tra tio n  o f  t h e i r  sympathy w ith  th e  p l ig h t  o f  th e  c a rp e n te r s ,  
th e  r e s ta u r a n t  w orkers c a l le d  a s t r i k e  and u n ion  tru c k  d r iv e r s  re fu se d  
to  c ro s s  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e  to  d e l iv e r  su p p lie s  to  th e  r e s ta u r a n t .  R i t t e r  
f i l e d  a com plain t w ith  th e  Texas C ourt o f  C iv i l  A ppeals, and th e  C ourt 
e n jo in ed  th e  p ic k e tin g  a s  a v i o la t io n  o f  th e  s t a t e  a n t i t r u s t  law . The 
c a rp e n te r s ' un ion  appea led  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s  Supreme C ourt on c o n . 
s t i t u t l o n a l  grounds, a l le g in g  t h a t  th e  in ju n c t io n  m s  a v io la t io n  o f  
due p ro c e ss  g u a ran teed  by th e  F o u rteen th  Amendment. Mr. J u s t i c e  
F ra n k fu r te r  d e liv e re d  th e  m a jo r ity  o p in io n  o f  th e  C ourt, a ff irm in g  th e  
in ju n c t io n  o f  th e  C ourt o f  A ppeals. Reviewing th e  s t a tu s  o f  th e  law  o f  
p ic k e tin g  s in c e  T ho rnh ill*  s  c a se , J u s t i c e  F ra n k fu r te r  adop ted  th e  s p i r i t  
o f  J u s t i c e  Holmes' d i s s e n t  i n  Vegelahn v. C en te r t h a t  i t  i s  n e ce ssa ry  i n  
a dem ocratic  s o c ie ty  f o r  th e  C ourt to  b a la n ce  th e  c o n f l ic t in g  i n t e r e s t s .  
I n  th e  absence  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  a rgued  J u s t io e  F ra n k fu r te r , i t  i s  th e  
du ty  o f  th e  J u d ic ia l  branch  to  dete rm ine  w hether th e  p u b lic  w e lfa re  w i l l  
be a d v e rse ly  a f f e c te d  by th e  con tem plated  a c t i v i t y .  In  seek ing  to
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b a la n c e  th e  opposing  i n t e r e s t s  th e  C ourt m ast d e te rm in e  w hether th e  
s t a t e  in  r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  r i g h t  o f  p r o t e s t  ". . . h as  v io la te d  ’ th e  
e s s e n t i a l  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  . . . l i b e r t y . 1 " ^ 7  r i g h t  to  p ic k e t  i s  
g u a ran teed  by th e  C o n s t i tu tio n  (T h o rn h ill  v . Alabama)# b u t th e  pursuance  
o f  t h i s  r i g h t  i s  s u b je c t  to  l im i ta t io n s .  I n  every  c a se  th e  C ourt m ust 
d e te rm in e  w hether th e  F o u rteen th  Amendment p r o h ib i t s  th e  s t a t e  from 
"■ • . c o n fin in g  th e  a re a  o f u n r e s t r i c te d  i n d u s t r i a l  w a rfa re  . . . The 
l i n e  drawn by  Texas i s  n o t th e  l i n e  drawn by New York i n  th e  Wohl 
c a se . "^38 i n  th e  l a t t e r  c a se  th e  p ic k e ts  were p u rsu in g  a  le g i t im a te  
i n t e r e s t :  i n  th e  p re s e n t  case  th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  in c id e n ta l  to  th e  p rim ary  
d is p u te .  The g en iu s  o f  th e  d is p u te  i s  w ith  th e  c o n tra c to r ,  and i t  i s  
n o t beyond th e  power o f  th e  s t a t e  " . . .  to  co n fin e  th e  sphere  o f  
communication to  t h a t  d i r e c t l y  r e l a te d  to  th e  d is p u te .  R e s t r ic t io n  o f  
p ic k e tin g  to  th e  a re a  o f  th e  in d u s try  w ith in  which a  la b o r  d is p u te  a r i s e s  
le a v e s  open to  th e  d is p u ta n ts  o th e r  t r a d i t i o n a l  modes o f  ooamnmi- 
c a t io n .
The m a jo r ity  d e c is io n  i n  th e  R i t t e r  c a se  re p re se n te d  a s i g n i f i ­
c a n t d e p a r tu re  from th e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e . I n  th e  
T h o rn h ill  case  th e  p ic k e tin g  was accorded  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c t io n  
b ecause  i t  was a  r e s u l t  o f  a la b o r  d is p u te .  P ic k e tin g  was h e ld  to  be  a 
p r iv i le g e d  r i g h t  o f  comm unication which g u a ran teed  to  w orkers th e  r i g h t
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to  communicate t h e i r  g rievances- I n  R i t t e r '  s  case  th e  p ic k e tin g  was 
en jo in ed  because i t  was in c id e n ta l  to  th e  p rim ary  d isp u te -  T h is a b ru p t 
re v e rs a l  in  J u d ic ia l  c o n s tru c tio n  i s  exem p lified  by th e  words o f  
J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r  t h a t  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p ic k e tin g  In  th e  H i t te r  
case  s t i l l  " . . .  le a v e s  open . . . o th e r  t r a d i t i o n a l  modes o f  communi­
c a t io n . " In  T h o rn h i l l 's  case  p ic k e tin g  which r e s u l te d  from a  la b o r  
d is p u te  was found to  be a " t r a d i t io n a l"  and p r iv ile g e d  mode o f  communi­
c a t io n . There was no su g g estio n  in  J u s t ic e  M urphy's o p in io n  th a t  
p ic k e tin g  was a secondary means o f  commun ic a t io n ,  and th e  r i g h t  to  
p ic k e t  was extended a f u l l  p a r tn e rs h ip  under th e  B i l l  o f  R ights- 
P ic k e tin g  was a f u l l - f le d g e d  member o f  th e  f r e e  speech fam ily  so neces­
sa ry  i n  f a c t  th a t  i t  was a ffo rd e d  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c t io n  a s  a  p r i v i ­
leg ed  form o f  communication. I n  th e  R i t t e r  case  th e  p r iv ile g e d  p o s i t io n  
o f  p ic k e tin g  assumes an i l l e g i t im a te  s ta tu s .  P ic k e tin g  i s  a f o s t e r  
c h ild  o f  f r e e  speech which may be en jo in ed  i f  i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  
d isp u te  i s  o u ts id e  th e  sphere  o f  p r iv ile g e d  communication.
The im portance o f  th e  R i t t e r  case  a s  a d e p a rtu re  from th e
p r in c ip le s  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D oc trine  was emphasized by bo th  d is s e n t in g
J u s t i c e s . J u s t i c e  Black o b jec te d  to  th e  in ju n c t io n  as an undue
r e s t r i c t i o n  on th e  r i g h t  o f  f r e e  speech. R e fe rrin g  to  th e  T h o rn h ill
case . J u s t ic e  Black sa id :
W hatever in ju r y  th e  responden t su ffe re d  h e re  r e s u l te d  from th e  
p e ace fu l and t r u th f u l  s ta tem en ts  made to  th e  p u b lic  t h a t  he had 
employed a non-union c o n tra c to r  to  e r e c t  a b u ild in g . T his
^*^Mr. J u s t ic e  Douglas and Mr. J u s t ic e  Murphy, th e  a u th o r  o f  th e  
T h o rn h ill  D oc trine , concurred  w ith  th e  d is s e n t  o f  J u s t ic e  Black.
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in fo rm a tio n , under th e  T h o rn h ill c ase , th e  p e t i t io n e r s  were p r i v i ­
leg e d  to  im p art end th e  p a b llc  wee e n t i t l e d  to  re c e iv e . I t  I s  one 
th in g  f o r  e s t a t e  to  r e g e la te  th e  nee o f  i t s  s t r e e t s  and highways 
so a s  to  keep th en  open . . . ;  o r  to  p a ss  g e n e ra l r e g u la tio n s  a s  to  
t h e i r  u se  In  th e  I n t e r e s t  o f  p a b llc  s a fe ty  . . . ;  o r  to  p r o te c t  I t s  
d t i s e n s  f ro n  v io le n c e  and b reach es  o f  pesos . . .  I t  i s  q u ite  
a n o th e r  th in g , however* to  "ab ridge  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  l i b e r t y  o f  
one r i g h t f u l ly  upon th e  s t r e e t  to  in p a r t  ia fo n a a tio n  through  speech 
o r  th e  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  l i t e r a t u r e . "  . . . The C ourt below . . . 
b a rre d  th e  p e t i t io n e r s  fro n  u sin g  th e  s t r e e t s  to  convey in fo rm a tio n  
to  th e  p u b llc t  because o f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  type  o f  in fo rm a tio n  th e y  
w ished to  oonyer. I n  so doing , i t  d i r e c t l y  r e s t r i c t e d  th e  p e t i ­
t io n e r s ' r ig h ts  to  ex p re ss  th e n se lv e s  p u b lic ly  concerning  an  is s u e  
which we reco g n ised  In  th e  T h o rn h ill  case  to  be o f  p u b lic  im portance. 
I t  Inposed th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  f o r  th e  reason  th a t  th e  p u b l i c 's  response  
to  such In fo rm a tio n  would r e s u l t  In  In ju ry  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  p e rso n 1 s 
b u s in e ss , a reason  which we s a id  i n  th e  T h o rn h ill  oase  was i n s u f f i ­
c ie n t  to  J u s t i f y  c u rta ilm e n t o f  f r e e  e x p re s s io n .I n ­
ju s t i c e  Reed review ed th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  R i t t e r  case  in  l i g h t  o f  
th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  concluding}
U n til  today , o rd e r ly , re g u la te d  p ic k e tin g  has been w ith in  th e  p ro ­
te c t io n  o f  th e  F ou rteen th  Amendment . . .  In  b a lan c in g  s o c ia l  
advan tages i t  has been f e l t  t h a t  th e  p re s e rv a tio n  o f  f r e e  speech in  
la b o r  d is p u te s  was more im p o rtan t than  th e  freedom o f  e n te rp r is e  
from th e  p ic k e t  l i n e .  I t  was a l im i ta t io n  on s t a t e  power to  d e a l 
a s  i t  p le a se d  w ith  la b o r  d is p u te s ;  a l im i ta t io n  oonsented  to  by th e  
s t a t e  when i t  became a p a r t  o f  th e  n a tio n , and one o f  p re c is e ly  th e  
same q u a l i ty  a s  th o se  en fo rced  i n  C arlson , T h o rn h ill  and Swing.
We a re  n o t h e re  fo rce d , a s  th e  Court assum es, to  su p p o rt a 
c o n s t i tu t io n a l  i n te r p r e ta t io n  t h a t  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  "m ast be 
w holly  lM m e  from re g u la tio n  by th e  community in  o rd e r  to  p ro te c t  
th e  g e n e ra l i n t e r e s t . "  We do n o t doubt th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  s t a t e  to  
impose n o t on ly  some b u t many r e s t r i c t i o n s  upon p e ace fu l p ic k e tin g . 
Reasonable numbers, q u ie tn e s s , t r u th f u l  p la c a rd s , open in g re s s  and 
e g re s s , s u i ta b le  hours o r  o th e r  p ro p e r l im i ta t io n s ,  n o t d e s t r u c t iv e  
o f  th e  r ig h t  to  t e l l  o f  la b o r  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  nay be re q u ire d  . ■ .
I n  a d d it io n  to  t h e i r  o b je c tio n s  to  th e  d e se r tio n  o f  th e  Thorn­
h i l l  D o c trin e  by th e  m a jo rity , bo th  J u s t i c e s  Reed and Black took
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e x ce p tio n  to  th e  d e s c r ip t io n  by J u s t i c e  F ra n k fu r te r  t h a t  R i t t e r  was a  
" n e u t r a l . '1 Commenting on th e  n e u t r a l i t y  i s s u e  Mr. J u s t i c e  Reed h e ld  
t h a t :
By t h i s  d e c is io n  a  s t a t e  r u le  i s  uphe ld  which fo rb id s  p e a c e fu l 
p ic k e tin g  o f  b u s in e s se s  by s t r a n g e r s  to  th e  b u s in e s s  and th e  
in d u s try  o f  which i t  i s  a  p a r t .  . . . T h is  r u l e  i s  a p p lie d , i n  
t h i s  oase , even though th e  p ic k e te r s  a re  p u b l ic is in g  a  l a b o r  d is p u te  
a r i s in g  f ro n  a c o n tr a c t  to  which th e  so le  owner o f  th e  b u s in e ss  
p io k e te d  i s  a  p a r ty .  Even i f  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  c o n tr a c t  covered  an 
a t ta c h e d  a d d i t io n  to  th e  r e s ta u r a n t  th e  C o u r t 's  o p in io n  would n o t  
p e rm it p ic k e tin g  d i r e c te d  a g a in s t  th e  r e s ta u r a n t .  To c o n s tru e  t h i s  
Texas d e c is io n  a s  w ith in  s t a t e  powers and th e  Wohl d e o is io n  a s  
o u ts id e  t h e i r  b o u n d a rie s , p la in ly  d is c lo s e s  th e  Inadequacy o f  th e  
t e s t  presum ably employed, t h a t  i s ,  th e  supposed la c k  o f  economic 
"in te rdependence"  betw een th e  p ic k e ts  and th e  p i c k e te d .* ^
I n  com parison to  J u s t i c e  Reed1s d is c u s s io n  o f  n e u t r a l i t y ,  Mr. J u s t ic e
B lack s a id :
W hether members o r  non-members o f  th e  b u ild in g  t r a d e s  u n io n s a r e  
employed . . . / i s  i n  a  v e ry  r e a l  wag7 • • • In f lu e n c e d  by th o se  
w ith  idiom th e y  do b u s in e ss  . . .
W hatever in ju r y  th e  resp o n d en t s u f fe re d  h e re  r e s u l te d  from 
p e a c e fu l and t r u th f u l  s ta te m e n ts  made to  th e  p u b lic  th a t  he had 
employed a non-un ion  c o n tr a c to r  to  e r e c t  a  b u i ld in g . T h is in fo rm a­
t io n ,  under th e  T h o rn h ill  c a se , th e  p e t i t i o n e r s  w ere p r iv i le g e d  to  
im p a rt and th e  p u b lic  was e n t i t l e d  to  re c e iv e .
The d e c is io n  i n  th e  R i t t e r  case  marks a tu rn in g  p o in t  i n  th e  
l e g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  a s  c o n s t i tu te d  under th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e . 
The m a jo r ity  o p in io n  i n  th e  R i t t e r  c a se  s u b s t i tu te d  th e  " r u le  o f  reason" 
f o r  th e  c le a r  and p re s e n t  danger t e s t  o f  T h o r n h i l l 's  c a se . The l e g a l i t y  
o f  p ic k e tin g  in  th e  R i t t e r  case  was n o t dependent on i t s  a s s o c ia t io n
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w ith  a  la b o r  d is p u te  b u t w hether th e  p ic k e tin g  was co n sid ered  to  be a 
J u s t i f i a b l e  means o f  ex tend ing  th e  scope o f  a la b o r  d is p u te .  L a b o r 's  
r i g h t  to  inform  th e  p u b lic  was l im ite d  to  th o se  means which were w ith in  
th e  c i r c l e  o f  p ro te c t io n .  I f  th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  o u ts id e  
th e  a re a  o f  rea so n a b le  c o n f l i c t ,  th e  p ic k e tin g  m ight be en jo in ed  by th e  
s t a t e .  P ic k e t in g 's  p r iv ile g e d  s t a tu s  under th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  a s  a 
t r a d i t i o n a l  mode o f  oom nunication was demoted in  th e  R i t t e r  case  to  a 
p o s i t io n  o f i n f e r i o r  rank . The b a r  o f  th e  c l e a r  and p re s e n t  danger t e s t  
was t h r u s t  a s id e  a s  a momentary la p s e  in  J u d ic ia l  rea so n in g . The doc­
t r i n e  o f  a law fu l o b je c t  and a rea so n ab le  means was h e ld  to  be more 
c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  ju d ic i a l  e q u a tio n  o f  r i g h t  and wrong.
The im p lic a tio n s  o f  t h i s  a b ru p t s h i f t  in  J u d ic ia l  reason ing  
e s ta b l is h e d  th e  b a s is  o f  co m p etitio n  between un ions and In d u s try  u n t i l  
th e  passage  o f th e  LMRDA in  1959. The r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f  th e  R i t t e r  
d e c is io n  In v i te d  th o se  s t a t e  c o u r ts  who were opposed to  th e  ph ilosophy  
o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  to  d e f in e  a la b o r  d isp u te  in  such a  way a s  to  
exclude  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g . I f  th e  "purpose o r  o b je c t"  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  
was found to  be in c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  co n tin u an ce  o f  a la b o r  d is p u te , 
th e  p ic k e tin g  was en jo in ed  a s  an un law ful o b je c t .  By v i r tu e  o f  th e  
R i t t e r  d e c is io n , un ions and union members were p laced  on th e  d e fe n s iv e  
s id e  o f  th e  i s s u e ,  and i t  became n e ce ssa ry  f o r  th e  un ions to  show t h a t  
th e  p ic k e tin g  was a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  a prim ary  d is p u te . I f  th e  d i r e c t  
in c id e n c e  could n o t  be e s ta b l is h e d  to  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  th e  c o u rt , th e  
a c t i v i t y  was co n sid e red  to  be u n law fu l. Employers w ere encouraged to  
seek  in ju n c t io n s  a g a in s t  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  i f  th e re  was a p o s s ib i l i t y
t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  e ig h t  be  co n s tru ed  a s  b e in g  o u ts id e  th e  c i r c l e  o f 
co m p e titio n . The R i t t e r  ease  became an open i n v i t a t i o n  to  o ireum vent 
th e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  oase  by  means o f  l e g a l  t e c h n i c a l i t i e s .  W ith 
th e  decay  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D octrine* th e  l im i ta t io n s  on th e  r i g h t  to  
p ic k e t  fo rc e d  th e  u n io n s to  adop t o th e r  m easures o f  economic p re s s u re .
I n  m ost c a se s  th e s e  m easures were o b je c tio n a b le  to  th e  p u b lic  and n o t  i n  
keeping w ith  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p h ilo so p h y  o f  th e  American la b o r  movement. 
The cu lm in a tio n  o f  th e s e  p r a c t ic e s  i n  com bination w ith  th e  wave o f  
s t r i k e s  in  l $ k 6  soon l e d  to  th e  LMRA. o f  19^7 which p rov ided  a new s e t  o f  
im p lic a tio n s  and r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  le g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p io k e tin g .
CHAPTER H I
THE STATUS OF PICKETING UNDER THE LMRA
P a r t i a l l y  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  s t a te  a g i t a t io n  and n a tio n a l  in d u e , 
t r i a l  u n re s t  and p r in c ip a l ly  due to  th e  p resenoe o f  a p o l i t i o a l  c lim a te  
u n fav o rab le  to  la b o r  un ions. Congress in  19*1-7 passed  th e  IMRA which 
e s ta b l is h e d  th e  f i r s t  s ta tu to r y  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  la v  o f  p ic k e tin g . 
Although th e  Act d id  n o t d i r e c t l y  r e f e r  to  p ic k e tin g , th e  Im plied  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p ic k e tin g  in  S ec tio n  8(b) were d e s tin e d  to  becone a  
c e n te r  o f  le g a l  con tro v e rsy  f o r  th e  N a tiona l Labor R e la tio n s  Board 
(NLRB) and th e  s t a t e  and fe d e ra l  c o u rts .
The most c o n tro v e rs ia l  s e c tio n  o f  th e  new la b o r  law was th e  
s o -c a l le d  u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e s  p ro v is io n . S ec tio n  8 (b ) .  The tw elve 
y e a r  p e rio d  between th e  NLRA o f  1935 and th e  LMRA o f  19**7 was c h a ra c te r -  
is e d  by an  unusual amount o f  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t .  The passage o f th e  
NLRA in  1935 s ig n i f ie d  th e  beg inn ing  o f  a new e ra  i n  la b o r  r e la t io n s .
For th e  f i r s t  tim e in  th e  h is to r y  o f  th e  U nited S ta te s , th e  power o f th e  
fe d e ra l  governaent was jo in ed  w ith  th e  fo rc e s  o f la b o r  a g a in s t  th e  
c o l le c t iv e  I n t e r e s t s  o f  em ployers. The pream ble o f  th e  NLRA d e c la re d  
th a t  i t  should:
. . .  be th e  p o lic y  o f th e  U nited S ta te s  to  e lim in a te  th e  causes o f  
c e r t a in  s u b s ta n t ia l  o b s tru c tio n s  to  th e  f r e e  flow  o f  commerce and to  
m it ig a te  and e lim in a te  th e se  o b s tru c tio n s , when th ey  have occu rred
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by enoouraging th e  p r a c t ic e  and p rocedure  o f  o o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  
and by p ro te c tin g  th e  e x e rc is e  by w orkers o f  f u l l  freedom  o f  a s so ­
c ia t io n .  s e l f -o rg a n is a t io n  and d e s ig n a tio n  o f  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  
t h e i r  own choosing, f o r  th e  purpose o f  n e g o tia t in g  th e  t e n s  and 
c o n d itio n s  o f  t h e i r  employment o r  o th e r  Mutual a id  o r  p r o te c t io n .
W ith th e  new found support o f  th e  f e d e ra l  government coupled w ith  th e  
fa v o ra b le  c o n d itio n s  o f  th e  d ep re ss io n , la b o r  unions experienced  a  
d ram atic  in c re a s e  i n  membership. New un ions were spawned in  th e  h e re to ­
fo re  uno rgan ised  mass p ro d u ctio n  in d u s t r ie s ;  e .g . ,  s t e e l ,  au tom ob iles, 
e le c t r o n ic s ,  rubber, and s im ila r  in d u s t r ie s .  Under th e  le a d e rs h ip  o f  
John L. Lewis, th e s e  new un ions soon broke w ith  th e  E xecu tive  Board o f  
th e  American F ed e ra tio n  o f  Labor and formed a s e p a ra te  f e d e ra t io n , th e  
Congress o f  I n d u s t r i a l  O rg a n isa tio n s . W ith th e  breakup o f  th e  p rev io u s  
c e n te r  o f  power, th e  two fe d e ra t io n s  were t h r u s t  in to  a con tinu ing  
s tru g g le  fo r  c o n tro l o f th e  la b o r  movement. As t h i s  s tru g g le  f o r  power 
widened th e  s p l i t  i n  th e  ranks o f  la b o r , i t  was a lm ost in e v i ta b le  t h a t  
un ions would engage in  unpopular p r a c t ic e s  and p o l ic i e s .  S t r ik e s  in  
su p p o rt o f  th e  c lo sed  shop, s t r i k e s  f o r  h ig h e r  wages du rin g  th e  war, 
th e  unpopu lar c la sh e s  betw een John L. Lewis' m iners and th e  R oosevelt 
a d m in is tra t io n , and th e  numerous work stoppages and s t r i k e s  a f t e r  VJ 
Day produced a d ram atic  s h i f t  in  p u b lic  o p in io n . The swing in  p u b lic  
o p in io n  was keenly  m an ifes t in  th e  pream ble o f  th e  LMRA which s t a te s  
t h a t  i n d u s t r i a l  experience  s in c e  th e  NLRA has " . . .  dem onstra ted  t h a t  
c e r ta in  p r a c t ic e s  by some la b o r  o rg a n is a tio n s  . . • have . . . th e
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" e f f e c t  o f  . . . o b s tru c tin g  commerce . • . Tbs e l im in a t io n  o f  such 
p r a c t ic e s  I s  n e o essa ry  . . . "2 f o r  th a  g u a ra n tee  o f  t b s  r i g h t s  e s ta b ­
l i s h e d  by  t h i s  A ct.
THE PICKETING RESTRICTIONS
I n  re s p e c t  t o  s t r i k e s ,  p ic k e tin g , and secondary  b o y o o tts , th e  
LMRA re g u la te d  th e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  by fo rb id d in g  a l l  oonduct vhose purpose  
was to  a c h ie v e  th o se  o b je c ts  d e c la re d  to  be un law fu l by S e c tio n  6 (b )  o f  
th e  Act* S e c tio n  8 (b )(1 )(A ) wade i t  un law fu l " . . .  to  r e s t r a i n  o r  
ooeroe em ployees i n  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  t h e i r  r i g h t s  . • . gm aftaiteed by 
v io le n c e  o r  t h r e a t s .  S e c tio n  8 (b )(1 )(B ) fo rb id s  a c t i v i t y  whose o b je c t  
i s  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  e a p lo y e r  i n  th e  s e le c t io n  o f  an  a g e n t f o r  pu rp o ses 
o f  o o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g . S e c tio n  8 (b ) (2 )  p r o h ib i t s  a c t i v i t y  to  cause  
an  em ployer to  d is c r im in a te  a g a in s t  em ployees i n  re g a rd  to  t h e i r  employ­
ment f o r  th e  purpose  o f  encourag ing  o r  d isc o u rag in g  un ion  membership. 
S e c tio n  8 (b )(h )  p r o h ib i t s  any a c t i v i t y  which in d u ces o r  enoourages 
" . . . th e  employees o f  any em ployer to  engage in  . . . J o r  sym pathize 
w ith  a  s t r i k e  o r  r e f u s a l  to  work7 • > • where an o b je c t  th e r e o f  i s  (A) 
fo rc in g  o r  r e q u ir in g  any em ployer o r  se lf-em p lo y ed  p e rso n  to  jo in  
. . . a  la b o r  o rg a n is a t io n .  The second p a r t  o f  S e c tio n  8 (b )(h )(A )
2I b i d .« LXI, P a r t  I ,  137*
^ Ib id . t  p . l* fl.
^ I b id . T h is  s e c t io n  o f  th e  LMRIA has s in c e  been  c o n stru ed  to  
fo rb id  s o - c a l le d  ovner-w orker p ic k e tin g  where th e  o b je c t  i s  to  fo rc e  th e  
ow ner-w orker to  jo in  a la b o r  un ion  a s ,  f o r  example, i n  th e  Senn c a se .
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( th e  secondary  b o y c o tt  p ro v is io n )  fo rb id s  a c t i v i t y  whose o b je c t  i s  to  
fo rc e  "• . . any em ployer o r  any o th e r  p e rso n  to  cease  . . doing 
b u s in e s s  w ith  a n o th e r  employer* S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(B )  fo rb id s  a c t i v i t y  
(p ic k e tin g )  whose o b je c t  i s  to  p e rsu ad e  an em ployer to  b a rg a in  w ith  an  
o rg a n iz a t io n  which h as n o t been c e r t i f i e d  by th e  NLRB.^ S e c tio n  8 (b ) 
(4 )(C ) p r o h ib i t s  a c t i v i t y  to  fo rc e  an em ployer to  b a rg a in  w ith  one 
un ion  when a n o th e r  u n ion  h as a lre a d y  been c e r t i f i e d  by th e  NLRB. Sec­
t io n  8 (b )(4 )(D ) p r o h ib i t s  a c t i v i t y  whose o b je c t  i s  to  f u r th e r  th e  cause  
o f  a  la b o r  o rg a n iz a t io n  engaged in  a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  d is p u te  w ith  a n o th e r  
l a b o r  o rg a n iz a tio n *
I t  seemed c le a r  from th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s to r y  o f  th e  LMRA t h a t  
Congress in te n d e d  to  p r o h ib i t  a l l  a c t i v i t y —in c lu d in g  p ic k e tin g —which 
sought to  a ch iev e  ends which were d e c la re d  u n law fu l i n  S e c tio n  8 (b ) . 
There was a p p a re n tly  no a ttem p t o r  i n t e n t  on th e  p a r t  o f  Congress to  
d is t in g u is h  betw een secondary  o r  p rim ary  a c t io n  i f  th e  purpose  o f  th e  
a c t io n  was to  ach iev e  an un law fu l o b je c t .  On th e  o th e r  hand, i t  was 
a p p a ren t t h a t  Congress d id  n o t w ish to  p la c e  any r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p rim ary  
a c t io n  a s  p ro te c te d  by S e c tio n  7 o f  th e  NLRA i f  th e  o b je c t  d id  no t 
c o n s t i tu t e  a v io la t io n  o f  S e c tio n  8 (b ) .
^ Ib id *
^T his s e c t io n  was d esig n ed  to  fo rb id  sym pathetic  s t r i k e s  and
b o y c o tts  i n  suppo r t  o f  a un ion  demanding re c o g n itio n  and b a rg a in in g
r ig h ts  a s  p ro sc r ib e d  u n der S e c tio n  9 o f  th e  A ct.
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INTERPRETATION OF THE PICKETING RESTRICTIONS
The d i f f i c u l t y  p re se n te d  by th e  u n f a i r  la b o r  p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  
A ct a r i s e s  f ro n  th e  d i f f e r e n t  i n te r p r e ta t io n s  which may be drawn from 
S ec tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ). Much o f  th e  con fusion  surrounding  th e  meaning o f  
t h i s  su b sec tio n  can be tra c e d  to  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  d eb a te  over th e  
s u b s t i tu t io n  o f  th e  words "an o b je c t"  f o r  " the  purpose1* which appeared  
in  th e  o r ig in a l  d r a f t  o f  th e  Senate b i l l .  An exam ination o f  th e  con­
g re s s io n a l  reco rd  re v e a ls  t h a t  th e  proponen ts o f th e  b i l l ,  in c lu d in g  
S ena to r T a f t ,  were concerned about th e  e f f e c t s  o f  s t r i k e s  and p ic k e tin g  
on " n e u tra ls "  i n  a la b o r  d is p u te . 7 I n  an e f f o r t  to  p ro te c t  th e se  
in n o cen t p a r t i e s ,  th e  su p p o rte rs  o f  th e  b i l l  became f e a r f u l  t h a t  " th e  
purpose" was too  r e s t r i c t i v e  and s u b s t i tu te d  "an o b je c t"  which would 
seem ingly p rec lu d e  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  p la c in g  a narrow  c o n s tru c tio n  on 
th e  word "purpose"; i . e . ,  t h a t  th e  c o u rts  m ight co n s tru e  th e  a c t i v i t y  
a s  be ing  th e  " so le  pu rp o se ."  The u n fo r tu n a te  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  s u b s t i tu ­
t io n  was to  p rov ide  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  ju d ic i a l  sa n c tio n s  a g a in s t  
prim ary  a c t io n .  I t  was soon reco g n ised  by th e  opponents o f  th e  Thorn­
h i l l  D octrine  t h a t  i t  was re a d i ly  p o s s ib le  to  co n stru e  "an o b je c t"  i n  
such a way a s  to  r e s t r i c t  p rim ary  conduct i f  th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  s t r i k e  
o r  p ic k e tin g  was to  c u r t a i l  th e  b u s in e ss  o p e ra tio n  o f  th e  prim ary 
employer by i n te r f e r in g  w ith  th e  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  p ro d u c ts  o r  th e  r e c e ip t  
o f  su p p lie s . Thus th e  s u b s t i tu t io n  o f  "an o b je c t"  f o r  " the  purpose"
793 Com. Rec. 4198.
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l e f t  th e  NLRB and th e  c o u r ts  i n  th e  d i f f i c u l t  p o s i t io n  o f  d ec id in g  
w hether to  adop t a narrow  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b ) (4 0 (A), which 
would p la c e  severe  l im i t s  on th e  r i g h t  to  s t r i k e  and th e  r i g h t  to  p ic k e t ,  
o r  to  ad o p t th e  b ro ad e r c o n s tru c tio n  th a t  S e c tio n  8(b)(4)(A .) was in te n d ed  
to  r e s t r i c t  secondary a c t iv i t y  a g a in s t  n e u tra ls*
A secondary problem  which evo lves from th e s e  two a l t e r n a t iv e  
e le c t io n s  under S ec tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) i s  w hether Congress in te n d ed  to  
p la c e  an a l l - in c lu s iv e  ban on th e  "means" o f  ach iev in g  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
o b je c t  o r  w hether Congress in te n d ed  to  p r o h ib i t  a p a r t i c u l a r  means o f  
a ch iev in g  a g iven  ob jec t*  Although th e  term  seoondary b o y c o tt i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  d e fin e , th e  a l t e r n a t iv e  methods o f  accom plish ing  a con­
s c r ip t io n  o f  n e u tr a ls  to  a d isp u te  i s  p r im a r ily  l im ite d  to  (1 ) p ic k e tin g  
to  encourage union  members to  re fu s e  to  hand le  goods o r  perform  s e rv ic e s  
f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  employer because he p e r s i s t s  i n  doing b u s in e ss  w ith  an 
employer who f o r  some reaso n  i s  s a id  to  be u n fa ir ,®  o r  (2) p ic k e tin g  
which u rg es  th e  p u b lic  ( in c lu d in g  union members) n o t to  purchase goods 
from an employer who i s  u n f a i r  to  th e  u n io n 's  p o in t o f  view . With some 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  i t  may be assumed th e  Congress in ten d ed  to  l im i t  l e g i t i ­
mate secondary a c t iv i t y  under S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) to  th a t  d e sc rib e d  i n  
(1 ) above. But t h i s  im p lied  co n g re ss io n a l i n t e n t  i s  co n d itio n ed  by th e
®This type  o f  p ic k e tin g  i s  sometimes r e f e r r e d  to  a s  s ig n a l 
p ic k e tin g , where th e  p la c a rd  c a r r ie d  by th e  p ic k e t  i s  in te n d e d  to  be a 
s ig n a l  to  o th e r  un ions n o t to  c ro s s  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e .  The e f f e c t iv e n e s s  
o f  t h i s  form o f  p ic k e tin g  i s  determ ined by th e  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een th e  
un ions concerned. The d e c is io n  to  c ro ss  o r  n o t to  c ro s s  a p ic k e t  l i n e  
depends on th e  l o c a l 's  i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  prim ary i s s u e .
problem o f  dec id in g  where prim ary  a c t i v i t y  ends and secondary a c t i v i t y  
b eg in s and th e  f u r th e r  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  de term in ing  w hether th e  in ju re d  
p a r ty  i s  a n e u tr a l  to  th e  d isp u te . I n  summary, w hile  S ec tio n  8 (b) o f  
th e  LMRA outlaw ed conduct whose purpose was h e ld  to  be un law fu l, Sec­
t io n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) c re a te d  two e q u a lly  fo rm idab le  problem s: (1) w hether 
th e  ph rase  "an o b je c t"  would be in te r p r e te d  in  accordance w ith  th e  
narrow  o r  b road  c o n s tru c tio n , and (2 ) w hether th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  on 
secondary b o y c o tts  was in ten d ed  to  p ro sc r ib e  bo th  s ig n a l and consumer 
p ic k e tin g . I f  Congress in ten d ed  to  ban b o th  o f th e se  g e n e ra l forms 
o f  p ic k e tin g , i t  was e v id e n t th a t  such a r e s t r i c t i o n  would be in  con­
f l i c t  w ith  th e  f r e e  speech g u a ran tee  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e , th u s  
r a i s in g  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  doub ts a s  to  th e  v a l id i ty  o f  th e  LMRA. Conse­
q u e n tly . th e  U nited S ta te s  Supreme Court cou ld  e i th e r  d e c la re  th e  LMRA 
u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l  as an abridgm ent o f  f r e e  speech o r  r e s t r i c t  th e  
a p p lic a t io n  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  by a llow ing  s t a t e  and f e d e ra l  
c o u r ts  to  e n jo in  p ic k e tin g  i f  "an o b je c t"  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  was in  
c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  im p l i c i t  l im i ta t io n s  o f  S ec tion  8 (b ) .
The f i r s t  t e s t  o f  th e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l i t y  o f th e  LMRA to  reach  th e
Supreme Court was Glboney v. Empire S to rage  I c e  Company-^ The f a c t s  o f
t h i s  case  p re se n t an in te r e s t in g  p a r a l l e l  to  th e  case o f  Bakery and 
P a s tn r  D riv ers  v . Wohl which was decided  by th e  Supreme Court i n  1942.
^336 U.S. 490 (1949). T his was n o t th e  f i r s t  p ic k e tin g  case
under th e  LMRA, b u t i t  was th e  f i r s t  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  case  accep ted  by 
th e  Supreme Court.
As i n  th e  Wohl oase where th e  b ak ery  d r i v e r s ' u n ion  sought to  compel th e  
nonunion p e d d le rs  to  h i r e  un ion  h e lp e r s ,  th e  un io n  d r iv e r s  i n  th e  
Qiboney c a se  were a tte m p tin g  to  fo rc e  th e  nonunion ooal and i c e  p e d d le rs  
to  a c c e p t un ion  membership w ith  an  o b je c t  o f  Im proving w orking cond i­
t i o n s '  These two o ases  a re  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  numerous s i t u a t io n s  where 
em ployers, due to  d ep re ssed  economic co n d itio n s*  were fo rc e d  to  l a y o f f  
t h e i r  d r iv e r s  and h e lp e r s  and to  c o n v e rt th e  d e l iv e ry  p ro c e ss  in to  an  
in d ep en d en t o p e ra t io n . The em ployers w ere:
. . . th e re b y  . * • / a b l e  to J  • . . reduce  overhead  . . . /"and  
th ey  c o u ld / • • • a ls o  c u t  c o s ts  i n  two d i r e c t  ways. F i r s t ,  th ey  
e lim in a te d  any p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i d l e  tim e f o r  which th e  employees 
would have to  be  p a id ;  and second, th e  in d ep en d en t c o n tr a c to r s  who 
re p la c e d  th e  em ployees--— th e y  w ere o f te n  th e  same in d iv id u a ls  
— -w orked lo n g e r  h o u rs  f o r  a sm a lle r  income th a n  had th e  employ­
ees-
The im m ediate e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  p r a c t ic e  was to  hamper th e  o p e ra t io n s  o f
th o se  em ployers who co n tin u ed  to  employ un ion  d r iv e r s ,  r e s u l t in g  i n
„ , n
c o n d it io n s  which would e v e n tu a lly  underm ine l a b o r  s ta n d a rd s . The
un ion  d r iv e r s  in  th e  Wohl case  a ttem p ted  to  s to p  t h i s  d e p re c ia tin g
s i tu a t io n  by p ic k e tin g  th e  b a k e r ie s  in  an e f f o r t  to  b r in g  p re s s u re  on
th e  nonunion d r iv e r s .  In  th e  Giboney c a s e  th e  un ion  o b ta in e d  agreem ents
from a l l  th e  w h o lesa le  d i s t r i b u t o r s  in  Kansas C ity , w ith  th e  e x ce p tio n
•^Etoanual Cordon. "Giboney v . S n p ire  S to rag e  and I c e  Co. A 
F oo tno te  to  F ree  Speech," V irg in ia  Law Review, XXXVI, No. 1 (F eb ruary ,
1950), 25.
11I b i d . ,  p . 26 .
of Empire, to the offoot that they would not aell ice  to the nonunion 
peddlers. When Ehrpire refused to aoqulesoe to the union's demands, the 
drivers established picket lin es protesting the . . sale of ice  to
b u s in e ss  was reduced  ap p rox im ate ly  85 p e rc e n t, and S n p lre  b rough t a s u i t  
under a  1939 M issou ri a n t i t r a d e  s t a t u t e  which fo rb ad e  agreem ents i n  
r e s t r a i n t  o f  t r a d e .  The t r i a l  c o u r t  is s u e d  a p re lim in a ry  o rd e r  h o ld in g  
t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was in te n d e d  to  o b ta in  an un law fu l purpose  and t h a t  
an  in ju n c t io n  a g a in s t  an  un law fu l a c t  " . . .  d id  n o t co n trav en e  . . . 
/ t h e  u n io n 's 7  • • • r i g h t  o f  f r e e  speech. -jhe Supreme C ourt o f 
M issouri a ff irm e d  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  t r i a l  c o u r t  and th e  union  ap p ea led  
con tend ing  t h a t  " . . .  th e  prim ary  o b je c tiv e  . . . / o f  th e  p ic k e t in g /
. . . was to  im prove wage and working c o n d it io n s  . • • and t h a t  t h e i r  
v io la t io n  o f  th e  s t a t e  . . . / la w  w as/ . . . in c id e n ta l  to  t h i s  law fu l 
purpose . "li4'
The f a c t s  o f  t h i s  case  p re se n te d  th e  Supreme C ourt w ith  a c l e a r  
q u e s tio n : w hether to  ex tend  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c t io n  to  p e ac e fu l and 
t r u th f u l  secondary  p ic k e tin g  o r  to  p r o te c t  th e  em ployers ' r ig h t s  to  
engage i n  u n r e s t r i c te d  c o m p e titio n  f r e e  from p e a c e fu l economic r e p r i s a l s  
I n  a unanimous d e c is io n  Mr. J u s t i c e  B lack, speaking  f o r  th e  C ourt, h e ld
12non-union peddlers." As a consequence of the picketing, Empire's
12336 U.S. h92. 
^^Ibld . , p. 49h.
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t h a t :
N e ith e r  T b g g g jm  ▼. £jyggma n o r  C arlson  C a llfb rn ia  . . * 
/ s u p p o r t s ^  • * * th e  c o n te n tio n  t h a t  conduct o th e rw ise  un law fu l i s  
alw ays immune fro n  s t a t e  r e g u la t io n  beoauee an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  
t h a t  oondnot i s  e a r r le d  on by d is p la y  o t  d a o a r d a  by  p e a o e f d  
p io k e te re .  I n  b o th  th e s e  o ases  • . * • . . s t ru c k  down
s t a tu t e s  which banned a l l  d is se m in a tio n  o f  in fo rm a tio n  by p eo p le  
a d ja o e n t t o  c e r ta in  prem ises* p o in tin g  o u t t h a t  s t a tu t e s  were so 
b road  t h a t  th e y  oould  n o t on ly  be  u t i l i s e d  to  pun ish  oonduct 
p la in ly  i l l e g a l  b u t  oould a ls o  be  a p p lie d  to  ban a l l  t r u th f u l  pub­
l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  f a c t s  o f  a  la b o r  controversy.^-*
In  ap p ly in g  th e  t e s t  o f  th e  T h o rn h il l  D octrine* J u s t i c e  B lack  
em phasized t h a t  c o u r ts  must be c a re fu l  n o t t o  r e s t r i c t  th e  p o l ic e  power 
o f  th e  s t a t e  so a s  to  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  im p a ir  th e  power o f  th e  s t a t e  i n  
i t s  a d m in is tr a t io n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  d is p u te s .  I n  p e rm itt in g  th e  s t a t e  to  
e x e rc is e  i t s  p o l ic e  powers th e  Court i s  m indfu l o f  th e  im portance o f  
p ro te c t in g  freedom  o f  speech. But p ic k e tin g  . . t o  e f f e c tu a te  th e  
pu rposes o f  an un law fu l com bination . . . cannot be  p ro te c te d  under 
th e  th e o ry  t h a t  i t  i s  a l e g a l  pursuance o f  an un law fu l o b je c t .
By th e  same token  J u s t i c e  B lack  sought to  d is t in g u is h  betw een
th e  f a c t s  o f  t h i s  case  and th o se  o f  th e  Wohl d e c is io n  which upheld
p ic k e tin g  a s  a r i g h t  o f  f r e e  speech . I n  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  d e p a r tu re
from th e  rea so n in g  o f  th e  Wohl case . J u s t i c e  B lack s a id  t h a t  i t  seemst
. * . d e a r  t h a t  a p p e l la n ts  were do ing  more th a n  e x e rc is in g  a r i g h t  
o f  f r e e  speeoh o r  p re s s  /B akery D riv e rs  L ocal v . Wohl: C i ta t io n s  
O m i t t e ^ . They were e x e rc is in g  t h e i r  eoonomic power to g e th e r  w ith  
t h a t  o f  t h e i r  a l l i e s  to  compel Empire to  a b id e  by union r a th e r  th a n
^ I b i d . * pp. U98J+99. 
l 6Ib ld . .  p. 5 0 2 .
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by s t a t e  r e g u la t io n  o f  t r a d e .1 '*
I n  s e n a r y ,  J u s t io e  B lack1 s  d e c is io n  in  th e  Giboney case  l im i te d  
th e  r a l e  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  by a llo w in g  th e  s t a t e s  to  e n jo in  
p ic k e tin g  i f  th e  s t a t e  law  p ro h ib ite d  p ic k e tin g  p ro v id ed  th e  s t a tu t e  i n  
q u e s tio n  d id  n o t e s ta b l i s h  broad  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  r i g h t  o f  speech .
Thus p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  m ight be e n jo in ed  by th e  s t a t e s  i f  th e  o b je c t  
c o n s t i tu te d  a  v io la t io n  o f  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  S ec tio n  8 (b ) o f  th e  LMRA. 
The Giboney d e c is io n  e x h ib i t s  a  c a re fu l  b u t g ra c e fu l  r e t r e a t  fro n  th e  
p o s i t io n  o f  e q u a l i ty  w ith  f r e e  speech. I n  t h i s  d e c is io n  th e  means 
employed and th e  o b je c t iv e  sough t by th e  p ic k e tin g  p rov ided  th e  t e s t  f o r  
d e te rm in in g  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  th e  s t a t e  law . Under t h i s  t e s t  th e  o b jec ­
t iv e s  sough t in  th e  Senn, Swing, Wohl, and R i t t e r  c a se s  would be i l l e g a l ,  
b u t th e  Swing d e c is io n  was u n eq u iv o ca lly  equated  to  f r e e  speech.
The s h i f t  i n  j u d ic i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  between th e  Wohl d e c is io n  
in  19^2 and th e  Giboney d e c is io n  in  19^8 p re s e n ts  some in te r e s t in g  
c o n c lu s io n s .
Source o f  
D ispu te
E x is ten ce  
o f  nonunion 




ment o f  
working 
condi­
t io n s
In ju re d
-EiESSL
Source o f
B usiness Union 
e n te r -  d r iv e r s  
p r i s e
Method o f
...igftsr
P ic k e tin g
Giboney
I 7I b ld . . p. 503.
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As i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  Io rego ing  comparison, th e  in ju ry*  objeot*  p a r t ie s *  
source* and method o f  in ju ry  a re  th e  same i n  both  c a se s . Moreover* th e  
in ju ry  in  th e  Giboney case  i s  n o t s u b s ta n t ia l ly  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  type  
o f  in ju ry  in  th e  c ase s  im m ediately p r io r  to  th e  LMRA. Any d is t in c t io n *  
th e re fo re *  between th e  Giboney case  and p r io r  d e c is io n s  must be d e riv e d  
from th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  in ju ry  i t s e l f ,  i . e .*  because th e  i n te n t  in  bo th  
Giboney and Wohl was to  fo rce  th e  nonunion d r iv e r s  to  adop t p o l ic ie s
fav o ra b le  to  th e  union d r iv e r s .  In  th e  Wohl case  th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e
lflin ju ry*  o th e r  th in g s  eq u al, was probably  an in c re a s e  in  c o s ts  w ith  
h ig h e r  p r ic e s  to  consumers. Although th e  p a t te rn  in  th e  Giboney case  
would p robab ly  have follow ed th e  same course o f  ev en ts , th e  union sought 
to  e f f e c tu a te  i t s  purpose by using  th e  o th e r  w holesale  d e a le rs  a s  a l l i e s  
in  su p p o rt o f th e  p ic k e tin g . The Supreme Court viewed t h i s  r e s u l t  a s  a 
dangerous th r e a t  s in ce  i t  i s  well-known* a t  l e a s t  in  ju d ic i a l  c i r c l e s ,  
t h a t  com binations a re  in h e re n tly  e v i l  because they reduce co m petition , 
d r iv e  up p r ic e s ,  and in ju r e  th e  p u b lic . T h is form o f  economic co e rc io n  
cannot be to le r a te d  in  a f r e e  m arket system ; and i t  i s  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  
s t a te ,  i n  th e  words o f  J u s t ic e  Black* to  determ ine th e  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  
and to  re g u la te  un ions f o r  th e  purpose o f keeping " . . .  th e  channels 
o f tra d e  wholly f r e e  and o p e n . W h i l e  J u s t ic e  Black was r e lu c ta n t  to
1SEven i f  o th e r  th in g s  should be eq u al, i t  i s  dangerous to  
assume t h a t  an in c re a s e  in  c o s ts  v ia  In c reased  wages would n e c e s s a r i ly  
cause an in c re a s e  in  p r ic e s -  For an ex te n s iv e  exam ination  o f  t h i s  
problem see Gordon F. Bloom and H erbert R. N orthrup, Economics o f  Labor 
R e la tio n s  (T h ird  E d itio n ; Homewood: R ichard D. Irw in , I n c . ,  19587* 
C hapter 13*
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m ain ta in  t h a t  th e  in ju ry  a f f e c t s  th e  e n t i r e  p u b lic , he was w il l in g  to  
e n jo in  th e  p ic k e tin g  on th e  grounds th a t  I t  m ight p o ss ib ly  a f f e c t  th e  
p u b lic  even though th e  Immediate purpose was to  fo rc e  Empire to  cease  
s e l l in g  Ic e  to  nonunion d r iv e r s .
The d i f f i c u l t y  in  defending  J u s t ic e  B lack’ s p o s i t io n  stems from 
th e  f a c t  th a t  h i s  op in ion  p e rm itte d  a r e lu c ta n t  w h o le sa le r to  combine 
w ith  nonunion p e d d le rs  to  d e fe a t  th e  ap p aren t le g i t im a te  purpose o f  th e  
union d r iv e r s .  Thus th e  l e g i s l a tu r e  o f th e  S ta te  o f  M issouri was a b le  
to  re g u la te  th e  d isp u te  by d e fa u l t .  Although th e re  may be some b a s is  
f o r  ju s t i f y in g  Immunity o f  s t a te  law s from ju d ic i a l  a t ta c k ,  th e  th eo ry  
o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  c ase  was no t fo rm ula ted  on th e se  grounds. On th e  
c o n tra ry , th e  o b je c t  In  T h o rn h i l l 's  case  was to  s t r ik e  down law s which 
have th e  e f f e c t  o f p rev en tin g  p eace fu l d issem in a tio n  o f  the  f a c t s  o f  a 
la b o r  d isp u te . T h is  i s  n o t to  say th a t  th e  s t a t e  was denied  th e  r ig h t  
o f  re g u la tin g  v io le n ce  o r  b reach es  of th e  peace which a re  in  c o n f l i c t  
w ith  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t ,  b u t to  say th a t  th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  Giboney case  
c o n s t i tu te  a c le a r  and p re s e n t  danger would seem ingly s t r e tc h  th e  t e s t  
beyond i t s  In tended  r e s u l t .  W hile J u s t ic e  Black attem pted  to  j u s t i f y  
th e  Giboney ru l in g  th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  c o n s t i tu te d  a v io la t io n  o f 
M issouri law  re p re se n tin g  a c le a r  and imminent danger to  th e  p rosecu­
t io n  o f  th a t  s t a tu te ,  an a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d e c is io n  In d ic a te s  th a t  c le a r  
and p re s e n t  danger was a dead l e t t e r  a t  law . N ev erth e le ss , th e  Court 
con tinued  to  pay homage to  th e  c le a r  and p re s e n t danger t e s t  even though
69
th e  p r a c t i c a l  a p p lic a t io n  o f  th e  d o c tr in e  had long  s in ce  been d isc a rd e d  
in  favo r o f th e  un law ful o b je c t  t e s t  a s  f i r s t  form ulated  in  C arpen ters 
Union ▼. R i t t e r .
In  th e  fo llow ing  term th e  Court review ed th re e  case s  which 
expanded th e  l im i ta t io n s  o f th e  Giboney ru l in g . In  th e  f i r s t  o f  th e se  
ca se s . Hughes v. S u p erio r Court o f  C a li fo rn ia . 2® th e  C a lifo rn ia  Supreme 
Court en jo in ed  th e  p l a i n t i f f 2^ from p ic k e tin g  c e r ta in  grooexy s to re s  f o r  
th e  purpose o f  fo rc in g  th e  s to r e s  to  employ negroes in  th e  sane r a t i o
a s  t h e i r  negro custom ers. Speaking f o r  a unanimous Court, J u s t ic e  
F ra n k fu r te r  o u tlin e d  th e  ph ilosophy  of th e  R i t t e r  and Giboney d e c is io n s  
s ta t in g  th a t :
I t  i s  amply recogn ized  t h a t  p ic k e tin g , n o t being  th e  e q u iv a le n t 
o f  f r e e  speech a s  a m a tte r  o f  f a c t ,  i s  n o t i t s  in e v i ta b le  le g a l  
e q u iv a le n t. P ic k e tin g  i s  n o t beyond th e  c o n tro l o f a s t a t e  i f  
th e  manner in  which p ic k e tin g  i s  conducted o r  th e  purpose which 
i t  seeks to  e f f e c tu a te  g iv es  ground fo r  i t s  d isa llow ance  . . . 2
In  com m uting on th e  im portance o f  ju d ic i a l  d e c is io n s  a s  doc­
t r in e s  o f  p u b lic  p o lic y . J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r  r e je c te d  the  claim  th a t  th e  
p o lic y  pronouncements o f th e  c o u r ts  a re  n o t e q u iv a le n t to  l e g i s l a t i v e  
s t a tu t e s .  The s t a te  may, a s  a p ro cess  o f  law, allow  th e  c o u rts  to  
fo rm u la te  th e  method and th e  scope o f  th e  la v . The c o u rt i s  th e  p r a c t i ­
c a l  In stru m en t o f  th e  s t a t e  and in  th e  cou rse  o f  i t s  du ty  i t  may dev ise
20339 U.S. ^60 (19^9).
^H ughes and o th e rs  were n o t members o f a la b o r  union.
22339 U.S. h65-h 66 .
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s o lu t io n s  which a re  "rough accom odations" and u n s c i e n t i f i c  In  n a tu re .
A s t a t e  i s  n o t  re q u ire d  to  e x e rc is e  i t s  in te rv e n t io n  on th e  b a s i s  
o f  a b s t r a c t  re a so n in g . The C o n s ti tu tio n  ooM tnds n e i th e r  l o g ic a l  
aym w try  n o r  e x h au s tio n  o f  p r in c ip le  . . . Imw nak lng  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
e m p ir ic a l and t e n t a t i v e ,  and in  a d ju d ic a t io n  a s  i n  l e g i s l a t i o n  th e  
C o n s ti tu tio n  does n o t  fo rb id  "c a u tio u s  advance* s te p  by step*  and 
th e  d i s t r u s t  o f  g e n e r a l i t i e s . "23
J u s t i c e  F ra n k fu r te r ,  by argum ent and im p lic a tio n , was su g g e s t­
in g  t h a t  th e  term ino logy  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  and i t s  companion 
c ase s  was an u n fo r tu n a te  grouping o f  " g e n e r a l i t ie s "  which by n e c e s s i ty  
r e q u ire  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  an d  p r a c t i c a l  im p lem en ta tion . The ph ilo so p h y  o f  
th e  T h o rn h ill  c a se , a lth o u g h  a c c e p ta b le  i n  s p i r i t ,  must be  supplem ented 
by a " ru le  o f  reaso n "  which w i l l  p e rm it th e  c o u r ts  to  e f f e c t iv e ly  regu ­
l a t e  i n d u s t r i a l  d is p u te s .
The unusual dem o n stra tio n  o f  j u d i c i a l  harmony i n  th e  Giboney
Ojk
and Hughes d e c is io n s  l a s t e d  f o r  one a d d i t io n a l  p ic k e tin g  case , B u ild ­
in g  S e rv ic e s  Employees v . Gazzam. 25 i n  th e  Gazzam case  th e  W ashington 
Supreme Court had a ff irm e d  an in ju n c t io n  o f  a s t a t e  c o u rt  r e s t r a in in g  
th e  p l a i n t i f f  (un ion) from p ic k e tin g  th e  d efen d an t (Gazzam). At th e  
tim e o f  th e  d is p u te ,  Gazzam o p e ra te d  a  « m n  h o te l  in  Brem erton, 
W ashington. On May 1 , 1946, th e  union  p e t i t io n e d  Gazzam fo r  th e  r i g h t  
to  o rg an iz e  h i s  em ployees and re q u e s te d  Gazzam to  s ig n  a union  shop
^•^ Ib id . , pp. 468-469*
Z^The d e c is io n s  i n  th e  Giboney, Hughes, and Gazzam c ase s  w ere 
unanimous w ith  th e  e x ce p tio n  o f  a co n cu rrin g  o p in io n  by J u s t i c e  B lack
th a t  he b e lie v e d  t h a t  th e  f a c t s  o f  Hughes and Gazzam were c o n tro l le d  by 
th e  r u l in g  o f  th e  Giboney c a se . A pparen tly  J u s t i c e  B lack was o f  th e  
o p in io n  th a t  h i s  term ino logy  in  th e  Giboney case  was more to  th e  p o in t .
2^339 U .S. 532 (1950).
o o n tra c t.  Gazzam in d ic a te d  th a t  he had no o b je c tio n  to  th e  u n io n 's  
re q u e s t and t h a t  he would p erm it th e  un ion  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  to  s o l i c i t  
membership from h i s  employees. The n ex t day th e  union ag a in  req u e s te d  
Gazzam to  sign  a union shop agreem ent ad v is in g  th e  defendan t t h a t  th e  
union m ight p la c e  h i s  b u s in e ss  on a "We Do Not P a tro n iz e '1 l i s t .  Gazzam 
re fu se d  to  s ig n  th e  c o n tra c t  and th e  union coun tered  w ith  a re q u e s t to  
meet w ith  h i s  em ployees. The o rg a n iz a t io n a l  m eeting took  p la c e  on Hay 
1 0 ; and, a f t e r  th e  union  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  had p re se n te d  t h e i r  case , th e  
employees by s e c r e t  b a l l o t  vo ted  a g a in s t  th e  union by a n in e  to  one 
m argin. The one fav o ra b le  v o te  was o a s t by a b e llb o y  " . . .  whose 
membership th e  union d id  n o t d e s i r e . ”2** A few days a f t e r  th e  vo te  th e  
defendan t was p laced  on th e  "Do Not P a tro n iz e "  l i s t  and p ic k e ts  
p a tr o l le d  in  f ro n t  o f  th e  e s tab lish m en t c a rry in g  ". . . a  s ig n  rea d in g :
' E n e ta i Inn— U nfair to  O rganized L ab o r.' The p ic k e tin g  was c a r r ie d  on 
by a  s in g le  p ic k e t  a t  . . . /a 7  • • * tim e and was in te r m i t t e n t  and 
p e a c e fu l . ”27 T h e re a f te r , th e  union ag a in  c a l le d  on th e  defendan t and 
o f fe re d  to  withdraw  th e  p ic k e t  i f  Gazzam would s ig n  an open shop a g re e ­
ment w ith  a p ro v is io n  re q u ir in g  new employees to  Jo in  th e  union w ith in  
f i f t e e n  days. G azzam  re fu se d  to  s ig n  t h i s  agreem ent and subsequen tly  
b rought a s u i t  a g a in s t  th e  un ion , a l le g in g  t h a t  th e  i n te n t  o f  th e  
u n io n 's  o f f e r  was to  ooerce him in to  s ig n in g  a c o n tra c t  in  v io la t io n  o f  
a s t a te  law . The S ta te  o f  W ashington had a la b o r  law which p rov ided
26I b i d . , p . 534.
27I b i d . . pp. 53^535 -
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t h a t  no in ju n c t io n  oould  be is s u e d  i n  a  " la b o r  d is p u te " —th e  i n t e r p r e t a ­
t io n  i n  t h i s  oase be ing  t h a t  no " la b o r  d is p u te "  e x is te d  and t h a t  th e  
p ic k e tin g  was i n  v io la t io n  o f  • • p u b lic  p o l ic y  a g a in s t  th e  em ployer: 
co e rc io n  o f  em ployees' cho ice  o f  . . . f a j  . . • b a rg a in in g  re p re s e n ta ­
t i v e  . . . " 2fl
The i s s u e  i n  t h i s  case—w hether a s t a t e  c o u rt  may i s s u e  an 
in ju n c t io n  r e s t r a in in g  p ic k e tin g  a s  p ro te c te d  by th e  f r e e  speech c la u se  
o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n —p re se n te d  a  d i r e c t  c h a lle n g e  to  th e  LMRA and p ro ­
v id ed  an in t e r e s t i n g  com parison to  th e  Swing case  i n  which th e  Court 
re fu s e d  t o  endorse  a s im ila r  o rder*  I n  s u s ta in in g  th e  in ju n c t io n  i n  th e  
Gazzam case , Mr. J u s t i c e  Minton gave a t t e n t io n  to  th e  e v o lu tio n  o f  th e  
f r e e  speech g u a ra n tee s  s in c e  th e  T h o rn h ill  c a se . S ig n i f ic a n t  i n  t h i s  
rev iew  o f  th e  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  was J u s t i c e  M in to n 's  r e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  
p e t i t i o n e r 's  c la im  t h a t  th e  Swing case  was c o n tr o l l in g .  J u s t i c e  M inton 
d is t in g u is h e d  th e  r e s u l t  i n  S w ing 's case  on th e  b a s i s  t h a t  th e  S ta te  o f  
I l l i n o i s  had e n jo in e d  p ic k e tin g  o f  S w ing 's Beauty P a r lo r  i n  th e  absence  
o f  a  la b o r  d is p u te .  The in ju n c t io n  i n  th e  Swing d e c is io n  was i n t e r ­
p re te d  a s  draw ing th e  c i r c l e  o f  co m p e titio n  so sm all a s  to  l i m i t  p ic k e t ­
in g  to  th e  p rim ary  em ployers ' em ployees. The p ic k e t in g  by " s tra n g e rs "  
was e n jo in e d  a s  a v io la t io n  o f  th e  due p ro c e ss  o f  law . The e f f e c t  o f  
t h i s  in ju n c t io n  was to  p re v e n t th e  workingmen from e x e rc is in g  t h e i r  
r i g h t  o f  communication under th e  C o n s t i tu tio n . I n  th e  Gazzam case  th e  
law  was n o t c o n s tru ed  by th e  Court i n  such a way a s  to  • . p r o h ib i t
28I b id . .  p . 536.
"p ic k e tin g  o f  w orkers by o th e r  workers* The c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th e  
s t a tu t e  > . . t h i s  o a s e j  * * • o n ly  p r o h ib i t s  c o e rc io n  o f  w orkers 
by em ployers. ”29 The e f f e c t  o f  th e  s t a t u t e  (a s  in te r p r e te d  h e re )  does 
n o t e n jo in  ”. . .  p ic k e tin g  p e r  se  b u t o n ly  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  which h as  a s  
i t s  purpose  v io la t io n  o f  th e  p o l ic y  o f  th e  s t a t e .  "3° A lthough p ic k e tin g  
i s  more th a n  f r e e  speech , i t  c o n ta in s  e le n e n ts  o f  f r e e  speech which 
re q u ire  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c t io n  u n le s s  th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  
i n  c o n f l i c t  w ith  an  e s ta b l is h e d  s t a t e  p o l ic y .  The in ju n c t io n  g ra n te d  
by th e  s t a t e  c o u rt was t a i l o r e d  to  p rev e n t a v io la t io n  o f  a s t a t e  law . 
The purpose  o f  t h i s  Act ”. . .  was to  p re v e n t u n reaso n ab le  j u d ic i a l  
in te r f e r e n c e  w ith  le g i t im a te  o b je c t iv e s  o f  w o rk e rs . But abuse by 
w orkers . . .  o f  d e c la re d  p u b lic  p o l ic y  . . . cannot be  condoned any 
more th a n  v io la t io n s  th rough  j u d i c i a l  i n te r f e r e n c e .
The c o n f l i c t  betw een th e  Swing and Gazzam d e c is io n s  i s  r e p re ­
s e n ta t iv e  o f  th e  s h i f t  i n  j u d ic i a l  ph ilo so p h y  betw een 19^2 and 1948.
T h is  t r a n s i t i o n  in  j u d i c i a l  o p in io n , which p e rm itte d  em ployers to  
r e s t r i c t  th e  b road  a s p e c ts  o f  th e  Swing case , was due i n  p a r t  to  unpopu­
l a r  p r a c t i c e s  o f  u n io n s, th e  s h i f t  i n  p u b lic  and l e g i s l a t i v e  sen tim en t, 
and th e  change i n  th e  com position  o f  th e  Supreme O ourt. A lthough i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  d ism iss  th e  l a t t e r  e lem ent, th e  f i r s t  two f a c to r s  p lay ed  an 
im p o rta n t r o le  i n  changing th e  o p in io n  o f  th o se  members o f  th e  Oourt who
29I b i d . . p . 539. 
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p a r t i c ip a te d  In  bo th  th e  Swing and Qazzaa dec is io n s*  Thus I t  was n o t 
s tra n g a  to  f in d  J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r , th e  a u th o r  o f  th e  m a jo r ity  o p in io n  
i n  S w ing 's c ase , v o tin g  w ith  th e  unanimous m a jo r ity  In  th e  Qazzam c a se . 
The change i n  p o s i t io n  by J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r  i s  in d ic a t iv e  o f  th e  
a tte m p t by th e  C ourt to  fo rm u la te  th e  p ro ce ss  o f  j u d ic i a l  o p in io n  on an 
e m p ir ic a l b a s i s  which encourages a ". . . c a u tio u s  advance, s te p  by s te p , 
and th e  d i s t r u s t  o f g e n e r a l i t i e s .  The g e n e ra l ru le  o f  th e  Swing case  
w i l l  no lo n g e r  s u f f ic e ;  i t  must be supplem ented by s p e c i f ic  d e c is io n s  
which w i l l  r e g u la te  p ic k e tin g  whose purpose has been d e c la re d  un law fu l 
by f e d e ra l  o r  s t a t e  law . The s t a t e s  were th e re fo re  encouraged to  draw 
t h e i r  s t a tu t e s  by d e f in in g  th o se  o b je c ts  which were c o n sid e red  to. be in  
c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  s t a t e ' s  announced p u b lic  p o lic y . As a r e s u l t ,  un ions 
were fo rc e d  to  wage l e g i s l a t i v e  s t ru g g le s  a s  w e ll a s  economic c o n f l i c t s  
w ith  th e  em ployer. The su ccess  o f  union o rg an iz in g  campaigns was th u s  
p lac ed  a t  a dec id ed  d isad v an tag e  i n  th e  a g r i c u l tu r a l  s t a t e s  whose 
l e g i s l a t u r e s  were ty p ic a l ly  a n tiu n io n . The im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  Oazzam 
d e c is io n  s h i f t e d  th e  pendulum o f  economic and p o l i t i c a l  p re s su re  to  th e  
management s id e  o f  th e  b a rg a in in g  ta b le .  The consequence o f  t h i s  d e c i ­
s io n  becomes more s ig n i f ic a n t  when i t  i s  co n sid ered  in  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  
c o n tin u in g  s tru g g le  between u n io n s and management on th e  i n d u s t r i a l  
f r o n t i e r .  For i t  i s  h e re  t h a t  th e  r e a l  is s u e s  a re  won and l o s t .  The 
a b i l i t y  o f  th e  union  movement to  r e t a in  o r  advance i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
power i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  dependent on th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  union to  engage in
32339 u . s .  469, e x t r a c t  from J u s t ic e  F r a n k f u r te r 's  m a jo rity  
o p in io n  in  Hughes v . S u p e rio r C ourt o f  C a li f o r n ia .
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p e a c e fu l s t r a n g e r  p ick e tin g *  The r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  i n  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
h as a t t a in e d  a s t a tu s  c o n s id e ra b ly  a p a r t  from o th e r  c o u n tr ie s .  P ic k e t­
in g  I s  a  r e f l e c t io n  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  c h a r a c te r  o f  th e  American la b o r  
movement i a symbol o f  th e  r ig h t  to  p r o te s t  a g a in s t  p r a c t ic e s  which a re  
h e ld  to  be u n f a i r  to  th e  f u tu r e  la b o r  movement. When th e  r i g h t  to  
p ic k e t  i s  encumbered by th e  burden o f  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i f e ,  th e  f u tu re  o f  
th e  la b o r  movement i s  p laced  i n  jeopardy . The i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  m arket 
co m p e titio n , d e s i r a b le  in  i t s  im pact, has been th r u s t  a s id e  f o r  a 
p o lit ic a l-e c o n o m ic  complex which reduces th e  argum ent on bo th  s id e s  to  
a s e r i e s  o f  unansw erable q u e s tio n s—o b je c t ,  i n te n t ,  and purpose— r e s u l t ­
in g  in  a  c o n tin u in g  e ra  o f  co n fu s io n . I f  th e  fu tu re  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
co m p e titio n  i s  dependent on th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a lan ce  betw een la b o r  and 
management, th e  f e d e r a l  c o u rts  should  n o t c o n tin u a l ly  unbalance t h i s  
eq u a tio n  by is s u in g  o p in io n s  which f a l l  to  c o n s id e r  th e  c o m p e titiv e  
a s p e c ts  o f  th e  m arket.
The l a s t  o f  th e  fo u r  c a se s  t e s t in g  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b ) 
i n  reg a rd  to  p ic k e tin g  was I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  T eam sters v. 
Hanke. A s  in  th e  th re e  p rev io u s  c a se s  dec id ed  d u rin g  th e  19^9 term , 
th e  Hanke case  in v o lv ed  th e  i s s u e  o f  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t  between th e  
purpose o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  and th e  q u e s tio n  o f  p u b lic  p o l ic y . I n  t h i s  
case  Hanke and h i s  th re e  sons o p e ra ted  a  com bination au tom obile  r e p a i r  
shop and used  c a r  l o t  i n  S e a t t l e ,  W ashington. Although Hanke belonged 
to  Local 309 and d isp la y e d  th e  union shop c a rd  i n  h i s  window, he re fu se d
33339 U.S. W  ( 1 W ) .
to  oomply w ith  a  re q u e s t  fay l o c a l  882 to  c lo s e  h i s  l o t  a t  H. . . 6  P.M. 
on weekdays and a l l  day Satu rday  and Sunday • • . "3^ The Hankes d id  n o t 
belong to  t h i s  a s s o c ia t io n  and i t  was t h e i r  p r a c t ic e  to  rem ain open 
du rin g  th e  p e r io d s  r e f e r r e d  to  i n  th e  c o n tr a c t .  At f i r s t .  L ocal 882 
a ttem p ted  to  conqpete w ith  th e  Hanke s . b u t " in  Jan u ary  o f  1948, r e p re ­
s e n ta t iv e s  o f  b o th  lo c a l s  c a l le d  upon th e  Hankes to  u rg e  them to  r e s p e c t  
th e  l im i t a t io n  on b u s in e ss  hours . . .  o r  g iv e  up t h e i r  un ion  shop 
c a r d .“35 The Hankes re fu s e d  to  consen t to  t h i s  r e q u e s t  and Local 309 
e s ta b l is h e d  a  s in g le  p ic k e t  who c a r r ie d  " . . .  a ' sandwich s ig n 1 w ith  
th e  words 'U nion P eople  Look f o r  th e  Union Shop Card' . . .  As a  r e s u l t  
o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  th e  Hankes' b u s in e s s  f e l l  o f f  h e a v ily  and d r iv e r s  f o r  
supply  houses re fu s e d  to  d e l iv e r  p a r t s  and o th e r  needed m a te r ia ls .  “36 
In  resp o n se  to  th e  u n io n 's  a c t io n  th e  Hankes b ro u g h t s u i t ,  seek ing  an  
in ju n c t io n  a g a in s t  th e  p ic k e tin g  and reco v ery  o f  money damages. The 
t r i a l  o o u rt made an  award o f  $250 i n  damages and g ran te d  a perm anent 
in ju n c t io n  a g a in s t  th e  p ic k e tin g . T h is  Judgment was l a t e r  a ff irm e d  by 
th e  Supreme Court o f  W ashington and th e  un io n  (L ocal 309) ap p ea led  to  
th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Supreme Court a l le g in g  th a t  th e  In ju n c t io n  c o n s t i tu te d  
an “. . . in frin g e m e n t o f  th e  r i g h t  o f  freedom  o f  speech . . ."37
I n  a f iv e  to  th r e e  d e c is io n  w ith  J u s t i c e s  M inton, d a r k ,  and
3/4I b l d . . p . 472.
3 5 ib id .
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37 ib id . , p . 4?4.
97
Black d is s e n t in g , th e  Supreme Oourt a ffirm ed  th e  lo v e r  c o u r t 's  in ju n c ­
t io n .  Th# ta s k  b a fo ra  J u s t io a  F ran k fu rte r*  a u th o r o f  th a  M ajo rity  
opinion* was q u i ts  d i f f e r e n t  from th a  problam s a s  p ra san ta d  by th e  
Giboney. Hughes* and Q assaa o ases . In  th e s e  oases th a  Court had bean 
asked  to  determ ine th a  l e g a l i t y  o f  p ic k e tin g  in  o o n f l ic t  w ith  an 
announced p u b lic  p o lic y . I n  a ff irm in g  th e se  d e c is io n s  th e  Supreme 
Oourt adhered  to  th e  ru le  o f  T h o rn h i l l 's  case  by p e rm ittin g  s ta te  
c o u rts  to  e n jo in  p ic k e tin g  where th e  o b je c t was in  d i r e c t  c o n f l ic t  w ith  
a s t a t e  law . The tre n d  o f  d e c is io n s  beg inn ing  w ith  R i t t e r 's  Cafe 
r e f le c te d  th e  new approach th a t  p ic k e tin g  was a h y b rid  and could  n o t be 
d ogm atica lly  equated  w ith  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c tio n  accorded to  
speech. But In  each o f  th e se  oases th e  Court re p e a te d ly  in d ic a te d  t h a t  
th e  in ju n c t io n  banning th e  p ic k e tin g  must be worded in  such a way a s  to  
r e s t r i c t  th e  a c t i v i t y  a s  a v io la t io n  o f  s t a t e  law  o r  o f  th e  d o c tr in e  o f  
p u b lic  p o lic y  a s  fo rm ulated  by th e  c o u rts .
But i n  H anke's case* th e  W ashington oou rt had done n e i th e r .  I t  d id  
no t e n jo in  th e  p ic k e tin g  because i t s  o b je c tiv e  was to  induoe a c t io n  
in  v io la t io n  o f  p u b lic  policy* n o r because s t a t e  p o lic y  excluded 
se lf-em p lo y era  from th e  a re a  o f  a llo w ab le  economic o o n f l ic t .  Rather* 
p ic k e tin g  was p reven ted  because i t s  consequences i n  th e  p a r t i c u la r  
case  were considered  to  con travene th e  oom aunity 's b e s t  i n t e r e s t s .  
T his r a t io n a le  m ight be term ed th e  "community i n t e r e s t "  r u l e . 3°
Thus* under th e  f a c t s  o f  H anke's case* J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r  was faced
w ith  th e  d e l ic a te  problem  o f  fo rm u la tin g  an op in io n  which would p erm it
th e  s t a te s  to  r e s t r i c t  p ic k e tin g  h e ld  to  be i n  c o n f l ic t  w ith  e s ta b l is h e d
Joseph Taimenhaus* "P ick e tin g —Free Speech* The Growth o f  th e  
New Law o f  P ic k e tin g  from 19^-0-1952." C orne ll Law Q u a rte r ly * XXXVIII* 
No. 1 (F la il, 1952). 1 -41 .
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community I n t e r e s t  and which. on th e  o th e r  hand, would p r o te c t  p ic k e tin g  
a s  a  secondary  neons o f  com m unication. I n  a c c e p tin g  t h i s  t a s k  J u s t i c e  
f r a n k f u r t e r  s t a te d  t h a t  th e  Court o u s t  " . . .  s t r i k e  a  b a la n ce  betw een 
th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c t io n  o f  th e  e lem ent o f  communication i n  p i c k e t ,  
in g  and th e  'pow er o f  th e  s t a t e  to  s e t  th e  l i m i t s  o f  p e rm is s ib le  o o n te s t  
open to  i n d u s t r i a l  co m b a ta n ts '—Thomh^ 13 v . Alabama— / c i t a t i o n s  
o m i t t e ^ J ."39 I n  pursuance  o f  t h i s  g o a l th e  s t a t e ' s  judgment re g a rd in g  
s o c ia l  and economic f a c to r s  must be re s p e c te d  by th e  ju d ic ia r y .  I t  i s  
f o r  th e  s t a t e  t o  govern and e s t a b l i s h  s ta n d a rd s  which r e f l e c t  i t s  judg ­
m ent. I f  th e  s t a t e  d e c id es  to  r e g u la te  th e  in te r p la y  o f  co m p etitio n  
betw een em ployers and u n io n s , th e  Court must weigh th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  
s t a t e  a s  w e ll a s  th o se  o f  th e  s e p a ra te  economic u n i t s .  I n  develop ing  
i t s  p u b lic  p o l ic y  th e  s t a t e  i s  s u b je c t  to  a  p ro c e ss  o f  c o n tin u a l change. 
I n  th e  a re a  o f  labor-m anagem ent r e l a t i o n s  " th e re  a re  no su re  answ ers and 
th e  b e s t  a v a i la b le  s o lu t io n  i s  l i k e l y  to  be ex p erim en ta l and t e n t a t i v e ,  
and alw ays s u b je c t  to  th e  c o n tro l  o f  th e  p o p u la r  w i l l .  W hile th e  
s t a t e  i s  alw ays s u b je c t  to  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f  th e  F o u rteen th  Amendment, 
th e  l im i ta t io n s  th e r e in  do n o t p rev en t th e  s t a t e  from e s ta b l is h in g  a 
la b o r  p o lic y  which seeks to  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  labor-m anagem ent r e l a t i o n s .  
The d e c is io n  to  i n t e r f e r e  o r  to  pu rsue  a  "h an d s-o ff"  p o l ic y  i s  a  m a tte r  
o f  p u b lic  p o lic y  and i s  n o t o f  j u d i c i a l  concern . As i n  th e  Senn case  
where a W isconsin  c o u rt den ied  in ju n c t iv e  r e l i e f  to  Senn. " . . .  t h i s
39339 u .S . 474. 
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"Oourt h e ld  t h a t  i t  la y  in  th e  domain o f  p o lic y  f o r  W isconsin to  p erm it
. . . o r  to  e n jo in  . • • th e  p ic k e tin g . The wisdom behind  t h i s
s t a te  law i s  n o t su b je c t to  ju d ic i a l  in te r f e re n c e  and may only  be
in te r p r e te d  by th e  s t a t e  i n  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  i t s  p u b lic  po licy*  The
f a c t s  o f  th e  Hanke case* because o f  th e  la c k  o f  agreem ent, d ivergency  o f
op in io n , and th e  im portance o f  th e  i s s u e  i n  q u e s tio n , p re s e n t a  problem
which i s  in  th e  domain o f  p u b lic  p o lic y .
/T h ig J  * * • d a s h  o f  f a c t  and op in ion  should be re so lv e d  by th e  
dem ocratic  p ro cess  and n o t by ju d ic i a l  sword. . . . While . . .
I t  i s  n o t fo r  us to  p ass  judgment on oases n o t now b e fo re  u s .
But when one co n sid e rs  t h a t  i s s u e s  no t u n lik e  th o se  th a t  a re  h e re  
have been s im ila r ly  viewed by o th e r  s t a t e s ,  and by th e  Congress o f  
th e  U nited S ta te s  (S ec tio n  3 (b )(4 )(A ) o f  th e  LMRA) we cannot con­
clude th a t  Washington* in  h o ld in g  th e  p ic k e tin g  i n  th e s e  c ase s  to  
be f o r  an  unlaw ful o b je c t ,  has s tru c k  a  b a lan ce  so in c o n s is te n t  w ith  
ro o ted  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  a f r e e  peop le  t h a t  i t  must be found an  uncon­
s t i t u t i o n a l  cho ice . Mindful a s  we a re  t h a t  a phase o f  p ic k e tin g  i s  
conmranication, we cannot f in d  th a t  W ashington has o ffended  th e  
C o n s titu tio n  •
Of th e  d is se n tin g  J u s t ic e s ,  on ly  J u s t ic e  Minton subm itted  a 
w r i t te n  d is s e n t .  J u s t ic e  Black d is se n te d  on th e  b a s is  o f  h is  o p in io n  in  
R i t t e r 's  Cafe, and J u s t ic e  Reed ooncurred w ith  J u s t ic e  M in ton 's  d is s e n t .  
J u s t ic e  Minton o b jec ted  to  th e  m a jo r ity  op in ion  on th e  grounds th a t  th e  
p ic k e tin g  en jo in ed  in  th e  Meadowmoor case and s im ila r  d e c is io n s  was o f  a 
v a r ie ty  q u i te  a p a r t  from th e  p ic k e tin g  in  th e  p re s e n t case . The p ic k e t­
in g  o f  H anke's ca r l o t  was p eace fu l and t r u th f u l  and was n o t in  v io la ­
t io n  o f  any s ta tu to r y  r e s t r i c t i o n  o r  p u b lic  p o l ic y  pronouncement. A ll
UlI b i d . . p . 476. 
/+2I b i d . ,  pp. 478-479*
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o f  th e  a s p e c ts  o f  t h i s  c a se , a rgued  J u s t i c e  M inton, a re  i n  keeping  w ith  
th e  f r e e  speech d o c tr in e  a s  im p lied  by J u s t ic e  B randeis  i n  th e  Senn 
c a se . I n  t h a t  case  p ic k e tin g  was acco rded  a  p r iv i le g e d  p o s i t io n —p u b l i ­
c a t io n  o f  a  la b o r  d is p u te —th e  a c t io n  o f  th e  S ta te  o f  W isoonsin—r e f u s ­
in g  to  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  th e  p ic k e tin g  amounted to  a  s a n c tio n  o f  f r e e  
speech under th e  C o n s t i tu tio n . "But because  W isconsin cou ld  p e rm it 
p ic k e t in g ,  and n o t th e re b y  encroach upon freedom o f  speech, i t  does n o t 
fo llo w  t h a t  i t  oould  fo rb id  l i k e  p ic k e tin g  . . • T h is  C ourt, con­
tended  J u s t ic e  M inton, has expended c o n s id e ra b le  e f f o r t  s in c e  th e  Senn 
case  to  e s ta b l i s h  a system  o f  p ro ce d u ra l r u le s  which would p erm it 
p ro te c t io n  o f  le g i t im a te  p ic k e tin g  and fo rb id  th e  p u r s u i t  o f  i l l e g i t i ­
mate o r  "ab u siv e1' p ic k e tin g  which co n trav en es a  s t a tu to r y  law o r  
announced p u b lic  p o l ic y . S ince th e  Oourt has so p a in s ta k in g ly  w rought 
th e  d o c tr in e  o f  p ro te c t io n —o f  le g i t im a te  p ic k e tin g —th e  S ta te  o f  
W ashington should n o t  be p e rm itte d  to  u p se t th e  n a tu r a l  cou rse  o f  th e s e  
d e c is io n s  by ou tlaw ing  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  on th e  b a s is  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  
c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  s t a t e .
I n  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  l e g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  betw een R i t t e r 1s 
Cafe (1942) and th e  Hanke case  (1949), i t  i s  e v id e n t t h a t  th e  Court 
abandoned th e  f r e e  speech d o c tr in e  i n  fa v o r  o f  a more r e s t r i c t i v e  
s ta n d a rd  which t r e a te d  p ic k e tin g  a s  a  means o f  communication r a th e r  th an  
a s  p u b l ic i ty  p e r  s e .  For example, i n  th e  Hanke case  J u s t i c e  F ra n k fu r te r  
s t a te d  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  c o n ta in s  . . a n  in g re d ie n t  o f  communication
^3lbid . , p. 483.
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" • • • a  rev iew  o f  . . . Our d e c is io n s  r e f l e c t  re c o g n itio n  t h a t  p ic k e t ­
in g  i s  in d eed  a h y b rid . This p o s i t io n  d is re g a rd s  th e  c l e a r  and p re ­
s e n t  dan g er t e s t  o f  th e  T h o rn h il l  and C arlson  d e c is io n s ,  s u b s t i tu t in g  
th e  r u le  o f  reason  a s  a p p lie d  i n  th e  Gazzam and Hanke c a se s . In  th e  
l a t t e r  in s ta n c e  p ic k e tin g  i s  d e fin e d  a s  a aeans o r  method o f  p u b l ic i ty  
and i s  su b seq u en tly  t r e a te d  a s  a  due p ro ce ss  o f  law q u e s tio n  w herein  
th e  t e s t  i s  re a so n a b le n e ss . Under t h i s  th eo ry  a s t a t e  cou ld  r e g u la te  
p ic k e tin g  by s ta tu to r y  law  o r  by p u b lic  p o lic y  a s  long  a s  th e  means o f 
r e g u la tio n  was n o t c o n sid e red  to  be in  o o n f l ic t  w ith  f e d e ra l  law  o r  th e  
im p lied  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f th e  f r e e  speech d o c tr in e . T h is sunoaatlon i s  
su p p o rted  by th e  d ic ta  o f  th e  Hanke op in ion  t h a t  th e  S ta te  o f  
W ashington n ig h t  in te rv e n e  and r e g u la te  p ic k e tin g  a s  a n a t t e r  o f  p o l ic y  
i f  th e  p ic k e tin g  was in  c o n f l io t  w ith  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  communi t y .
The th e o ry  which emerged from t h i s  ca se  and s im ila r  d e c is io n s  h e ld  t h a t  
th e  s t a t e s  m ight r e g u la te  p ic k e tin g  i f  th e  law o r  p o lic y  i n  q u e s tio n  
p rov ided  a rea so n ab le  t e s t  c o n tr o l l in g  d is o rd e r ,  co e rc io n , o r  i n  p ro ­
te c t in g  th e  g e n e ra l w e lfa re .
EFFECTS OF SECTION 8 ( b )  LMRA
The d e c is io n  o f  th e  U nited S ta te s  Supreme C ourt i n  th e  Hanke 
case , w ith  some l im i ta t io n s ,  was accep ted  a s  th e  c o n tro l l in g  d e c is io n  
govern ing  th e  l e g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  u n t i l  th e  passage  o f  th e  
LMREA o f  1959* B efore c o n s id e rin g  t h i s  p e rio d  in  th e  l e g a l  s t a tu s  o f
^ b i d . , p.
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p ic k e tin g ,* 4̂  i t  i s  n e c e ssa ry  to  g iv e  a t t e n t io n  to  th e  consequences o f  
S ec tio n  8 (b ) o f  th e  LMRA on th e  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g . As a b r i e f  synop­
s i s  o f  t h i s  problem . S ec tio n  8(b ) (4) (A)  c o n fe rre d  on th e  N a tio n a l Labor 
R e la tio n s  Board (NLRB) th e  in s e d ia te  and s ig n i f i c a n t  a u th o r i ty  o f  
d e te rm in in g  how th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  su b se c tio n  should  be I n te r p r e te d  
and a p p lie d  to  d is p u te s  which c o n ta in e d  e lem en ts o f  bo th  prim ary  and 
secondary  ac tio n *  The f i r s t  t e s t  o f  S e c tio n  8(b) (4) (A)  under th e
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  Board a ro se  i n  th e  case  o f  I n te m a t io n a l  R ice
46K il l in g  Company v . NLRB. This case  r e s u l te d  from an u n f a i r  la b o r  
p r a c t ic e  com plain t b rough t by th e  I n te r n a t io n a l  Rice M illin g  Company o f  
Crowley, L o u i s i a n a . T h e  responden t union  (Local 201 o f  th e  I n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  T eam sters) was a tte m p tin g  to  o rg a n is e  th e  
em ployees o f  th e  m il l in g  companies in  q u e s tio n . I n  th e  co u rse  o f th e s e  
n e g o tia t io n s  th e  union  had s e v e ra l c o n fe ren ces  w ith  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  
th e  m il l in g  com panies, b u t  th e  companies n e v e r  ". . . reco g n ised  th e  
responden t a s  th e  c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  t h e i r  
employees."**® A pproxim ately s ix  months t h e r e a f t e r  i n  Septem ber, 1947,
^ T h e  1949-1959 p e rio d  i s  g e n e ra l ly  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  th e  d e c l in ­
in g  phase  o f  th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e .
**684 NLRB 360 (1949).
**?The o th e r  m ill in g  companies a f f e c te d  by t h i s  d e c is io n  were 
lo c a te d  in  A b b e v ille , Rayne, and Kaplan, L o u is ian a .
**®84 NLRB 366.
**^The p ic k e t  l i n e  was e s ta b l is h e d  e lev en  days a f t e r  th e  LMRA 
became law .
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th e  u n io n  c a l le d  a  s t r i k e  a g a in s t  I n te r n a t io n a l  and th e  American R ice 
M illin g  Company and L o u is ian a  S ta te  R ice M illin g  Company a t  th e  Crowley 
m i l l .  W ith in  th e  n ex t th r e e  days th e  s t r i k e  was ex tended to  Rayne and 
A b b e v ille . L ouisiana*  To e n fo rc e  th e  s t r i k e  th e  un ion  e s ta b l is h e d  
p ic k e t  l i n e s  a t  th e  s tru c k  m il l s  which " . . .  ex tended a c ro s s  th e  
t r a c k s  o f  th e  M issouri and S ou thern  P a c i f i c  . . . th e  p ic k e ts  c a r r i e d  
p la c a rd s  * . . b e a r in g  . . . th e  fo llo w in g  leg e n d s  . . .
T h is  i s  a  p ic k e t  l i n e .  R espect i t .  Do n o t c ro s s  i t .
T h is  Job i s  u n f a i r  to  L ocal 201 . . .
T h is  jo b  i s  u n f a i r  to  o rg an ized  la b o r .
High c o s t  low pay b lues*
At f i r s t  th e  r a i l r o a d  erqployees d id  n o t re s p e c t  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e s  and 
co n tin u ed  w ith  t h e i r  norm al sw itch in g  o p e ra t io n s . The p ic k e ts  d id  make 
some a tte m p t to  i n t e r f e r e  by . . c lu s te r in g  on th e  r a i l r o a d  t r a c k  
. . . "51 b u t when th e  eng ine approached th e y  d isp e rse d . A few days 
l a t e r  th e  r a i l r o a d  conducto r re c e iv e d  a s e r i e s  o f  phone c a l l s  th r e a te n ­
in g  to  f i r e  a t  th e  r a i l r o a d  em ployees w ith  bucksho t and . . i f  o u r  
p ic k e ts  w o n 't  s to p  you. dynam ite w i l l ."^2 As a  r e s u l t  o f  th e s e  t h r e a t s ,  
th e  conducto r I n s t r u c te d  h i s  crew th a t  each in d iv id u a l  " . . .  should  u se  
h i s  own d i s c r e t io n  in  d e te rm in in g  w hether i t  was sa fe  to  c ro ss  th e  
p ic k e t  l i n e s . "53 On O ctober 15. th e  union  i n te n s i f i e d  i t s  p ic k e tin g
5°8h NLRB 367.
^ I b i d . . p . 368 .
52I b i d . .  p . 369.
53Ib id .
o p e ra t io n s , and th a  t r a i n  crews honored th a  p ic k e t  l i n e s  and co n tin u ed  
to  do so u n t i l  th e  d i s t r i c t  o o u rt is s u e d  an  o rd e r  e n jo in in g  th e  p ic k e t ­
in g . T h e re a f te r ,  th e  p ic k e ts  w ere w ithdraw n from th e  r a i l r o a d  track s*  
b u t th e  un ion  con tinued  to  p ic k e t  th e  m i l l s  u n t i l  th e  end o f  19^7* The 
p ic k e tin g  d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d  was p e a c e fu l w ith  th e  ex ce p tio n  o f  one 
in s ta n c e  when a t ru c k  a tte m p tin g  to  e n te r  th e  « i l l  was stoned  by th e  
p ick e ts*  With th e  con tinuance  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g , th e  m il l in g  companies 
p e t i t io n e d  th e  NLRB charg ing  th a t  th e  un ion  was v io la t in g  S e c tio n  8(b)  
(h)(A) o f  th e  LMRA by encourag ing  secondary  em ployers to  p a r t i c ip a te  I n  
and su p p o rt a  secondary  boycott*  At th e  h e a r in g  th e  un ion  contended 
t h a t  th e  "* * . d e f in i t io n s  o f  th e  term s 'em p loyer' and ' em ployee' 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  excluded  from th e  scope o f  th e  A ct, any person  s u b je c t  to  
th e  Railw ay Labor Act . * . I n  re s p e c t  to  t h i s  c o n te n tio n . S en a to r 
T a f t  s ta te d !
I  want to  p o in t  o u t t h a t  ra ilw a y  la b o r  has n ever been covered
by - th e  Railway Labor A ct. which p ro v id e s  a  somewhat d i f f e r e n t
p ro ced u re . We see  no rea so n  to  change t h a t  s i tu a t io n ,  because  th e r e  
were no a b u ses  which had a r i s e n  in  connec tion  w ith  th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  
th e  Railway Labor Ac t .**
The T r ia l  Bxaminer r e je c te d  th e  c o n te n tio n  o f  th e  u n io n , h o ld in g  t h a t
to  exclude  th e  r a i l r o a d  and i t s  employees from th e  term  em ployer and
employee under th e  Act " . . .  would remove from th e  am bit o f  S e c tio n
8 (b ) ,  su b se c tio n s  (^)(A) and (h ) (B) ,  th e  in d u s t ry  p o s s ib ly  most d i r e c t l y
and e x te n s iv e ly  concerned w ith  commerce * . * /a n d 7 • • • would v io la t e
^ tb id *. p . 373*
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" th e  c l e a r  I n te n t  o f  Congress . . . namely, t h a t  th e  b road  usage o f  
"any em ployer o r  o th e r  person" i n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) was in te n d e d  to  in c lu d e  th e  
xm ilroads and t h e i r  em ployees.
The T r ia l  E xam iner's  r e p o r t  o rd e rin g  th e  union  to  oease  and 
d e s i s t  f r a  th e  d e sc r ib e d  a c t i v i t i e s  was review ed by th e  NLRB i n  June o f  
1949• The NLRB d ism issed  th e  com plain t and th e  p r io r  o rd e r  s t a t in g  
th a t i
I n  view o f  th e  c l e a r  language o f  th e  . . . Act . . .  we must 
conclude t h a t  none o f  th e  R esponden t's  . . . a c t i v i t i e s  induced  o r  
encouraged employees o f  an  em ployer to  engage in  a  secondary  boy­
c o tt*  w ith in  th e  meaning o f  th e  . . . J X ct-7 . . . ”
The m il l in g  companies appea led  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  NLRB to  th e  C i r c u i t
C ourt o f  A ppeals. With Judge Edwin Holmes p re s id in g , th e  C ir c u i t  Oourt
s e t  a s id e  th e  NLRB's o rd e r  h o ld in g  t h a t :
A c lo s e  read in g  o f  th e  language used i n  S ec tion  8 (b )(4 )  con­
v in c e s  u s  t h a t  by th e  u se  o f  th e  words "any employer" Congress 
in te n d e d  to  ex tend  th e  s e c t io n  to  any and a l l  s i tu a t io n s  r e l a t i v e  to  
th e  one we have b e fo re  u s . . . . I n  c o n s tru in g  a s t a tu t e ,  i t  i s  
n e ce ssa ry  t h a t  every  word be g iven  s ig n if ic a n c e  and e f f e c t ,  and 
every  p a r t  o f  th e  s t a t u t e  must be co n stru ed  in  co n n ec tio n  w ith  th e  
whole, so a s  to  make a l l  p a r t s  harm onise. . . . The words "any 
employer" a s  used i n  S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )  a p p ea r to  u s to  r e f e r  to  th e  
same em ployer a s  d e sc rib e d  i n  S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) by th e  words "any 
em ployer o r  o th e r  p e r s o n ." Thus we see  th e  u se  o f  th e  words "any 
em ployer o r  any o th e r  person" being  used to  am plify  and e x p la in  th e  
words any em ployer. . . . N o sc itu r  a 1 s o c i i s t  th e  meaning o f  a  word 
may be a s c e r ta in e d  by re fe re n c e  to  th e  meaning o f  words a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  i t . 5 s
I n  re s p e c t  to  th e  NLRB* s o rd e r  h o ld in g  th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  r e l a te d  to  th e
^ 8 4  NLRB 375* 
57I b i d . , p . 361. 
58183 F. 2d. 21, 25.
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ston in g  o f  th e  trnok urns a case  o f  primary p ick etin g  and thus pro too  tod
by th a  l o t .  th a  C ourt a a ld  th e  B o a rd 's  d e c is io n :
. . . a tte m p ts  to  draw a f i n s  d i s t i n c t io n  between p r in a ry  and se c ­
ondary a c t io n .  . . .
The s t a tu t e  d e a r l y  p ro v id e s  a  reaiedy f o r  th e  type  o f  oonduot 
engaged in  by th e  un ion , w ith o u t r e s o r t  t o  any d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een 
p r in a ry  and seoondaxy a c t i v i t i e s .  I f  th e  u n io n 's  a c t i v i t i e s  cone 
w ith in  th e  language o f  th e  s ta tu te *  th ey  c o n s t i tu t e  an u n f a i r  la b o r  
p r a c t ic e  . . . We do n o t th in k  th e  ends o f  J u s t ic e  w i l l  be b e s t  
se rved  by i f  we a llo w  th e  Board to  o v e r tu rn  . . . / t h e  T r ia l  
B xan iner' s7  • • • f in d in g  M erely because  i t  o o n s id e rs  a l l  th e  a c t iv ­
i t i e s  to  be  p r in a ry  In s te a d  o f  secondary . . . . The f a c t  . . .
/ t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  i n  q u e s tio n ?  • • • ooourred  n e a r  th e  s tru o k  
a n p io y e r 's  p la n t  i s  n o t enough~to draw th e  d i s t i n c t io n  . . . / t h a t  
th e  p ic k e tin g  was p r in a r y  and n o t w ith in  th e  Aotj7 • • • The g rav a - 
nen o f  th e  o ffe n se  p ro h ib ite d  by th e  s t a tu t e  I s  t h a t  i t s  s a n c tio n s  
b e a r , n o t upon th e  en p lo y e r who a lo n e  i s  a  p a r ty  to  th e  d is p u te ,  b u t  
upon sane n e u t r a l  sm ployer who h as  no concern  in  th e  d is p u te ,  and 
i t s  a lu  i s  to  compel h in  to  s to p  b u s in e ss  w ith  th e  en p lo y e r i n  th e  
hope th a t  th e  e n p lo y e r w i l l  be induced  to  s u b n it  to  th e  denands o f  
th e  s t r i k e r s .  To a llo w  th e  Board to  r u le  such a c t i v i t y  a s  p ro ­
h ib i te d  by th e  s t a tu t e  n o t to  be a v io la t io n  th e re o f ,  s in p ly  because  
i t  ooourred  in  th e  v i c i n i t y  o f  th e  s tru c k  e n p lo y e r 's  p la n t ,  would 
re n d e r th e  s e c t io n  in e f f e c t iv e  and i n s u f f i c i e n t .™
I f  th e  d i s t i n c t io n  by th e  Board th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was p r in a ry  
because  i t  o ccu rred  in  th e  v i c in i ty  o f  th e  e n p lo y e r 's  p la n t  was, i n  th e  
■ words o f th e  C ir c u i t  C ourt, on te c h n ic a l  grounds, th e  C o u r t 's  c o n te n tio n  
t h a t  th e  r a i l r o a d  company was a " n e u tra l"  i s  i n  s im ila r  jeopardy . I n  
every  i n d u s t r i a l  d is p u te  one c e r t a in  o b je c t  o f  s t r i k e s  o r  p ic k e tin g  i s  
to  p re v e n t o u ts id e r s  from a id in g  th e  en p lo y er. I n  th e  I n s t a n t  c ase  i f  
th e  un ion  cou ld  n o t p rev e n t th e  s a le s  houses i n  q u e s tio n  from t r a n s p o r t ­
in g  r i c e  from th e  s tru o k  p la n ts ,  th e  p ic k e tin g  would have been to  no 
a v a i l .  The h o ld in g  o f  th e  C ir c u i t  C ourt c lo th in g  th e  s a le s  house w ith
j 9Ib ld . . pp. 26-27.
th e  shroud o f n e u t r a l i ty  s e ts  a s id e  th e  e s s e n t ia l  purpose o f  th e  law .
I t  seems c le a r  th a t  C o r re a s  d id  n o t in ten d  th a t  S ec tion  8 (b )(k ) should 
be construed  by th e  c o u rts  a s  a naans o f r e s t r i c t i n g  p r in a ry  p ic k e tin g  
b u t a s  a ban a g a in s t  secondary b o y co tts  where th e  a c t i v i t y  in  q u estio n  
i s  o u ts id e  th e  p r in a ry  s i tu s  and a g a in s t a t ru e  n e u tra l .  In  t h i s  
s i tu a t io n  th e  enp loyer i s  J u s t i f i e d  In  seeking an in ju n c tio n  to  r e s t r a in  
th e  union from s o l i c i t in g  a id  fro® d is in te r e s te d  p a r t i e s ,  b u t th e  f a c t s  
o f th e  Rice M illing  ease  do no t apply  to  t h i s  fo r*  o f le g it im a te  i n t e r ­
v en tio n . The d e n ia l o f  th e  r ig h t  o f p ro te s t  in  t h i s  case  p la c e s  th e  
employees a t  a s e r io u s  d isadvan tage . P icke ting  a s  a means o f p u b lic a ­
t io n  and economic r e p r i s a l  i s  th e  most s ig n i f ic a n t  and. in  th e  m ajo rity  
o f  c ase s , th e  only form idable weapon a v a i la b le  to  unorganized employees. 
The consequences o f  th e  C irc u it  Court* s ru lin g  in  th e  Rice M illing  
case  imposed an a r b i t r a r y  san c tio n  on th e  r ig h ts  o f employees and 
e f f e c t iv e ly  l im ite d  t h e i r  s tru g g le  to  improve working co n d itio n s . 
Although th e  op in ion  o f th e  C irc u it  Oourt was subsequently  overtu rned , 
th e  la p s e  o f  t in e  between th e  d ec is io n  of th e  C irc u it  Court and th a t  o f 
th e  U nited S ta te s  Supreme Court served as an e f f e c t iv e  b a r r i e r  on th e  
u n io n 's  a b i l i t y  to  develop an o rgan ised  f ro n t  fo r  purposes of c o l le c t iv e  
b a rg a in in g .
The Rice M illing  case  was argued befo re  th e  U nited S ta te s  
Supreme Court in  February, 1951* and was decided in  June, 1951* In  a 
unanimous d e c is io n , w ith  J u s t ic e  Burton w ritin g  th e  op in ion , th e  Court 
s e t  a s id e  th e  ru lin g  o f th e  C irc u i t  Court hold ing  th a t  th e re  was no 
In te n t  in  th e  Act. o r by v ir tu e  o f i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to ry  to  I n te r f e r e
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w ith  th e  u n io n 's  t r a d i t i o n a l  r i g h t s .  "/ f 7he u n io n 's  p ic k e tin g  and I t s  
encouragenent o f  th e  nen on th e  tru c k  . . . J t n  q uestion7  . • . d id  n o t 
amount to  such inducem ent o r  encouragenent to  'o o n e e rted  a c t iv i t y  a s  
. . . ^ S e c tio n  8 ( b ) (4^7 • • • p r e s c r i b e s . '" ^  At th e  sane t in e  th e  
Oourt took  s p e c ia l  en p h asis  to  a s s e r t  t h a t  each case  o u s t  be co n sid ered  
on i t s  m e r i ts  h o ld in g  th a t  s in c e  th e  com plain t i n  th e  p re s e n t case  was 
l im ite d  to  a s in g le  in c id e n t  th e re  i s  no need " . . .  to  determ ine th e  
s p e c i f ic  o b je c ts  toward which a u n io n 's  encouragement o f concerted  con­
d u c t m ust be d ire o te d  i n  o rd e r  to  amount to  an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  
under su b se c tio n  (A) o r  (B) o f  S ec tion  8 (b ) (4 ) .
THE STATUS OF NEUTRALS UNDER THE LMRA
On th e  same day a s  th e  d e c is io n  in  th e  R ice M illin g  case , th e  
Supreme Oourt a ffirm ed  th re e  d e c is io n s  in  which th e  NLRB had found v io -  
l a t i o n s  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ). In  one o f  th e se  c ase s , NLRB v. Denver 
B u ild in g  anfl C o n stru c tio n  T rades, th e  Supreme C ourt considered  th e  
q u e s tio n  o f  w hether 8 (b )(4 )(A ) was a p p lic a b le  to  a s i tu a t io n  in v o lv in g  
bo th  prim ary  and secondary a c t io n . In  th e  Denver case  a b u ild in g  t r a d e s  
c o u n c il had p ro te s te d  th e  employment o f nonunion men by a su b c o n trac to r  
on a  c o n s tru c tio n  p ro b je c t.  When th e  g en era l c o n tra c to r  re fu sed  to  o rd e r
60341 U.S. 665, 670 (1951).
6 lI b l d . . p . 671.
^2NLRB v. Denver RnjyTrfing and C o nstruc tion  T rades, 341 U.S. 675 
(1950); Ib S T v . NLRB, 3^1 uTs. 694 (1950); and L ocal fr» v , NLRB, 341
u .s. 707TT950).
th e  nonunion w orkers o f f  th e  jo b , th e  un ion  p lac ed  a s in g le  p ic k e t  a t  
th e  e n tra n c e  to  th e  p r o je c t .  A ll o f  th e  union  employees honored th e  
p ic k e t  l i n e ,  and th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th e  b u i ld in g  was b rough t to  a 
v i r t u a l  s t a n d s t i l l .  T h e re a f te r , when th e  un ion  re q u e s te d  th e  g e n e ra l 
c o n tr a c to r  to  o rd e r  th e  nonunion men o f f  th e  job , he com plied w ith  th e  
re q u e s t  and th e  un ion  men re tu rn e d  to  th e  p r o je c t .  As a r e s u l t  o f  th e s e  
a c t io n s  th e  s u b c o n tra c to r  f i l e d  charges w ith  th e  NLRB a l le g in g  t h a t  th e
p ic k e tin g  was in te n d e d  ", . . to  fo rc e  th e  g e n e ra l c o n tr a c to r  to  cease
63doing b u s in e s s . . . . w ith  them. The NLRB accep ted  th e  su b co n trac ­
t o r 1 s  p le a  ho ld in g  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  f o r  th e  pu rposes o f  fo rc in g  A to  e x e r t  
p re s su re  a g a in s t  B to  e i t h e r  employ un ion  men o r  g ive  up h i s  o o n tra c t  was 
p ro sc r ib e d  by S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) o f th e  LMRA a s  an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e .  
The un ion  appea led  th e  NLRB1 s d e c is io n  to  th e  U nited  S ta te s  Oourt o f 
A ppeals which s e t  a s id e  th e  B o a rd 's  o rd e r  on th e  grounds t h a t  th e  a c t io n  
was p rim ary  and n o t secondary  i n  n a tu re  and th e r e f o re  d id  n o t meet th e  
t e s t  o f  S e c tio n  3 (b ) ( 4 ) ( A ) . ^  I n  a cc ep tin g  ju r i s d ic t io n  i n  t h i s  c a se . 
J u s t ic e  B urton, speak ing  f o r  th e  U nited  S ta te s  Supreme C ourt, ph rased  
th e  p e r t in e n t  q u e s tio n  o f  law a s :
We m ust de te rm ine  w hether th e  s t r i k e  . . . h e re  . . . had a  p ro ­
s c r ib e d  o b je c t .  The conduct which th e  Board h e re  oondemned i s  
r e a d i ly  d i  s t in g u i  sh ab le  from th a t  which i t  d e c lin e d  to  condemn i n  
th e  R loe M illin g  case  / c i t a t i o n s  om itted /*  There th e  accused  u n ion  
sough t m erely  to  o b ta in  i t s  own re c o g n itio n  by th e  o p e ra to r  o f  th e  
m i l l ,  and th e  u n io n 's  p ic k e ts  n e a r th e  m il l  sought to  in f lu e n c e  two
6:j341 U.S. 680.
6/*l86 F. 2d. 326 , 33?.
110
employees o f  a  custom er o f  th e  m il l  n o t to  c ro s s  a  p ic k e t  lin e *  I n  
t h a t  case  we su ppo rted  th e  Board i n  i t s  c o n c lu sio n  t h a t  such conduct 
was no more th an  was t r a d i t i o n a l  and p e rm is s ib le  i n  a  p rim ary  s t r i k e .  
The union  d id  n o t engage i n  a  s t r i k e  a g a in s t  th e  custom er. I t  d id  
n o t encourage c o n ce rted  a c t io n  by th e  c u s to m e r 's  employees to  fo rc e  
th e  custom er to  b o y o o tt th e  m i l l .  I t  d id  n o t , commit any u n f a i r  
la b o r  p r a c t ic e  p ro sc r ib e d  by S e c tio n  8 (b ) (*0 . ^
I n  th e  Denver oase , however, th e  o b je c t  was to  fo rc e  a  n e u t r a l ,  
th e  g e n e ra l c o n tra c to r ,  to  s to p  doing b u s in e s s  w ith  th e  s u b c o n tra c to r . 
T h is  ty p e  o f  a c t i v i t y  i s  un law fu l under th e  LMRA s in c e  i t  m eets th e  t e s t  
o f  8 (b ) (^ ) (X ) , which makes a  secondary b o y c o tt an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e .  
Thus J u s t i c e  B urton concluded t h a t  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  Board conforms 
11. . . w ith  th e  dua l c o n g re ss io n a l o b je c t iv e s  o f  p re s e rv in g  th e  r i g h t  o f  
la b o r  o rg a n iz a tio n s  to  b r in g  p re s su re  to  b e a r  on o ffen d in g  em ployers i n  
p rim ary  la b o r  d is p u te s  and o f  s h ie ld in g  unoffend ing  em ployers and o th e r s  
from p re s s u re s  i n  c o n tro v e rs ie s  n o t t h e i r  own.
The B o a rd 's  i n te r p r e t a t i o n  th a t  S e c tio n  8 (b ) ( 4 ) (A) was no t 
in te n d e d  a s  a ban a g a in s t  la w fu l prim ary  a c t io n  r a i s e d  a secondary  i s s u e  
o f  e s ta b l is h in g  a s u i ta b le  c r i t e r i a  fo r  d e te rm in ing  th e  s t a tu s  o f  
n e u tr a ls  to  th e  p rim ary  d is p u te .  I n  l i g h t  o f  th e  d e c is io n  in  th e  R ice 
M illin g  case  i t  became q u i te  obvious t h a t  i f  th e  employer i n  q u e s tio n  
was a  r e g u la r  custom er o f  th e  p rim ary  em ployer th e  un ion  m ight escape  o r  
s u b s ta n t ia l ly  l i m i t  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f  S e c tio n  8 (b )(^ )(JL )» th e  th e o ry  
be ing  t h a t  a r e g u la r  custom er o f  th e  prim ary  em ployer cou ld  n o t overoome 
th e  n e u t r a l i t y  req u irem en t. The Board, however, re fu se d  to  a c c e p t t h i s
6534 l U.S. 687-688. 
66I b i d . . p . 692.
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reaso n in g  h o ld in g  t h a t  em ployers i n  th a  oourse  o f  t h e i r  everyday a f f a i r s  
a r e ,  by v i r tu e  o f  th e  co m p e titiv e  p re s s u re s ,  fo rc e d  to  do b u s in e s s  w ith  
a  m yriad o f  independen t c o n tra c to rs*  The r e l a t i o n s  betw een th e s e  f irm s  
a re  independen t o f  em ployer-em ployee r e l a t i o n s ,  and th e  norm al cou rse  o f
b u s in e ss  i s  n o t s u f f i c i e n t  to  b in d  em ployers and t h e i r  employees
67to g e th e r  a s  a common u n i t .  The on ly  e x ce p tio n  to  t h i s  d e f in i t io n  h as  
been in  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  S e c tio n  8 ( b ) ( 4 ) (A) to  s p e c ia l  c ircu m stan ces  
where b u s in e s s  o f  th e  em ployers i s  s a id  to  be so t h a t  th e  " n e u tra l"  i n
e f f e c t  i s  an " a l ly "  o f  th e  p rim ary  em ployer. I n  Douds v . M e tro p o litan
68F e d e ra tio n  o f  A r c h i te c ts , e t c . th e  un ion  p ic k e te d  a n o th e r  e n g in e e rin g  
f irm  w ith  whom th e  prim ary  en p lo y e r (Ebasco) su b c o n tra c te d  a  c o n s id e r­
a b le  amount o f  b u s in e s s . The s u b c o n tra c to r  P ro je c t  E ng ineering  Company 
had been o rg an ized  abou t one y e a r  p r io r  to  th e  s t r i k e  a t  Ebasco*
Although e n t i r e l y  independen t o f  Ebasco, P r o j e c t 's  b u s in e s s  was i d e n t i ­
c a l  to  t h a t  o f  Ebasco, and a  few months a f t e r  i t s  o rg a n iz a tio n  P ro je c t  
began to  perform  an a p p re c ia b le  p e rcen tag e  o f  E b asco 's  work. T h is  p e r ­
cen tage con tinued  to  In c re a se  u n t i l  th e  tim e o f  th e  s t r i k e ,  when " . . .  
abou t 75$ o f  . . . ^ P r o je c t 's 7  • • * work was E b a sc o 's . The in te g r a ­
t io n  betw een P ro je c t  and Ebasco e v e n tu a lly  became so com plete t h a t  
Ebasco a d v e r t is e d  i t s  s e rv ic e s  a s  in c lu d in g  e n g in e e rs  who were employed
^ S e e  Schenley D i s t i l l e r s  C o rp o ra tio n , 78 NLRB 504 (1948)* Climax 
M achinery Company, 86 NLRB 12^3 ( l9 4 9 ;:  I r a  A. Watson Company. 80 NLRB 
533 ( 1 9 ^ ) ;  and th e  Denver B u ild in g  case  ( fo o tn o te  £2 ) .
^ 7 5  F* Supp. 672 (1948). The p ic k e tin g  was th e  r e s u l t  o f  a  d i s ­
p u te  o v e r a new c o n tra c t  betw een th e  prim ary  en p lo y e r and h i s  em ployees.
69I b id . , p. 674.
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by P r o je c t ,  As a  f u r th e r  te s tim o n y  o f  t h e i r  r e la t io n s h ip  th e  companies
norm ally  exchanged tim e sheets*  and Ebasco1s " . . .  su p e rv iso ry
p e rso n n e l made r e g u la r  v i s i t s  to  P ro je c t  to  o v e rsee  th e  work on
s u b c o n tr a c ts ." 7°
W ith th e  c o n tin u a tio n  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  a t  P r o j e c t .7^ th e  NLRB
p e t i t io n e d  th e  d i s t r i c t  c o u rt  f o r  an in ju n c t io n  to  e n jo in  th e  un ion  from
p ic k e tin g  th e  secondary  em ployer. Upon review  o f  th e  case  th e  c o u rt
re fu se d  to  g ra n t  th e  in ju n c t io n  h o ld in g  t h a t  P ro je c t  was n o t "doing
b u s in e ss"  w ith  Ebasco w ith in  th e  meaning o f  th e  A ct.
To su g g e s t . . . .  / s a i d  th e  C o u rt/ • . • t h a t  P ro je c t  had no i n t e r e s t  
i n  th e  d is p u te  betw een Ebasco and i t s  employees i s  to  lo o k  a t  th e  
form and rem ain b l in d  to  su b s ta n c e . I n  ev e ry  m eaningful sense  i t  
had made i t s e l f  a  p a r ty  to  th e  o o n te s t .  M a n ife s tly  i t  was n o t an 
in n o c e n t b y s ta n d e r , n o r a  n e u t r a l .  I t  was f i rm ly  a l l i e d  t o  Ebasoo 
and i t  was i t s  conduct a s  a l l y  o f  Ebasoo w hich d i r e c t l y  provoked th e  
u n io n ’ s a c t io n  . . . The economic e f f e c t  upon E basoo 'a  em ployees 
was p r e c is e ly  t h a t  which would flow  from E b asco 's  h i r in g  s t r i k e ,  
b re a k e rs  to  work on i t s  own p rem ises . The oonduct o f  th e  un ion  in  
in d u c in g  P r o je c t1 s  employees to  s t r i k e  i s  n o t d i f f e r e n t  i n  k in d  from 
i t s  conduct i n  in d u cin g  E b asco 's  employees to  s t r i k e  i f  th e  l a t t e r  
i s  n o t amendable to  j u d ic i a l  r e s t r a i n t  n e i th e r  i s  th e  former* 72
S ince th e  M e tro p o litan  F e d e ra tio n  case  th e  NLRB has shown some
in c l i n a t io n  to  a c c e p t th e  rea so n in g  o f  th e  d i s t r i c t  c o u rt  p ro te c t in g
p ic k e tin g  o f  some " n e u tra ls* "  However, th e  Board has re fu s e d  to  e x ten d
th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  a l l y  d o c tr in e  to  c a se s  whose c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  do
n o t conform to  th e  s p e c ia l  f a c t s  o f  th e  M e tro p o litan  d e c is io n . I n
7° I b id .
The i n i t i a l  com plain t was subm itted  by th e  P r o je c t  Company.
72I b i d . . pp. 676-677.
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su m a ry  o f  th a  economic a l l i a n c e  c a s e s » th e  NLRB h as c o n s is te n t ly  
re fu s e d  to  a c c e p t com p la in ts  I f  th e  " n e u t r a l '1 em ployer h a s  re c e iv e d  
g o o d s - in -p ro c e ss  from th e  s tru c k  em p loyer.73 The Board h as  a ls o  re fu s e d  
to  a c c e p t p e t i t io n s  I n  th o se  I n d u s t r i e s  c h a ra c te r iz e d  by a h igh  deg ree  
o f  I n te g r a t io n  betw een th e  g e n e ra l c o n tr a c to r  and th e  s u b c o n t r a c to r s .^  
T h is  ex p erien ce  h as r e c e n t ly  re c e iv e d  f u r th e r  a t t e n t io n  under th e  second 
p ro v iso  o f  th e  LMRDA o f  1959 which exempts th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  S e c tio n  
3 (b )(4 )(B )  from th e  garm ent in d u s t ry .
PICKETING AND SECONDARY ACTION
I n  a d d it io n  to  th e  i s s u e s  o f  p ro te c t in g  prim ary  p ic k e t in g ,75 
d e te rm in in g  th e  s t a tu s  o f  n e u t r a l s .7^ and th e  l im i ta t io n s  o f  th e  a l l y  
d o c t r in e , 7 7  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  what c o n s t i tu te d  secondary  a c t io n  under Sec­
t io n  3 (b )(4 )(A ) proved to  be an e q u a lly  te c h n ic a l  q u e s tio n  f o r  th e  NLRB. 
Even i f  th e  secondary  em ployer i s  e n t i r e l y  n e u tr a l  to  th e  d isp u te  and
^ S in c e  1948 th e  NLRB h as re fu se d  to  i s s u e  com plain ts  i n  th e  
Climax M achinery case  ( fo o tn o te  6 7 ), th e  I r a  A. Watson Company case  
(fo o tn o te  6 7 ), and IBEW v . NLRB ( fo o tn o te  62 ) . I n  c o n tr a s t ,  th e  " a l ly  
d o c tr in e "  was adop ted  by th e  Court o f  A ppeals I n  NLRB v . B usiness 
Machines and O ff ic e  Machine M echanics. 228 F. 2d. 553 (1955); and by th e  
NLRB i n  T n t^m ftA ana l p ie  S in k e rs  C onference. San J a c in to  Die S in k e rs  
Lodge 410, and G eneral M etals C o rp o ra tio n . 120 NLRB 1227 (19537*
7ifSee th e  s ta te m e n t o f  George J .  B a t t .  G eneral Counsel, NLRB, 
b e fo re  th e  Committee on Labor and P u b lic  W elfare  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  
S en a te , A p r il  28, 1958.
7^84 NLRB 360.
^ 3 4 1  U.S. 675-
7 7 7 5  F. Supp. 672 .
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n o t an  a l l y  o f  th e  prim ary  employer* i t  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  fo llo w  t h a t  
p ic k e tin g  designed  to  r e s t r i c t  th e  normal flow, o f  b u s in e s s  betw een th e  
em ployers i n  q u e s tio n  w i l l  be p ro sc r ib e d  by S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A )*  The 
l e g a l i t y  o f  such a c t i v i t y  depends on w hether th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  h e ld  to  be 
p rim ary  o r  secondary  a c t io n .  U nfortunately*  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s to r y  o f  
th e  Act d id  no t p ro v id e  s u f f i c i e n t  docum entation to  a d e q u a te ly  d e f in e  
th e  m eanings o f  th e s e  terms* and i t  was n e ce ssa ry  f o r  th e  NLRB and th e  
c o u r ts  to  fo rm u la te  a  d e f in i t io n  through  case  e x p e rien c e . In  develop ing  
a  w orking d e f in i t io n  o f  p rim ary  v e rsu s  secondary  a c t io n ,  th e  Board h a s  
g iven  s p e c ia l  c o n s id e ra tio n  to  th e  lo c a t io n  o f  th e  a c t i v i t y  i n  ques­
t io n .  The s i t u s  o f  th e  d is p u te  i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  im portance in  th o se  
c a se s  in  which two o r  more em ployers c u s to m a rily  u t i l i s e  th e  f a c i l i t i e s  
i n  q u e s tio n . I n  o rd e r  to  p u rsue  th e  e v o lu tio n  o f  t h i s  s p e c ia l  problem* 
i t  i s  q u i te  h e lp fu l  to  s e p a ra te  th e  case s  i n  accordance w ith  th e  lo c a ­
t io n  o f  th e  a c t i v i t y ;  i . e . *  a t  th e  prim ary  p rem ises, a t  th e  se p a ra te  
n e u tr a l  prem ises* a t  th e  am bulatory  prem ises* a t  th e  rov ing  prem ise i n
(a ) t r a n s p o r ta t io n  and (b ) co n s tru c tio n .? ®
At th e  p rim ary  p rem ise s . Because o f  th e  p h rase  in  S e c tio n  8(b) 
(4) t h a t  i t  s h a l l  be an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  to :
?®Ibr a more e x p l i c i t  d is c u s s io n  o f  t h i s  p rocedu re  see  Donald 
H. W o lle tt  and Benjamin Aaron1 s Labor R e la tio n s  and th e  Law (Second 
E d it io n ;  B oston: L i t t l e  Brown & C o .* I9 6 0 ;, pp. 305-320* a ls o  see S idney 
Sherm an's "Prim ary S t r ik e s  and Secondary B o y co tts* " Labor Law J o u rn a l ,
V, No. 4 (A p r il .  195^)* 241* 2 ^ 2 5 1 .
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• . . induce  o r  enoourage th e  employees o f  any em ployer to  engage 
i n  . . . a  co n ce rted  r e f u s a l  . . .  to  u se  . . . t r a n s p o r t ,  o r  o th e r ­
w ise  hand le  • . . where an ob .lec t th e r e o f  i s :
(A) fo rc in g  . . . any em ployer . . .  to  cease  u s in g  . • .
h a n d lin g , t r a n s p o r t in g ,  o r  o th e rw ise  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  manu­
f a c tu r e r  . . .79
many w r i t e r s  b e lie v e d  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  which induced  employees o f  "neu­
t r a l s "  to  engage in  a  "co n ce rted  r e fu s a l"  would be a v io la t io n  o f  th e
LMRA. I n  in te r p r e t in g  th e  s o - c a l le d  secondary b o y c o tt c la u se  th e  NLRB 
has a ttem p ted  to  p r o te c t  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  r i g h t  to  s t r i k e  and th e  r i g h t  
to  p ic k e t  from a t ta c k s  through  th e  co n certed  r e f u s a l  c la u se  o f  S e c tio n  
3 (b ) (4 ) (A ) . I n  develop ing  t h i s  b a s i s  o f  i n te r p r e t a t i o n  th e  Board h as 
upheld  th e  r i g h t  to  p ic k e t  i f  th e  union  could  e s ta b l i s h  t h a t  th e  p ic k e t­
in g  i s  p rim ary  in  c h a ra c te r  a s  w e ll a s  in  pu rpose . An im p o rta n t f a c to r  
i n  th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f  t h i s  p r in c ip le  has been th e  lo c a t io n  o f  th e  
p ic k e t in g .  Thus, i f  th e  p ic k e tin g  ta k e s  p la c e  a t  th e  p rem ises s o le ly
Qa
occup ied  by th e  p rim ary  em ployer. th e  NLRB and th e  U nited  S ta te s  
Supreme C ourt have h e ld  t h a t  a c t i v i t y  which causes secondary employees 
to  ta k e  p a r t  i n  a la b o r  d isp u te  does n o t v io la t e  S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) .
I n  th e  S an ta  Ana T.umh^p Co. ca se 8*- th e  Board h e ld  t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  
which o c cu rred  a t  th e  p rim ary  employer* s y a rd  o r  th e  p r a c t ic e  o f  fo llo w ­
in g  th e  company*s t ru c k s  to  th e  d e l iv e ry  p o in t  " . . .  was t r a d i t i o n a l




"prim ary  a c t io n  which i s  n o t outlaw ed by  S e c tio n  8 ( b ) ( 4 ) (A ).11®2
At th e  —p a ra ts  n s u t r a l  p— l a s s . When th e  p ic k e tin g  ta k e s  
p la c e  a t  th e  p rem ises which a r e  s o le ly  occup ied  by th e  n e u tra l*  th e  NLRB 
h as h e ld  th e  a c t i v i t y  to  be a v io la t io n  o f  th e  secondary  b o y c o tt p ro v i­
s io n . th e  th e o ry  being  t h a t  th e  in te n d e d  in ju r y  i s  to o  rem ote from th e  
sou rce  o f  th e  o r ig in a l  d is p u te .  I n  th e  Wadsworth Bu-11 rilng Company 
oas#88 th e  c a rp e n te r s ' and jo in e r s ' un ion  had p ic k e te d  a  b u ild in g  p ro ­
j e c t  w ith  th e  o b je c t  o f  in d u c in g  th e  employees o f  secondary  s u p p l ie r s  to  
r e fu s e  to  d e l iv e r  m a te r ia ls  to  th e  p r o je c t  to  cause th e  g e n e ra l c o n tra c ­
t o r  . . t o  cease  doing b u s in e s s  w ith  W adsworth."®^ The Board h e ld  
t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  i n  t h i s  In s ta n c e  cou ld  n o t escape  th e  p r o s c r ip t io n  o f  
S e c tio n  8 (b ) (4 ) (A ) . The o b je c t  o f  th e  un ions to  u n io n ise  th e  b u ild in g  
p r o je c t  r e g a rd le s s  o f  i t s  m e r it  i s  im m ate ria l to  th e  p ro c e ss  o f  law .
T h is  ty p e  o f p ro d u c t b o y c o tt , a rgued  th e  Board, i s  ". . . one o f  th e  
p r e c is e  e v i l s  t h a t  . ■ . / th e 7  . . • p ro v is io n  was designed  to  curb .
In  re fe re n c e  to  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  debate on t h i s  q u e s tio n . S en a to r T a f t  
t e s t i f i e d  t h a t :
. . . t h i s  p ro v is io n  makes i t  un law fu l to  r e s o r t  to  a  secondary  boy­
c o t t  to  in ju r e  th e  b u s in e s s  o f  a t h i r d  p e rso n  who i s  w holly  uncon­
cerned  w ith  th e  d isag reem en t betw een an  em ployer and h i s  em ployees.
82I b i d . . p . 940. A lso see  D« G iorg io  T r u l t  C o rp o ra tio n  v . NLRB, 
191 F. 2d .“ 552 (1951). c e r t ,  d e n ., 342 U.S. 869‘7 l 9 5 i r
838 l NLRB 802 (1949). c e r t ,  d e n .,  341 U .S . 947.
^ b i d . . p . 803.
8^ I b ld . . p . 806.
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. . .  I t  has been s a t  f o r th  t h a t  th a r a  a r e  good secondary  b o y c o tts  
and bad secondary  b o y c o tts . Our commi t t e e  h e a rd  e r ld e n e a  f o r  weeks 
and n e v e r succeeded In  hav ing  anyone t e l l  u s  any d i f f e r e n c e  betw een 
th e  d i f f e r e n t  k in d s o f  secondary  b o y c o tts .  So we have so broadened 
th e  p ro v is io n  d e a lin g  w ith  secondary  b o y o o tts  a s  to  make th e n  an 
u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e .
I n  sum narising  th e  d e b a te  o v e r th e  meaning o f  S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) 
reg a rd in g  p ic k e tin g  o f  a  n e u tr a l  s i t u s ,  th e  Board h e ld  t h a t  . . Sec­
t io n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) p ro h lb it^ e d 7  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g , a s  w e ll a s  o th e r  
p e a c e fu l means o f  inducem ent and encouragem ent . . . and t h a t  S e c tio n  
8 (c )  does n o t immunize such conduct."® ^ The m a jo r i ty 's  d e c is io n  t h a t  
C ongress in te n d e d  to  s t r i k e  down secondary  b o y c o tts  a s  a  le g i t im a te  
means o f  economic p re s s u re  drew v ig o ro u s d is s e n ts  from members Huston 
and Murdock. The d is s e n t in g  members o b je c te d  to  th e  m a jo r i ty 's  assump­
t io n  t h a t  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  was p re s c r ib e d  by th e  words "Induce o r  
encourage" i n  S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) and th a t  S e c tio n  8 (c )  would n o t p r o te c t  
p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  from th e  p r o s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  secondary b o y c o tt  
c la u s e . The i n te r p r e t a t i o n  by th e  m a jo r ity  t h a t  S ec tio n  8 (c )  could  n o t 
a c t  a s  a  means o f  p r o te c t in g  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  a t  th e  s e p a ra te  p rem ises 
o f  th e  n e u t r a l  has th e  e f f e c t  o f  in s e r t in g  . . a n  ex cep tio n  to  th e  
ex p re ss  language  in  S e c tio n  8 (c ) g u a ra n tee in g  freedom o f  e x p re ss io n  to  
a l l  concerned u n d er th e  Act, ' r e g a rd le s s  o f  any o th e r  p ro v is io n . ' "®® 
A ocordlng to  th e  m ajo rity*  s a n a ly s is  o f  th e  c o n g re ss io n a l i n t e n t .  S ection
^ 9 3  Cong. Rec. 4323 (A p ril  29. 1947).
®^8l NLRB 615. S e c tio n  8 (c ) p rov ided  th a t  p e a c e fu l p r o te s t  
should  n o t  c o n s t i tu t e  ev idence  o f  an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e .
88IWLd., p. 823.
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8 (c )  " . . . would rea d  • • . 'u n d e r  any p ro v is io n s  o f  t h i s  A ct, ex cep t 
S e c tio n  8 ( b ) ( 4 ) . " "
I n  rev iew ing  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to r y  o f  S ec tio n  8 (c )  and S e c tio n  
8 (b ) (4 ) (A ) , mentoers Huston and Murdock contended t h a t  th e r e  was no e v i­
dence t h a t  S en a to r T a f t  o r  th e  members o f  h i s  com m ittee In ten d ed  th a t  
th e  te rm s "Induce o r  encourage" should  a c t  a s  a  b a r  to  p e a c e fu l p ic k e t ­
in g  a s  p ro te c te d  by S e c tio n  8 ( c ) .  A lthough th e r e  seems to  be some 
oonfuslon  I n  th e  s e r i e s  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e  d e b a te s  which took  p la c e  betw een 
S en a to r T a f t  and S en a to r Pepper, who was ex trem ely  c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  b road  
language o f  S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) , S en a to r T a f t  b e lie v e d  t h a t  th e  s e c t io n  
would ou tlaw  s t r i k e s  le a d in g  to  secondary  b o y c o tts  b u t n o t p e a c e fu l 
p ic k e t in g ;  f o r  I f  S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) fo rb id s  p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  as a 
form o f  Inducem ent, th e  ex cep tio n  under S e c tio n  8 (c )  becomes a  dead 
l e t t e r .  The o n ly  p la u s ib le  answ er to  t h i s  dilemma I n  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  I s  
to  assume th a t  Congress in te n d ed  to  ou tlaw  secondary  b o y c o tts  and, a t  
th e  same time* p r o te c t  p e a c e fu l e x p re ss io n  a s  a  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r i g h t .
I n  d e fen se  o f  t h i s  p o s i t io n  S en a to r T a f t  s t a te d  t h a t  "S ubsec tion  (c) 
/S e c t io n  87 r e l a t in g  to  th e  r i g h t  o f  em ployers, em ployees, and la b o r  
o rg a n iz a t io n s  to  e x p re ss  o p in io n s  and view s . . . conforms w ith  th e  
House v e rs io n  and i s  in te n d e d  to  In su re  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  
r i g h t s . 1,90 S e n a to r M cC lellan, who suppo rted  th e  conference  v e rs io n  o f  
th e  B i l l  In  th e  S ena te , in te r p r e te d  th e  purpose  o f  S e c tio n  8 (c )  by
" ib id .
9°93 Pong. Hec. 6601 (June 5. 1 W ) .
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em phasizing  th a t:
• . . w hether th e  oou rt knows I t  o r  n o t , w h eth er  a d m in is tr a t iv e  
o f f i c e s  w i l l  know I t  o r  n o t . ev ery  o th er  c i t i z e n  w ith  ooimwn under­
sta n d in g  and who can read th e  lan gu age w i l l  know t h a t  i t  was n o t  
th e  in t e n t  o f  th e  C ongress to  d e p r iv e  any c i t i z e n ,  e i t h e r  em ployer  
o r  em ployee o f  a r ig h t  guaranteed  under th e  C o n s t i tu t io n .91
As fu r th e r  e v id en ce  o f  th e  in t e n t  o f  C ongress to  exempt p e a c e fu l p ic k e t ­
in g  from th e  secondary b o y c o tt  c la u s e , i t  I s  s i g n i f i c a n t  to  n o te  th a t  
. th e  o r ig in a l  House v e r s io n  o f  th e  B i l l  . . . s p e c i f i c a l l y  
p r o sc r ib e d  th r e e  ty p e s  o f  p ic k e t in g  . . . 92 S ig n i f i c a n t ly  . . . a l l  
r e fe r e n c e s  to  p ic k e t in g , w hether p e a c e fu l o r  o th e r w ise , w ere o m itted  
from th e  co n feren ce  v e r s io n  o f  th e  B i l l . "9  ̂ A lthough th e r e  may be some 
q u e s t io n  o f  in t e r p r e t a t io n ,  th e  B i l l  was a p p a ren tly  a compromise betw een  
th e  opponents o f  secondary b o y c o t t s  and th e  propon en ts o f  p e a c e fu l p ic k ­
e t in g .  The Board and th e  c o u r ts  were th u s  l e f t  w ith  th e  dilemma o f  
d eterm in in g  w hether to  adopt a broad o r  narrow a p p lic a t io n  o f  S e c t io n  8
( b ) (^ ) (A ) .  The d e c is io n  to  a c c e p t  a broad in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  secon d ­
ary  b o y c o tt  c la u s e  served  to  l i m i t  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  em ployees to  p r o t e s t  
th e  la b o r  movement and su b seq u en tly  p r a c t ic e s  u n fa ir  to  la b o r , and became 
a s ig n i f i c a n t  econom ic r e s t r a in t  on t h e ir  a b i l i t y  to  g en era te  s u f f i c i e n t  
p r e ssu r e  to  w ith sta n d  th e  c o l l e c t i v e  s tr e n g th  o f  e m p lo y ers .9^
91I b l d . . pp. 509^-5095 (May 9 . 1 9 ^ 7 ).
92S e c t io n  1 2 (a )  o f  H.R. 3020 fo r t» d e  p ic k e t in g  whose in t e n t  was 
to  in d u ce  seoondary em ployees to  engage in  a co n cer ted  r e f u s a l .
9381 NLRB 8 2 5 -8 2 6 .
9^See NLRB v . S erv ice  Trade C hauffeu rs, 191 F. 2d. 65 (1951); 
S e a lr ie h t  P a c if ic  L td . , §2 NLRB 271 (19^9); and Armco D rainage and 
M etal P roduc ts . I n c . , 93 NLRB 751 (1951)*
At th e  am bulatory p r w i» « i . The problem o f  app ly ing  th e  Board' a 
t e s t  th a t  S ec tio n  8 (b) (4){A) ou tlaw s p e ac e fu l p ic k e tin g  i f  th e  p ic k e tin g  
occu rs a t  p re v is e s  o th e r  th an  th o se  o f  th e  prim ary  employer i s  f u r th e r  
com plicated  whan th e  p rem ises in  q u e s tio n  a re  occupied  by th e  p rim ary  
employer a s  w e ll a s  "n e u tra ls "  to  th e  d is p u te .  I n  c o n s tru c tin g  an 
acc e p ta b le  b a s is  f o r  re so lv in g  c a se s  in  t h i s  area* th e  Board and th e  
c o u rts  have p e rm itte d  unions t o  p ic k e t  th e  com on p rem ises i f  th e  p ic k e t­
ing  was " In c id e n ta l"  to  th e  u n ion 1 s  p rim ary  purpose . T h is  te s t*  however* 
r a i s e s  a f u r th e r  problem o f  de term in ing  what i s  in c id e n ta l .  I n  th e  case  
o f  O il Workers I n t e r n a t i onal Union v . The Pure O il Company^  where th e  
union p ic k e te d  a dock owned by th e  prim ary  employer which was le a s e d  to  
The Pure O il Company* th e  Board h e ld  th e  a c t i v i t y  to  be prim ary in  n a tu re  
and n o t i n  v io la t io n  o f  th e  LMRA. I n  a s im ila r  case  U nited g l e c t r l c a l  
Workers Union v . Ryan C o n stru c tio n  C orporation^  th e  union had p ic k e te d  a 
g a te  o f  th e  p rim ary  employer in  an e f f o r t  to  Induce employees o f  Ryan to  
p a r t i c ip a te  in  t h e i r  s t r i k e  a g a in s t  Bucyrus ( th e  prim ary em ployer). In  
comparing th e  f a c t s  o f  t h i s  case  w ith  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n t e n t  in  S ec tio n  
8(b)(4)(A )*  th e  Board h e ld  " . . .  th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  o f  Bucyrus p rem ises 
. . . d id  n o t lo s e  i t s  . • . ^prim ary7  * * * c h a ra c te r  and become 
'seco n d ary 1 a t  th e  so -o a lle d  Ryan Gate because th e  Ryan employees were 
th e  on ly  employees re g u la r ly  e n te r in g  Bucyrus p rem ises a t  t h a t  g a t e . ^
9584 NLRB 315 (1949)- 
7 85 NLRB 417 (1949).
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I n  comparison to  t h i s  l i n e  o f  d e c is io n s , th e  Board has re fu se d  
to  p e rm it p ic k e tin g  a t  p rem ises used by b o th  prim ary and n e u tr a l  employ­
e rs  under th e  th eo ry  th a t  th e  a c t i v i t y  i s  concerted  i n  n a tu re  and n o t 
in c id e n ta l  to  th e  d is p u te . I n  th e  m a jo rity  o f  th e s e  cases th e  p ic k e t­
in g  in  q u e s tio n  o ccu rred  a t  c o n s tru c tio n  s i t e s  c o n tro lle d  by th e  prim ary  
em ployer. I n  th e  u su a l case  th e  purpose o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  was to  encour­
age th e  employees o f  th e  "n e u tra l"  su b c o n tra c to rs  to  honor th e  p ic k e t  
l i n e s  which in  tu rn  would fo rce  th e  g en e ra l c o n tra c to r  to  acq u iesce  to  
th e  u n io n 's  demands. As in  th e  Denver B u ild ing  case^® where th e  union  
re s o r te d  to  p ic k e tin g  in  p r o te s t  o f  th e  enployment o f  nonunion men on 
th e  c o n s tru c tio n  s i t e ,  bo th  th e  NLRB and th e  U nited S ta te s  Supreme Court 
found th e  p ic k e tin g  to  be secondary in  n a tu re  and s u b je c t to  th e  r e s t r i c ­
t io n  o f  S ec tio n  8 ( b ) ( 4 ) (A) o f  th e  LMRA. The immediate r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  
form o f  d e c is io n  was to  p la c e  r e s t r i c t i v e  l im i ta t io n s  on th e  most 
e f f e c t iv e  method o f  union p r o te s t  i n  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  in d u s try . P a r t i a l ly  
a s  a r e s u l t  o f  th e  numerous com plain ts a g a in s t  th e se  d e c is io n s  and f o r  
o th e r  reaso n s m y ste rio u sly  unknown, th e  NLRB subsequen tly  e s ta b l is h e d  a 
d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  fo r  de term in ing  th e  s ta tu s  o f  p eace fu l p ic k e tin g  under 
S ec tion  8 (b )(4 )(A ).
At th e  rov ing  prem ise i n  t r a n s p o r ta t io n . The f i r s t  example o f  
th e  B o a rd 's  r e in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  secondary b o y co tt p ro v is io n  was s e t
983^1 U.S. 675- Compare Montgomery F a ir  g o . ,  82 NLRB 211 (19^*9); 
Grauwan Company. 87 NLRB 755 (1949); and Klmsey M anufacturing Co. . 89 
NLRB 1168 (1950).
122
fo r th  In  th e  c a se  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  T eam sters v . S c h u ltz  
R e fr ig e r a te d  S e r v ic e . I n c .^9 The S c h u ltz  C orporation  was engaged in  
tr a n sp o r t in g  p e r is h a b le  p rod u cts betw een  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  and in  th e  New 
York C ity  a r e a . P r io r  to  th e  b eg in n in g  o f  th e  d is p u te  w ith  th e  respon d­
e n t u n io n , th e  u n ion  members had been:
. . . employed by S ch u ltz  to  make d e l iv e r ie s  to  and p ickups from 
v a r io u s  b u s in e ss  concerns lo c a te d  in  New York C ity . The d isp u te  
betw een th e  Respondent and S chu ltz  a ro se  when S chu ltz  removed i t s  
te rm in a l to  Slackwood, New Je rse y  . . . and th e r e a f t e r  re fu sed  to  
. . . /em ploy th e  u n io n 's  d r i v e r s / . . . .  S chu ltz  . . . con tinued  
to  o p e ra te  i t s  . . . b u s in e ss  in  New York C ity  . . . /b u t7  . • • 
employed members o f  a New Je rse y  lo c a l  to  . . . / t a k e  th e  p la c e  o f 
th e  R esponden t's  d rivers7*
In  p r o t e s t  o f  t h i s  a c t io n  th e  un ion  p ic k e te d  S c h u ltz  by e s t a b l is h in g  a 
p a tr o l  around S c h u lt z ' s  tr u c k s  w h ile  th e y  w ere lo a d in g  or  u n load in g  
goods a t  th e  p rem ises  o f  t h e ir  cu stom ers. The p ic k e t in g  was p e a c e fu l  
and was s p e c i f i c a l l y  l im it e d  to  th e  lo c a t io n s  o f  S c h u ltz ’ s  tr u c k s . The 
company f i l e d  a com p la in t w ith  th e  NLRB ch argin g  th a t  p ic k e t in g  by th e  
u n ion  amounted to  an inducem ent o f  a secondary b o y c o tt  and was a v i o l a ­
t io n  o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 4 ) ( A ) .  The T r ia l Examiner a ccep ted  th e  company1s 
com p la in t, b u t th e  Board r e fu se d  to  e n fo r c e  th e  o rd er  h o ld in g  th a t  th e  
T r ia l  Examiner had r e l i e d  on "the l i t e r a l  language" o f  th e  s e c t io n  i n  
rea ch in g  a r e s u l t  in c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  p r io r  d e c is io n s  under th e  A ct.
I t  was n o t th e  in t e n t  o f  C ongress In  S e c t io n  8 (b ) ( 4 ) ( A ) ,  oontended th e  
Board, to  ou tlaw  prim ary a c t io n .  A un ion  which I s  in v o lv e d  in  a d is p u te
" 8 ?  NLRB 502 (1949).
1QQIb ld . . p. 503.
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w ith  i t s  employer must be p e rm itte d  to  v o ice  i t s  p r o t e s t .  I n  t h i s  case  
th e  union adhered  to  th e  r u le s  o f  prim ary conduct; i . e . .  th ey  l im i te d  
t h e i r  p ic k e tin g  to  th e  lo c a t io n  and imm ediate v i c in i ty  o f  S c h u l tz 's  
t ru c k s ,  t h i s  was th e  o n ly  means a v a i la b le  by which th e  un ion  could 
g ive  n o tic e  o f  i t s  d isp u te  w ith  th e  en p lo y e r. I n  p ic k e tin g  th e  employ­
e r ' s t ru c k s  th e  uniont
. . . was a c tin g  in  a  manner t r a d i t i o n a l  to  em ployers i n  a l l  o th e r  
I n d u s t r i e s ,  who choose to  s ta n d  b e fo re  t h e i r  p la c e  o f  employment and 
p o in t  ou t t h e i r  rep lacem en ts to  th e  p u b lic  a s  s t r ik e - b r e a k e r s ,  and 
t h e i r  employer a s  u n f a i r .  Such p ic k e tin g , v i r t u a l l y  synonymous w ith  
th e  r ig h t  to  s t r i k e ,  i s  an e x e rc is e  o f  a h i s t o r i c  r i g h t  though t 
n ecessa ry  to  th e  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  a s t r i k e .
Thus p eace fu l p ic k e tin g , even though i t  may Induce and encourage neu­
t r a l s  to  su p p o rt a work d is p u te , must be p ro te c te d  from th e  im p l ic i t  
s a n c tio n s  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b ) ( 4 ) (A) p rov ided  th e  p ic k e ts  do no t t r e s p a s s  
beyond th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  boundary o f  prim ary  a c t i v i t y .
The ex ac t lo c a tio n  o f  where prim ary  a c t iv i t y  ends and secondary 
a c t iv i t y  b eg in s  was f i r s t  announced by th e  Board in  th e  d isp u te  o f  
S a i lo r 1 s Onion o f  th e  P a c i f ic  v . Moore Dry Dock Co.^02 In  t h i s  case  
th e  union  p ic k e te d  th e  e n tran ce  to  a secondary em ployer1s sh ipyard  
where a sh ip  be long ing  to  th e  p rim ary  employer was being  re p a ire d . In  
review ing th e  J u d ic ia l  reco rd  under S ec tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A ) th e  NLRB observed  
th a t  th e  s e c tio n  was in ten d ed  to  ou tlaw  secondary a c t iv i t y  and no t 
le g i t im a te  prim ary a c t io n .
101I b i d . . p . 50? .
102192 NLRB 547 (1 9 5 0 ) .
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I n  th e  u su a l case* th e  s i t u s  o f  a  la b o r  d is p u te  i s  th e  p rem ises o f  
th e  p rim ary  em ployer. . . . But i n  some c a se s  th e  s i t u s  o f  th e  
d is p u te  may n o t be l im i te d  to  a f ix e d  lo c a t io n  i t  may be ambula­
to r y .  . . .
When th e  s i t u s  i s  am bu lato ry , i t  may oome to  r e s t  te m p o ra r ily  
a t  th e  p rem ises o f  a n o th e r  em ployer. The p e rp le x in g  q u e s tio n  i s : 
Does th e  l i g h t  to  p ic k e t  fo llo w  th e  s i t u s  w h ile  i t  i s  s ta t io n e d  a t  
th e  p rem ises o f  a  secondary  em ployer, when th e  on ly  way to  p ic k e t  
t h a t  s i t u s  i s  i n  f r o n t  o f  th e  secondary  em p lo y er 's  p rem ises?  . . • 
E s s e n t ia l ly  th e  problem  i s  one o f  b a la n c in g  th e  r i g h t  o f  a  un ion  to  
p ic k e t  a t  th e  s i t e  o f  i t s  d is p u te  a s  a g a in s t  th e  r i g h t  o f  a second­
a ry  em ployer to  be f r e e  o f  p ic k e tin g  i n  a c o n tro v e rsy  i n  which i t  
i s  n o t d i r e c t l y  in v o lv ed .
’When a  secondary  em ployer i s  h a rb o rin g  th e  s i t u s  o f  a  d is p u te  
betw een a un ion  and a p rim ary  enployer* th e  r i g h t  o f  n e i th e r  th e  
un ion  to  p ic k e t  nor o f  th e  secondary  em ployer to  be  f r e e  from 
p ic k e tin g  oan be a b s o lu te .  The enmeshing o f  p rem ises and s i t u s  
q u a l i f i e s  b o th  r i g h t s .  I n  th e  k ind  o f  s i t u a t io n  t h a t  e x i s t s  in  
t h i s  c a se , we b e l ie v e  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  o f  th e  p rem ises o f  a secondary  
em ployer i s  p rim ary  i f  i t  m eets th e  fo llo w in g  c o n d itio n s i
(a )  The p ic k e tin g  i s  s t r i c t l y  l im i te d  to  tim es when th e  s i t u s  
o f  d is p u te  i s  lo c a te d  on th e  secondary  em ployer’ s p rem ises;
(b) a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  th e  p rim ary  em ployer i s  engaged 
in  i t s  norm al b u s in e s s  a t  th e  s i t u s ;
(c )  th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  l im i te d  to  p la c e s  rea so n ab ly  d o s e  to  th e  
lo c a t io n  o f  th e  s i t u s ;  and
(d) th e  p ic k e tin g  d is c lo s e s  d e a r l y  t h a t  th e  d isp u te  i s  w ith  th e  
p rim ary  em ployer.
With th e  s ta te m e n t o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  under which a un ion  m ight 
p ic k e t  a p rim ary  em ployer a t  th e  am bulatory  s i t u s ,  th e  Board reach ed  a 
compromise betw een th e  b road  and narrow  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b ) 
( 4 ) (A). S ince  t h i s  ca se , th e  Board has re fu se d  to  i s s u e  com plain ts i n  
ca se s  which do n o t meet th e  c r i t e r i a  a s  s e t  f o r th  i n  th e  Moore Dry Dock
1Q3 lb id . ,  p . 549.
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fo rm ula . In  th e  Meat C u tte rs  and B u tcher Workmen v . t f e s t -
i/v[t
a m , I n c . eaaa , th a  Board re fu s e d  to  ap p ly  th a  Moore Dry Dock form ula 
where th a  p ic k e tin g  by th a  union o f  th a  p rim ary  em ployer' a t ru c k s  was 
con a id e r  ad to  be in  su p p o rt o f  a d is p u te  a t  th a  p rim ary  em ployer' a p la n t .  
I n  a  c ircu m stan ce  s im ila r  to  th a t  o f  th a  S ch u lte  case , th a  Board h e ld  
p ic k e tin g  which encompassed th a  tru c k  and o th e r  p rem ises to  be i n  v io la ­
t io n  o f  S e c tio n  8 (b )(4 )(A )
At th a  rov ing  prem ise i n  c o n s tru c t io n . With th a  compromise in  
th a  Moore Dry Dock c a se , i t  was on ly  a q u e s tio n  o f  tim e b e fo re  th a  Board 
was fo rc e d  to  adop t a  s im ila r  s o lu t io n  in  th a  c o n s tru c t io n  In d u s try .  I n  
I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  B oilerm akers v . R ic h f ie ld  O il C o r p o r a t io n ^  
th a  un ion  p ic k e te d  th e  e n tra n c e  to  th e  p rim ary  em ployer1s g a te  a t  a 
secondary em p loyer'a  p la n t .  The prim ary  em ployer (S u p e rio r)  was engaged 
in  i n s t a l l i n g  equipm ent on th e  p rem ises o f  th e  secondary em ployer 
(R ic h f ie ld ) .  I n  ap p ly in g  th e  s ta n d a rd s  o f th a  Moore Dry Dock oase  th e  
Board h e ld  t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  d id  n o t meet th a  t h i r d  t e s t  o f  th e  doc­
t r i n e — t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  f a i l e d  to  d is c lo s e  t h a t  th e  d is p u te  was w ith  
S u p erio r and n o t R ic h f ie ld . There was ev idence  in  th e  case  t h a t  th e
10^93 NLRB 336 (1951). Compare Kanawha Coal O p e ra to rs . 94 NLRB 
1731 (1951)-
10^ S en rice  Truck C h au ffeu rs . 97 NLRB 123 (1951). end S te r l in g  
B everages. I n c . , 90 NLRB 4oi (1950).
10*95 NLRB 1191 (1951). T h is  oase  was review ed by th e  Board 
e ig h t  months a f t e r  th e  d e c is io n  in  th e  Moore Dry Dock c ase .
p ic k e t in g  on o c c a s io n  had in t e r f e r e d  by im p lic a t io n  and e v a s iv e  r e p l i e s  
w ith  goods in ten d e d  fo r  R ic h f ie ld .  A lthough th e  Board f a i l e d  to  approve  
th e  method o f  p ic k e t in g  i n  th e  R ic h f ie ld  o a se . th e  a n a ly s i s  o f  th e  
p ic k e t in g  was su b je c te d  to  th e  r u le  o f  th e  Moore Dry Dock o a se . 
A pproxim ately two y e a r s  l a t e r  th e  Board u p h eld  t h i s  I n te r p r e ta t io n  by  
e n jo in in g  p ic k e t in g  a t  a common s i t u s  u sed  by b oth  th e  prim ary and 
seoondary em ployers. I n  th e  C hfliifT im ™ . T m u n s ta r f l .  W a r e h o u a m a n . g Q l  
H elp ers v .  H o o sier  P etroleum  Co. 3-0? c a s e s ,  th e  u n ion  p ic k e te d  a f i l l i n g  
s t a t io n  w hich was u sed  i n  th e  r e g u la r  co u rse  o f  b u s in e s s  by th e  prim ary  
em ployer (J e s s e  F lo y d ) . F loyd was i n  th e  b u s in e s s  o f  tr a n sp o r t in g  gas  
and o i l  f o r  th e  H o o sier  Petroleum  Go. w hich o p era ted  s e v e r a l  f i l l i n g  
s t a t io n s .  As a p a r t  o f  th e  p r o c e ss  o f  tr a n sp o r t in g  th e  d e fe n d a n t's  prod­
u c t s .  F loyd m ain ta in ed  a r e g u la r  p la c e  o f  b u s in e s s  a t  one o f  th e  H o osier  
P e te  s t a t io n s .  In  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  se c u r in g  r e c o g n it io n  from F loyd , th e  
un ion  r e s o r te d  t o  p ic k e t in g  th e  s t a t io n  where F loyd m ain ta in ed  h i s  b u s i ­
n e s s .  In  th e  co u rse  o f  t h i s  a c t i v i t y  th e  p ic k e t s  a ttem p ted  t o  a t t r a c t  
th e  a t t e n t io n  o f  tr u c k e r s  and custom ers who w ere u s in g  th e  p rem ises  by  
waving s ig n s  and sh o u tin g  a t  them when th ey  came in t o  th e  s ta t io n *  On 
th e  b a s i s  o f  th e s e  f a c t s  th e  Board h e ld  t h a t  th e  p ic k e t in g , though  
prim ary in  n a tu re , was seoondary in  in t e n t  s in c e  th e  a c t s  o f  th e  p ic k e t s  
r e v e a le d  th a t  th e  p ic k e t in g  was " . . .  d ir e c t e d  n o t a g a in s t  F loyd  o n ly  
b u t . . . ,/was7 . . . d e l ib e r a t e ly  In ten d ed  to  ex ten d  th e  area  o f  th e  
d is p u te  to  n e u tr a l em ployers and th ereb y  fo r c e  H o osier  P e te  to  c e a se
l°7 l06  NLRB 6h9 (1953)*
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"doing b a d n e s s  w ith  Floyd and to  fo rc e  Floyd to  reco g n ize  th e  Respond­
e n t a s  th e  b a rg a in in g  ag en t o f  h i s  em ployees."'1-0® With th e  a p p lic a t io n  
o f  th e  Moore Dry Dock forealm  in  th e  H oosier oase, th e  Board rea ffirm e d  
i t s  i n t e n t  to  develop  a p o lic y  which would p ro v id e  a  means o f  comparison 
i n  e a se s  under th e  secondary b o y c o tt c la a s e . The l e g a l i t y  o f  p ic k e tin g  
which had p re v io u s ly  depended on such a r b i t r a r y  f a c to r s  a s  deg ree  o f  
in c id e n c e  was th e r e a f t e r  su b je c ted  to  a s p e c i f ic  s e t  o f  uniform  s ta n d ­
a rd s . T his means o f  c la s s i f y in g  p ic k e tin g  a s  prim ary o r  secondary 
enabled  th e  Board to  ba lance  th e  r ig h t s  o f  th e  p a r t i e s .  By v i r tu e  o f  
th e  v a lu e  o f  p r a c t i c a l  ex p erien ce  th e  Board oould weigh th e  p o te n t ia l  
In ju ry  to  th e  n e u tr a ls  a g a in s t  th e  p o te n t ia l  in ju ry  to  th e  em ployees.
In  t h i s  p ro cess  o f  i n d u s t r ia l  a d ju d ic a tio n  th e  term s prim ary and second­
a ry  lo s e  t h e i r  form al c h a ra c te r  and become ad hoc judgm ents o f  th e  
competing i n t e r e s t s .  T his p ro c e ss  o f  w eighing r ig h ts  and i n ju r i e s  i s  o f  
p a r t i c u l a r  v a lu e  in  p ic k e tin g  c a se s  where th e  a c t i v i t y  occu rs a t  a 
common s i t u s  o r  i n  c a se s  whose f a c t s  a re  com plicated  by th e  e x is te n c e  o f  
a roving prem ise. In  cases  o f  t h i s  ty p e  th e  Board i s  faced  w ith  th e  
extrem ely  d e l ic a te  ta s k  o f  b a lan c in g  a group o f  competing I n t e r e s t s .  In  
e v a lu a tin g  th e se  p o te n t ia l  r ig h ts  and i n j u r i e s  th e  Board h as sought to  
avo id  r ig id  d e f in i t io n s  in  fa v o r  o f  a f l e x ib le  p o lic y  which w i l l  enab le  
unions to  r e s o r t  to  p ic k e tin g  under c a r e f u l ly  p ro sc r ib e d  s ta n d ard s .
T h is p rocedure  o f  ad hoc d e l ib e r a t io n  and a p p lic a t io n  has p layed  an 
im p o rtan t r o le  i n  de term in ing  th e  le g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  under th e
108Ib ld .. p. 633.
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LMRA and n a s i  be regarded  a s  a commendable achievem ent by th e  Board in  
I n te r p r e t in g  S e c tio n  8(b) (* 0 (1 ) '
With th e  e s tab lish m en t o f  th e  Moore Dry Dock form ula, th e  t re n d  
o f  p ic k e tin g  d e c is io n s  between th e  Glboney case  (1949) and th e  e n a c t­
ment o f  th e  LMRDA. (1959) con tinued  to  fo llo w  th e  te le sc o p in g  p a t te r n  o f  
l im i t in g  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro te c tio n  o f  p ic k e tin g  a s  a form o f  f r e e  speech, 
w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f  preem pting, in  s p e c i f ic  c ase s , s t a t e  rem edies t h a t  
were h e ld  to  be i n  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  LMRA. I n  th e  case  o f  U nited  Asso­
c ia t io n  o f  Journeyman Plumbers and S te a m f lt te r s  v . Graham^0?  th e  un ion  
p ic k e te d  a g e n e ra l c o n tra c to r  who was employing nonunion la b o r . The 
s t a te  oou rt e n jo in ed  th e  p ic k e tin g  a s  an  a ttem p t to  i n t e r f e r e  and 
o b s tru c t  enforcem ent o f  a s t a te  r ig h t- to -w o rk -la w . On th e  b a s is  o f  
p r io r  decisions^ -®  th e  Supreme Court upheld  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  th e  
V irg in ia  S ta tu te  a s  be ing  w ith in  th e  domain o f  s t a t e  j u r i s d ic t io n  con­
s i s t e n t  w ith  S e c tio n  14(b) o f  th e  LMRA which e s ta b l is h e d  th e  le g a l  b a s is  
f o r  s t a t e  r ig h t- to -w o rk - la w s . The d is s e n t in g  J u s t ic e s  B lack and Douglas 
o b je c te d  to  th e  m a jo r i ty 's  i n te r p r e t a t i o n  th a t  p e ac e fu l p ic k e tin g  o f  a 
nonunion c o n tra c to r  c o n s t i tu te d  a degree o f  economic co erc io n  s u f f i c i e n t  
to  s e r io u s ly  je o p a rd iz e  th e  enforcem ent o f  a s t a t e  law . W hile i t  i s  
w ith in  th e  p rov ince  o f  th e  s t a t e  to  re g u la te  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t io n s  under 
i t s  p o l ic e  powers, th e  s t a te  may no t r e s t r i c t  a c t i v i t y  which a d v e r t is e s  
" . . .  to  union men and union sym path izers t h a t  non-union men . . .
109345 U.S. 192 (1953).
110A -F .L . v. American Sash and Door Company. 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
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" /a r e J  * • • employed on th e  Job. . . . The p ro te c tio n  o f  p ic k e tin g  
i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  con tinuance  o f  th e  union movement, and th e  s t a t e  and 
th e  c o u r ts  should n o t be  p e rm itte d  to  o b s tru c t  th e  d issem in a tio n  o f  
p u b l ic i ty  which r e l a t e s  th e  f a c t s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  l i f e .
In  1955* th e  Supreme Court re fu se d  to  a c c e p t an appeal to  review
11?a lo w er  c o u r t  d e c is io n  e n jo in in g  p e a c e fu l p ic k e t in g  a s  a  v io l a t i o n  o f  
a s t a t e  law  p r o te c t in g  w orkers in  th e  s e l e c t io n  o f  t h e ir  o o l l e c t i v e  bar­
g a in in g  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s .  Three o f  th e  em p lo y er 's  tw enty  em ployees had  
p ic k e te d  h i s  res ta u ra n t— T h eod ore's  L ob ster  House— f o r  th e  s o le  pu rpose  
o f  a ttem p tin g  to  o r g a n ise  th e  o th e r  em ployees. The Supreme Court o f  
Maine up held  th e  in j u n c t io n  s t a t in g  th a t  a ". . . s t r ik e  by th e  th r e e  
un ion  em ployees f o r  o r g a n is a t io n a l  p u rp oses i s  . . . u n law fu l . . .
/a n d 7  . • . p ic k e t in g  i n  supp ort o f  such a s t r ik e ,  a lth o u g h  p e a c e fu l ,  i s  
l ik e w is e  u n law fu l and may be e n jo in e d .1 , 1 1 By r e fu s in g  to  rev iew  t h i s  
d e c is io n  th e  U nited  S ta te s  Supreme Court o v e rr u le d  by im p lic a t io n  
J u s t ic e  B la c k 's  o p in io n  in  th e  Qiboney c a se  th a t  a s t a t e  co u r t may n o t  
e n jo in  p e a c e fu l  p ic k e t in g  u n le s s  th e  co n tin u a n ce  o f  th e  a c t i v i t y  p o se s  
a s e r io u s  danger, im m inent and im m ediate, to  th e  power o f  th e  s t a t e .
The im p lic a t io n  in  Pappas v . S ta cey  th a t  th e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  
s t a t u s  o f  p ic k e t in g  was a p rod u ct o f  l e g a l  f i c t i o n  was fo r m a lly
m 3^5 U.S. 203-
^ 2Pappas v. S tacey , 350 U.S. 870 (1955)* appeal d ism issed . 
113116 A. 2d. 497 (1955)-
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concluded by th e  Supreme Court I n  I n te r n a t io n a l  T eam sters v . V ogt.-1̂-**
The d e fen d an t (Vogt) o p e ra te d  a  g ra v e l p i t  which employed f i f t e e n  to  
tw enty  men. The union  sought to  o rg an iz e  th e  Vogt Company and began 
p ic k e tin g  th e  e n tra n c e  to  th e  e x ca v a tio n  p i t .  The d r iv e r s  o f  o th e r  
f irm s  re fu s e d  to  c ro s s  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e s ,  and Vogt sought a c o u r t  o rd e r  
to  e n jo in  th e  p ic k e tin g . The r e s t r a in in g  o rd e r  was upheld  by th e  Supreme 
Court o f  W isconsin and th e  U nited  S ta te s  Supreme Court g ran te d  
c e r t i o r a r i  to  c l a r i f y  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  under th e  
LMRA. J u s t ic e  F ra n k fu r te r  d e liv e re d  th e  m a jo r ity  o p in io n  h o ld in g  t h a t  
th e  b ro ad  pronouncem ents eq u a tin g  p ic k e tin g  w ith  f r e e  speech must " . . .  
y i e ld  ' t o  th e  im pact o f  f a c t s  u n fo re se e n ' (P eople  v . S chw ein ler P r e s s ,
214 N.Y. 3 9 5 )* " ^ ^  Reviewing th e  evo lv ing  l e g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  
beg in n in g  w ith  th e  Senn case . J u s t i c e  F ra n k fu r te r  concluded t h a t  th e  
s e r i e s  o f  d e c is io n s  betw een 1937 and 1957 h as  produced a p o lic y  which 
p e rm its  th e  s t a t e  to  employ wide d i s c r e t io n  i n  fo rm u la tin g  i t s  i n t e r n a l  
p o l i c i e s .  The s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  has been so c a r e f u l ly  examined and 
re g u la te d  by th e  s t a t e  and f e d e r a l  c o u r ts  t h a t  th e r e  i s  no lo n g e r  any 
s u b s ta n t ia l  q u e s tio n  t h a t  th e  s t a t e  may e n jo in  even p e a c e fu l p ic k e tin g  
i f  th e  a c t i v i t y  i s  h e ld  to  be  i n  v io la t io n  o f  a s t a t e  law o r  p u b lic  
p o lic y  pronouncem ent. J u s t i c e  F ran k fu rte r*  s o f f i c i a l  b e n e d ic tio n  to  th e  
dem ise o f  th e  T h o rn h il l  D octrine  drew a v ig o ro u s  d i s s e n t  from J u s t i c e
11 **354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
^ - ^ I b ld . . p . 289.
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D o u g la s .11^ R eferr in g  to  th e  r u le  o f  th e  T h o r n h ill o a se— eq u atin g
p ic k e t in g  w ith  fr e e  s p e e c h . .J u s t ic e  Douglas s ta te d  th a t:
The Oourt has now oome f u l l  c i r c l e .  . . . Today, th e  Court s ig n s  a 
form al su rren d er. S ta te  c o u r ts  and s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  cannot 
fa s h io n  b la n k e t p r o h ib it io n s  on a l l  p ic k e t in g . But f o r  p r a c t ic a l  
pu rp oses th e  s i t u a t io n  now i s  a s  i t  was when Senn ▼. T i le  !*▼ ««  
Union . . . was d e c id ed . S ta te  c o u r ts  and s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  a r e  
f r e e  to  d e c id e  w hether t o  perm it or  su p p ress any p a r t ic u la r  p ic k e t  
l i n e  fo r  any reason  o th er  than a b la n k e t p o l ic y  a g a in s t  a l l  p ic k e t ­
in g . I  would adhere t o  th e  p r in c ip le  announced i n  T h o r n h ill. I  
would adhere to  th e  r e s u l t  reached in  Swing. I  would re tu rn  to  th e  
t e s t  en u n cia ted  i n  Giboney— th a t  t h i s  form o f  e x p r e ss io n  can be  
reg u la te d  o r  p r o h ib ite d  o n ly  t o  th e  e x te n t  th a t  i t  form s an e sse n ­
t i a l  p a r t o f  a cou rse  o f  conduct which th e  s t a t e  can r e g u la te  or  
p r o h ib i t .11?
The m a jo r ity  opin ion* argued J u s t ic e  D ouglas, d e n ie s  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  
un ion  to  engage in  p e a c e fu l p r o te s t  a g a in s t  em ployer d is c r im in a t io n .
The p r o te c t io n  o f  speech i s  th e  r e le v a n t i s s u e  i n  t h i s  c a se . There i s  
no ev id en ce  o f  any v io le n c e ,  c o er c io n , or d iso r d e rs— o n ly  th e  s ta tem en ts  
by th e  union th a t  th e  em ployer was u n fa ir  to  org a n ized  la b o r . To con­
c lu d e  th a t  p ic k e t in g  i n  t h i s  form c o n s t i t u t e s  a c le a r  and imminent 
danger to  th e  power o f  th e  s t a t e  i s  to  abandon th e  p u r s u it  o f  l o g i c a l  
rea so n in g  fo r  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  l e g a l  f i c t i o n .
PICKETING BY A MINORITY UNION
With th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  Supreme Court i n  th e  Vogt c a se , th e  
l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  p ic k e t in g  under th e  LMRA was r e so lv e d  w ith  th e
11^C hief J u s t ic e  Warren and J u s t ic e  B lack concurred in  D ouglas'
d is s e n t .
11?35i+ U.S. 295-297.
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e x c e p t io n  o f  two sep a ra te  i s s u e s :  (1 )  o r g a n iz a t io n a l p ic k e t in g  by a 
m in o r ity  u n io n  and (2 )  th e  preem ption  q u e s t io n . The l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  
o r g a n iz a t io n a l p ic k e t in g  by a u n ion  which se e k s  to  r e p r e se n t  th e  em ploy- 
e r a 1 em ployees or  by a u n ion  w hich h as r e c e n t ly  l o s t  a r e p r e s e n ta t io n  
e l e c t io n  i s  r e g u la te d  by S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 1 )  o f  th e  LMRA w hich p r o v id e s  i n  
p a rt:
(b )  I t  s h a l l  be an u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  f o r  a la b o r  o r g a n iz a t io n  
o r  i t s  a g e n ts  —
(1 )  to  r e s t r a in  o r  o o erce  (A) em ployees in  th e  e x e r c is e  o f  th e
r ig h t s  gu aranteed  in  S e c t io n  7 • • ■
S e c t io n  7 o f  th e  amended Act p r o te c t s  th e  r ig h t s  o f  em ployers to  
o r g a n iz e  or  to  a s s i s t  la b o r  o r g a n iz a t io n s  fo r  pu rp oses o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
b a rg a in in g  and g u a ra n tees  th e  r ig h t  o f  em ployees to  r e f r a in  from such  
a c t i v i t i e s  i f  th ey  so e l e c t .
The d e term in a tio n  o f  th e  l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  p ic k e t in g  by a m in o r ity  
u n ion  h as proved to  be a d i f f i c u l t  problem  fo r  th e  NLRB and th e  s t a t e  
and fe d e r a l  c o u r ts  a s  w e l l .^ 2® i t  i s  e v id e n t , by r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  
in d u s t r ia l  scen e , th a t  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  u n ion  to  p ic k e t  fo r  o r g a n iz a ­
t io n a l  a n d /o r  r e c o g n it io n  purp oses i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  th e  p r o te c t io n  o f  
union membership and s e c u r ity .  3y th e  same argument i t  i s  app arent t h a t  
th e  c o n tin u a tio n  o f  p ic k e t in g  a f t e r  th e  l o s s  o f  a r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c ­
t io n  im p oses u n fa ir  h ard sh ip s on th e  em ployer. The p resen ce  o f  a p ic k e t
l l 8 6 l  U .S . S t a t .  141 , P a r t I  (1 9 4 7 ) .
119I b l d . . p . 140 .
^■^The d eb ate  o v er  t h i s  i s s u e  was c a r r ie d  over  to  S e c tio n  8 (b )  
(7 )  o f  th e  LMRDA (1959)*
l i n e  i n  fr o n t  o f  a r e t a i l  o u t l e t  o r  a t  th e  en tra n ce  o f  th e  em ployer1s  
e s ta b lish m e n t  o r  a t  th e  g a te  o f  th e  prim ary em ployer r e p r e s e n ts  a con­
t in u a l  sou rce  o f  in t e r f e r e n c e  and i s  an e x p e n s iv e  n u isa n c e . But such  
i s  th e  hard f a c t s  o f  in d u s t r ia l  c o m p e tit io n , and th e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  i s  
c o s t ly  and u n fa ir  to  b o th  p a r t ic ip a n t s .  W hile  th e  em ployer would c e r ­
t a in ly  p r e fe r  to  b e  f r e e  from th e  econom ic p r e s s u r e s  o f  p ic k e t in g ,  th e  
freedom  o f  th e  em ployer d oes im prove o r  promote th e  ca u se  o f  u n io n iz a ­
t io n .  A b la n k e t  p r e s c r ip t io n  o u tla w in g  a l l  p ic k e t in g  o r  a d o c tr in e  
p r o te c t in g  b o th  prim ary and seoondary p ic k e t in g  je o p a r d iz e s  th e  r e s u l t  
f o r  e i t h e r  s id e .  Complete v ic t o r y  i s  an im p o ss ib le  g o a l i n  an  in d u s ­
t r i a l  dem ocracy. The r e s u l t  must seek  to  com prise th e  e i t h e r /o r  
s o lu t io n ,  s u b s t i t u t in g  a stand ard  w hich w i l l  en a b le  both  s id e s  to  
p a r t ic ip a t e  in  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  in d u s t r ia l  freedom .
The landmark case on th e  s ta tu s  o f  m in o rity  p ic k e tin g , which has 
c a r r ie d  over to  th e  LMRDA (1959)* was I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  
T eam sters v . C u rtis  B ro th e rs , I n c .^ 21 The union (Local 639) was 
c e r t i f i e d  by th e  Board as th e  b a rg a in in g  agen t f o r  C u r tis  B ro th e rs ' 
employees in  1953* The p a r t i e s  were unable  to  a r r iv e  a t  an i n i t i a l  
agreem ent and th e  union began p ic k e tin g  th e  company'3 prem ises in  195*+* 
The company subsequen tly  p e t i t io n e d  th e  Board fo r  a new e le c t io n  in  
which th e  union l o s t  i t s  m a jo rity  s ta tu s .  When th e  union continued  to  
p ic k e t  th e  p la n t ,  th e  company f i l e d  a p e t i t io n  w ith  th e  Board charg ing  
a  v io la t io n  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b )(1 )(A ) o f  th e  LMRA. The T r ia l  Examiner
m 119 N L R B  2 3 2  (1957)-
13^
r e fu se d  to  a c c e p t th e  co m p la in t, b u t th e  Board o v erru led  t h i s  in t e r p r e ­
t a t io n  h o ld in g  th a t  th e  p la in  in t e n t  o f  th e  a fo rem en tio n ed  s e c t io n  was 
to  p r o h ib it  th e  ty p e  o f  p ic k e t in g  d e sc r ib e d  in  t h i s  c a s e . R e fer r in g  to  
sta te m e n ts  by S en ator  T a ft and o th e r  su p p o rter s  o f  th e  B i l l ,  th e  NLRB 
con clu ded  th e  p ic k e t in g  was in te n d e d  to  red u ce th e  e a rn in g s  o f  th e  
em ployer and to  th r e a te n  th e  Jobs o f  th e  em ployees w hich would co erce  
r ig h t s  gu aranteed  under S e c t io n  7 to  r e f r a in  from jo in in g  a u n io n .^-2 2
The B oard 's  o p in io n  in  th e  C u r tis  d e c is io n  was l a t e r  a p p lie d  i n  
th e  c a se  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n  o f  M a ch in ists  v .  A llo y  Mfg. C o.^2  ̂
As i n  th e  p r io r  c a se  th e  u n ion  had l o s t  a r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t io n  and 
s ta t io n e d  a p ic k e t  who c a r r ie d  a banner s t a t in g  th a t  th e  " . . .  em ploy­
e e s  . . . w ere 'Non-Union' or  'U n fa ir * ' "^2^ The Board r e fu se d  to  a c c e p t  
th e  T r ia l  Exam iner’ s  r u lin g  th a t  th e  p ic k e t in g  d id  not c o n s t i t u t e  an 
u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  h o ld in g  th a t  ". . . a s  s ta te d  in  th e  C u r tis  
B ro th ers ' d e c is io n ,  'c o e r c io n ' e x i s t s  in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  'th e  u n ion  s e e k s  
to  cause  eoonom ic l o s s  to  th e  b u s in e s s  . . . /a n d  to 7  • • • th e  
em p loyees. . . . ,'^2^
The C u r tis  B ro th ers  d o c tr in e  a s  in t e r p r e te d  i n  th e  A llo y  d e c i ­
s io n  was co n sid ered  by th e  Court o f  A pp eals f o r  th e  D i s t r i c t  o f  
Columbia in  195 8 . The Court r e fu se d  to  endorse th e  B oard 's  d e c is io n
1 2 2I b ld . .  p . 2h3 - 
123119 NLRB 30? (1 9 5 7 ) .
12**I b i d . , p . 3 1 7 - 
1 2 5I b id . , p . 309-
1 3 5
h o ld in g  th a t  . . p e a c e fu l p ic k e t in g , w hether 'o r g a n iz a t io n a l'  o r  
1r e c o g n lt lo n a l . 1 i n  n a tu re  . . • 3‘2^ i s  n o t p r o sc r ib e d  by S e c t io n  8 (b )
(1 )(A ) o f  th e  A ct. The r e v e r s a l  o f  th e  B oard 's  o p in io n  was rev iew ed  by 
th e  U n ited  S t a te s  Supreme Court i n  March o f  I 9 6 0 . 3-2 '7 In  u p hold ing th e  
d e c is io n  o f  th e  Court o f  A pp eals— th a t  S e c t io n  8 (b ) (1 ) (A )  d id  n o t p ro­
s c r ib e  p ic k e t in g  by a m in o r ity  un ion— th e  Court to o k  s p e c ia l  n o t ic e  o f  
S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  o f  th e  LMRDA (1959) which e s t a b l is h e d  new p r o v is io n s  
r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t .  I n  d is c u s s in g th e  p o s s ib le  e f f e c t s  o f  
th e  new s e c t io n ,  th e  Court forew arned th e  NLRB th a t  i t  sh ou ld  th o ro u g h ly  
reexam ine i t s  p o s i t io n  on th e  l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  m in o rity  p ic k e t in g  b e fo r e  
i s s u in g  any new d e c is io n s  r e s t r i c t i n g  o r  r e g u la t in g  t h i s  form o f  
p ic k e t in g .3-2®
THE PREEMPTION QUESTION
P r io r  to  19^7 th e  U nited  S t a te s  Supreme Court was p r im a r ily  con­
cerned  w ith  th e  l e g a l  im p lic a t io n s  o f  s t a t e  o rd in a n ces  r e s t r i c t in g  th e  
r ig h t  t o  p ic k e t  and l im i t a t io n s  by th e  s t a t e s  on freedom  o f  sp eech . The 
p a ssa g e  o f  th e  LMRA added to  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  d e f in in g  th e  l e g a l  s t a t u s  
o f  p ic k e t in g  by e s t a b l is h in g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  in  S e c tio n  8 (b ) which w ere in  
c o n f l i c t  w ith  s t a t e  law  r e g u la t in g  s t r ik e s  a n d /o r  p ic k e t in g  i n  la b o r  
d is p u t e s .  T h is  area  o f  fe d e r a l  v e r su s  s t a t e  c o n f l i c t  was co m p lica ted  by
12627i* f . 2d. 551* 552 (195S) •
127362 U.S. 2?k ( i 960) .
l 2® T his p ro b le m  w iU  r e c e i v e  f u r t h e r  a t t e n t i o n  i n  C h a p te r  IV .
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th e  r e f u s a l  o f  th e  NLRB to  ex ten d  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  beyond c e r t a in  r e c o g ­
n is e d  l i m i t s  a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  a c a se  by  c a se  d e f i n i t i o n . ^ 9  The d e v e l­
opment o f  t h i s  p o l i c y  r e s u l t e d  i n  numerous c o n f l i c t s  betw een  th e  s t a t e  
c o u r ts  and th e  NLRB, and i t  became n e c e s s a r y  f o r  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  
Supreme Court t o  e s t a b l i s h  g u id e  l i n e s  en cou rag in g  a c o n s i s t e n t  approach  
t o  th e  no-m an 's la n d  q u e s t io n . ^ 0
The landm ark p ic k e t in g  c a se  on th e  q u e s t io n  o f  p reem p tion  was 
G arner v .  T eam sters Union.-*-31 i n  a unanimous d e c is io n  th e  Supreme Court 
r e v e r se d  a lo w er  c o u r t r u l in g  e n jo in in g  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  p ic k e t in g  w hich  
v io la t e d  s t a t e  la w . I n  th o s e  c a s e s  i n  w hich th e  em ployer i s  engaged i n  
I n t e r s t a t e  commerce, th e  Court h e ld  t h a t  a s t a t e  may n o t r e g u la te  a c t i v ­
i t y  w hich  i s  govern ed  by f e d e r a l  la w . In  a s t a t e  r lg h t - to -w o r k - la w  c a se  
( Farnsw orth and Chambers v . E l e c t r i c a l  W orkers L oca l 4 2 9 -̂3 2 ) ,  th e  
Supreme Court ex ten d ed  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  th e  G am er c a se  by r e fu s in g  to  
a llo w  an in j u n c t io n  a g a in s t  a  u n ion  w hich was p ic k e t in g  f o r  th e  p u rp ose  
o f  fo r c in g  an em ployee t o  j o in  th e  u n io n . I n  a su b seq u en t r u l in g  th e  
Supreme Court r e v e r se d  th e  tr e n d  o f  i t s  i n i t i a l  p o l i c y  on preem p tion  a s
■*-29 s e e  NLRB v . Denver B u ild in g  and C o n stru c tio n  T rades C o u n c il, 
341 U .S . 675 .
1 3 °In  O f f ic e  Em ployees Union v .  NLRB, 353 U .S . 313 (1 9 5 7 ) and  
H o te l E m ployees Union v .  Leedom, 353 U .S . 1 (1957)*  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  
Supreme Court h e ld  th a t  th e  NLRB oou ld  n o t r e f u s e  to  a s s e r t  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
o v e r  an e n t ir e  c a te g o r y  o f  em p lo y ers.
13l3i46 U .S . 465  (1 9 5 3 ) .
132353 U . S .  969 (1957).
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e s t a b l is h e d  in  th e  Garner and Farnsw orth cases*  I n  UAW v .  R u s se ll^ ^
th e  Oourt u p h eld  a reco v ery  o f  a c tu a l  and p u n it iv e  damages to  a nonunion
em ployee who was d en ied  en tra n ce  to  th e  p la n t  by th e  p r e se n c e  o f  a
p ic k e t  l i n e  su p p ortin g  an eoonom ic s t r i k e .  The u n io n 's  c o u n se l argued
th a t  th e  J u r y 's  award shou ld  b e  s e t  a s id e  on th e  grounds th a t  th e
p ic k e t in g  was r e g u la te d  by th e  LMRA.. The m a jo r ity  o f  th e  Supreme Court
r e fu se d  to  a c ce p t t h i s  in s t r u c t io n  s t a t in g  th a t t
There i s  n o th in g  in c o n s is t e n t  i n  h o ld in g  th a t  an em ployee may 
r e c o v e r  l o s t  w ages a s  damages in  t o r t  a c t io n  under s t a t e  law , and  
a ls o  h o ld in g  th a t  th e  award o f  such damages i s  n o t n e c e ssa r y  to  
e f f e c t u a t e  th e  p u rp o ses  o f  th e  F ed era l A ct . . . /a n y  o th e r  r u l in g  
w o u ld / • * * g r a n t to  u n io n s a  s u b s ta n t ia l  immunity from th e  co n se ­
qu en ces o f  mass p ic k e t in g  o r  c o e r c io n  such a s  was em ployed d u rin g  
th e  s t r ik e  in  th e  p r e se n t  c a s e . l - ^
The d is s e n t in g  j u s t i c e s ,  C h ie f J u s t ic e  Warren and J u s t ic e  
D ou glas, o b je c te d  t o  th e  m a jo r ity 's  o p in io n  on th e  grounds th a t  th e  d e c i ­
s io n  o f  th e  lo w er  co u r t was preem pted from th e  f i e l d  by th e  e x is t e n c e  o f  
fe d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n .  C h ie f J u s t ic e  Warren contended  th a t  s in c e  th e  
em ployer was o p e r a tin g  i n  i n t e r s t a t e  commerce and th e  u n ion  was th e  law ­
f u l  a g en t (a s  d e s ig n a te d  by th e  NLRB) o f  th e  em ployees en gaging  in  a 
l e g a l  s t r ik e ,  i t  w ould appear th a t  th e  c a se  f a l l s  under fe d e r a l  and not  
s t a t e  j u r i s d ic t i o n .  The purpose o f  th e  LMRA o f  1947 was to  e s t a b l i s h  
uniform  r e g u la t io n s  and to  b a la n ce  th e  com peting i n t e r e s t s  i n  in d u s t r ia l  
c o m p e tit io n . The v e r d ic t  o f  th e  m a jo r ity  would perm it th e  s t a t e s  to  
u p se t t h i s  b a la n ce  by e s t a b l is h in g  d u p lic a t in g  and c o n f l i c t in g  aw ards.
133356 U.S. 634 (1953)• 
1 3 /* I b id ., p . 645-
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The Supreme C ourt, argued th e  C h ie f J u s t i c e ,  sh ou ld  n o t uphold  d e c i s io n s  
w hich w i l l  enoourage th e  s t a t e s  to  d e v is e  rem ed ies w hich a re  in c o n ­
s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  b a s ic  purpose o f  th e  F ed era l A ct.
/0 n e 7  • • • purpose o f  th e  Wagner and T a ft -H a r t le y  A c ts  i s  to  pro­
m ote in d u s t r ia l  p e a c e . C o n s is te n t  w ith  th a t  aim O ongress c r e a te d  
t r ib u n a ls ,  p roced u res and rem ed ies c a lc u la te d  to  b r in g  la b o r  d i s ­
p u te s  to  a speedy c o n c lu s io n . B ecause o f  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a  s t a t e  
damage a c t io n  d is c o u r a g e s  r e s o r t  to  th e  c u r a t iv e  f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  
p e r t in e n t  f e d e r a l  lg b o r  la w , i t  c o n f l i c t s  w ith  th e  a im s o f  th a t  
l e g i s l a t i o n  . . * /a n d  a c t s  a s  a means o f  d is r u p t in g  th e  un iform  
p r o c e s s  o f  la b o r  law7 * ^ ^
The no-man1s  la n d  i s s u e  was tem p o ra r ily  r e s o lv e d  by th e  U n ited  
S t a t e s  Supreme Court in  th e  c a se  o f  Quss v .  Utah Labor R e la t io n s  
Board1 3 6  in  w hich th e  Supreme Court h e ld  th a t  S e c t io n  1 0 (a )  o f  th e  LMRA 
was c o n t r o l l in g  in  problem s in v o lv in g  s t a t e  and fe d e r a l  j u r i s d ic t i o n .
The Court e x p r essed  th e  judgment th a t  w h ile  O ongress m igh t, by l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  enactm en t, change th e  r e g u la t io n  a s  p ro v id ed  in  S e c t io n  1 0 (a )  th e  
Board cou ld  e i t h e r  r e a s s e r t  i t s  j u r i s d ic t i o n  o r  cede j u r i s d ic t i o n  to  th e  
s t a t e s .  The im p asse reached  in  th e  Guss c a se  w as con tin u ed  u n t i l  1958  
when th e  NLRB p u b lish e d  a r e v is e d  s e t  o f  stan d ard s which p erm itted  th e  
Board to  a c c e p t  j u r i s d ic t i o n  i n  about tw en ty  p er  c e n t o f  th e  c a se s  
p r e v io u s ly  r e j e c t e d .13?
The d is p u te  betw een  th e  NLRB and th e  c o u r ts  o v er  th e  preem ption  
q u e s t io n  c a r r ie d  o v er  to  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h e a r in g s  on th e  LMRDA in  1959*
1 3 5I b l d . , p . 6 5 3 .
13 6 353 U .S . 1 (1 9 5 7 ) .
1 3?H earings b e fo r e  th e  S en a te  Committee on A p p ro p ria tio n s on
H.R. 11645 , 8 5 th  C ongress, 2d. S e s s .  189 (1 9 5 8 ) .
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The i s s u e  was f i n a l l y  r e s o lv e d  b y  l e g i s l a t i v e  compromise b etw een  f e d e r a l  
and s t a t e  p rop o n en ts  i n  S e c t io n  701 o f  th e  LMRDA, w hich amends S e c t io n  l h  
o f  th e  LMRA (1 9 ^ 7 )• S e c t io n  701 p r o v id e s  i n  p a r t  th a t :
(C )(1 )  The Board* i n  i t s  d is c r e t io n *  may* by r u le  o f  d e c i s io n  o r  
by p u b lis h in g  r u le s  ad op ted  p u rsu a n t t o  th e  A d m in is tr a t iv e  P roced u re  
Act* d e c l in e  to  a s s e r t  J u r is d ic t io n  o v e r  any la b o r  d is p u te  in v o lv in g  
any c l a s s  o r  c a te g o r y  o f  em ployers* w h ere, i n  th e  o p in io n  o f  th e  
B oard, th e  e f f e c t  o f  such la b o r  d is p u te  on  commerce i s  n o t  s u f f i ­
c i e n t l y  s u b s t a n t ia l  t o  w arran t th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  i t s  j u r i s d ic t i o n :  
P ro v id ed , th a t  th e  Board s h a l l  n o t d e c l in e  to  a s s e r t  J u r is d ic t io n  
o v e r  any la b o r  d is p u te  o v e r  w hich i t  w ould  a s s e r t  J u r is d ic t io n  under  
th e  sta n d a rd s  p r e v a i l in g  upon A ugust 1 . 1959*
(2 )  N oth ing i n  t h i s  A ct s h a l l  b e  deemed to  p r e v e n t o r  b ar any  
agen cy  o r  th e  c o u r ts  o f  any S t a te  o r  T e r r ito r y  ( in c lu d in g  th e  Common­
w e a lth  o f  P u erto  Rico* Guam* and th e  V ir g in  I s la n d s ) ,  from assum ing  
and a s s e r t in g  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  la b o r  d is p u t e s  w hich th e  Board  
d e c l in e s ,  p u rsu an t t o  paragraph ( l )  o f  t h i s  s u b s e c t io n , to  a s s e r t  
j u r i s d i c t i o n .* 3 °
In  v iew  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  and th e  c u r r e n t tr e n d  o f  th e  
NLRB and c o u r t  d e c i s i o n s ,  S e c t io n  701 w i l l  a p p a r e n tly  p erm it th e  s t a t e s  
and s t a t e  c o u r ts  to  a c c e p t  j u r i s d i c t i o n  in  th o s e  c a se s  d e c l in e d  by th e  
NLRB. The B oard1s  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  how ever, may n o t b e  narrow ed and r ep re ­
s e n t a t io n  c a s e s  may b e  d e le g a te d  to  r e g io n a l  d i r e c t o r s .  The im p o rta n t  
q u e s t io n  w hich  rem ains u n d ecid ed  i s  w h eth er  o r  n o t a g iv e n  c a se  w i l l  
f a l l  w ith in  th e  Board1s  j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  s ta n d a rd s . The u lt im a te  answ er  
to  t h i s  q u e s t io n  w i l l  depend on th e  r u le s  and r e g u la t io n s  a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
by th e  Board to  d eterm in e  th e  b a s i s  f o r  a p p ly in g  i t s  stand ard s*  In  an 
e f f o r t  t o  r e s o lv e  t h i s  i s s u e ,  th e  NLRB h as r e c e n t ly  p u b lish e d  a s e t  o f  
new r u le s  w hich p erm it d e c la r a t io n  o f  an a d v is o r y  o p in io n  reg a rd in g  th e
13873 U.S. S ta t . 519. 5^1 (1959)*
1^0
Board' 8 j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The p a r t i e s  to  an agen cy  o r  c o u r t p r o c ee d in g  may 
p e t i t i o n  th e  Board f o r  a r u l in g  on j u r i s d i c t i o n  v i t h o u t  th e  n e c e s s i t y  
o f  b in d in g  th e  p a r t i e s ,  th e  Board, o r  th e  G eneral C ou n sel.
A lthough i t  i s  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  S e c t io n  701 w i l l  b e  a b le  to  r e s o lv e  
th e  preem ption  problem , i t  a p p a r e n tly  p r o v id e s  a b a s i s  w hich w i l l  p erm it  
th e  p a r t i e s  to  e v o lv e  an  a c c e p ta b le  s o lu t io n .  I t  may be ex p e c ted  t h a t  
th e  s t a t e s  w i l l  c o n tin u e  to  c o n t e s t  th e  a u t h o r ity  o f  th e  Board e sp e ­
c i a l l y  i n  th o se  a r e a s  i n  which th e  i s s u e  o f  un ion ism  i s  s t i l l  i n  d o u b t. 
However, th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  s t a t e s  do n o t  have u n iform  la b o r  la w s  i s  a 
c o n tin u in g  problem , and i t  may b e  n e c e s sa r y  f o r  th e  NLRB to  broaden i t s  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  to  a s su r e  a un iform  r e s u l t .  In  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n  th e  l a t e  
P r e s id e n t  o f  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  John F. Kennedy (th e n  U n ited  S t a t e s  
S en a to r ) p o in te d  o u t t h a t :
. . .  we must b ea r  i n  mind th a t  35 o f  th e  s t a t e s  have no ad eq u ate  
la b o r  la w s . I n  th a t  c o n n e c tio n  . . .  I  s h a l l  w atch v e r y  c a r e f u l ly  
what a c t io n s  a r e  ta k en  by t h e s e  v a r io u s  s t a t e s ,  b e c a u se  i f  any  
e f f o r t  i s  made to  u se  t h i s  p r o v is io n  (S e c t io n  701) a s  an o p p o r tu n ity  
t o  l i m i t  r ig h t s  w hich a l l  o f  u s  b e l i e v e  a l l  Am erican w orking p e o p le  
and em ployers i n  th e s e  s t a t e s  h ave , th en  i t  w i l l  b e  v e ry  e a sy  under  
t h i s  p r o v is io n  fo r  th e  N a tio n a l Labor R e la t io n s  Board . . .  to  
assum e . . . f u l l e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n .^39
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 8 (b ) RESTRICTIONS
I n  rev iew in g  th e  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  S e c t io n  3 (b )  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  by th e  NLRB and th e  c o u r ts  betw een  19^7 and 19 5 7 . 
i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  c a s e s  s e v e r e ly  l im i t e d  th e  a b i l i t y  o f
■̂39i o 5 Cong. R ec. 16416 ( d a i ly  e d i t i o n ,  Septem ber 3* 1 9 5 9 ) .
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u n io n s  to  p r e se r v e  and r e t a in  t h e i r  b a r g a in in g  s ta tu s*  The r ig h t  to  
p ic k e t  i n  a p e a c e fu l manner a s s u r e s  p u b lic  n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  co n tr o ­
v e r sy  and p r o v id e s  a d ir e c t  form o f  econom ic r e p r is a l  a g a in s t  th e  
employer* When th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  o r  fo rb id d en  by a 
c o u rt o rd er , th e  un ion  and i t s  membership a r e  su b je c te d  to  th e  naked  
power o f  th e  co rp o ra te  e n t i t y .  Under th e s e  c o n d it io n s  th e  em ployer i s  
f r e e  to  p r e s s  h i s  tem porary advantage a g a in s t  th e  u n io n . R e s t r ic t io n  o f  
th e  r ig h t  t o  p ic k e t  u p se ts  th e  c o m p e tit iv e  b a la n ce  betw een th e  em ployer  
and th e  union* Thus th e  un ion  w hich i s  seek in g  to  p r o te c t  an e s ta b ­
l i s h e d  b a rg a in in g  u n it  o r  a ttem p tin g  to  o r g a n iz e  a nonunion em ployer i s  
l e f t  a t  a d ec id ed  d isa d v a n ta g e .
The im portance o f  j u d ic ia l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  
under th e  LMRA i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  dem onstrated  by th e  o v e r a l l  d e c l in e  in  
p e r ce n ta g e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  b a rg a in in g  e l e c t io n s  won by u n io n s betw een  1947  
and 1955 ( s e e  T ab le  I ) .  In  1947, th e  y e a r  p r io r  to  th e  enactm ent o f  th e  
LMRA t u n io n s w ere v ic t o r io u s  i n  75 p e r  c e n t o f  th e  e l e c t io n s  c e r t i f i e d  
by th e  NLRB. T h is  p ercen ta g e  d ecrea sed  t o  70*5 p er c e n t in  1949; and, 
e x ce p t f o r  a b r i e f  reco v ery  during th e  Korean h o s t i l i t i e s ,  th e  o v e r a l l  
p e rcen ta g e  con tin u ed  to  d e c l in e  throughout th e  1947-1957 p e r io d . The 
marked d e c re a se  i n  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t io n s  from 75 p er c e n t  in  194? to  
63 p e r  c en t in  1957 took  p la c e  d e s p it e  a co n tin u ed  growth i n  th e  s i z e  o f  
th e  la b o r  fo r c e  and a r i s i n g  r e a l  n a t io n a l  incom e— a com bination  o f  
f a c t o r s  which i s  norm ally  con d u siv e  to  growth i n  u n ion  a f f i l i a t i o n  and 
b a rg a in in g  power. A lthough i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s s ig n  th e  f u l l  w e ig h t o f  
t h i s  f a i l u r e  to  m ain ta in  o r  in c r e a s e  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  power o f  u n io n s
TABLE I
OOLLECnVE-BAKUIKIltt ELECTIONS1 BT AFFILIATION 
AND BT PARTI dPATUC UNIONS
E le c t io n s  Won b r  
A. F. o f  L. CTO No
Number A f f i l i a t e s  A f f i l i a t e s  T T w affiT ^tyi Union
o f  P er - P er - P e r -  P e r -  T o ta l
Tear E le c t io n s Number c en t Nturiber c e n t Number c e n t Suaber c e n t P ercen t
1997 T o ta l . 6 ,9 2 0 2 ,1 9 6 31*7 2 ,1 3 8 3 0 .9 860 1 2 .9 1 ,7 2 6 2 9 .9 75 -0
1998 T o ta l* . 3 ,2 2 2 1 ,1 8 8 3 6 .9 532 I 6 . 5 617 1 9 .1 885 2 7 .9 7 2 -5
1999 T o ta l . 5 .5 1 9 2 ,0 9 2 37 -9 8 5 8 1 5 .6 939 1 7 .0 1 .6 2 5 2 7 .6 7 0 .5
1950 T o ta l . 5 .6 1 9 2 .1 0 1 3 7 .9 1 ,1 9 9 2 1 .3 886 1 5 .8 1 .9 3 3 2 5 .5 7 9 .5
1951 T o ta l . 6 ,9 3 2 2 ,6 5 0 9 1 .2 1 ,3 7 5 2 1 .9 733 1 1 .9 1 .6 7 9 2 6 .0 7 9 .0
1952 T o ta l > 6 ,7 6 5 3 .0 7 5 9 5 .9 1 .3 9 9 2 0 .6 969 6 .9 1 .8 3 2 2 7 . I 7 2 .9
1953 T o ta l . 6 ,0 5 0 2 ,7 5 0 9 5 .9 1 ,1 1 9 1 8 .9 986 8 .0 1 .7 0 0 2 8 .1 7 1 .9
1959 T o ta l • 9 ,6 6 3 1 .9 2 5 9 1 .3 780 1 6 .7 355 7 -6 1 .6 0 3 3 9 .9 6 5 .6
1955 T o ta l • 9 ,2 1 5 1 .7 2 1 9 1 .0 809 1 9 .1 329 7 .7 1 .3 6 6 3 2 .9 6 7 .6
H
♦ F ir s t  y ea r  o f  NLRA.
^Tfce te r n  " c o l le c t iv e  b a r g a in in g " e l e c t io n  I s  need to  co v er  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e le c ­
t io n s  req u e sted  by a u n ion  o r  o th e r  ca n d id a te  fo r  em ployee r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o r  by th e  employer*
The NLRB a d ju s ted  th e  b a s i s  f o r  r e p o r t in g  c o l le c t iv e - b a r g a in in g  e l e c t io n s  In  1956; 
th ere fo re*  th e  d a ta  f o r  1956 and 1957 i s  n o t in c lu d e d  In  T able  I .  The t o t a l  p ercen ta g e  f o r  
1957 was 63 p e r c e n t .
Sources Annual R eport o f  th e  NLRB. U nited  S t a te s  Government P r in t in g  O ffice*  
W ashington. D.C-
to  th e  j u d ic ia l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  r ig h t  t o  p ic k e t ,  i t  i s  app arent th a t  
th e s e  l im i t a t io n s  have p la y ed  an im p ortan t r o le  in  r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  
a b i l i t y  o f  th e  u n io n s to  r e s i s t  th e  t a c t i c s  o f  em p loyers.
CHAPTER IV
THE STATUS OF PICKETING UNDER THE LMRDA
The LMRQi (1 9 5 9 ) r e p r e s e n ts  th e  f i r s t  com prehensive a ttem p t by  
th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent t o  r e g u la te  th e  l i m i t s  o f  p e r m is s ib le  oonduot in  
r e s p e c t  to  p ic k e tin g *  The LMRDA amends th e  LMRA (19^7) by adding Sec­
t i o n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  w h ic h  e s t a b l i s h e s  r e s t r i c t i v e  l im i t a t io n s  on th e  r ig h t  o f  
an u n c e r t i f i e d  u n ion  to  p u b l ic iz e  a la b o r  d is p u te  by en gag in g  i n  r ec o g ­
n i t io n  a n d /o r  o r g a n iz a t io n a l p ic k e t in g .  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  i s  d iv id e d  in t o  
two p a r ts t  a pream ble w hich e x p la in s  th e  ty p e  o f  un ion  a c t i v i t y  compre­
hended* and th r e e  se p a r a te  s u b s e c t io n s  w hich p r o h ib it  p ic k e t in g  under  
s p e c i f i c  c o n d it io n s .
Pream ble
I t  s h a l l  be an u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e !
(7 )  t o  p ic k e t  or  cause to  be p ic k e te d , or  th r e a te n  t o  p ic k e t  or  
cau se  t o  b e  p ic k e te d , any em ployer where an o b j e c t  th e r e o f  i s  
f o r c in g  or  r e q u ir in g  an em ployer to  r e o o g n lz e  or  b a rg a in  w ith  a 
la b o r  o r g a n iz a t io n  a s  th e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  h i s  em ployees, o r  
fo r c in g  o r  r e q u ir in g  th e  em ployees o f  an em ployer to  a c c e p t o r  
s e l e c t  such la b o r  o r g a n iz a t io n  a s  t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a in in g  
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e ,  u n le s s  such la b o r  o r g a n iz a t io n  i s  c u r r e n tly  
c e r t i f i e d  a s  th e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  o f  such em ployees:
(A) where th e  em ployer has la w f u l ly  r eo o g n ize d  i n  accord an ce  
w ith  t h i s  A ct any o th e r  la b o r  o r g a n iz a t io n  and a q u e s t io n  
co n cern in g  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  may n o t a p p r o p r ia te ly  be r a is e d  
under S e c t io n  9 ( c )  o f  t h i s  A ct.
(8 )  where w ith in  th e  p reced in g  tw e lv e  months a v a l id  e l e c ­
t io n  under S e c t io n  9 ( c )  o f  t h i s  A ct h as been conducted , or
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(C) where such p io k e tin g  has been conduoted w ith o u t a  p e t i ­
t io n  under S e c tio n  9 (e )  b e in g  f i l e d  w ith in  a reaeo n ab le  
p e r io d  o f  t i n e  n o t  to  exceed t h i r t y  days f ro n  th e  oowsenoe- 
n e n t o f  aweh p ic k e tin g i  P rovided , T hat when auoh a  p e t i t i o n  
haa been  f i l e d  th e  Board s h a l l  fo r th w ith , w ith o u t re g a rd  to  
th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  S e c tio n  9 ( 0 )(1 )  o r  th e  absenoe o f  a 
shewing o f  a s u b s ta n t ia l  i n t e r e s t  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  la b o r  
o rg a n is a t io n , d i r e c t  an  e le c t io n  i n  such u n i t  a s  th e  Board 
f in d s  to  be a p p ro p r ia te  and s h a l l  c e r t i f y  th e  r e s u l t s  
th e r e o f  1 P rov ided  f u r th e r .  T hat no th in g  i n  t h i s  Subpara­
graph (C) s h a l l  be c o n s tru ed  to  p r o h ib i t  any p ic k e tin g  o r  
o th e r  p u b l ic i ty  f o r  th e  purpose o f  t r u t h f u l l y  a d v is in g  th e  
p u b lic  ( in c lu d in g  consum ers) t h a t  an  em ployer does n o t 
ewploy members o f . o r  have a c o n tr a c t  w ith , a  la b o r  o rg a n i­
s a t io n ,  u n le s s  an  e f f e o t  o f  such p ic k e tin g  i s  to  induce  any 
in d iv id u a l  employed by any o th e r  p e rso n  i n  th e  co u rse  o f  h i s  
employ*®nt, n o t to  p ic k  up, d e l iv e r  o r  t r a n s p o r t  any goods 
o r  n o t to  perform  any s e r v ic e s .1
INTERPRETATION OF THE PICKETING RESTRICTIONS
S ig n i f ic a n t  w ith in  th e  pream ble i s  th e  d i r e c t  re fe re n c e  to  th e  
t e r n  p ic k e tin g . A lthough p ic k e tin g  was re g u la te d  by th e  NLRB and th e  
c o u r ts  under th e  LMRA (19*7), th e  Act d id  n o t c o n ta in  any re fe re n c e  to  
th e  term  p ic k e tin g  p e r  se . W ithout th e  b e n e f i t  o f  p rev io u s  s t a tu to r y  
d e f in i t i o n .  C ongress a p p a re n tly  in te n d e d  t h a t  S e c tio n  3 (b )(7 )  would 
r e g u la te  p ic k e tin g  i n  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  se n se ; i . e . ,  p ic k e tin g  by em ployees 
o r  non employee a in  p r o t e s t  o f  p r a c t ic e s  u n f a i r  to  th e  la b o r  movement.
T h is  d e f in i t i o n  would In c lu d e  a p p e a ls  to  consumers—p u b l ic i ty  p ic k e tin g  
—b u t would n o t encompass o th e r  form s o f  p u b l ic i ty  which do n o t conform 
to  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  meaning o f  p ic k e tin g . The e x c lu s io n  o f  o th e r  form s 
o f  p u b l ic i ty  from th e  p ic k e tin g  re g u la t io n s  i s  suppo rted  by th e  h i s to r y
X73 U.S. S ta t . 519. 5**-
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o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  d eb a te  ov e r S ec tio n  8 (b ) (7 ) 2 and by th e  re fe re n c e  
i n  th e  second p ro v iso  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b )(4 )  to  " p u b lic i ty  o th e r  than  
p ic k e t in g ."
Although t h i s  d e f in i t io n  o f  p io k e tin g  i s  narrow in  scope, i . e . .  
re q u ir in g  th e  p resence  o f  a union  p ic k e t  n e a r  th e  s i t u s  o f  th e  d isp u te , 
i t  oonforms to  th e  i n t e n t  o f  Congress to  re g u la te  a s p e c i f ic  type  o f  
a c t i v i t y .  Both th e  advocates and th e  opponents o f  S ec tio n  8 (b ) (7 ) were 
concerned about th e  e f f e c t s  o f p a r t i c u l a r  fo re s  o f  p ic k e tin g . S enato r 
M cClellan, who u n su c c e ss fu lly  urged  th e  Senate to  adop t a s t r i c t e r  
v e rs io n  in  p re fe re n c e  to  S e c tio n  8 (b )(7 )*  c o n s is te n t ly  r e f e r r e d  to  th e  
"u n d es ira b le  fo re s  o f  p ic k e tin g "  r a th e r  th an  th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  p ic k e t­
in g . I n  re p ly in g  to  a c r i t i c i s e  o f h i s  aeendeent by P re s id e n t Kennedy 
( th en  Ju n io r  S en a to r f ro e  M assachusetts) t h a t  (S en ato r M cClellan) tended  
to  overem phasise th e  ra c k e te e r in g  elem ent in  la b o r  un ions and o rg a n is in g  
campaigns, S en a to r M cClellan s ta te d :
The c o n d itio n s  w h ic h  e x is t  need remedying. I  do n o t want to  deny 
th e  w orkers t h e i r  r ig h t s  when a m a jo r ity  o f  them want a  un ion . I  
do n o t want to  deny them freedom o f  speech. I  want them to  have 
freedom o f  speech. . . .
But I  am opposed to  b lackm ail p ic k e tin g . I  am opposed to  shake- 
down p ic k e tin g . I  am opposed to  top  down o rg a n is in g . . . .  i f  th e se  
p r a c t ic e s  a re  n o t c o rre c te d , th e re  w i l l  be a c o n tin u a tio n  . . .  o f  
a c t i v i t i e s  . . . JJa y  g a n g s te rs  and ra c k e te e rs  who have7  • • • been 
e x p lo it in g  employees in  a l l  s e c tio n s  o f  th e  coun try .
Legislative H isto ry  o f  th e  LMRDA (1999) (W ashington, D .C .t 
U .S . O overm ent P r in t in g  O ffic e , T95$T. f t *  1174-1192.
3Ib id ., p. 1182.
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S en ator  G oldw ater, who oou ld  h a rd ly  b e  c a l l e d  a " fr ie n d  o f  l a b o r ," was 
e q u a lly  d is tu r b e d  about th e  e f f e c t  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n a l a n d /o r  r e c o g n i-  
t io n a l  p ic k e t in g  on th e  em ployee a s  w e l l  a s  h i s  em ployer. Even w ith  th e  
r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  th e s e  form s o f  p ic k e t in g , argued S en ator  Goldwater* th e  
u n ion  may s t i l l  r e s o r t  t o  11. . . th e  u se  o f  h a n d b i l ls ,  m eetin g s , home 
v i s i t s  and so f o r th .
Thus i t  would seem from th e  s ta te m e n ts  o f  S en a to r  M cC lellan  and 
S en ator  G oldwater a s  w e l l  a s  th e  comments o f  S en a to r  Kennedy—who was 
I n t e r e s t e d  in  p r o te c t in g  th e  r ig h t  o f  em ployees to  engage in  s o - c a l l e d  
sw eat shop p ic k e t in g — th a t  C ongress in ten d e d  to  r e g u la te  p ic k e t in g  i n  
th e  t r a d i t io n a l  s e n se . T h erefore , p u b l ic i t y  w hich d oes n o t conform to  
t h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  stand ard  i s  a p p a ren tly  w ith o u t remedy under S e c t io n  8(b)  
( 7 ) ;  e . g . ,  th e  d e c is io n  by a d i s t r i c t  co u rt in  P h i l l i p s  v . I n te r n a t io n a l  
L ad ies Garment Workers U n io n -5 i s  seem in g ly  in  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  t r a d i ­
t io n a l  d e f in i t i o n  o f  p ic k e t in g .  In  t h i s  c a se  th e  co u r t h e ld  th a t  th e  
p la c in g  o f  3 ig n s  on p o s te r s  n orm ally  c a r r ie d  by p ic k e t s  was a form o f  
p ic k e t in g  s im ila r  to  am bulatory p ic k e t in g  and was p r o sc r ib e d  by S e c t io n  
8 ( b ) ( 7 )  o f  th e  ItfHDA.
By th e  term in o lo g y  o f  th e  s t a t u t e  and by v ir t u e  o f  i t s  l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  h is t o r y ,  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  r e s t r i c t s  p ic k e t in g  a s  an u n fa ir  la b o r  
p r a c t ic e  i f  th e  o b j e c t  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  i s  to  fo r c e  e i t h e r  th e  em ployer  
o r  h i s  em ployees to  r e c o g n iz e  th e  un ion  a s  th e  b a rg a in in g  a g en t- T h is
**l b i d . , p . 1191 .
5^5 L.R.R-M. 2363 (1959) .
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r e s t r i c t i o n  on r e o o g n it io n a l  p ic k e t in g  i s  fu r th e r  d e f in e d  i n  S u b se c tio n s
(A) .  (B) ,  and (C) .  By im p osin g  s p e c i f i c  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  r ig h t  to  
p ic k e t .  C ongress in ten d e d  to  p r o te c t  th e  em ployee and h is  em ployer from  
s i t u a t io n s  i n  w hich (1 ) th e  u n ion  was (a cco rd in g  to  S en ator  M cC lellan ) 
a ttem p tin g  to  fo r c e  i t s  w ish e s  on th e  m a jo r ity  o f  em ployees who p re­
f e r r e d  to  r e t a in  t h e ir  nonunion s t a t u s ,  o r  (2 )  in  th e  s i t u a t io n  where  
th e  em ployer and th e  u n ion  w ere a ttem p tin g  to  c o e r c e  s u p p lie r s  and t h e i r  
em ployees to  c e a se  d e l iv e r in g  p ro d u cts  to  th e  nonunion em ployer. In  
a d d it io n  to  th e s e  two b a s ic  a r e a s . C ongress e s t a b l is h e d  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
which would curb th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  r a c k e te e r s  and p r o fe s s io n a l  g a n g s te r s  
in  in d u s t r ia l  r e la t io n s .
From a l e g a l i s t i c  p o in t  o f  v iew , w h ile  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  d oes n o t  
p r o h ib it  p ic k e t in g  by a c e r t i f i e d  u n ion  i n  su p p ort o f  an econom ic  
s t r ik e ,  i t  d oes n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  fo l lo w  th a t  em ployees may p ic k e t  i n  pro­
t e s t  o f  s o - c a l l e d  sw eat shop c o n d it io n s  a s ,  fo r  exam ple, i n  th e  garment 
in d u s tr y . The e s s e n t i a l  q u e s t io n  o f  law  as to  w hether th e  p ic k e t in g  i s  
p r o h ib ite d  o r  p r o te c te d  under S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  depends on th e  o b j e c t  or  
th e  purpose o f  th e  p ic k e t in g :  i . e . ,  ( 1 )  i f  th e  o b je c t  or  th e  purpose o f  
th e  p ic k e t in g  i s  p r o sc r ib e d  by th e  term s o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) .  th e  p ic k e t ­
in g  may be e n jo in ed  a s  an u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e ;  however, (2 )  i f  th e  
o b j e c t  i s  n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o sc r ib e d  by S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) ,  th e  p ic k e t in g  
may esca p e  th e  u n fa ir  la b e l  even though th e  a c tu a l  r e s u l t  may be th e  
same in  b oth  c a s e s . The f i n a l  r e s u l t  under S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  depends upon 
th e  c o u r t 's  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  o b j e c t  and th e  c o n d it io n s  under w hich  
th e  p ic k e t in g  took  p la c e . I t  i s  q u ite  p o s s ib le ,  th e r e fo r e , fo r  p ick etin g
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under one s e t  o f  c o n d it io n s  to  be an u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  and under a  
d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  c ircu m sta n ces  to  be a l e g i t im a t e  e x e r c is e  o f  f r e e  
sp e ec h *
S u b sec tio n  (A) o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  r e f l e c t s  th e  d e s ir e  o f  
C ongress to  p rev en t p ic k e t in g  by a r iv a l  un ion  where th e  em ployer I s  
v a lr ea d y  l e g i t im a t e l y  b a rg a in in g  w ith  a u n ion  p r e v io u s ly  d e s ig n a te d  to  
r e p r e se n t  h i s  em ployees* T h is  s e c t io n  i s  d e s ig n e d  t o  curb p ic k e t in g  
f a l l i n g  under th e  NLRB c o n tr a c t  bar r u le ,  i . e . ,  th a t  a r iv a l  un ion  may 
n o t p ic k e t  an em ployer who h as s ig n e d  a c o n tr a c t  w ith  a n o th er  u n io n .
The c o n tr a c t  w i l l  a c t  a s  a bar a g a in s t  t h i s  form o f  p ic k e t in g .  The 
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  in t e r p r e t in g  S u b sec tio n  (A) e v o lv e s  from th e  problem  o f  
d e c id in g  what c o n s t i t u t e s  a c o n tr a c t;  e . g . ,  th e  p r o h ib it io n  o f  p ic k e t in g  
by a r i v a l  ( le g i t im a t e )  un ion  under S u b sec tio n  (A) s e r v e s  a s  an in d u c e ­
ment to  a n t iu n io n  em ployers to  s ig n  a sw eeth ea r t c o n tr a c t  w ith  a b a rg a in  
basem ent u n io n . In  r e c o g n it io n  o f  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  th e  NLRB has h e ld ^  
i n  fo rm u la tin g  i t s  c o n tr a c t  bar r u le , t h a t  a c o n tr a c t  fo r  p u rp oses o f  
r eo o g n iz in g  th e  u n ion  which co n ta in ed  . . a  n o - s t r ik e ,  n o - lo c k o u t  
c la u s e , and In su ra n ce  and p en sio n  p la n s  . . . 1,7 i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  rea so n  
f o r  in v o k in g  th e  c o n tr a c t  a s  a b a r  to  p e a c e fu l p e r su a s io n . The a c t s  o f  
r e c o g n it io n  which would m eet th e  t e s t  o f  S u b sec tio n  (A) are th e  s ig n in g  
o f  a c o n tr a c t  and c e r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  un ion  by th e  NLRB. 
C e r t i f i c a t io n  by th e  NLRB bans r e o o g n it io n a l p ic k e t in g  by a r iv a l  un ion
695 NLRB 1508 (1 9 5 0 -
7Ib ld . ,  p. 1510.
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f o r  on© y e a r  and s ig n in g  o f  a l e g i t im a t e  c o n tr a c t  bans r e o o g n it io n a l  
p ic k e t in g  f o r  two years*
S u b sec tio n  (B) o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  i s  in ten d e d  to  r e s t r i c t  
p ic k e t in g  i n  th o se  in s t a n c e s  where th e  em ployees in  q u e s tio n  have  
r e j e c t e d  th e  union in  a r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t i o n .  A fte r  th e  l o s s  o f  a 
r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t io n  th e  u n ion  a s  w e l l  a s  r iv a l  u n ion s a re  p r o h ib ite d  
from p ic k e t in g  th e  em ployer1s  p la c e  o f  b u s in e s s  fo r  a p e r io d  o f  one 
y e a r . The eoonondc e f f e c t s  o f  t h i s  p r o v is io n , which w ere b i t t e r l y  con­
t e s t e d  in  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h e a r in g s  on th e  LMRDA, p la c e d  a d ir e c t  l i m i t a ­
t io n  on th e  r ig h t  o f  s e l f - o r g a n iz a t io n  by encouraging  em ployers to  adopt 
an a n t iu n io n  a t t i t u d e ,  and a c t s  a s  a d e tr im en t to  th e  advance o f  in d u s­
t r i a l  dem ocracy by r e s t r i c t in g  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  b a rg a in in g .
The argument by S enator  M cC lellan  and o th e r  sp o n so rs  o f  th e  B i l l
was th a t  S u b sec tio n  (B) fr e e d  th e  em ployer and h i s  em ployees from th e
n u isa n ce  o f  r e o o g n it io n a l p ic k e t in g  a f t e r  th e  l o s s  o f  a r e p r e s e n ta t io n  
e l e c t io n .  The in t e r f e r e n c e  o f  p ic k e t in g , accord in g  to  S en ator  M cC lellan , 
i s  an e x p e n s iv e  l i a b i l i t y  to  th e  em ployer and r e p r e se n ts  an attem p t to  
co erce  th e  em ployees in t o  a c c e p tin g  a union which th e y  do n o t w ant.
The e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  p r o v is io n , however, g o es  c o n s id e ra b ly  fa r th e r
th an  th e  e lim in a t io n  o f  an e x p e n s iv e  and burdensome n u isa n ce ; i . e . ,  i t
p r o h ib it s  th e  union from e x e r c is in g  an e s t a b lis h e d  r ig h t  o f  p e a c e fu l  
p r o t e s t  th u s  weakening th e  in t e r n a l  s e c u r ity  o f  un ion ism , and i t  g iv e s  
th e  en^ployer a f r e e  hand in  c o n t r o l l in g  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  h i s  em ployees. 
Furtherm ore, t h i s  b a r r ie r  o f  la w fu l p r o te c t io n  i m p l i c i t l y  assum es th a t  
th e  em ployer i s  in  a b e t t e r  p o s i t io n  to  manage th e  p r o t e s t  o f  h i s
employees a g a in s t  a r b i t r a r y  p r a c t ic e s  I n  re s p e c t  to  d i s c ip l in a r y  a c t io n s ,  
t r a n s f e r s ,  la y o f f s ,  s a n io r l ty  r ig h ts ,  h e a l th  p lan a , pension  agreem ents, 
e tc .  th an  a union which would seek  to  p r o te c t  th e  employees f ro a  adm ln i- 
s t  r a t i  r e  I n te r p r e ta t io n s  which nay r e s u l t  i n  in a p p ro p r ia te  pun ishnen t 
and even d lM is s a l .  I t  I s  a well-known f a c t  t h a t  one o u t o f  every th re e  
case s  to  reach  th e  te rm in a l s te p  o f  th e  g riev an ce  p ro c e d u re -- ! , e . , 
v o lu n ta ry  a r b i t r a t i o n —in v o lv e s  employee d is c ip l in e  o r d isc h a rg e . The 
e s ta b l is h e d  f a c t  o f  I n d u s t r ia l  r e l a t io n s  a s  evidenced by c o l le c t iv e  b a r­
ga in ing  c o n tra c ts ,  th e  development o f  g rievance  procedures, and th e  
p ro cess  o f  I n d u s t r ia l  a r b i t r a t i o n  I s  t h a t  employers cannot be expected  
to  s u c c e s s fu lly  manage th e  p r o te s t  o f  t h e i r  M ployees. The e s s e n t ia l  
q u e s tio n , th e re fo re , i s  w hether th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  system  (on th e  f e d e ra l  
and s t a t e  l e v e l )  w i l l  d ev ise  law s which w i l l  p e rm it a dem ocratic  so lu ­
t io n  to  th e se  problem s, o r  w hether th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  b o d ies  w i l l  con tinue  
to  e r e c t  le g a l  b a r r i e r s  which w i l l  p re se rv e  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  M p lo y ers  to  
evolve s o lu t io n s  which a re  fo rm ula ted  under th e  g u ise  o f  p e rso n a l 
democracy.
Under S ubsec tions (A) and (8) th e  employer i s  p ro te c te d  from 
re o o g n itio n a l p ic k e tin g  in  th e  fo llow ing  s i tu a t io n s t  (1) where the  
employer s ig n s  a c o n tra c t  w ith  a c e r t i f i e d  union, (2) where a union w ins 
a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e le c t io n , and (3 ) where th e  employees r e j e c t  a union In  
a  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e le c t io n . Although th e  l im i ta t io n  o f  th e  NLRB1s con­
t r a c t  b a r  r u le  nay d isco u rag e  em ployers from n e g o tia tin g  so -c a l le d  sw eet­
h e a r t  c o n tra c ts ,  th e  lo s s  o f a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e le c t io n  has been and w i l l  
con tinue  to  be an e f f e c t iv e  union b u s tin g  dev ice . Even in  th e  case  o f  a
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fr a u d u le n t e l e c t io n  a le g i t im a t e  u n ion  may f i l e  an u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  
co m p la in t, b u t th e  en su in g  l i t i g a t i o n  may b e  drawn o u t from one to  th r e e  
y e a r s .
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PICKETING RESTRICTIONS
The d isagreem en t in  C ongress o v er  th e  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  Su bsec­
t io n  (B) has c a r r ie d  o v e r  t o  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  NLRB and th e  c o u r ts .  
W hile th e  m a jo r ity  r e p o r t  on th e  B i l l  a s  approved by C ongress seemed to  
con clu d e th a t  th e  s u b s e c t io n  banned a l l  p ic k e t in g  by an u n c e r t i f ie d  
union fo r  tw e lv e  months a f t e r  th e  l o s s  o f  a r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t io n ,  th e  
l i t i g a t i o n  o f  t h i s  s u b s e c t io n  has produced v a r ie d  r e s u l t s .  I n  t e s t  
c a se s  rev iew ed  by th e  NLRB. Bachman F u rn itu re  Company.** B lin n e  C onstruc­
t io n  C o . , 9 and Crown C a f e t e r i a . t h e  Board h as h e ld  th a t  p ic k e t in g  w hich  
i s  p u r e ly  in fo r m a tio n a l in  c h a r a c ter  does n o t f a l l  w ith in  th e  r e s t r i c ­
t io n s  o f  S u b sec tio n  ( B ) .  I n  th e  d ic ta  o f  th e  B lin n e  c a se  th e  NLRB 
rev iew ed  th e  in t e n t  o f  Congress in  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  h o ld in g  th a t  w h ile  
Congress c l e a r ly  in ten d ed  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a v ig o r o u s  oode govern in g  o r g a n i­
s a t io n a l  o r  r e o o g n it io n a l p ic k e t in g  i t  a l s o  sought to  p r o te c t  le g i t im a t e  
p ic k e t in g  from u n reason ab le  i n t e r f e r e n c e .^  " I n  o th e r  words . . . / t h e  
Board contended  th a t7  • • . th e  th r u s t  o f  a l l  th e  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )
h j k  NLRB 670 (1 9 6 1 ) .
91 3 5  NLRB 1153  (1 9 6 2 ) .
1 0 1 3 5  NLRB 1183  ( 1 9 6 2 ) .
^ F o r  e x a m p le , s e e  t h e  NLRB1 s  a t t e m p t  t o  r e g u l a t e  p i c k e t i n g  b y  a  
m i n o r i t y  u n io n  u n d e r  t h e  C u r t i s  D o c t r in e .
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" p ro v is io n s  I s  o n ly  upon p ic k e t in g  fo r  sn  o b je c t  o f  r e c o g n it io n  o r  
o r g a n iz a t io n , and n o t  upon p ic k e t in g  f o r  o th er  o b j e c t s .
The attem p t by th e  NLRB and th e  c o u r ts  to  d is t in g u is h  betw een  
th e  im m ediate and u lt im a te  o b je c t  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  o r  to  d is c o v e r  th e  
tr u e  purpose o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  has le d  to  a s e r i e s  o f  c a se s  which may be 
r e fe r r e d  to  a s  exam ples o f  " p r o te s t  p ic k e t in g ."  In  each o f  th e s e  c a se s  
th e  u n io n 's  co u n se l has m ain ta ined  th a t  th e  purpose o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  was 
In  p r o te s t  o f  some p r a c t ic e  u n fa ir  to  th e  union and n o t fo r  one o f  th e
p r e sc r ib e d  o b j e c t s .  The a n a ly s is  o f  p ic k e t in g  in  terras o f  p r o te s t  may
b e s e p a r a te d .in to  th r e e  c a te g o r ie s :  (1 )  p r o te s t  a g a in s t  em ployer u n fa ir  
la b o r  p r a c t ic e ,  (2 )  p r o te s t  a g a in s t  d isch a rg e  o f  econom ic s t r ik e r s ,  and
(3 ) p r o te s t  a g a in s t  substandard wages or  working o o n d it io n s .
Though th e r e  was an attem p t in  th e  Senate d eb ate  over  S e c t io n  8 
( b ) ( 7 )  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a d e fe n se  a g a in s t  a S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  com plaint where 
th e  em ployer was engaging in  o r  had com m itted an u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e ,  
th e  exem ptions under S e c tio n  1 0 ( 1 )  do n o t p ro v id e  fo r  t h i s  form o f
e x c e p t io n . However, t h i s  does not p rev en t a union from p r o te s t in g  an
u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  by p ic k e t in g . The t e s t  a s  to  w hether th e  p ic k e t ,  
in g  i s  i n  v io la t io n  o f  S e c tio n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  depends on th e  m otive behind th e  
p ic k e t in g . I f  th e  u n io n 's  tr u e  m otive, a s  determ ined by th e  w eig h t o f  
th e  evidence* i s  to  p r o te s t  a v io la t io n  o f  th e  law  by th e  em ployer, th e  
p ic k e t in g  nay escap e  th e  r e s t r i c t io n s  o f  S e c tio n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) *  On th e  o th er  
hand, i f  th e  tr u e  m otive o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  i s  o r g a n iz a t io n a l in  n a tu re .
12135 NLRB 1159-
15*
p ic k e t in g  i n  p r o t e s t  o f  an u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  w i l l  n o t  a c t  a s  a 
d e fe n s e . In  th e  two c a s e s  on t h i s  p o in t  th e  Board has s p l i t  i t s  d e c i ­
s io n s  h o ld in g  i n  B ahia Motor H o te l1 ^ th a t  p ic k e t in g  i n  p r o t e s t  o f  an  
u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  w as a su b ter fu g e  to  p r o te c t  th e  u n io n 's  r e a l  
m otive— t o  o r g a n iz e  th e  em ployer w hich i s  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  S e c t io n  6 ( b )  
( 7 ) •  By c o n tr a s t ,  in  th e  Bachman F u rn itu re  Company c a se 1 **' th e  Board 
adop ted  th e  T r ia l  E xam iner's r u lin g  th a t  th e  p ic k e t in g  in  p r o t e s t  o f  an  
u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  d id  n o t have an "immediate" r e o o g n it io n a l m otive  
and th e r e fo r e  was a  le g i t im a t e  e x e r c is e  o f  u n ion  r ig h t s  under th e  la w .
I n  th e  Bahia c a se  th e  u n ion  had engaged in  p r e - e le c t io n  p ic k e t ­
in g  f o r  th e  o b j e c t  o f  o r g a n iz in g  th e  em p lo y er 's  em p loyees. A fte r  th e  
l o s s  o f  th e  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t i o n  th e  u n ion  co n tin u ed  to  p ic k e t  th e  
em ployer fo r  a p e r io d  o f  f i f t e e n  days b e fo r e  any change was made i n  th e  
le g e n d  on th e  p ic k e t  s ig n s .  T h e r e a fte r , th e  p ic k e t s  c a r r ie d  s ig n s  
rea d in g ;
WE PROTEST MULTIPLE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF BAHIA.
LOCAL JOINT EXECUTIVE BOARD LOCALS h 0 2 -5 0 0 .
On th e  r e v e r se  s id e ,  th e  new s ig n s  s ta te d ;
IN THE LAST 3 TEARS BAHIA HAS;
1 . FORMED A FRAUDULENT LABOR UNION;
2 . SPIED ON ITS EMPLOYEES;
3* DISCRIMINATED AGAINST UNION MEMBERS-15
13132 NLRB 737 (1 9 6 1 ) .
l i f 13*  NLRB 670 .
15132 NLRB 7h0.
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The o o u n se l f o r  th e  u n io n  m a in ta in ed  t h a t  th e  change i n  th e  
le g e n d  o f  th e  p ic k e t  s ig n s  and th e  su b m iss io n  o f  w r i t t e n  n o t ic e  to  t h e  
em ployer d is c la im in g  any in t e n t  to  r e p r e se n t  h i s  em p loyees w as s u f f i ­
c ie n t  e v id e n c e  th a t  th e  u n ion  was s o l e l y  p r o t e s t in g  th e  con d u ct o f  th e  
em p loyer . The Board r e fu s e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h i s  c o n te n t io n  h o ld in g  th a t :
The f a c t  t h a t  th e  a s s e r t e d  o b j e c t  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  a f t e r  December 
15 r e la t e d  t o  such an o b s o le t e  m a tter  a s  th e  rem ed ied  u n f a ir  la b o r  
p r a c t ic e *  c o n v in c e s  u s t h a t  th e  u n ion  ch o se  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  o f  con­
cea lm en t and th a t  th e  tr u e  o b j e c t  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  a s  b e fo r e  
December 15* i 9 6 0 . was t o  f o r c e  Evans / t h e  em hloyej*/ to  r e o o g n iz e  
o r  b a r g a in  w ith  th e  u n io n  . . . i t  . . . /w a s /  • • • a p p aren t . *. . 
/ t h a t  th e  u n ion  had l i t t l e  to  g a in /  ■ . . sh o r t  o f  r e c o g n i t io n .16
I n  th e  Bachman c a se  th e  T r ia l  Exam iner f i l e d  a p r e lim in a r y  
r e p o r t  h o ld in g  th a t  p ic k e t in g  by th e  u n io n  was n o t i n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  S ec­
t io n  3 ( b ) ( 7 ) *  T h is  r e p o r t  was a p p ea led  to  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  D i s t r i c t  
Court* and th e  Court s e t  a s id e  th e  T r ia l  E xam in er's r u l in g  h o ld in g  t h a t  
th e  p ic k e t in g *  r e g a r d le s s  o f  i t s  a l l e g e d  in t e n t io n s ,  was r e o o g n it io n a l  
in  n a tu re  and i n  v io l a t i o n  o f  th e  la w . T h e r e a fte r , th e  Board rev iew ed  
th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  d e c i s io n s  o f  th e  D i s t r i c t  Court and th e  T r ia l  Exam iner, 
and ad op ted  th e  o p in io n  o f  th e  T r ia l  E xam iner.1 ?
A ccord in g to  th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  c a se  a s  p r e se n te d  i n  th e  p ro ceed ­
in g s  b e fo r e  th e  D i s t r i c t  Court on March 24* I9 6 0 , th e  u n ion  p r e se n te d  a 
form al r e q u e s t  to  th e  em ployer t o  r e p r e s e n t  h i s  em ployees f o r  p u rp o ses  
o f  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a in in g . The em ployer ag reed  to  a c o n sen t e le c t io n *
l 6I b id . . p . 741 .
17'The Board d id  n o t i s s u e  a se p a r a te  o p in io n .
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w hich proved  in c o n c lu s iv e ,!®  and th e  un ion  o b je c te d  to  th e  r e s u l t s  on  
th e  b a s i s  o f  an u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  ch arge. . The u n ion  a l le g e d  th a t  
betw een th e  s ig n in g  o f  th e  co n sen t agreem ent on A p r il 8 and th e  e l e c t i o n  
o f  A p r il 15  th e  em ployer had " in terview ed "  h i s  em ployees " . . .  prom is­
in g  . . .  a  3 0 - c e n t  p er  hour in c r e a s e ,  i f  th ey  v o te d  a g a in s t  th e  
u n io n ."19
The R eg ion a l D ir e c to r  r e fu se d  to  a c c e p t th e  u n io n 's  com pla in t  
b ecau se  th e  " . . .  m iscondu ct w ith  one e x c e p tio n  o ccu rred  b e fo r e  A p r il  
8 . . . . The e x c e p t io n  i n  q u e s t io n  c o n s is t e d  o f  an unsworn sta tem en t by 
an em ployee to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  he had a 'd i s c u s s io n 1 . • . _/with one o f  
th e  e m p lo y e r ^  * • • ’ sometime around A p r il 8 . ' " 20 The R egion al D irec ­
to r  a l s o  ordered  th a t  two o f  th e  th r e e  d isp u te d  b a l l o t s  be opened, and  
th e  f i n a l  t a l l y  was th r e e  v o te s  fo r  th e  u n ion  and fo u r  a g a in s t .
A pproxim ately  one month a f t e r  th e  is su a n c e  o f  th e  rep o r t d i s ­
m iss in g  th e  u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  charge, th e  un ion  began p ic k e t in g  th e  
em p lo y er 's  p rem ises  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e .
The p ic k e t  s ig n  read  on one s id e t
BACHMAN ADMITS UNFAIR 
LABOR PRACTICES
and on th e  o th e r :
i a The proposed  b a rg a in in g  u n i t  c o n s is t e d  o f  seven  em p loyees; two 
v o te d  f o r  th e  u n ion , th r e e  a g a in s t ,  and th r e e  b a l l o t s  w ere c h a lle n g e d .
19 1 3 ^  NLRB 6 ? 5 .
2^ Ib ld . The unsworn sta tem en t was co n sid ered  to  be too  i n d e f i ­




The union* a b u s in e ss  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  t h i s  was th a  aeoond 
occasio n  on which th ia  employer had engaged i n  q u e s tio n a b le  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
and th e  union* s  purpose in  p io k e tin g  was " . . .  to  ach iev e  1 th e  s a t i s ­
fac tion*  in  a  1lab o r-o o n ec lo u a  community,' o f  ' l e t t i n g  peop le  know* 
about Bachman's a c t i v i t i e s ,  even though ' i t  w o u ld n 't f u r th e r  th e  L o c a l 's  
end to  do s o . '
The d i f f i c u l t y  o f app ly ing  S ubsection  (B) to  th e  f a c t  s i tu a t io n  
in  t h i s  case  i s  evidenced  by th e  c o n f l ic t in g  o p in io n s o f  th e  T r ia l  
Examiner and th e  D i s t r i c t  C ourt. I n  a n a ly s in g  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  th e  p ic k ­
e tin g , th e  Court p laced  c o n s id e ra b le  emphasis on th e  sequence o f  e v en ts  
as a guide f o r  de te rm in ing  th e  reaso n ab le  o b je c tiv e  o f  th e  un ion . In  
concluding  th a t  re c o g n itio n  was th e  immediate as w ell a s  th e  u l t im a te  
o b je c tiv e , th e  C ourt s a id  th a t :
The evidence i s  overwhelm ingly c le a r  t h a t  re c o g n itio n  was th e  
Union* s o b je c tiv e  . . . / a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  consen t p e t i t io n  and 
a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  e l e c t i o n / '  . . .  I t  a ls o  appears  t h a t  . . . / t h e  
un ion  a s  l a t e  a s  June 7 * was in te r e s te d  i n  re c o g n itio n  a s  w it­
n e s s e d  • • . by . . . / t h e /  . • • sign ing  . . . / o f 7  . . . th e  
R evised T a lly  o f  B a llo ts .  We a re  s a t i s f i e d  . . . t h a t  th e  rec o g n i­
t io n  demand d id  no t go in to  o r b i t  i n  th e  cosmos b u t rem ained on a 
very  down to  e a r th  p lan e , and employees, employer and th e  union 
. . . f i k a t f  J v J *  can form no o th e r  co n c lu sio n  from th e  t o t a l i t y  o f  
th e  Union’ s a c t s  w ith in  th e  re le v a n t p e rio d  . . . b u t t h a t  . . .
^ I b i d . ,  pp. 6 7 5 -676 .
22I b ld . . p . 6?6.
2^The u n ion  conmenced th e  p ic k e t in g  on June 2 8 .
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/ t h e  u n io n 7  • • • has had fo r  an o b j e c t iv e  and i t s  p r in c ip a l  o b je c ­
t i v e  th e  r e c o g n it io n  o f  th e  U nion .™
I n  r e j e c t in g  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  th e  Court, th e  T r ia l  Examiner 
r e fu se d  to  a c c e p t  th e  p o s i t io n  t h a t  t h e  f a c t s  o f  th e  Bachman c a se  a r e  
govern ed  by th e  C u r tis  D o c tr in e  a s  su p p orted  by S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) *  I n  th e  
C u rtis  c a se  th e  Board h e ld  th a t  p o s t  e l e c t i o n  p ic k e t in g  by th e  un ion  was 
a v io la t io n  o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A )  o f  th e  LMRA, but th e  f a c t s  o f  t h i s  
c a se  a re  s u b s t a n t ia l ly  d i f f e r e n t  from th o se  o f  th e  p r e se n t  d is p u te . I n  
th e  C u rtis  c a se  th e  em ployer o r i g i n a l l y  sought a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t io n  
and th e  p ic k e t in g  p r io r  to  and a f t e r  th e  e l e c t io n  was a d m itte d ly  o r g a n i­
z a t io n a l  in  n a tu r e . "The un ion  . . . th e r e fo r e  . . . had • . . mani­
f e s t e d  a p r e - e x i s t in g  d i s p o s i t i o n  to  r e s o r t  to  th a t  eco n o m ica lly  
o o e r d v e  d e v ic e  . . . ^ p ic k e t in g /  • • . i n  o rd er  to  fo r c e  r e c o g n it io n . ^  
The f i n a l  d e c is io n  in  th a t  c a se  tu rn ed  on a q u e s t io n  o f  l e g a l  f a c t :  th e  
m o tiv e  beh ind  th e  p ic k e t in g  was n o t  a p o in t  o f  d is p u te .  I n  th e  Bachman 
ca se  th e r e  was no e v id e n c e  o f  econom ic p r e ssu r e  b e fo r e  th e  e le c t io n ;  and 
th e  u n io n , a s  a fu r th e r  te s tim o n y  o f  good f a i t h  and w i l l in g n e s s  to  
subm it to  a c c e p te d  p roced u re, i n i t i a t e d  th e  co n sen t p e t i t i o n .  They d id  
n o t ch oose  to  p r o t e s t  th e  a c t io n s  o f  th e  em ployer u n t i l  t h i r t y  days  
a f t e r  th e  d a te  o f  th e  e l e c t i o n .  I f  r e c o g n it io n  was th e  "real"  m otive  
b ehind  th e  p ic k e t in g ,  i t  w ould have been more p r a c t ic a l  fo r  th e  u n ion  to  
p ic k e t :
21*188 F. 3upp. 18h , 189 -190  ( i 9 6 0 ) .  
NLRB 670 , 679.
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. . . th e  o th e r  firm  a t  which th e  Union had re c e n tly  l o s t  an e le c ­
t io n  . . . /E han to  p ic k e t  Bachman/. Tk* f a c t  th a t  th e  Union was 
U n i t in g  th e  expense o f  p ic k e tin g  to  t h i s  employer would tend  to  
len d  evidence to  i t s  a s s e r t io n  th a t  i t  was saving i t s  f i r e  f o r  th e  
eap lo y er a g a in s t  whon i t  f e l t  th e  g re a te r  resentm ent.
T h erefore , i f  i t  I s  a sso n ed  by exam ination  o f  th e  ev id en ce  th a t  th e  
Immediate o b j e c t iv e  was n o t r e o o g n it io n a l i n  n a tu re , th e  im portant i s s u e  
i s  w hether an u lt im a te  g o a l o f  r e c o g n it io n  p ic k e t in g  i s  banned by 
S e c tio n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  during th e  one y e a r  p e r io d . I f  t h i s  q u e s t io n  i s  
1 • • • answ ered in  th e  a f f ir m a t iv e , th e  r e s u l t ,  f o r  a l l  p r a c t ic a l  pur­
p o s e s . would be to  ban a l l  p ic k e t in g , even  o f  a p u re ly  in fo rm a tio n a l
27c h a r a c ter , during th e  one y ea r  p er io d  . . ."
PICKETING FOR A NON RE OOGNITIONAL MOTIVE
I t  d o es  n o t appear from a read in g  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h is to r y  
th a t  Congress in ten d ed  to  ban a l l  form s o f  p ic k e t in g  during th e  tw e lv e  
month p er iod  a s  d e fin ed  b y  S u b sectio n  (A) and S u b seetio n  (B) .  In  a 
com parison o f  th e  m a jo r ity  and m in o r ity  v iew s on t h i s  p o in t , Senator  
Kennedy s ta te d  in  th e  rep o r t o f  th e  B i l l  b e fo r e  th e  Senate th a t  "Para­
graphs (A) and (B) . . . p r o h ib it  p ic k e t in g  fo r  union  o r g a n isa t io n  o r  
r e c o g n it io n . . . .  I n  both c a s e s  th e  p r o h ib it io n s  r e la t e  o n ly  to  
p ic k e t in g  in  an e f f o r t  to  o r g a n ise  em ployees o r  secu re  r e c o g n it io n  
i n  a b a rga in in g  u n it  covered  by th e  e x i s t in g  c o n tr a c t or  th e  p r io r
26I b id . .  p . 681. 
2 7I b id . . p . 682 .
i6o
V l e c t i o n . j2 ® I n  u rg in g  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  th e  co n feren ce  r e p o r t  o f  th e  
J o in t  House and S en a te  Oommittee. S en ator  G oldw ater s a id t
I n  th e  f i e l d  o f  r e c o g n it io n  and o r g a n is a t io n a l  p io k e t in g  th e  
S en ate  B i l l  p r o h ib ite d  p ic k e t in g  f o r  t h e s e  p u rp oses f o r  9  months 
a f t e r  an e l e c t i o n  o r  when a n o th er  u n ion  had been  c e r t i f i e d  o r  la w -  
f u l l y  r e a e g n ise d . T h is  was a l l -  The L an d ru n -G rlffin  b i l l  w ent 
fu r th e r — i t  r e s t r i c t e d  p io k e t in g  u n le s s  th e  u n ion  co u ld  show a 30  
p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t  among th e  em ployees and th en  a llo w ed  i t  /r e o o g n i­
t i o n a l  p ic k e t lq g 7  o n ly  f o r  a r ea so n a b le  p er io d  o f  t i n e ,  n o t  
e x ce e d in g  30 d ays- The c o n fe r e e s  ad op ted  th e  su b sta n ce  o f  th e  House 
p r e v is io n s  e x ce p t f o r  th e  30  p e r ce n t showing o f  I n t e r e s t  r e q u ir e ­
m e n t s .^
W hile th e  c o n fe r e e s  w ere in  agreem ent on th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  law  a s  
a p p lie d  to  o r g a n is a t io n a l and r e o o g n it io n a l  p ic k e t in g  th e r e  was some 
c o n fu sio n  o v er  th e  r ig h t  o f  th e  un ion  to  engage in  " p r o te s t  p ic k e tin g "  
d u rin g th e  tw e lv e  month p e r io d . In  r e f e r r in g  to  t h i s  problem  S en ator  
G oldw ater sa id t
The im pact o f  t h i s  charge . . .  in  la b o r  law  i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  s e r io u s  
in  v iew  o f  th e  f a c t  th a t  such p ic k e t in g  i s  p r o h ib ite d  i f  an o b j e c t  
i s  r e c o g n it io n  o r  o r g a n is a t io n . Few I n s ta n c e s  o f  p ic k e t in g  w i l l  be  
found where a t  l e a s t  a rem ote o b j e c t iv e  o f  th e  un ion  cannot b e  found  
to  b e  r e la t e d  to  r e c o g n it io n -  The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  d ep artu re  from  
e x i s t in g  la b o r  p olicy -50 oou ld  w e l l  b e  u p s e t t in g  t o  th e  b a la n ce  
b etw een  th e  r ig h t s  o f  em ployees and u n io n s  and th e  r ig h t s  o f  
em p loyers. I n  a d d it io n  i n  th e  a b sen ce  o f  c le a r  l e g i s l a t i v e  h is t o r y  
to  show th a t  a co n tra ry  in t e n t io n ,  t h i s  p r o v is io n  m ight make i t  an  
u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  to  p ic k e t  a g a in s t  an em p lo y er 's  u n fa ir  la b o r  
p r a c t ic e  i n  many in s t a n c e s ,  s in c e  fr e q u e n t ly  i t  may b e  found th a t  
o r g a n is a t io n  i s  a ls o  an o b j e c t .
^ L e g i s l a t i v e  H i s to r y  o f  t h e  LMRDA ( 1 9 5 9 ) . p .  1433-
2% b id - . p . 1^37* The f i n a l  v e r s io n  o f  th e  B i l l  a s  approved by 
th e  J o in t  Committee banned o r g a n is a t io n a l  and r e o o g n it io n a l p ic k e t in g  
fo r  a p e r io d  o f  tw e lv e  months.
^ E x is t in g  p o l i c y  p r io r  to  1959 w ould have p erm itted  p e a c e fu l  
p ic k e t in g  in  p r o t e s t  o f  a c o n d it io n  h e ld  to  be u n fa ir .
^ L e g i s l a t i v e  H i s to r y  o f  t h e  LMRDA ( 1 9 5 9 ) . p .  1 3 ^ 1 .
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The f a i lu r e  o f  th e  conference  B i l l  to  p rov ide  any d i r e c t  e ta te n e n t  on
th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  p io k e tin g  o th e r  than fo r  a  re o o g n itio n a l m otive caused
S en a to r Morse to  s t a t e *
The House co n fe ree s  in s i s t e d  t h a t  a p ic k e t  l i n e  p ro te s t in g  u n f a i r  
la b o r  p r a c t ic e s  would n o t be i n  v io la t io n  o f  th e  a n t ip ic k e t in g  p ro ­
v is io n s  o f  t h e i r  b i l l .  But why d id  th ey  re fu s e  to  say so in  t h e i r  
b i l l ?  Eveiyone knows th a t  p r o te s t  p io k e tin g  when th e  union  has n o t 
ga ined  re c o g n itio n  o e n ta in s  a t  l e a s t  a s u b s ta n t ia l  m otive o f  
prom oting o rg a n iz a tio n .™
In  conclu sion  to  th e se  s ta tem en ts  on w hether S ubsec tions (A) and
(B) banned a l l  forms o f  p ic k e tin g  during  th e  p e rio d  in  q u e s tio n , th e
T r ia l  Examiner in  th e  Bachman case  s ta te d i
Why, in  p i t t i n g  a ban on p o s t e le c t io n  (and " c o n tra c t  bar" p e rio d )  
p ic k e tin g , d id  Congress e x p re ss ly  q u a lify  i t  in  th e  manner i t  d id . 
i f  i t  though t t h a t  a l l  p io k e tin g  du ring  such p e rio d s  was f o r  an 
o b je c t  a s  s ta te d  i n  th e  q u a l i f ic a t io n ?  The f a i r  conclu sion  then 
would be th a t  Congress in  e n a c tin g  th e  p ro h ib it io n  o f  8 (b )(7 )  was 
n o t ooncerned w ith  r e s id u a l  o r  long range goal in h e re n t  i n  even 
p r o te s t  p io k e tin g , b u t in ten d ed  to  reach  p ic k e tin g  du ring  such 
p e rio d s , which had re c o g n itio n  a s  a "reasonab ly  iJsaed ia te  g o a l. "33
In  adop ting  th e  op in ion  o f th e  T r ia l  Examiner In  th e  Bachman case  th e  
Board took th e  p o s i t io n  th a t  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  "n o n reco g n itio n a l"  p ic k e t­
in g  du ring  th e  p e rio d  in  q u e s tio n  would depend on th e  m otive o f  th e  
union, th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  proceeding , and o th e r  c ircum stances which 
would e i t h e r  prove o r  d isp ro v e  th e  d e n ia l  by th e  union th a t  i t  was 
p ic k e tin g  in  mere p r o te s t .
As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  and s im ila r  d e c is io n s , unions have been 
fo rced  to  devote c a re fu l  a t t e n t io n  to  w r i t te n  a s  w ell a s  v e rb a l
32I b id . , p. 1429. 
33x34 NLRB 670, 684.
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com m unications which may be co n s id ered  a s  ev id e n c e  th a t  th e  u n io n 1s  tr u e  
m otive was r e o o g n it io n a l and i n  v io l a t i o n  o f  th e  la w . The u lt im a te  
e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s  nay be to  o v e r lo o k  th e  im p ortan t i s s u e s  i n  fa v o r  
o f  some l e g a l  p h ra seo lo g y  w hich w i l l  perm it th e  union t o  c o n tin u e  i t s  
p r o t e s t  w ith o u t in t e r r u p t io n .
A. seoond form o f  p ic k e t in g  w hich r e c e iv e d  c o n s id e r a b le  a t t e n t io n  
both  d u rin g  th e  d eb a tes  o v e r  th e  B i l l  i n  C ongress and more r e c e n t ly  
b e fo r e  th e  Board and th e  c o u r ts  i s  p ic k e t in g  i n  p r o t e s t  o f  substan dard  
o r  sw eat shop c o n d it io n s .  The q u e s t io n  o f  w hether a u n ion  may engage in  
p ic k e t in g  i n  p r o t e s t  o f  substan dard  w ages and working c o n d it io n s  was 
r e fe r r e d  to  by S en ator  Kennedy in  th e  co n feren ce  rep o r t on th e  B i l l  
b e fo r e  th e  U nited  3 t a t e s  S en a te .
Under th e  L andrum -Q riffin  B i l l  £ In i t s  o r ig in a l  Torn/ I t  would  
have been im p o ss ib le  f o r  a un ion  to  th e  custom ers o f  a secondary  
em ployer th a t  th a t  em ployer o r  s to r e  was s e l l i n g  goods w hich w ere  
made under r a c k e t  c o n d it io n s  o r  sw eat shop c o n d it io n s .  . . .  We 
w ere n o t a b le  to  persu ade th e  House c o n fe r e e s  to  perm it p ic k e t in g  in  
f r o n t  o f  a second ary shop, b u t we w ere a b le  to  persu ade them to  
a g r ee  th a t  th e  un ion  s h a l l  b e  fr e e  to  conduct in fo r m a tio n a l a c t i v i t y  
sh o r t  o f  p ic k e t in g  . . .  in  fr o n t  o f  a seaondary s i t e . - ’4
The dilemma b e fo r e  th e  NLRB and th e  c o u r ts  in  t h i s  regard  i s  w hether th e
union shou ld  b e  p erm itted  to  engage in  " in fo rm a tio n a l p ic k e tin g "  i n
fr o n t  o f  th e  prim ary s i t u s .  In  th e  d e c is io n s  d e a lin g  w ith  t h i s  form o f
p ic k e t in g , th e  Board has tak en  th e  g e n e r a l p o s i t io n  th a t  p ic k e t in g  a f t e r
l o s s  o f  a r e o o g n it io n a l e l e c t io n  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  im p ly  a
-̂ ^ L e g is la t iv e  H is to r y  o f  th e  LMRM (1 9 5 9 ) , p . 1432 .
re o o g n itio n a l o b j e c t i v e . 35 The f i n a l  d e te rm in a tio n  I n  re g a rd  to  th e  
l e g a l i t y  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  under S ubsec tion  (B) must depend upon th e  
f a c t s  and c ircum stances o f  eaoh case*
The ad o p tio n  o f  t h i s  l i n e  o f  reaso n in g  i s  e x h ib ite d  by th e  o p in ­
io n  o f  th e  Board i n  A lton  Myers B ro th e rs . 36 In  t h i s  case  th e  union  had 
p ic k e te d  th e  p rem ises o f  th e  prim ary  employer f o r  th e  purpose o f  o rg an is­
in g  th e  em ployer1s employees. A f te r  th e  l o s s  o f  th e  re o o g n itio n a l 
e le c t io n  th e  union con tinued  to  p ic k e t  th e  employer, a d v is in g :
. . . th e  Regional D ire c to r  / o f  th e  NLRB7 th a t  i t  was m a in ta in in g  
I t s  p ic k e t  l i n e  in  an e f f o r t  to  o rg an iz e  th e  Company1s  employees. 
A pproxim ately f iv e  months th e r e a f t e r ,  however, th e  Local abandoned 
I t s  e f f o r t s  to  o rg an iz e  th e  Company1s employees, and by I t s  
oon tinued  p ic k e tin g  a f t e r  t h a t  d a te  sought m erely to  e n l i s t  p u b lic  
suppo rt a g a in s t  th e  Company's non-union s ta n d a rd s .
During th e  p e rio d  o f  p r o te s t  p ic k e tin g , th e  union se n t ou t "a c i r c u la r  
l e t t e r  to  o th e r  unions" making re fe re n c e  to  th e  p r io r  o rg a n iz a tio n a l 
p ic k e tin g  and s ta t in g  th a t  th e  union had been unable to  o b ta in  a d v e r t i s ­
ing  space i n  th e  lo c a l  newspaper to  re p ly  to  a sta tem en t by th e  oorapany 
u rg ing  p u b lic  support o f  i t s  p o s i t io n .  The union oontinued  to  p ic k e t  
th e  employer du ring  th e  rem aining months o f  1959* and when th e  LMRDA 
amendments became e f f e c t iv e  on November 13. 1959► th e  company f i l e d  an 
u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  p e t i t io n  in  accordance w ith  th e  p ro v is io n s  a s  s e t
3-5S e e  Calumet C o n trac to rs  A ssn. , 133 NLRB 512 (1961) and Claude 
E v e re tt  C o n stru c tio n  PoT. 136 NLRB 321 (1962).
36136 NLRB 1270 (1962).
forth  in  Section  8 (b )(7 ) .
The p e r t in e n t  is s u e  in  t h i s  oase a s  s ta te d  by th e  Board ". . . 
i s  w hether th e  re sp o n d e n t's  p ic k e tin g  on and a f t e r  November 13* 1959* 
was f o r  th e  p ro sc rib e d  o b je c tiv e  o f  rec o g n itio n , ba rga in ing , o r  o rg a n i­
z a tio n . fo r  ab sen t such a f in d in g  th e re  i s  no b a s is  f o r  invoking th e  
p ro v is io n s  o f  S ec tio n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) ." 3® In  re je c t in g  th e  co n ten tio n  o f  th e  
General Counsel th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  p r io r  to  and a f t e r  June, 1959. was 
re o o g n itlo n a l in  c h a ra c te r  as w e ll a s  i n  f a c t ,  th e  Board h e ld  th a t  th e :
. . . c i r c u la r  l e t t e r  o f September 29 /w as not j  . . . s u b s ta n t ia l  
independent evidence . . • / t h a t  th e  p ic k e tin g /  * • .w a s  fo r  th e  
o b je c t o f  re c o g n itio n . . . bu t ra th e r  was s in g ly , a s  i t  pu rpo rted  
to  be* an appeal to  consumers no t to  p a tro n iz e  a company whose wages 
and o th e r  co n d itio n s  o f  employment were considered  to  be substandard  
f o r  th e  a re a .
Members Rogers and Leedom, d is se n tin g  from th e  m a jo rity  op in ion ,
o b jec te d  to  th e  In te r p r e ta t io n  th a t  th e  l e t t e r s  in  q u estio n  d id  no t
c o n s t i tu te  prlma f a d e  evidence o f a re o o g n itlo n a l m otive.
W h e th e rp re fa to ry  o r  n o t, th e  l e t t e r s  candid ly  adm it th a t  th e  Local 
. • • /w as in te r e s te d  in  o rg an iz in g  th e  employer7 . . .
The l e t t e r s  a ls o  complained about th e  "un fa irness"  o f  th e  
Company's "non-union s ta n d a rd s ."  . . .  In  con tex t o f  th e  L o c a l 's  
continuous p ic k e tin g  and i t s  o rg a n iz a tio n a l campaign . . . t h i s  
c h a ra c te r iz a t io n  o f  th e  Company's employment s tan d ard s a s  "u n fa ir"  
has th e  same fo rce  and e f f e c t  a s  p la d n g  the  Company1 s name on an 
"u n fa ir"  l i s t .  Such a c tio n  on th e  p a r t  o f  a union a t  th e  tim e i t  
i s  p ic k e tin g  an employer c o n s t i tu te s  an a ttem pt to  o b ta in  co n d itio n s  
and concessions which norm ally r e s u l t  from c o lle c t iv e  b a rg a in in g , 
and th u s  amounts to  a claim  fo r  re c o g n itio n .
3 s!  b i d . . p . 1272. 
39I b i d . . p . 1273- 
^ b i d . .  pp. 1274-1275-
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As c h a ra c te r iz e d  by th s  f a c t s  and o p in io n s  i n  t h i s  c ase , i t  i s  
q u i te  p o s s ib le  f o r  reaso n ab le  nen to  h a re  le g i t im a te  d if fe re n c e s  o v e r 
w hether th e  union has abandoned i t s  re o o g n itlo n a l m otives- W hile th e  
f a i l u r e  o f  th e  UfRDA to  s p e l l  o u t th e  c ircum stances under which t h i s  
form o f  p ic k e tin g  would be a le g i t im a te  e x e rc is e  o f  union r ig h ts  i s  
c e r ta in ly  d e p lo ra b le , c r i t ic i s m  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )  w i l l  n o t so lve  t h i s  
d i f f i c u l t  issue*  I t  i s  eq u a lly  u n fa i r  to  d ism iss  th e  im portance o f  th e  
r i g h t  to  p ic k e t  i n  p r o te s t  o f  substandard  c o n d itio n s  a s  a le g a l  te c h n i­
c a l i t y .  I f  th e  Board d e s i re s  to  d ev ise  a workable s o lu t io n  to  t h i s  
problem> i t  w i l l  be  n ecessa ry  to  e s ta b l is h  p r a c t i c a l  r u le s  which w i l l  
enab le  th e  l i t i g a n t s  to  re so lv e  th e  i s s u e .  I n  d isc u ss in g  th e  l e g a l  and 
economic a sp e o ts  o f  t h i s  problem . P ro fe sso r  A rch ibald  C ox^ has s ta te d  
th a t :
Banning o rg a n is a t io n a l  p ic k e tin g  a f t e r  an  NLRB e le c t io n  p a r t i a l l y  
r e j e c t s  th e  f r e e  s tru g g le  f o r  l i f e *  f o r  i t  p r e f e r s  th e  nonunion 
em ployees' i n t e r e s t  i n  s e l f  d e te rm in a tio n  over th e  u n io n 's  i n t e r e s t  
i n  sp read ing  i t s  o rg a n iz a tio n  a s  a  means o f  p ro te c tin g  i t s  wage 
s c a le  and la b o r  s ta n d a rd s . Suppose, however* t h a t  a  union were to  
p ic k e t  f o r  th e  avowed purpose o f  p u b lic iz in g  th e  low wages p a id  i n  
an  e s tab lish m en t, w ith o u t becoming th e  b a rg a in in g  ag en t, i n  o rd e r  to  
compel th e  owner to  r a i s e  h is  wages to  th e  un ion  s c a le  o r  e ls e  to  
p rev e n t th e  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  lo w -co s t, nonunion goods in  d i r e c t  
co m p e titio n  w ith  th e  p ro d u c ts  o f  union la b o r  . * . /S in c e  S ec tio n  8 
(b ) (7 )  p r o h ib i t s  p ic k e tin g  where th e  o b je c t  i s  re c o g n itio n , p ic k e t­
in g  f o r  th e  o b je c t j  . . > o f  e lim in a tin g  . . . com petition  based  
upon d if fe re n c e s  i n  la b o r  s ta n d a rd s  . . • /oou ld  be co n ce iv ab ly /
. . . accom plished w ith o u t i n te r f e r in g  w ith  th e  d e c is io n  concerning  
un ion  re p re s e n ta t io n . The danger in  d is t in g u is h in g  p ic k e tin g  to  
p r o te s t  substandard  wages o r  working c o n d itio n s  from p ic k e tin g  f o r  
un ion  re c o g n itio n  o r  o rg a n iz a tio n  th a t  i t  may enoouraee ev asio n s
k l
P ro fe sso r  Oox a c te d  a s  an a d v is e r  to  S en a to r Kennedy du rin g  
th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  th e  LMRDA.
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th rough  d is in g en u o u s phrm alng o f  th e  p i c k e t s 1 p la c a rd s  and th e  mrioo's 
demands. The b e s t  s o lu t io n  would be to  t r e a t  th e  u n io n 's  o b je c t  a s  
a q u e s tio n  o f  f a c t .  Norm ally re c o g n itio n  o r  un ion  o rg a n is a t io n  a re  
o b je c t iv e s  o f  any p ic k e tin g  o f  an  un o rg an ised  shop, b u t th e  fo rc e  o f  
t h i s  p resum ption , based on ex p e rien c e , can be d is s ip a te d  by p ro o f  
t h a t  th e  la b o r  c o n d itio n s  o f  whioh th e  un ion  oom plalns a re  p r e s e n t ly  
such a s u b s ta n t ia l  t h r e a t  to  e x is t in g  un ion  s ta n d a rd s  i n  o th e r  shops 
a s  to  su p p o rt a  f in d in g  t h a t  th e  un ion  h a s  a  genuine i n t e r e s t  i n  
com pelling  th e  improvement o f  th e  la b o r  c o n d itio n s  o r  e lim in a tin g  
th e  c o m p e titio n , even though th e  un ion  does n o t become th e  b a rg a in ­
in g  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e .  2
Although P ro fe s s o r  Oox's su g g estio n  may be in co m p a tib le  to  th o se  
c r i t i c s  who would brand a l l  p ic k e tin g  a s  r e c o g n i t io n a l— re fu s in g  to  
d is t in g u is h  between im m ediate and u l t im a te  o b je c t iv e s —th e  p ro p o sa l i s  
p re f e r a b le  to  th e  B o ard 's  approach s in c e  i t  would re q u ire  th e  un ion  to  
prove t h a t  la b o r  c o n d itio n s  a re  such a s  to  pose a s e r io u s  t h r e a t  to  th e  
la b o r  movement. A f te r  th e  lo s s  o f  a r e p re s e n ta t io n  e le c t io n ,  a n a ly s is  
o f  p ic k e tin g  under t h i s  framework would p r o te c t  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  
employees concern ing  re p re s e n ta t io n  and i t  would enab le  th e  un ion  to  
in form  th e  p u b lic  o f  su b stan d ard  c o n d itio n s . Employment o f  t h i s  
c r i t e r i a  would be a p o s i t iv e  s te p  in  so lv in g  th e  c u rre n t  dilem oa and i t  
would o f f e r  a p re fe ra b le  a l t e r n a t iv e  to  th e  n igh  im p o ssib le  ta s k  o f  
de te rm in ing  th e  u n io n 1s t r u e  m otive.
A secondary form o f  p r o te s t  p ic k e tin g  which i s  s im ila r  to  p ic k e t­
in g  a g a in s t  nonunion s ta n d a rd s  i s  p ic k e tin g  f o r  re in s ta te m e n t o f  economic 
s t r i k e r s .  P r io r  to  th e  enactm ent o f  th e  LMRDA th e  Board h e ld  i n  th e
^A rch ibald  Cox, "The L andrum -G riffin  Amendments to  th e  N a tio n a l 
Labor R e la tio n s  A c t,"  M innesota Law Review, XLIV, No. 2 (December, 1959), 
257, 266-267.
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Lewis Food Company c a s e ^  th a t  p ic k e tin g  o f  th e  em ployer1 3 p la n t  fo r  th e  
dua l o b je c tiv e  o f  fo rc in g  th e  employer to  recogn ize  th e  union and to  
fo rc e  th e  employer to  r e in s ta t e  employees who were a d h e ren ts  o f  th e  
union could  n o t be se p a ra te d  i n  law  and most be co n sid ered  f o r  th e  s o le  
o b je c t  o f  re c o g n itio n . I t  i s  n o t conce ivab le , s a id  th e  Board, t h a t  th e  
p ic k e tin g  f o r  re in s ta te m e n t " . . .  was m erely th e  'a d ju s t  o f  a g r ie v ­
ance . 1 Such a f in d in g  ig n o re s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  re c o g n itio n  and b a rg a in in g  
a re  e s s e n t ia l  e lem ents o f  t h i s  o b je c tiv e  w ithou t which i t  would be 
im p o ssib le  fo r  th e  Respondent to  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  s e t t l e  i t s  s p e c i f ic  
d isp u te .
I n  two o f  th e  cases  s in ce  1959 th e  Board has h e ld  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  
fo r  re in s ta te m e n t may no t be a v io la t io n  o f  S ubsec tion  (B) u n le s s  th e re  
i s  ev idence o f  a b roader o b j e c t i v e .^  While " . . .  p ic k e tin g  f o r  an 
em ployee 's re in s ta te m e n t may in  some c ircum stances be used a s  a p r e te x t  
f o r  a t ta in in g  re c o g n itio n  . . . / t h e r e  must be7 . . .  an a ff i rm a tiv e  
showing o f  such o b j e c t . " ^  In  d is t in g u is h in g  th e  Lewis Food case  from 
F a n e ll i  Ford S a le s , th e  Board h e ld  t h a t  p ic k e tin g  i n  th e  form er case  was 
co-detem dnous w ith  th e  o b je c t  o f  re c o g n itio n  w h ile  th e  p ic k e tin g  in  th e  
l a t t e r  case " . . .  would have ceased i f  th e  employer, w ith o u t
NLRB 890 (1956).
^ I b i d . . p . 993*
^ F a n e l l i  Ford S a le s . 133 NLRB 1468 (1961).
4* I b id . ,  p . 1469.
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" reco g n iz in g  o r , Indeed , exchanging a word w ith  th e  Respondent, had 
r e in s ta te d  . . . / t h e  employee i n  q u estio n /*
I n  a  re c e n t case which ooshined th e  dua l problem o f  p ro te s t in g
an em ployer's  u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  and a subsequent p r o te s t  o f  th e  
em p loyer's  r e f u s a l  to  r e h i r e  eoonomic s t r i k e r s ,  th e  Board h e ld  t h a t  th e
i
change i n  th e  legends was a s a t i s f a c to r y  disavow al o f  th e  re c o g n itio n  
o b j e c t i v e .^  Under th e  f a c t s  o f  t h i s  case  th e  union had f o r  se v e ra l 
y e a rs  re p re se n te d  c e r ta in  employees o f  th e  M ission V alley  In n . P r io r  to  
th e  e x p ira tio n  o f  t h e i r  c o n tra c t  th e  union  n o t i f i e d  th e  employer o f  i t s  
i n te n t  to  n e g o tia te  a new agreem ent covering  a l l  o f  th e  em ployers. 
Between th e  te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  c o n tra c t  and th e  re p re s e n ta t io n  e le c t io n  
n e c e s s i ta te d  by th e  new o o n tra c t. th e  employer a l le g e d ly  engaged i n  c e r­
t a i n  u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e s .  The union f i l e d  an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e
and c a l le d  a s t r i k e  in  p r o te s t  o f  th e  snqxLoyer's a c t io n .  The s t r i k e  was
supported  by . . p ic k e t  s ig n s  read in g t
'WE PROTEST UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF 
MISSION VALLEY INN' ~
'WE PROTEST EMPLOYER'S INTERROGATION OF EMPLOYEES' —
1MVI SAYS IT WILL REFUSE TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH IF  UNION WINS
ELECTION. ' " * 9
An In v e s t ig a t io n  o f  th e  charges rev ea led  th a t  th e  employer had engaged 
i n  u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e s  and, by agreem ent w ith  th e  Regional D ire c to r ,
^7I b i d .
ff**Mlaslon V aliev Inn. 140 NLRB 433 (1963).
% d . ,  p. 435-
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th e  company r e in s ta te d  some o f  th e  employees. The union  was no t a  p a r ty  
to  t h i s  agreem ent and f i l e d  a p r o te s t  ap p ea lin g  th e  d ism is sa l o f  th e  
charges* When th e  appeal was den ied  th e  an io n  " . . .  changed i t s  p ic k e t  
s ig n s  to  read  on one s id e :
'WE PROTEST 
MISSION VALLEY INN'S REFUSAL TO REHIRE 
ALL UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE STRIKERS'
and on th e  o th e r  s id e :
'2 2  EMPLOYEES STRUCK BECAUSE 
MISSION VALLEY INN 
ENGAGED IN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
MVI NOW WILL TAKE BACK ONLY 
PART OF EMPLOYEES 
MVI IS  REAPING BENEFIT OF UNFAIR LABOR 
PRACTICE WITHOUT RECTIFYING SITUATION.' " 5°
The union oontinued to  p ic k e t  th e  employer p r io r  to  and a f t e r  
th e  re p re s e n ta t io n  e le c t io n .  The p ic k e tin g  was p eace fu l and was con­
ducted  a t  th e  em ployer's  main en tran ce  which was used by employees, 
g u e s ts , and deliverym en. A fte r  th e  v a l id i ty  o f  th e  e le c t io n  was e s ta b ­
l is h e d ,  th e  employer p e t i t io n e d  th e  d i s t r i c t  c o u rt to  e n jo in  th e  p ic k e t­
in g  a s  a v io la t io n  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )(B )— p ic k e tin g  f o r  a re c o g n itio n a l  
o b je c t  a f t e r  th e  lo s s  o f  a re p re s e n ta t io n  e le c t io n .  The union den ied  
any re o o g rd tio n a l m otive and a s s e r te d  th a t  p ic k e tin g  was " . . .  s o le ly
in  p r o te s t  . . . / o f  th e  em ployer’ s7 • • • u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e s
-51
•  ■ *
The c o u rt re fu sed  to  a c c e p t th e  u n io n 's  i n te r p r e ta t io n  o f  i t s
5° I b id . . p . 436.
fl-I b i d . .  p . 437-
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a c t i v i t i e s  and th e  un ion  ap p ea led  to  th e  NLRB. I n  rev iew ing  th e  f a c ta  
o f  t h i s  case  th e  Board c i te d  i t s  d e c is io n  in  B llnne C o n stru c tio n  
Company^  t h a t  " . . .  th e  t h r u s t  o f  S e c tio n  8 (b )(7 )  i s  to  d e a l w ith  
r e c o g n it io n  and o rg a n iz a tio n  p i c k e t in g ." ̂ 3 i t  i s  d e a r  from th e  con­
s t r u c t io n  o f  S e c tio n  8 (b )(7 )  and th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s to r y  o f  th e  Act t h a t  
p ic k e tin g  f o r  an  o b je c t  o th e r  th a n  " . . .  re c o g n itio n , b a rg a in in g , o r  
o rg a n iz a t io n  . . . f a l l s  p la in ly  o u ts id e  . . . / t h e  p ro s c r ip t io n  in 7  
. . . S e c tio n  8 ( b ) (7 ) .  A lthough th e  un ion  in  th e  p re s e n t  case  con­
t in u e d  to  p ic k e t  in  p r o t e s t  o f  an  u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  a f t e r  th e  
I n i t i a l  com plain t had been rem edied, to  co n stru e  a  r e o o g n it lo n a l  o b je c ­
t i v e  to  t h i s  form o f  p ic k e tin g  would be in c o n s is te n t  w ith  e s ta b l is h e d  
p r a c t i c e .  The i n t e n t  o f  th e  law  was to  p ro s c r ib e  p ic k e tin g  f o r  a 
r e o o g n it lo n a l  m otive. "The e x is te n c e  o f  th e  p ro sc r ib e d  o b je c t  . . .
/ i s  a c r l t i c a l 7  * ■ • elem ent o f  a f f i rm a t iv e  p ro o f  which i s  a p re re q u i­
s i t e  to  a f in d in g  o f  th e  v io la t io n  • • • a lle g e d  • . • / t h i s  p ro o f /  • *
. cannot be su p p lied  by m erely d isp ro v in g  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a d i f f e r e n t  
o b je c t ."  5 5
The r e f u s a l  o f  th e  em ployer to  r e i n s t a t e  a l l  o f  th e  s t r i k e r s  a s  
th e  u n io n s demand to  have them r e in s ta te d  was a  f a c t  o f  th e  ca se . The 
un ion  was n o t a  p a r ty  to  th e  u n i l a t e r a l  agreem ent between th e  R egional
52135 NLR3 1153 (1982).
53I b i d . ,  p . 1155-
^ I k O  NLRB 437.
55I b i d . ,  p . *08-
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D ire c to r  and M ission V alley  which re so lv ed  th e  u n fa i r  la b o r  p ra c tic e s*  
The d isappearance  o f  t h i s  o b je c t i n  a le g a l  sense does no t re so lv e  i t s  
economic im p lic a tio n s . The u n io n 's  demand to  r e in s t a t e  a l l  o f  th e  
s t r i k e r s  was a le g i t im a te  and p ro p er o b je c tiv e  and th e  oontinued p r o te s t  
cannot be regarded  a s  ". . . a  p re te x t  to  mask a co v ert demand fo r  
re c o g n itio n  and b a r g a in in g ." ^
RESTRICTION OF PICKETING UNDER SUBSECTION (C)
The most c o n tro v e rs ia l  p a r t  o f  th e  new r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  law  
o f  p ic k e tin g  I s  con ta ined  in  S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )(C ) o f  th e  LMRDA. (1959).
T his su b sec tio n  was designed  to  p ro te c t  p u b l ic i ty  o r  oonsumer p ic k e tin g  
which l im ite d  i t s  appea l to  employees to  Jo in  th e  union o r  to  th e  p u b lic  
to  d isc o n tin u e  pa tronage  o f  th e  em ployer's  e s tab lish m en t. The o r ig in a l  
B i l l  a s  passed  by th e  House and Senate d id  not make any p ro v is io n  in  
r e s p e c t to  so -c a l le d  p u b l ic i ty  p ic k e tin g . Subsection  (C) a s  enac ted  was 
d ra f te d  by th e  J o in t  Conference on th e  House and Senate v e rs io n s  o f  th e  
B i l l .  The su b sec tio n  was a p roduct o f  compromise, and th e  subsequent 
d iv is io n  among th e  members o f  th e  NLRB and th e  c o u rts  over th e  i n t e n t  o f 
th e  su b sec tio n  may be tra c e d  to  th e  c o n f l ic t in g  i n t e r e s t s  who were 
re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  i n i t i a l  d r a f t  o f  th e  B i l l .  In  ana lyzing  th e  im p li­
c a tio n s  o f  S ubsection  (C) S enato r Kennedy s ta te d  th a t  " . . .  p ic k e tin g  
would be p e rm itted  to  con tinue  w ithou t a p e t i t io n  i f  i t  appealed on ly  to  
th e  employees to  jo in  th e  union o r  th e  p u b lic  not to  p a tro n iz e  th e
56I b id .,  p. **41.
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"non-union e s tab lish m en t w ithou t causing  tru c k e rs  o r  th e  employees o f  
o th e r  em ployers to  re fu s e  to  c ro s s  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e .  Regarding th e  
broad im p lic a tio n  o f  S ec tion  8 (b )(7 )  in  re fe re n c e  to  Subsection  (C) 
Senator Kennedy s ta te d  th a t  " in  o th e r  words# we say. in  e f f e c t :  'You can 
s t a r t  p ic k e tin g  w ith  any th ing  you have, w ith  any members you have; b u t 
i f  th e  p ic k e tin g  r e s u l t s  i n  stopping  d e l iv e r ie s  o r  s e rv ic e  employees 
from e n te r in g  th e  p rem ises, then  th e re  must be an immediate e l e c t i o n .1 
I n  comparison to  Senato r Kennedy's comments on th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  p ic k e t ­
in g  re g u la tio n s . P ro fe sso r Cox has s ta te d  th a t :
P ic k e tin g  b e fo re  a  union e le c t io n  . . .  i s  d iv id ed  . . . in to
two c a te g o r ie s :  (1 ) P ic k e tin g  which h a l t s  p ick -u p s o r  d e l iv e r ie s  by 
independent tru c k in g  concerns o r  th e  r e n d i t io n  o f  s e rv ic e s  by 
employees o f  o th e r  em ployers, and (2) which ap p ea ls  o n ly  to  th e  
e s tab lish m en t and members o f  th e  p u b lic  • . .
Congress p laced  no l im i ta t io n  upon th e  p e rio d  f o r  which a union  
may engage in  p u b l ic i ty  p ic k e tin g . S ig n a l p ic k e tin g — (a s ig n a l  to  
o rg an ised  economic a c t io n  backed by group d i s c ip l in e ) —i s  t r e a te d  a s  
a le g i t im a te  o rg a n is in g  t a c t i c  u n t i l  th e  e le c t io n  i s  h e ld  . . . b u t 
a f t e r  th e  e le c t io n , a l l  p ic k e tin g , s ig n a l o r  p u b l ic i ty ,  i s  f o r ­
b idden. . . .  “
While S enato r Kennedy and P ro fe sso r  Cox d isa g ree d  concerning th e  l e g a l ­
i t y  o f  p u b l ic i ty  p ic k e tin g  a f t e r  a re p re s e n ta t io n  e le c t io n ,  th ey  were
in  agreem ent th a t  th e  union could p ic k e t  in  absence o f a c o n tra c t  o r  an 
e le c t io n  i f  th e  e f f e c t  o f  such p ic k e tin g  d id  n o t d is ru p t  o r  i n te r f e r e
^ L e g is l a t iv e  H is to ry  o f  th e  LMRDA (1959). p. 1384.
38I b l d . , p . 1377.
5^Cox, pp. 267-268.
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w ith  "p ick -u p s  o r  d e l i v e r i e s . ' 1̂ 0
I n  c o n tr a s t  to  S en a to r K ennedy's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Congressman
G r i f f in ,  c o -a u th o r o f  th e  law  a s  en ac ted , s t a te d  t h a t :
The second p ro v iso  to  th e  su b se c tio n  makes an ex ce p tio n  o f  p ic k e t in g  
o r  o th e r  p u b l ic i ty  which i s  f o r  l im i te d  pu rposes and which does n o t 
have th e  e f f e c t  o f  in d u c in g  employees o f  o th e r s  to  r e fu s e  to  c ro s s  
th e  p ic k e t  l i n e  to  make p ic k -u p s  o r  d e l iv e r i e s  and to  perform  
s e rv ic e s .  Any ty p e  o f  p u b l ic i ty  in c lu d in g  p ic k e tin g , which h as t h i s  
e f f e c t  i s  n o t p ro te c te d  by th e  p ro v iso . The p ro v iso  p e r ta in s  to  
S u b sec tio n  (C) o n ly  and th e re fo re  consumer a p p e a ls  f o r  o rg a n is a ­
t io n a l  o r  re c o g n itio n  pu rposes a re  banned a f t e r  an  e le c t io n ,  i
Congressman G r i f f i n 's  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  p ro v is io n s  was su p p o rted  
i n  th e  d eb a te  i n  th e  upper house by S en a to r G oldw ater and S en a to r 
D i r k s e n . S p e a k i n g  to  th e  S enate  on th e  day th e  B i l l  was sig n ed  in to  
law , S en a to r G oldw ater s t a te d  t h a t  th e  s i t u a t io n  o f  p ro h ib i te d  p ic k e t ­
in g :
. . . sim ply means . . .  A un ion  may no t p ic k e t  f o r  re c o g n itio n  o r  
f o r  o rg a n is a t io n a l  pu rp o ses fo r  more th a n  a  rea so n a b le  p e r io d  which 
may be l e e s  th an  30 days i f  th e  Board so d e te rm in es , b u t  may no t be 
lo n g e r , w ith o u t p e t i t i o n  f o r  a  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e le c t io n  b e ir e  f i l e d  
w ith  th e  Board. I f  no such p e t i t i o n  i s  f i l e d  . . . J p y  th e /  • • •
3 1 s t day from i t s  commencement, such p ic k e tin g , i f  co n tinued  o r
resumed, becomes u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e .
. . . where th e  union  engages i n  p ic k e tin g  o r  o th e r  p u b l ic i ty  f o r  
th e  s o le  purpose o f  t r u th f u l l y  a d v is in g  th e  p u b lic  t h a t  an  em ployer
does not employ members o r  have a c o n tra c t  w ith  a la b o r  u n io n . I n
th o se  c ircu m stan ces, such p ic k e tin g  may be c a r r ie d  on i n d e f i n i t e ly .  
However, i f  one o f  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  such exempted p ic k e tin g  i s  to  
in d u ce  any in d iv id u a l  employed by any o th e r  p e rson—o th e r  th an  th e
^°Both S e n a to r Kennedy and P ro fe s s o r  Cox p re f e r r e d  to  d e f in e  
p ic k e tin g  a s  s ig n a l  o r  p u b l ic i ty  s in c e  th ey  were aware o f  th e  d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  i n  de te rm in in g  th e  t r u e  "m otive" behind  th e  p ic k e tin g .
^ L e g is la t iv e  H istory o f  the LMREA (1 959 ). p. 1812.
62I b id . ,  p. 1823-
17^
p ic k e te d  employer—i n  th e  course  o f  h i s  employment, n o t to  p ic k  up. 
d e l iv e r ,  o r  t r a n s p o r t  any goods o r  not to  perform  any se rv ic e s  
* > • th e  employer may • • • p e t i t io n  * . . / f o r  a r e p re s e n ta t io n  
e le c t io n /  • » * ^
I n  comparing th e se  two in te r p r e ta t io n s .  S enato r G oldwater and 
Congressman G r i f f in  took  th e  p o s i t io n  th a t  S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )  re g u la te d  
re o o g n it lo n a l  and o rg a n iz a tio n a l  p ic k e tin g  by c a l l in g  f o r  an e le c t io n  
w ith in  t h i r t y  days, and th a t  any evidence o f  a re o o g n itlo n a l m otive 
a f t e r  th e  e le c t io n  would a u to m a tic a lly  p rec lu d e  th e  c o n tin u a tio n  o f  t h i s  
form o f  p r o te s t .  Senato r Kennedy and P ro fe s so r  Oox, on th e  o th e r  hand, 
adopted  th e  c o n ten tio n  th a t  a union  could p ic k e t  fo r  re c o g n itio n  (excep t 
a s  re g u la te d  by S ec tio n  8 /b7FT!) i f  th e  p ic k e tin g  in  q u e s tio n  d id  n o t 
i n t e r f e r e  w ith  o r  d is ru p t  th e  employer* s  b u s in e ss . As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  
e x p l i c i t  d if fe re n c e  o f  op in ion  between th e  two r e p re s e n ta t iv e  co n tin ­
g en ts  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  d ra f t in g  S ec tio n  8 (b ) (7 ) , i t  became ap p aren t t h a t  
th e  HLRB and th e  c o u rts  might e le c t  one o f  th re e  p o s s ib le  in t e r p r e t a ­
t io n s :  (1) t h a t  S ubsec tion  (C) would exempt on ly  t r u th f u l  In fo rm a tio n a l 
p ic k e tin g  whose so le  purpose was to  inform  th e  p u b lic  th a t  th e  employer 
i s  u n f a i r ,  (2) th a t  S ubsection  (C) would exempt a l l  forms o f  p ic k e tin g  
re g a rd le s s  o f  m otive, p rovided such p ic k e tin g  does not have a secondary 
e f f e c t ,  o r  (3) th a t  Subsection  (C) would exempt a l l  p ic k e tin g  w ithou t 
r e s t r i c t i o n  in  r e s p e c t  to  m otive o r  e f f e c t  i f  th e  union could show by 
th e  w eight o f  th e  ev idence th a t  i t s  purpose was to  inform  th e  p u b lic  
t h a t  th e  employer was u n fa ir .
% b id . . pp. 1858-1859.
175
The p o te n t i a l  im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  f i r s t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  on th e  
s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  was i l l u s t r a t e d  in  th e  case  o f  P h i l l i p s  v . I n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  L ad ies Garment W orkers. ^  I n  t h i s  case  th e  union  p ic k e te d  th e  
em ployer f o r  th e  purpose o f  o rg a n iz in g  th e  c u tt in g  room em ployees. The 
" p ic k e tin g " —which c o n s is te d  o f  p o s tin g  s ig n s  on p u b lic  p ro p e r ty - -  was 
" p e a c e fu l ." and th e r e  was no ev idence  th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  induced  second­
a ry  em ployers to  re fu s e  " . . .  to  p ic k  up, d e l iv e r  o r  t r a n s p o r t  any 
goods o r  no t to  perform  any s e rv ic e s  • . . f o r  th e  em ployer. D esp ite  
th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  and th e  absence o f  secondary  e f f e c t s ,  th e  
c o u rt  took  th e  p o s i t io n  th a t  th e  m otive— re c o g n itio n  and o rg a n iz a tio n — 
was w ith in  th e  pream ble and th e r e fo re  was p ro h ib ite d  try S e c tio n  8 (b ) (7 ) .  
The ad o p tio n  o f  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  by th e  U nited  S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  Court 
em phasized th e  q u e s tio n  o f purpose w ith  th e  s p e c i f ic  in fe re n c e  t h a t  th e  
purpose , a s  d e fin e d  i n  th e  pream ble, means "so le  purpose" to  th e  e x c lu ­
s io n  o f  o th e r  m otives. The c o u r t 's  o p in io n  in  th e  P h i l l ip s  case  would 
seem to  r e s t r i c t  th e  le g a l  s t a tu s  o f  p ic k e tin g  even beyond th a t  o f  th e  
G o ld w a te r-G riff ln  a n a ly s is .  Both S enato r G oldw ater and Congressman 
G r i f f in  were concerned w ith  th e  e f f e c t  o f  r e c o g n it io n a l  p ic k e tin g — 
commonly known a s  b lackm ail p i c k e t i n g ^ —because  o f  i t s  i n te n t  to  fo rc e  
th e  em ployer and h i s  employees in to  an unwanted r e la t io n s h ip  which
6445 L.R.R.M. 2363 (1959)*
6^ Ib id *. p . 2364.
^ S e e  L e g is la t iv e  H is to ry  o f  th e  LMRDi (1 9 5 9 ), p* 1859, rem arks 
by S en a to r G oldw ater b e fo re  th e  UniEed S ta te s  S ena te .
p la c e s t
. . . th e  le g i t im a te  tra d e  union movement . . .  i n  jeopardy* The 
ho n est and f o r th r ig h t  union o rg a n is e r  cannot hope to  compete w ith  
th e  o rg a n is e r  who u ses such methods. When th e  weapons o f  o o e rd o n  
and fo rce  a re  tak en  away from th e  b lackm ail o rgan izer*  th e  l e g i t i ­
mate union movement can grow and expand in  a  h e a lth y  and wholesome 
w ay.6”
I t  seems u n lik e ly  t h a t  th e  form o f  p ic k e tin g  in  th e  P h i l l ip s  
case  could  have any resem blance to  th e  weapons o f  o o e rd o n  and fo rc e  
d e sc rib e d  by Congressman G r i f f in  o r  Senator G oldw ater. I t  i s  q u ite  con­
c e iv ab le  th a t  p eacefu l re o o g n itlo n a l p ic k e tin g  may be th e  on ly  f e a s ib le  
means o f  communicating w ith  th e  employees in  q u e s tio n . Condemnation o f 
t h i s  form o f  p r o te s t  a s  an u n fa ir  la b o r  p ra c t ic e  i s  a d i r e c t  c o n t r l f ic a ­
t io n  o f  con g ress io n a l i n te n t .
The i m p l i d t  danger o f  th e  c o u r t 's  op in ion  i n  th e  P h i l l ip s  case 
i s  th e  in h e re n t  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  t r u th f u l  consumer p ic k e tin g  could be , 
under g iven  d rcu m sta n ce s , construed  a s  a demand f o r  re c o g n itio n . T his
problem  was subsequently  i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  case o f  McLeod v . Local 89,
68Chefs Union. In  t h i s  case th e  union had been p ic k e tin g  th e  employer.
The S to rk  Club, s in ce  1957* One o f  th e  adm itted  purposes o f  th e  p ic k e t­
ing  was o rg an iz a tio n  o f  th e  employer, and a f t e r  th e  passage o f  th e  LMRDA 
th e  unions were Inform ed th a t  th ey  would no t be p e rm itte d  to  con tinue  to  
p ic k e t  f o r  re c o g n itio n . T h e re a f te r , th e  union ad v ised  th e  NLRB th a t
^ 1 0 5  Gong. Rec. Ih l9 5  (August 11, 1959). rem arks by Congressman
G r if f in .
68280 F. 2d. 760 (I960).
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th ey  were w ithdraw ing " . . .  demands f o r  re c o g n itio n  b u t would oon tlnue  
to  p ic k e t  . . . f o r  th e  pu rposes o f  a d v is in g  th e  p u b l ic .  /? h e 7  • * • 
/s 7 lg n s  were . . .  a ls o  changed . . .  to  c a rry  th e  fo llo w in g  in s c r ip ­
t io n s :
'TO THE .PUBUC 
THE STORK CLUB 
DISCHARGED EMPLOYEES 
BECAUSE THEY JOINED 
CHEFS, COOKS, PASTRY COOKS 









'TO THE PUBLIC 
THE STORK CLUB 




& ASST'S UNION 
LOCAL 89 AFL-CIO'1,69
I n  a n a ly z in g  th e  u n io n 's  a tte m p ts  to  comply w ith  th e  l e t t e r  o f  
th e  law . Judge Dawson o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  D i s t r i c t  C ourt h e ld  t h a t  th e  
wording on th e  p ic k e t  s ig n  t h a t  "The S to rk  Club does n o t have a c o n tra c t  
w ith  th e  union" im p lied  t h a t  th e  union s t i l l  sought r e c o g n itio n . Review­
in g  th e  case  on a p p ea l, th e  F ed e ra l C irc u i t  Court re fu se d  to  en fo rce  th e  
ru l in g  o f  th e  D i s t r i c t  Court h o ld in g  th a t  th e r e  was no reason  to  b e lie v e
69Ib id . , p . ?6 2 .
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t h a t  th e  un ion  was pu rsu in g  a re o o g n it lo n a l  m otive .
To say  . • . /a rg u e d  th e  C o u rt/ • . . t h a t  th e  c a rry in g  o f  s ig n s  
s ta t in g  t h a t  th e  em ployer h as no c o n tra c t  w ith  th e  union  I s  p ro o f  
o f  re o o g n it lo n a l  p ic k e tin g  I s  to  Ig n o re  th e  l e t t e r *  and. we th in k  
th e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  s t a tu t e  . . • / i n  de te rm in ing  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  
p ic k e tlq g 7  * • • th e  s t a t u t e  r e q u ir e s  a  d e te rm in a tio n  . . . / o f 7  
. . . w hether th e  p ic k e tin g  had a s  an o b je c t iv e ,  one o f  fo rc in g  o r  
r e q u ir in g  th e  em ployer to  b a rg a in  w ith  o r  reco g n ize  th e  un ion .
I n  a r r iv in g  a t  t h i s  d e te rm in a tio n  th e  Court h e ld  t h a t  c o u r ts  shou ld  n o t 
r e ly  e n t i r e l y  on th e  l e t t e r i n g  o f  th e  s ig n s ;  f o r  o th e r  f a c to r s ,  i . e . ,  
a c t io n s  o f  th e  p ic k e ts ,  correspondence o f  th e  un ion , and r e a c t io n  o f  
secondary employees should  re c e iv e  equal c o n s id e ra tio n . Any o f  th e s e  
a c t i v i t i e s  co n sid ered  s e p a ra te ly  cou ld , under g iven  c o n d itio n s , become 
th e  b a s i s  o f  an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  charge , b u t th e  Oongress d id  n o t 
in te n d  3uch a r e s u l t .  To e n jo in  a l l  p ic k e tin g  on th e  b a s i s  o f  one 
r e f u s a l  o f  d e liv e ry  o r some o th e r  s e p a ra te  v io la t io n  would be a m is­
c a r r ia g e  o f  j u s t i c e .  A b la n k e t  in ju n c t io n  i s  a d is r u p t iv e  fo rc e , and 
should  be r e le g a te d  to  th o se  o ccas io n s  when no th ing  w i l l  remedy b u t t o ta l  
com pliance. I n  cases in v o lv in g  m inor i n f r a c t io n s  th e  in ju n c t io n  d ev ice  
should  be t a i l o r e d  to  p rec lu d e  th e  i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t y ,  f o r  to  e n jo in  a l l  
p ic k e tin g  would deny th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  t r u th f u l l y  in fo rm  th e  p u b lic .
Such a r u l in g  " . . .  would seem to  c a rry  th e  scope o f  th e  in ju n c t io n  
beyond . . • / t h e 7  * • • con tem pla tion  o f  th e  A c t . " ^
The f i r s t  im p o rtan t case  to  come b e fo re  th e  NLRB under Subsec­
t io n  (C) was Crown C a f e te r ia - I n  t h i s  case  th e  u n io n 's  b u s in e ss  ag en t
7° I b id . . pp. 763-7&+.
^ I b l d . ,  p . 764.
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con tac ted  one o f  th e  p a r tn e rs  p r io r  to  th e  opening o f  a new branch o f 
Crown C a fe te r ia . Inc* The b u sin ess  a g en t1s req u e s t th a t  union employees 
be employed in  th e  new e stab lish m en t was re fu sed , and th e  union p ic k e ts  
began to  p a tro l  th e  prem ises ca rry in g  a s ig n  reading*





PLEASE DO NOT PATRONIZE. " ? 2
During th e  i n i t i a l  p e rio d  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g . Crown experienced some 
d i f f i c u l ty  in  g e tt in g  su p p lie s  and found i t  necessary  to  p ick  up t h e i r  
own requ irem ents and b rin g  them to the  c a f e te r ia .  However, when the  
p ic k e tin g  was th e r e a f te r  reduced to  conform w ith  normal b u siness hours 
". • . Crown was a b le  to  g e t su p p lies  by sp ec ify in g  th a t  d e l iv e r ie s  were 
to  be made b e fo re  11 A.M."73 The p ick e tin g  continued on an e ig h t hour 
day b a s is  from May u n t i l  December o f  1959 when th e  p ic k e ts  were w ith ­
drawn p u rsu an t to  an agreement between th e  Regional D ire c to r  and th e  
union. In  re p o rtin g  th e  case to  th e  General Counsel, th e  T r ia l  Examiner 
adopted the  Kennedy-Cox in te r p r e ta t io n  hold ing  ' .  . . th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  
even though fo r  an o b je c t o f  re c o g n itio n  . . . / t h a t  th e  a c t i v i t / 7  • • • 
f e l l  w ith in  th e  p ro te c tio n  o f  th e  p u b lic i ty  p rov iso  to  S ec tion  8 (b )(7 ) 
(C) because i t  d id  no t have the  e f f e c t  o f  inducing  any stoppage o f  goods
72130 NLRB 570, 581 (1961).
?3 lb id . . P* 532.
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o r  s e rv io e s . The Board re fu s e d  to  a co e p t th e  T r ia l  S x a n in e r 's t
. . . unduly narrow  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  th e  A ct. Congress in  S e c tio n  8 
(b ) (7 )  ex p ressed  th e  g e n e ra l o b je c t iv e  o f  p ro h ib i t in g  p ic k e tin g  by 
u n c e r t i f i e d  la b o r  o rg a n is a t io n s  where an o b je c t  was re c o g n itio n  
. . . even though th e  p ic k e tin g  may a ls o  have had o th e r  o b je c ts  a s  
w s l l •  • •  •
"We reg a rd  th e  T r ia l  Exam iner' s and o u r d is s e n t in g  c o lle a g u e s ' 
c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th e  Act a s  underm ining th e  c a r e f u l ly  worked o u t
program  e s ta b l is h e d  by C ongress. . . .  We cannot b e lie v e  th a t
Congress meant to  p e im it re c o g n itio n  p ic k e tin g  m erely  beoause th e  
p ic k e tin g  a ls o  ta k e s  th e  form o f  t r u th f u l l y  a d v is in g  th e  p u b lic  
t h a t  th e  em ployer i s  nonunion. . . .
"We a r e  s a t i s f i e d  th a t  Congress added th e  p ro v iso  only  to  make 
c l e a r  t h a t  p u re ly  in fo rm a tio n  p ic k e tin g , w h i c h  p u b l ic i s e s  th e  la c k  
o f  a union  c o n tr a c t  o r  th e  la c k  o f union o rg a n iz a tio n  and which has 
no p re s e n t  o b je c t  o f  re c o g n itio n , should  n o t be c u r ta i l e d .
The two d is s e n t in g  members, Jen k in s  and Fanning, o b je c te d  to  th e  
m a jo r ity  op in io n  on th e  th eo ry  th a t  th e  p r a c t i c a l  r e s u l t  was to  re n d e r
Subparagraph (C) . . w holly in e f f e c tu a l  a s  i f  indeed  Congress had
in s e r te d  mere language  in te n d e d  to  se rv e  a s  a u s e le s s  appendage in  an 
academ ic vacuum. "7^ An a n a ly s is  o f  Subparagraph (C) does n o t su p p o rt 
th e  m a jo r i ty 's  i n te r p r e ta t io n  f o r  ". . . i t  seems c le a r  th a t  Congress 
in te n d e d  to  p e rm it a  k ind  o f  p ic k e tin g  which, b u t f o r  th e  p ro v iso , would 
have come w ith in  th e  p ro h ib i t io n  o f th e  S e c t io n ." 77 Under th e  p ro v iso , 
un ions m ight engage in  s o -c a l le d  r e c o g n it io n a l  p ic k e tin g  i f  th e  purpose  
o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  was to  t r u th f u l l y  a d v e r t is e  to  th e  p u b lic  and i f  th e
7W ,  p. 571-
75I b i d . .  pp. 571-572.
76I b i d . , p . 575-
77Ib ld .
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p ic k e tin g  was n o t secondary in  e ffe c t*  "This read ing  o f  th e  p ro v iso , 
argued th e  d is se n tin g  members • • • g iv e s  l i f e  to  i t s  language* / i n  
com parison/ / t7 h e  in te r p r e ta t io n  our co lleag u es  g ive  i t  makes i t ,  f o r  
a l l  p r a c t ic a l  pu rposes, in e f f e c tu a l  and s u p e rf lu o u s ." ? 3
The d is s e n tin g  op in ion  i n  th e  Crown C a fe te r ia  case  took  an added
s ig n if ic a n c e  when a subsequent change in  th e  membership o f  th e  Board
re s u l te d  in  a re v e r s a l  o f  th e  i n i t i a l  ru l in g  w ith  th e  adop tion  o f  th e  
o r ig in a l  d is s e n t  by th e  new m a jo rity  o f  th e  B oard.?9 The new d is s e n te r s  
i n  th e  supplem ental d e c is io n  a ttem pted  to  c la r i f y  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  s ta t in g  
th a t  S ubsection  (C):
(1) . . . exempted such so -c a l le d  in fo rm a tio n a l p ic k e tin g  from a 
g en era l p ro h ib it io n  a p p lic a b le  to  a l l  re c o g n itio n  o r  o rg an isa ­
t io n  p ic k e tin g  . . *;
(2) / t h a t  p ic k e t in g /  • • • to  ad v ise  th e  p u b lic  th a t  an employer
does no t employ . . . /u n io n  members; t h a t /  . . . re c o g n itio n  
. . .  i s  n e c e s s a r ily  an o b je c t o f  t h a t  s o -c a lle d  in fo rm a tio n a l 
p icke ting*  * . . ;
(3) t h a t  i n  o rd e r  to  b rin g  p ic k e tin g  w ith in  th e  purview  o f  S ec tio n  
3 (b )(7 )  re c o g n itio n  * . . need only be an o b je c t,  whereas to  
b rin g  p ic k e tin g  w ith in  th e  excep tion  c re a te d  by th e  p ro v iso , i t  
must be f o r  th e  purpose o f  a d v is in g  th e  p u b lic  . * *; and
(4) / th e r e f o r e ,  th e  d is s e n te r s  concluded/ . . . Congress in ten d ed  
t h a t  s o -c a l le d  in fo rm a tio n a l p ic k e tin g  may be conducted on ly  
when th e re  i s  no independent ev idence o f  an unlaw ful o b je c t and 
where such p ic k e tin g  does no t have an  o b je c t  o f  inducing  a work 
s to p p a g e .30
The sw itch  in  th e  m a jo rity  and d is s e n t in g  op in ions in  th e
78I b id .
?9135 NLRB 1183 (1962).
8oI b id .,  p. 1186.
182
supplem ental d e c is io n  t e  th e  o r ig in a l  o rd e r  i n  Crown C a fe te r ia  has
p layed  an  im p o rtan t ro le  in  re c e n t  cases review ed by th e  NLRB. In  th e
case o f  B artenders and H otel and R estau ran t Workers Union v . Fowler 
SiH otel th e  union  had n e g o tia te d  a c o n tra c t  w ith  th e  p r io r  owner o f  th e  
h o te l  and r e s ta u ra n t ,  b u t when th e  new owner took over th e  o p e ra tio n  o f  
th e  h o te l  he re fu sed  to  reco g n ize  th e  union a s  b a rg a in in g  agen t fo r  th e  
employees. I n  response to  t h i s  r e fu s a l  th e  union c a l le d  a s tr ik e*  and 
th e  s t r i k e  was supported  by p ic k e tin g  " . . .  w ith  a banner b ea rin g  th e  
fo llow ing  legend:
ON STRIKE 
FOR RENEWAL OF OUR 
UNION CONTRACT 
EMPLOYEES OF FOWLER HOTEL.1
Upon in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  a p e t i t io n  f i l e d  by th e  h o te l  to  e n jo in  th e  p ic k ­
eting* th e  T r ia l  Examiner h e ld  th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was in  v io la t io n  o f  
S ec tio n  8 (b ) (7 ) . reason ing  th a t  th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  was to  fo rc e  
re c o g n itio n  and n o t to  t r u th f u l ly  ad v ise  th e  p u b lic  th a t  th e  h o te l  was 
u n f a i r .  C itin g  th e  re v is e d  d e c is io n  in  Crown C a fe te r ia , th e  m a jo rity  o f 
th e  Board h e ld  t h a t  Congress in te n d ed  by th e  p ro v iso  to  ". . . p e rm it 
p ic k e tin g  which t r u th f u l l y  adv ised  th e  p u b lic  th a t  th e  employer d id  no t 
have a  c o n tra c t  w ith  th e  union . Although th e  p ic k e tin g  in  t h i s  case 
was a d m itte d ly  reo o g n itlo n a l*  th e  p ic k e tin g  was in fo rm a tio n a l and i s
81138 NLRB 1315 (1962).
32I b ld . . p . 1320.
83I b ld . . p . 1316.
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w ith in  th e  p ro v iso . The d is s e n t in g  members, Rodgers and Leedoa, 
o b jec te d  to  th e  n a jo r i ty 1 s  o p in io n  en th e  grounds t h a t  th e  d e c is io n  
re p re se n te d  an e x te n s io n  o f  th e  Crown C a fe te r ia  d e c is io n . I t  i s  d i f f i ­
c u l t  to  see , contended th e  m in o rity , " . . .  how a p ic k e t  s ig n , which on 
i t s  fac e  s t a t e s  t h a t  th e  purpose o f  p ic k e tin g  i s  to  secu re  renew al o f  a 
union c o n tra c t ,  can be deemed l im i te d  to  th e  purpose o f  a d v is in g  th e  
p u b lic  t h a t  th e  employer does n o t have a union c o n tra c t .  The a c t io n s  
and th e  purpose o f  th e  union was c le a r ly  re o o g n it lo n a l— such conduct i s  
banned by S ec tio n  8 (b ) (7 ) .  To a llow  such a c t iv i t y  on th e  th eo ry  th a t  i t  
i s  p r iv i le g e d  fay th e  legend  " to  th e  p u b lic "  i s  a g ro ss  m is in te rp re ta t io n  
o f  th e  p u b l ic i ty  p ro v iso .
In  th e  oases a r i s in g  under S ubsec tion  (C) s in c e  th e  Crown d e c i­
s io n , th e  m a jo rity  o f th e  Board has con tinued  to  fo llow  th e  p r in c ip le s  
exp ressed  in  th e  Crown case  w ith  th e  minor ex cep tio n  th a t  p u b l ic i ty  
p ic k e tin g  must be d ir e c te d  to  th e  p u b lic  and no t to  th e  employees o f  th e  
p ic k e te d  employer. I n  A t la n t ic  M aintenance Company^  th e  Board took th e  
p o s i t io n  th a t  th e  un io n 1s p ic k e tin g  o f  th e  on ly  en tran ce  used fay employ­
ees w ith  s ig n s  a d v is in g  th e  p u b lic  a s  w e ll a s th e  employees was i n  
v io la t io n  o f  th e  LMRQA.
P ick e tin g  fo r  an o rg a n iz a t io n a l , re o o g n itio n a l o r  b a rg a in in g  
o b je c tiv e  i s  n o n e th e le ss  p ro te c te d  i f  i t  com plies w ith  th e  second 
p ro v iso  to  S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )(C ) , t h a t  i s  i f  i t  i s  " fo r  th e  purpose o f  
t r u th f u l ly  a d v is in g  th e  p u b lic  ( in c lu d in g  consumers) th a t  an 
employer does n o t employ members o f  o r  have a c o n tra c t  w ith , a la b o r
^ Ifa id . , p . 1317-
85136 NLRB 1104 (1962).
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"o rg a n iz a tio n . However, where p ic k e tin g , though o s te n s ib ly  d ire c te d  
a t  th e  p u b lic , i s  t r a n s p a re n t ly  n o t f o r  t h a t  purpose , clrcranrvention 
o f  th e  s ta tu to r y  p ro h ib i t io n  . . . w i l l  no t be t o l e r a t e d ." 66
I n  Y p s ila n ti  P re s s , I n c . 6? th e  Board a p p lie d  th e  r u le  o f  A tlan tic
M aintenance Company. In  t h i s  case  th e  union p ic k e te d  th e  e n tra n c e s  and 
park ing  l o t s  used  by employees. The p ic k e ts  c a r r ie d  s ig n s  rea d in g : '
"OUR DEMANDS ARE JUSTIFIED, NOT UNREASONABLE 
YPSILANTI DAILY PRESS UNFAIR TO LOCAL UNION 154 ." 56
The p ic k e tin g  was supported  by l e t t e r s  to  th e  employer encouraging
se ttle m e n t o f  th e  s t r ik e  fo r  re c o g n itio n . I n  adopting  th e  ru l in g  o f  th e
T r ia l  Examiner, th e  Board h e ld  th a t  th e  d e a r  in te n t  o f  th e  u n io n 's
a c t io n s  was to  fo rc e  th e  employer, v ia  h i s  employees, to  recogn ize  th e
un ion . Such a c t io n  i s  a v io la t io n  o f  S ec tio n  3 (b ) (7 ) , and i t  cannot be
saved by s e l f - s e rv in g  c la im s th a t  th e  in fo rm a tio n  was in te n d ed  fo r  th e
p u b lic .
In  two re c e n t d e c is io n s  Jay Jacobs Downtown, I n c . 8? and 
M artino1s Home F u rn ish in g s?6 in v o lv in g  S ubsection  (C) p e t i t io n s ,  th e  
Board h e ld  th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was no t i n  v io la t io n  o f  th e  second p rov iso . 
In  Jay Jacobs Downtown th e  p ic k e ts  c a r r ie d  s ig n s  read in g :
86I b i d -, p . 1105-
8?137 NLRB 1116 (1962).
88I b ld . . p . 1119.
8?140 NLRB 1344 (1963).
?°141 NLRB 503 (1963)-
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"JAY JACOBS NON-UNION 
please DO NOT PATRONIZE 
HELP US PROTECT AND BETTER OUR WAGE 
STANDARDS AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
SHOP AT OTHER UNION STORES."91
I n  re fu s in g  to  adopt th e  T r ia l  Examiner' s op in ion  th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was
in  v io la t io n  o f  S ec tio n  8 (b ) (7 ) , th e  Board s ta te d  th a t  an a n a ly s is  o f
th e  f a c t s  re v e a ls  th a t :
The p ic k e ts  were in s t r u c te d  to  p ic k e t  on ly  a t  th e  customer e n tra n ce s  
to  th e  s to re  . • . J a c o b 's  employees were never p ic k e te d ; th e  s ig n s  
were s o le ly  to  th e  p u b lic  and th e  legends on th e  s ig n  embodies i n  
substance  th e  language o f  th e  p u b l ic i ty  p ro v iso . . . .  I t  i s  th u s  
c le a r  . . . th a t  th e  . . . p ic k e tin g  was in fo rm a tio n a l in  c h a ra c te r  
and p ro te c te d  by th e  p u b l ic i ty  p ro v iso . 92
In  M a rtin o 's  Complete Home F u rn ish ings th e  Board agreed  w ith  th e
T r ia l  Examiner1s conclu sions th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was re o o g n itlo n a l in
scope; b u t i t  does no t fo llow , contended th e  Board, t h a t  re c o g n itio n
p ic k e tin g  p e r  se  i s  a v io la t io n  o f  th e  A ct. To invoke th e  ban o f Sec-
i
t io n  8 (b )(7 )  th e  p ic k e tin g  must be d ire c te d  tow ards th e  employees o f  th e  
p ic k e te d  employer. I f  th e  p ic k e tin g  i s  to  t r u th f u l ly  a d v ise  th e  p u b lic  
th a t  th e  employer does no t employ union members o r  does n o t have a union 
c o n tra c t ,  such a c t iv i t y  i s  p ro te c te d  by S ubsection  (C).
While th e  Board has adopted a m odified  v e rs io n  o f  th e  Kennedy- 
Cox in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  Subsection  (C)» the  c o u rts  a s  a g en e ra l ru le  have 
fo llow ed a l e g a l i s t i c  approach in  l i n e  w ith  th e  G o ld w ate r-G riffin
91140 NLRB 13^5-
9^Ibid. , p. 1 3 ^ .
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i n te r p r e ta t io n .  I n  Graham v . R e ta il  C lerks A s s 'n . 95 th e  r e t a i l  c le r k 1 s
union had p ick e te d  th e  em ployer1s r e t a i l  o u t le t  p r io r  to  a re p re se n ta ­
t io n  e le c t io n  f o r  th e  purpose o f  o rg an iz in g  and re p re se n tin g  th e  employ­
e r ' s  employees a t  a recogn ized  n e g o tia t io n  se ss io n . The union  h e ld  
numerous conferences p r io r  to  th e  i n i t i a l  p ic k e tin g  and subm itted  a 
proposed b arg a in in g  c o n tra c t  to  th e  s to re  manager. Upon f a i lu r e  o f  th e  
i n i t i a l  n e g o tia tio n  th e  union began p ic k e tin g  th e  s to re  on February 9* 
i 960 . The p ic k e t s ig n  read t
The p ic k e tin g  continued w ithou t in c id e n t  u n t i l  a few days b e fo re  th e  
e le c t io n  on March 18 "when th e  union fo rg o t abou t o rg a n iz in g . ' The 
p ic k e tin g  was p eace fu l and th e re  was evidence th a t  o th e r  employees 
re fu sed  to  c ro ss  th e  p ic k e t  l in e  on two o ccasio n s . A f te r  th e  e le c t io n  
in  which th e  employees vo ted  unanimously a g a in s t  th e  respondent un ion , 
th e  p ic k e tin g  ceased u n t i l  May 6, i 960 , a t  which tim e i t  was resumed. 
The new p ic k e t sign  read :
'THIS RESTED STORE 
HAS NO 
CLERK'S UNION CONTRACT 
AND
NON-UNION CLERKS PA 
UNION CLERKS."
"RESTED HAS NO 
CLERK'S UNION CONTRACT
NON-UNION CLERKS."95
95188 F. Supp. 8h? (I9 6 0 ). 
9** Ib id . . p . 851.
95Ib id . . p . 857.
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P rior to  the resumption o f  the p ick etin g  the respondent1 s attorney
s ta te d  i n  a l e t t e r  to  th e  Cascade Oounty Trade Assembly th a t  H ested d id
no t have a union c o n tra c t  and th a t )
♦ . . i n  th e  n ear fu tu re  th e se  un ions in te n d  to  p ic k e t  • • • f o r  
in fo rm a tio n a l purposes on ly  • . . /seo o n d lx 7  th e  I n te n t  / o f  th e  
p ic k e tin g  i s  n o t/  to  stop  d e l iv e r ie s  • • • / a t  th e  s to re ,  b u t/
. . . to  in f lu e n c e  th e  p u b lic  and th e  f r ie n d s  o f  o rg an ized  la b o r  
no t to  make pu rchases from H ested1s s to re  . . .  We hope th e  members 
o f  your a s s o c ia t io n  w i l l  n o t p a tro n iz e  non-union c le rk s  o r  w a i tr e s s e s  
a t  H e s te d 's  s to re .
The q u e s tio n  b e fo re  th e  c o u rt i n  t h i s  case  was w hether th e  i n f o r ­
m ational p ic k e tin g  c a r r ie d  on a f t e r  th e  re p re s e n ta t io n  e le c t io n  was f o r  
o rg a n iz a tio n a l and re c o g n itio n  pu rposes. The p e t i t io n e r  contended th a t  
th e  ex cep tio n  under S ec tion  8 (b )(7 )(C ) ( t r u th f u l  consumer p ic k e tin g )  was 
n o t a p p lic a b le  to  an a c tio n  under 8 (b )(7 )(B ) and th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was 
f o r  o rg a n iz a tio n a l  purposes and was secondary in  e f f e c t .  In  support o f 
t h i s  p o s i t io n  th e  p e t i t io n e r  c i te d  P en e llo  v . R e ta il  S to re  Employees.
In  t h i s  case th e  c o u rt l im ite d  in fo rm a tio n a l p ic k e tin g  to  Subparagraph 
(C). In  th e  Graham case , however, th e  c o u rt p o in ted  ou t t h a t  th e  
P enello  d e c is io n  recognized  th a t  p ic k e tin g  which i s  p u re ly  in fo rm a tio n a l 
in  n a tu re  may be p e rm itte d  under S ec tio n  8 (b )(7 )(B ) i f  i t  does no t have 
an o b je c t  o f  fo rc in g  o r  re q u ir in g  re c o g n itio n  o r  o rg a n iz a tio n . Evidence 
reg a rd in g  the secondary e f f e c t s  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g  d isc lo se d  two o ccasio n s 
where persons re fu se d  to  make d e liv e ry  by reason  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g . On 
May 18, a d r iv e r  in  th e  normal course  o f  h is  a c t i v i t i e s  re fu sed  to  make
96I b l d .
97188 F. Supp. 193 (I9 6 0 ).
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d e liv e ry  o f  paper cups because o f  th e  p ick e tin g *  On June 13. a 
m echanic, a f t e r  ta lk in g  w ith  a p ic k e t ,  re fu se d  to  c ro s s  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e  
and re tu rn e d  to  h i s  shop w ith o u t n o tify in g  th e  s to re  manager th a t  h i s  
au tom obile  would n o t be ready  on schedu le . Regarding th e  o rg a n iz a tio n a l  
q u e s tio n  an employee o f  Hested t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  a p ic k e t  Joe Conway to ld  
him th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  would con tinue  u n t i l  "we" jo in e d  up. Under 
exam ination Conway adm itted  th e  d is c lo s u re  bu t s a id  he was on ly  jo k in g .
Reviewing th e  evidence and th e  rea so n ab le  i n t e n t  o f th e  p a r t i e s '
a c t io n , th e  c o u rt re fu se d  to  g ra n t th e  in ju n c t io n  a g a in s t  th e  p ic k e tin g
ho ld ing  th a t  i t  i s  th e  du ty  o f  th e  c o u rts  under S ec tio n  3 (b )(7 )(B )
. . t o  determ ine th e  i n t e n t  o f  th e  p a r ty  charged . . . / t h e  t e s t7
. . .  i s  th a t  o f  our in q u iry  in to  / t h e  reasonab le7  imm ediate o b je c tiv e
o f  th e  union . . . and th e re  i s  no way to  determ ine in te n t  o r  o b je c tiv e
except through  in fe re n c e s  to  be drawn from th e  a c t io n s  o f  th e  p a r t i e s . " 9®
In  o rd e r  to  a s c e r ta in  th e  o b je c tiv e  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g , i t  i s  n e ce ssa ry  to
d is t in g u is h  between th e  im m ediate o b je c tiv e  and th e  u lt im a te  o b je c t iv e .
In  t h i s  case th e  c o u rt determ ined th a t ;
. . . w h ile  th e  i n i t i a l  p ic k e tin g  had an o b je c t  o f  fo rc in g  o r  
re q u ir in g  re c o g n itio n  and o rg a n iz a tio n , th a t  o b je c t  was abandoned 
by th e  responden t . . . /a n d  th e  evidence o f  th e  union  a c t i v i t i e s  
s in c e  May ^7  • • • i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  show a rea so n ab le  immediate 
o b je c t  o f  fo rc in g  o r  re q u ir in g  re c o g n itio n  o r  o rg a n iz a tio n , b u t 
r a th e r  m a n ife s ts  an i n te n t  to  inform  th e  p u b lic  th a t  H ested does no t 
have a union c o n tra c t  and employs non-union clerks.99
The c o u rt d is t in g u is h e d  th e  Graham case  from th e  P ene llo  d e c is io n  on th e
98188 F. Supp. 837.
" i b i d . . p . 858.
189
f a c t s  t h a t  th e  onion withdrew  from th e  e lc t io n ,  th e  absence o f  communi­
c a tio n  between th e  union and th e  employer a f t e r  th e  e le c t io n ,  th e  change 
in  th e  p ic k e t  legend , and th e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  p e t i t io n e r  to  show su b s tan ­
t i a l  secondary e f f e c t s .
In  th e  case  o f  Greene v . NLHB1 ^  th e  union was engaged i n  p ic k ­
e tin g  B l in s tru b 1 s  V illa g e  and G r i l l e ,  In c . f o r  th e  purpose o f  o rg an iz in g  
th e  employees and to  fo rc e  B l in s t ru b 's  to  b a rg a in  w ith  th e  un ion . The 
p ic k e tin g  took p la c e  n ine  months a f t e r  th e  un ion  l o s t  a  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  
e le c t io n  in  which th e  employees by a v o te  o f  n in e ty - th re e  to  seven 
r e je c te d  th e  un ion . I n  view o f  th e  evidence d is c lo s in g  th e  im m ediate 
and u ltim a te  i n te n t  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g , th e  c o u rt he ld  th a t  th e  union 
engaged in  an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  w ith in  th e  meaning o f  S ec tio n  8(b) 
(7)(B ) o f  th e  A c t.101
The case  o f  P en e llo  v . R e ta il  S to re  Employees upheld  by th e  
U nited S ta te s  Court o f  Appeals in  March, 1961, p re s e n ts  an i n te r e s t in g  
c o n tra s t  to  th e  Graham and Greene d e c is io n s . In  th e  P en e llo  case th e  
union in  February , i 960 , began conducting a campaign to  o rg an ize  I r v i n s ' 
em ployees. T his a c t iv i t y  c o n s is te d  o f  d is t r ib u t in g  l e a f l e t s  and o b ta in ­
ing  employee s ig n a tu re s .  Between February and May th e  union continued  
i t s  o rg an iz in g  a c t iv i ty *  and bo th  th e  union and th e  employer accused 
each o th e r  o f  v io la t io n s  under th e  A ct. During t h i s  p e rio d  th e  union
100186 F. Supp. 630 (I9 6 0 ) .
101Compare Cavers v . T eam sters G eneral L ocal 200, 188 F. Supp. 
184 (I9 6 0 ).
p ick e te d  I r v in e 1 s to r e s  c a rry in g  s ig n s  which read :
"IRVINS REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE
LOCAL 1692 
RETAIL STORE EMPLOYEES UNION R .C .I.A .
AFL-CTO."102 *
As a r e s u l t  o f  th e  p ic k e tin g . I r v in s  f i l e d  a charge a l le g in g  th a t  th e  
p ic k e tin g  was being  conducted w ithou t su p p o rt o f a p e t i t io n .  The union 
subsequen tly  f i l e d  a p e t i t io n  f o r  an exped ited  e le c t io n  which was h e ld  
on August 18, i 960 . The employees vo ted  a g a in s t  th e  un ion  and th e  
r e s u l t s  were u n co n tested . On August 19. th e  union  n o t i f i e d  I r v in s  by 
l e t t e r  w ithdraw ing i t s  demands f o r  re c o g n itio n  b u t g iv ing  n o tic e  t h a t  i t  
would inform  th e  la b o r  movement and th e  C ity  o f  B altim ore o f th e  employ­
e e s ' a n tiu n io n  p o s i t io n  by a d v e r t is in g  to  th e  p u b lic  th e  re p re h e n s ib le  
conduct o f ". . . your su p e rv iso rs , ag en ts  and r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  th re a te n ­
in g , coercing  and in tim id a tin g  your employees • • . la b o r  h a tin g  and 
la b o r  b a i t in g  a re  th in g s  o f  th e  p a s t . T h e  union con tinued  i t s  p ic k ­
e tin g  a f t e r  th e  e le c t io n  changing th e  legend  on th e  s ig n s  to  read :




FOR ITS EMPLOYEES 
PLEASE 
DO NOT PATRONIZE 
RETAIL STORE EMPLOYEES UNION ^
LOCAL 692 R .C .I .A ., AFL-CTO,
102188 F. Supp. 196 .
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and th e  union m odified  th e  hours o f  p ic k e tin g  i n  o rd e r  to  avoid  d i r e c t  
o o n tac t w ith  th e  employees* The number o f  p ic k e ts  was reduced to  one 
a t  each s to re  and th e  conduct o f th e  p ic k e tin g  was p eace fu l and was 
w ith o u t secondary e ffe c ts*
A fte r  review ing th e  S ec tio n s  8 (b )(7 )(A ). (B), and (C), th e  
F edera l C irc u it  Court he ld  th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was i n  v io la t io n  o f  th e  
LMRQA. The C o u rt 's  d e c is io n  gave a t te n t io n  to  co n g ress io n a l i n te n t  in  
th e  Landrum -G riffin  Act r e f e r r in g  to  Congressman G r i f f i n 's  s ta tem en t 
th a t  th e  second p ro v iso  11. . . p e r ta in s  to  S ubsection  (C) only and 
th e re fo re  consumer ap p ea ls  fo r  o rg a n iz a tio n a l  and re c o g n itio n  purposes 
a re  banned a f t e r  an e l e c t i o n ."105 The Court p o in ted  ou t t h a t  th e  un ion 's 
p ic k e t legend  . . .  to ld  no one th a t  th e  s to re  had committed u n fa ir  
la b o r  p r a c t ic e s ,  th e  un ion1s p re se n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  p ic k e tin g . I t  
only to ld  re a d e rs  th a t  th e  union had n o t been re c o g n iz e d ."1°^ On t h i s  
b a s is  and on th e  union a g e n t’ s  testim ony  th a t  i n  o rd e r  to  secu re  th e  
removal o f  th e  p ic k e ts .  I r v in s  would have to  inform  i t s  employees th a t  
i t  would no t i n t e r f e r e  w ith  t h e i r  f r e e  cho ice  o f  a b a rg a in in g  agen t, b u t 
th a t  I r v in s  would a ls o  have to  a llow  th e  a p p e l la n ts  to  ad d ress  such 
meeting o f  th e  employees. The Court ooncluded th a t  th e  p ic k e tin g  was 
o rg a n iz a tio n a l a s  w e ll a s  in fo rm a tio n a l in  purpose. In  determ in ing  th e  
reaso n ab le  in te n t  o f  the  p ic k e tin g , th e  Court h e ld  th a t  i t  was no t 
re q u ire d i
105Cong. Reg. A7915- 
1o6188 F. Supp. 201.
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. . . to  a c c e p t  a t  fa c e  v a lu e  th e  s e l f - s e r v in g  s ta te n a n t s  made by 
e i t h e r  s id e  . . . The p r io r  o b j e c t iv e  sh ou ld  b e  con sid ered *  ( a s  
w e l l  a s  o th e r  e v id e n c e )  in  d e c id in g  w hether p ic k e t in g  h as had a s  an  
o b j e c t  fo r c in g  th e  em ployer to  r e c o g n is e  and b a rg a in  w ith  th e  u n ion  
— n o t  i n  th e  f a r  d i s t a n t  fu tu re*  n o t  im m ed ia te ly  * b u t w ith in  a 
r e a so n a b le  time* b e fo r e  or  s h o r t ly  a f t e r  th e  e x p ir a t io n  o f  one  
y e a r .10”
R eferr in g  to  th e  r e sp o n d e n t's  c o n te n t io n  th a t  p ic k e t in g  in  th e  
in s t a n t  c a se  i s  p r o te c te d  by th e  C o n s t itu t io n  under th e  r u le  o f  A .F .L . 
v . Sw ing, th e  Court h e ld  th a t  a lth o u g h  C ongress co u ld  n o t  p r o p e r ly  ban 
p ic k e t in g  in  ev ery  s i t u a t io n  i t  may ban p ic k e t in g  w hich d e f e a t s  p u b lic  
p o l i c y .  P ic k e t in g  I n v o lv e s  more than j u s t  p u b lic a t io n  and th e  p u b lic  
p o l i c y  em bodied i n  th e  LMRDA 11. . . i s  th a t  th e  em ployer and h i s  
em p loyees sh ou ld  be f r e e  f o r  a r ea so n a b le  tim e  a f t e r  an e l e c t i o n  from  
r e c o g n it io n  and o r g a n iz a t io n a l  p ic k e t in g ." 1 0 ® W hile t h i s  a n a ly s i s  o f  
c o u r t  d e c i s io n s  d oes n o t  p r o v id e  a r e a l  i n s ig h t  in t o  th e  f i n a l  r e s u l t  in  
r e s p e c t  to  S u b sec tio n  (C ). i t  d o es  g iv e  some in d ic a t io n  o f  th e  d i f f i ­
c u l t y  o f  b a la n c in g  th e  com peting i n t e r e s t s  and th e  problem  o f  t r y in g  to  
d e v e lo p  a  c o n s i s t e n t  body o f  p ro ced u ra l r ig h t s  w hich w i l l  p erm it th e  
p a r t i e s  to  p r o t e c t  th e m se lv e s  from each  o th e r  a s  w e l l  a s  from th e  s t a t e .
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 8 (b )(7 )  RESTRICTIONS
A lthough th e  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  on th e  s t a t u s  o f
10W
l o 6I b id . , p . 202 . For a d d it io n a l  c o u r t  d e c i s io n s  in  regard  to  
t h i s  q u e s t io n  s e e  Brown v . Departm ent and S p e c ia l t y  S to r e s  Em ployees 
Onion* 187 F. Supp. 619 ( I 9 6 0 ) ;  Kennedy v . RCOA L o ca l 32kt D.C. C al. hz 
( I 9 6 0 ) ;  and E l l i o t  v . I n t e r n a t io n a l  T y p ograp h ica l Union L oca l 6 1 9 * D .C . 
O kla. (1 9 5 9 ) .
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r e c o g n it lo n a l  a n d /o r  o r g a n is a t io n a l  p ic k e t in g  hare n o t bean s p e l la d  o u t  
In  e v er y  c o n c e iv a b le  oaae . I t  l a  p o e a lb le  to  a s c e r t a in  th e  r e le v a n t  
e f f e c t s  o f  th e se  r e g u la t io n s  on th e  s t a t u s  o f  p ic k e t in g .  B efo re  a n a ly s ­
in g  th e s e  e f f e c t s *  however, i t  i s  im p ortan t to  r e c o g n is e  th a t  S e c t io n  
8 (b ) (7 )  a p p l ie s  to  a s p e c ia l  c a s e — r e c o g n it lo n a l  p ic k e t in g —and t o  a 
s p e c i f i c  s e c to r  o f  th e  tr a d e  u n ion  movement. S e c t io n  8 (b ) (7 )  r e p r e s e n ts  
an a ttem p t to  l i m i t  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  tra d e  u n ion s to  p ic k e t  f o r  r e c o g n i­
t io n  u n le s s  th e  purpose o f  such p ic k e t in g  i s  to  t r u t h f u l ly  a d v is e  th e  
p u b lic  th a t  th e  em ployer i s  u n fa ir .  Under th e s e  c ircu m sta n ces  C ongress 
in ten d ed  th a t  S e c t io n  8 (b ) (7 )  shou ld  a c t  a s  a sa feg u a rd — p r o te c t in g  
th e  em ployer from th e  secondary e f f e c t s  o f  p ic k e t in g , i . e . .  i n t e r ­
fe r e n c e  w ith  d e l i v e r i e s  and a p p e a ls  to  h i s  em p loyees. S e c t io n  8 (b )(7 )*  
th e r e fo r e ,  r e g u la te s  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  u n ion  to  p ic k e t  under g iv en  
c ircu m sta n ces  u n le s s  th e  union i s  a b le  to  dem on strate an ab sen ce  o f  a 
r e c o g n it lo n a l  m o tiv e . W hile th e  r e g u la t io n s  under S e c t io n  8 (b ) (7 )  are  
u n iv e r s a l  in  in t e n t ,  th ey  a re  n o t  u n iv e r s a l  in  p r a c t ic e .  The r e g u la ­
t io n s  o n ly  a f f e c t  th e  u n ion  i f  i t  i s  see k in g  to  r e p r e se n t th e  em ployer’ s  
em ployees. The r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  in  supp ort o f  a l e g i t im a t e  s t r ik e  i s  
o th er w ise  u n a ffe c te d  by S e c tio n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) .  But by l im i t in g  th e  Im pact o f  
th e  r e g u la t io n s  to  th e  p resen ce  o f  a r e c o g n it lo n a l  m o tiv e , S e c t io n  8 (b )  
(7 ) d e s tr o y s  th e  m ost s i g n i f i c a n t  means o f  power a v a i la b le  to  th e  tr a d e  
u n io n . The tr a d e  u n ion  in  t h i s  in s ta n c e  i s  e i t h e r  seek in g  t o  p r o te c t  
i t s  e x is t e n c e  ( l o s s  o f  a d e c e r t i f i c a t io n  e le c t io n )  or t o  ex ten d  i t s  
in f lu e n c e  through a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t io n .  In  b oth  c a se s  th e  e x is t e n c e  
o f  th e  l o c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  th e  fu tu r e  o f  th e  tr a d e  union movement i s  a t
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s ta k e . The e f f e c t  o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) (7 )  h as been  to  d isavow  th e  econom ics  
o f  p ic k e t in g  in  fa v o r  o f  a l e g a l i s t i c  s o lu t io n .  The r e s u l t  has b een  to  
c o n fu se  th e  prim ary p a r t ie s  reg a rd in g  th e  cu rren t s t a t u s  o f  p ic k e t in g .  
N e ith e r  u n io n s nor em ployers may b e  c e r ta in  about th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  th e  
u n io n 's  p ic k e t in g  i n  a g iv e n  c a se , b u t th e  econom ic conseq u en ces o f  th e  
r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  o r  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  p ic k e t in g  cannot be o v er lo o k ed  by  
th e  p a r t i e s .  The econom ic p r e ssu r e  o f  p ic k e t in g  f o r c e s  th e  em ployer to  
e i t h e r  b a rg a in  w ith  th e  u n ion  or to  seek  an in j u n c t io n  a g a in s t  th e  
p ic k e t in g .
S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  assum es th a t  th e  em ployer sh ou ld  be fr e e  o f  
r e c o g n it lo n a l  p ic k e t in g ,  and th e  em ployer i s  encouraged to  r e s i s t  u n t i l  
such tim e a s  th e  co u r t may in t e r v e n e . In  v iew  o f  th e  preem ption  o f  th e  
b o y c o tt  (S e c t io n  ?04) and th e  r e g u la t io n  a g a in s t  second ary  p ic k e t in g  
(Moore Dry D ock), th e  r e s t r i c t i o n  on prim ary p ic k e t in g  (S e c t io n  8 f b J / T 7 )  
e f f e c t i v e l y  e l im in a te s  th e  o n ly  rem aining means o f  c o u n te r v a ilin g  power 
in  th e  hands o f  th e  u n io n . Thus in  t h i s  c r i t i c a l  area  (o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  
new u n io n s) S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  rem oves th e  l a s t  v i s t a g e  o f  un ion  power 
a g a in s t  th e  em ployer. The im m ediate con seq u en ces o f  th e  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on r e c o g n it lo n a l  p ic k e t in g  a re  i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  reco rd  o f  
r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t i o n  p e t i t i o n s  s in c e  1959 ( s e e  T ab le  I I ) .  In  1959 . 
th e  y e a r  p r e ce d in g  th e  enactm ent o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) ,  th e r e  w ere 5*428  
r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t io n s  condu cted  by th e  NLRB. U nions (b oth  a f f i l i a t e d  
and u n a f f i l i a t e d )  w ere v ic t o r io u s  in  6 2 .8  p er  c e n t o f  th e  e l e c t io n s  h e ld .  
I n  I9 6 0 , th e  t o t a l  p e rcen ta g e  d ecrea sed  to  58*6 p er  c en t and th e  o v e r a l l  
p e r ce n ta g e  f e l l  t o  5 6 .1  p er  cen t in  196 1 . W hile th e  a v era g e  p ercen ta g e
195
TABLE II
COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING ELECTIONS1 3Y AFFILIATION 
OF PARTICIPATING UNIONS
Year Union A f f i l i a t i o n
E L ection s P a r t ic ip a te d  In
T o ta l Won P e rcen t Won
1959 T o ta l ................... 5 .4 2 8 2 3 .4 1 0 6 2 .8
AFL-CIO . . . . . 3 .9 7 0 2 ,3 0 2 5 8 .0
U n a f f l l ia t e d .  . . 2 ,0 3 0 1 ,1 0 8 5 4 .6
I960 T o ta l .................... 6 ,3 8 0 3 .7 4 0 5 8 .6
AFL-CIO . . . . . 4 ,5 0 4 2 ,4 0 0 53-3
U n a f f l l ia t e d .  . . 2 ,5 2 2 1 ,3 4 0 53-1
1961 T o ta l .................... 6 ,3 5 ^ 3 ,5 6 3 5 6 .1
AFL-CIO .................... 4 ,2 8 7 2 ,1 7 0 5 0 .6
U n a f f l l ia t e d .  . . 2 ,7 1 4 1 .3 9 3 51-3
1 9 6 2 T o ta l .................... 7 .3 5 5 4 ,3 0 5 5 8 .5
A FL-C IO .................... 5 .0 4 9 2 ,7 0 8 5 3 .6
U n a f f i l ia t e d .  . . 3 .0 1 4 1 .5 9 7 53 -0
1963 T o ta l ................... 6 ,8 7 1 4 ,0 5 2 5 9 .0
AFL-CIO . . . . . 4 ,7 4 9 2 ,5 6 5 5 4 .0
U n a f f l l ia t e d .  . . 2 ,7 6 8 1 ,4 8 7 53-7
-'-'The term " c o l l e c t iv e  b argain in g"  e l e c t io n  i s  u sed  to  cover  
r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t io n s  req u ested  by a un ion  or  o th e r  ca n d id a te  fo r  
em ployee r e p r e s e n ta t io n  or by th e  em ployer.
^ E le c t io n s  in v o lv in g  two u n io n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  a f f i l i a t i o n s  a re  
counted  under each a f f i l i a t i o n ,  but o n ly  on ce  in  th e  t o t a l -  T h ere fo re , 
th e  t o t a l  i s  l e s s  than th e  sum o f  th e  f ig u r e s  o f  th e  two groupin gs by  
a f f i l i a t i o n .
Source: Annual Report o f  th e  NLRB, U n ited  S t a te s  Government
P r in t in g  O ff ic e ,  W ashington, D-C-
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in c r e a s e d  t o  5^*5 p e r  c e n t  f o r  1962 and t o  59 p e r  c e n t f o r  1 9 6 3 . th e  
i n i t i a l  d e c r e a se  o f  s i x  and o n e - h a l f  p er  cen t betw een  June o f  1959 and  
June o f  1 9 6 2  em p h asizes th e  i n i t i a l  im p act o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) on c e r t i ­
f i c a t i o n  e l e c t i o n s .
S in c e  th e  enactm ent o f  th e  LMRDA u n io n s  have e x p e r ie n c e d  
in c r e a s in g  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  m a in ta in in g  r e c o g n it lo n a l  s t a t u s .  T h is  i s  
d em on stra ted  by th e  reco rd  o f  d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p e t i t i o n s  s in c e  1959 ( s e e  
T able I I I ) .  Of th e  two hundred s ix t e e n  d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t i o n s  con ­
d u cted  b y  th e  Board in  195 9 . u n io n s  l o s t  t h e i r  l e g a l  s t a t u s  in  65*7 p er  
c e n t o f  th e  t o t a l .  In  i 9 6 0 , th e  t o t a l  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s  
in c r e a s e d  to  6 8 .8  p e r  c e n t .  A lth ough th e  t o t a l  p e r ce n ta g e  d e c re a sed  to  
6 6 .8  p e r  c e n t  i n  1961 , th e  p e r ce n ta g e  f o r  u n a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n s  in c r e a s e d  
t o  73*^ p e r  c e n t .  S ig n i f i c a n t  w ith in  t h e s e  f ig u r e s  i s  th e  in c r e a s e  In  
th e  number o f  d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p e t i t i o n s  fo r  u n a f f l l i a t e d  u n io n s . In  
1959 th e r e  w ere f o r t y - n in e  d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p e t i t i o n s ;  t h i s  number 
in c r e a s e d  to  s e v e n t y - f iv e  in  i 9 6 0  and to  s e v e n ty -n in e  i n  1961 o r  an  
in c r e a s e  o f  s ix ty - tw o  p er  c e n t  in  two y e a r s .  I n  com parison th e  number 
o f  p e t i t i o n s  f o r  u n io n s  a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  th e  AFL-CTO d e c re a sed  from one 
hundred s ix t y - s e v e n  in  1959 to  one hundred s ix ty - t w o  in  1 9 6 1 .
The o v e r a l l  in c r e a s e  in  d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p e t i t i o n s  among 
u n a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n s  s tr o n g ly  su p p o rts  th e  h y p o th e s is  o f  t h i s  stu d y  th a t  
S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) has encouraged " n e u tr a l” em ployers to  adop t an a n t iu n io n  
a t t i t u d e .  T h is  change i n  a t t i t u d e  h a s  f o s t e r e d  th e  developm ent o f  a new 
p h ilo so p h y  o f  re-en tren ch m en t among nonunion em ployers com parable to  
t h a t  o f  th e  1 9 2 0 's .  The enactm ent o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  h a s  made i t
19?
TABLE I I I
DECERTIFICATION ELECTIONS BY AFFILIATION 
OF PARTICIPATING UNIONS
E le c t io n s  P a r t ic ip a te d  In
R e su lt in g  in  R e su lt in g  i n
C e r t i f i c a t io n ________ D e c e r t i f i c a t io n
Year
Union
A f f i l i a t i o n T o ta l Number
P ercen t  
o f  t o t a l Number
P e rcen t  
o f  t o t a l
1959 T o ta l . . . . 216 74 3 4 .3 142 6 5 .7
AFI^dO . . . . 167 60 3 5 .9 107 6 4 .1
U n a f f i l ia t e d .  . 49 14 2 8 .6 35 7 1 .^
I960 T o ta l . . . . 23? 74 3 1 .2 163 6 8 .8
AFL-dO . . . . 162 51 3 1 .5 111 6 8 . 5
U n a f f l l ia t e d .  . 75 23 3 0 .7 52 6 9 .3
1961 T o ta l . . . . 241 80 3 3 .2 161 6 6 .8
AFL-CIO . . . . 162 59 3 6 .4 103 6 3 .6
U n a f f i l ia t e d .  . 79 21 2 6 .6 58 7 3 .^
1962 T o ta l . . . . 285 99 3 ^ .7 186 6 5 .3
AFL—CIO . . . . 192 72 3 7 .5 120 6 2 .5
U n a f f l l ia t e d .  . 93 27 2 9 .0 66 71-0
1963 T o ta l . . . . 225 60 2 6 .7 165 73-3
AFL—CIO . • . 139 3? 2 6 .6 102 7 3 .^
U n a f f i l ia t e d .  . 
AFL-CIO v .
76 15 1 9 -7 61 8 0 .3
U n a f f l l ia t e d . 10 8 8 0 .0 2 2 0 .0
Source: Annual Report o f  th e  NLRB* U n ited  S ta te s  Government
P r in t in g  O f f ic e ,  W ashington, D.C.
in c r e a s in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  u n ion s on th e  f r o n t ie r  o f  th e  la b o r  movement 
to  d ev e lo p  s a t i s f a c t o r y  means o f  opp osin g  th e  a c t io n s  o f  em p loyers.
The co n tin u ed  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  th e  t o r t  p h ilo so p h y  o f  p ic k e t in g  by th e  
c o u r ts  h as encouraged em ployers to  seek  rem ed ies under S e c t io n  8 ( b ) (7 )  
to  e v i c t  u n io n s from t h e ir  p la n t s .
THE LEGAL STATUS OF PICKETING (1963)
The l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  p ic k e t in g  has tr a v e le d  th e  " f u l l  c ir c le "  
from e q u a l i ty  w ith  f r e e  sp eech  to  a cu rren t p o s i t io n  o f  r e s t r i c t e d  scop e  
en ta n g led  by th e  o b j e c t iv e  t e s t  and th e  due p r o c e s s  c la u s e  o f  th e  Four­
te e n th  A m e n d m e n t . W i t h i n  t h i s  c i r c l e  o f  adjustm ent th e  l e g a l  s t a t u s  
h a s been s u b je c t  to  a v a r ie t y  o f  in t e r p r e t a t io n s ,  r e in t e r p r e t a t io n s ,  
and new ap p roach es. The most r e c e n t  approach, o r  th e  o b j e c t iv e  t e s t ,  
e x h ib i t s  c o n s id e r a b le  prom ise a s  a c o n tin u in g  so u rce  o f  j u d ic ia l  co n tro ­
v e r s y . The problem  o f  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  d eterm in in g  th e  p r e c is e  o b j e c t  o f  
th e  p ic k e t in g , e . g . ,  which e s t a b l is h e d  th e  t e s t  fo r  a llo w in g  o r  d i s ­
a llo w in g  th e  p u b lic a t io n  o f  a la b o r  d is p u te , p ro v id es  a seem in g ly  
u n so lv a b le  q u e s t io n . The fu tu r e  l e g a l  s t a t u s  o f  p ic k e t in g  may d eg en era te  
to  a c a se  by c a se  exam ination  w ith  em phasis on c o n g r e s s io n a l in t e n t ,  
p r a c t ic e  o f  th e  p a r t ie s ,  p r e se n t o b j e c t iv e s ,  and p a s t  o b j e c t iv e s  w ith in  
a c a r e f u l ly  d e f in e d  tim e p e r io d .
In  su rv ey in g  th e  l e g a l  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e t in g , i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  
some form s o f  p ic k e t in g  a re  i l l e g a l  r e g a r d le s s  o f  th e  o b j e c t iv e ,  th a t
10^Samoff, lo c .  c i t .
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some ty p e s  a re  exempt from r e s t r ic t io n s *  and th a t  o th er  ty p e s  may o r  may 
n o t be i l l e g a l  depending on th e  f a c t  s i t u a t io n .  The ty p e s  o f  p ic k e t in g  
w hich a re  i l l e g a l  r e g a r d le s s  o f  c ircu m sta n ces  a re  (1 )  p ic k e t in g  in  
supp ort o f  a second ary  b o y c o tt , (2 )  J u r is d ic t io n a l  p ic k e t in g , (3 )  p ic k ­
e t in g  fo r  th e  purpose o f  d is p la c in g  a c e r t i f i e d  u n ion , (4 ) p ic k e t in g  i n  
supp ort o f  a s t r ik e  under a c o n tr a c t  co n ta in in g  a n o - s tr ik e  c la u s e ,
(5 )  p ic k e t in g  fo r  th e  purpose o f  demanding a c lo se d  shop. (6 )  p ic k e t in g  
which c o n s t i t u t e s  a breach o f  n o t i f i c a t i o n  procedure under S e c t io n  8 (d )  
o f  th e  T a ft-H a r t le y  A ct, (7 )  p ic k e t in g  o f  an em ployer in  v io la t io n  o f  a 
s t a t e  a n t itr a d e  law  w ith in  i n t r a s t a t e  commerce, (8 ) p ic k e t in g  i n  supp ort 
o f  an econom ic d isp u te  a g a in s t  a p u b lic  u t i l i t y  or  an in d u s tr y  a f f e c t in g  
th e  n a t io n a l w e lfa r e , (9 ) p ic k e t in g  in  support o f  a w ild c a t  s t r ik e ,  and 
(1 0 ) p ic k e t in g  in  v io la t io n  o f  a s t a t e  p u b lic  p o l i c y  s t a t u t e  which i s  
n o t preem pted by fe d e r a l  j u r i s d ic t io n .
The form s o f  p ic k e t in g  which a re  exempt from fe d e r a l and s t a t e  
r e g u la t io n s  a r e  (1 ) p ic k e t in g  by prim ary em ployees in  supp ort o f  a 
s t r ik e  a g a in s t  t h e ir  em ployer a t  (a )  th e  prim ary s i t u s  o r  (b ) a t  th e  
common s i t u s  where th e  p ic k e t in g  d o es  n o t in t e r f e r e  w ith  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  second ary  em ployees, ( 2 ) p ic k e t in g  by a m in o r ity  un ion  fo r  th e  purpose 
o f  o r g a n iz in g  a nonunion em p lo y er 's  em ployees p r io r  to  a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  
e l e c t io n ,  (3 )  p ic k e t in g  fo r  th e  purpose o f  a d v e r t is in g  to  th e  p u b lic  and 
t o  th e  em ployees th a t  an em ployer i s  co n tin u in g  to  engage in  an u n fa ir  
la b o r  p r a c t ic e  fo r  th e  purpose o f  d is c r e d i t in g  th e  u n ion , (4 )  t r u t h fu l  
p u b l ic i t y  p ic k e t in g  fo r  th e  purpose o f  in form in g  th e  p u b lic  th a t  th e  
em ployer d oes n o t have a un ion  c o n tr a c t  (a ) where th e  p ic k e t in g  i s  n o t
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second ary  in  e f f e c t  and (b ) p rovid ed  th e  p ic k e t in g  d o es  not ta k e  p la c e  
w ith in  a tw e lv e  month p er io d  a f t e r  a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t io n ,  and (5 )  
p ic k e t in g  fo r  th e  purpose o f  e s t a b l is h in g  a un ion  shop where th e  s t a t e  
d o es n o t have a s t a t e  r lg h t- to -w o r k  law .
The form s o f  p ic k e t in g  which may or  may not be l e g a l ,  depending  
on th e  c o u r t 's  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  o b j e c t iv e  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g , a re  ( l )  
p ic k e t in g  fo r  th e  purpose o f  a d v e r t is in g  t o  th e  p u b lic  th a t  th e  em ployer  
has n e g o t ia te d  a sw eeth ea rt c o n tr a c t  w ith  a bogus u n ion , and (2 ) tr u th ­
f u l  p u b l i c i t y  p ic k e t in g  w hich ta k e s  p la c e  w ith in  a tw e lv e  month p er io d  
a f t e r  a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t io n  (a ) where th e r e  i s  " ev id en ce’’ th a t  th e  
union  may o r  may n o t have abandoned p r io r  o r g a n iz a t io n a l and r e c o g n it io n  
o b j e c t iv e s  (b ) p ro v id ed  th e r e  i s  no s u b s ta n t ia l  second ary  e f f e c t s ,  and 
( c )  where th e  tim e p e r io d  betw een th e  e le c t io n  and th e  resum ption  o f  th e  
p ic k e t in g  i s  r ea so n a b le .
The fu tu r e  l e g a l  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e t in g  w i l l  depend upon th e  tren d  
o f  co u rt in t e r p r e t a t io n s  w ith in  th e  a forem en tion ed  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .  
W hether th e  Board and th e  c o u r ts  w i l l  e l e c t  to  adopt a q u a s i - le g a l  o r  
l e g a l i s t i c  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  o f  th e  LMRDA w i l l  depend  
upon th e  in t e r a c t io n  o f  econom ic and s o c ia l  p r e ssu r e , th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  
th e  c o u r ts ,  th e  tren d  o f  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  and th e  c o u r t s ’ p h ilo s o p h i­
c a l  approach to  la b o r  d is p u te s .  The f i n a l  cou rse  o f  p ic k e t in g , however, 
i s  d e s t in e d  to  p la y  a s ig n i f i c a n t  r o le  w ith in  th e  scop e o f  cu rren t and 
fu tu r e  labor-m anagem ent r e la t io n s *
CHAPTER V
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING STATUS OF PICKETING 
ON UNIONS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As i l l u s t r a t e d  by th e  d e c r e a s in g  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  
e l e c t i o n s  won^ by u n io n s  and th e  in c r e a s in g  p e r ce n ta g e  o f  d e c e r t i f i c a ­
t io n  e l e c t i o n s  l o s t 2 by u n io n s , th e  l e g a l i s t i c  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  
r ig h t  t o  p ic k e t— S e c t io n  8 ( b) <^)  and S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) — have assum ed an  
in c r e a s in g ly  im p o rta n t r o le  i n  labor-m anagercent r e la t io n s .  The r e s t r i c ­
t io n s  on th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  have p la c e d  e f f e c t i v e  l i m i t s  on th e  r ig h t  
to  s t r ik e ,  w here th e  s t r i k e  i s  h e ld  t o  be secon d ary  in  e f f e c t .  In  
a d d it io n , th e  p ic k e t in g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  have so  e f f e c t i v e l y  c ircu m scr ib ed  
th e  r ig h t  o f  p r o t e s t  in  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  and d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  c a s e s  th a t  
u n io n s a r e  l im it e d  to  p ic k e t in g  on t e c h n ic a l  grounds, i . e . ,  consumer 
p ic k e t in g . Thus th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  h as e v o lv e d  from  
th e  m o tiv e  t e s t  ( V egelahn v . G unter) to  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p r o te c t io n  a s  
f r e e  sp eech  (T h o r n h ill  v . Alabama) and back to  th e  m otive  t e s t  (S e c t io n
8/ F Z z 7/S7. lmrda).
■^See T ab le I ,  p . 142 , and T ab le  I I ,  p. 195*
2See T ab le  I I I .  p.  197-
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The s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  change In  th e  s ta tu s  o f  p ic k e t in g  from  
r e s t r i c t i o n  to  p r o te c t io n  and back to  r e s t r i c t i o n  n e c e s s i t a t e s  a reexam­
in a t io n  o f  th e  l e g a l  b a s i s  o f  p ic k e t in g .3 The l e g a l i t y  o f  p ic k e t in g  a s  
a t o r t  depends upon th e  form and conduct o f  th e  a c t i v i t y  a s  a sep a ra te  
fu n c t io n . P ic k e t in g  i s  co n sid ered  to  be a means to  an end whose l e g a l ­
i t y  must be judged a s  a sep a ra te  i s s u e  and n o t a s  a p a r t o f  th e  o v e r a l l  
r e la t io n s h ip .  W hile i t  may be j u s t i f i a b l e  to  determ ine th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  
s t r ik e s  and b o y c o tts  by t h i s  th eo ry  (means to  a g iv e n  en d ), can th e  same 
r e s u l t  be a p p lie d  to  p ic k e t in g ?  I s  th e  p o t e n t ia l  o f  p ic k e t in g  in  term s  
o f  eoon on ic  power equal to  th a t  o f  th e  s t r ik e  or  o f  a b o y co tt?  Or i s  
p ic k e t in g  an e x te n s io n  o f  a le g i t im a t e  d isp u te  w hich a c t s  a s  a means o f  
conveying  in form ation ?
The argument in  b e h a lf  o f  th e  t o r t  th eo r y  h o ld s  th a t p ic k e t in g  
i s  more than an e x te n s io n  o f  a la b o r  d is p u te . The c r i t ic s * 4, o f  th e  
T h o rn h ill D o c tr in e  (p ic k e t in g  a s  fr e e  sp eech ) have contended th a t  p ic k ­
e t in g  i s  more than sp eech — i t  i s  a form o f  in t im id a t io n  in ten d ed  to  
c r e a te  th e  fe a r  o f  r e p r is a l  in  th e  mind o f  th e  v ie w er . The elem en t o f
^For an e x te n s iv e  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  l e g a l  a s p e c t s  o f  p ic k e t in g  
s e e  Edgar A. J o n es, " P ick etin g  and C oercion: A Ju risp ru d en ce  o f  E pthets,"  
V ir g in ia  Law Review. XXXIX (December, 1953)* 1023; C h arles 0 . G regory, 
P ic k e t in g  and C oercion: A D e fe n s e ," V ir g in ia  Law R eview , XXXIX 
(December, 1953)* 1053: J o n es . " P ick e tin g  and C oercion: A R e p ly ." 
V ir g in ia  Law Review, XXXIX (December, 1953)* 1063; and G regory, " P ick et­
in g  and C oercion: A C o n c lu s io n ," V ir g in ia  Law R eview , XXXIX (December, 
1953). 106?.
**See P e tr o , " P ick etin g  and th e  F ree Market— V egelahn Re-examined,"
p. 403.
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I n t im id a t io n  o r  co erc io n ^  in  p ic k e t in g  i s  th a t  p a r t  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  
p r o c e s s  which makes p e a c e fu l p ic k e t in g  a l e g a l  f i c t i o n .  C oercion  in  any 
form (p ic k e t in g  or  b la c k m a il)  i s  a s e r io u s  v io la t io n  o f  human r ig h t s  and 
must e i t h e r  be r e s t r i c t e d  or  r e g u la te d  by r ea so n a b le  d o c tr in e s .  The 
elem en t o f  in t im id a t io n  or  c o e r c io n  in  p ic k e t in g  a s d e sc r ib e d  by J u s t ic e  
F ran k fu rter  (sp ea k in g  fo r  th e  m a jo r ity  in  Hughes v . S u p erio r  C ourt)
. . i s  t o  e x e r t  in f lu e n c e s  and i t  produ ces con seq u en ces, d i f f e r e n t  
from o th e r  modes o f  com m unication. The l o y a l t i e s  and r e sp o n se s  evoked  
. . . a re  u n lik e  th o se  flo w in g  from a p p ea ls  by p r in te d  word.
I t  i s ,  th e r e fo r e , th e  c o e r c iv e  e lem en t which h as su b je c te d  p ic k ­
e t in g  to  th e  law o f  t o r t s .  But i s  p ic k e t in g  c o e r c iv e  p er  se  o r  i s  t h i s  
a l e g a l  f i c t i o n  r e s u lt in g  from d ecad es o f  j u d ic ia l  in t e r p r e t a t io n .  In  
order to  answer t h i s  q u e s t io n  i t  i s  n e c e ssa ry  to  examine th a t  p a r t o f  
p e a c e fu l p ic k e t in g  which a l le g e d ly  d e s tr o y s  i t s  l e g a l i t y .  The meaning 
o f  c o e r c io n  conveys th e  id e a  th a t  th e  in d iv id u a l  o r  i n s t i t u t i o n  has been  
fo r c e d  to  commit an a c t  or  adopt a p o s i t io n  co n trary  to  t h e ir  own w i l l  
". . . where co er c io n  . . . / e x i s t s ?  • • * th e r e  i s  no v o l i t i o n .  There 
i s  no in t e n t io n  nor purpose, b u t to  y i e l d  to  moral p r e s s u r e . V / h i l e  
th e r e  was c o n s id e r a b le  ev id en ce  o f  v io le n c e ,  l i b e l ,  and c o e r c io n  in
^Contemporary j u d ic ia l  d e c is io n s  have tend ed  to  s u b s t i t u t e  
c o er c io n  f o r  th e  id e a  o f  in t im id a t io n  as  expounded i n  V egelahn v .
G unter-
6339 U.S.  ^60.
^Robert H ale, "B argaining, D uress and Economic L ib e r t y ,"
Columbia Law R eview , LXIII (J u ly , 19^3)> 603.  6 l6 .
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s e le c t e d  p ic k e t in g  c a s e s  both  p r io r  to  and d u rin g  th e  T h o r n h ill  e ra ,®  
t h i s  form  o f  p ic k e t in g  i s  an e x c e p t io n  r a th e r  than  th e  r u le  i n  c u r re n t  
c a s e s .  D e sp ite  th e  d isa p p ea ra n ce  o f  th e  c o e r c iv e  e lem en t i n  p ic k e t in g ,  
th e  NLRB and th e  c o u r ts  have p e r s i s t e d  i n  t h e i r  condem nation o f  p ic k e t ­
in g  a s  an  a c t  o r  form o f  c o e r c io n .
Does i t  n e c e s s a r i ly  f o l lo w , how ever, th a t  p ic k e t in g  i s  c o e r c iv e ?  
The answ er to  t h i s  problem  can n ot b e  s a t i s f i e d  by a s im p le  y e s  o r  no b u t  
must be c o n s id e r e d  from th e  p o in t  o f  ■view o f  th e  o b j e c t — th e  p r o s p e c t iv e  
v ie w er  o f  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e .  The e f f e c t  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  o r  "the purpose"  
o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  a s  in t e r p r e te d  by S e c t io n  8 (b )(7 )  o f  th e  LMRDA depends  
upon th e  r e a c t io n  in  th e  ndnd o f  th e  v ie w e r . VJhen th e  v iew er  r e f u s e s  to
c r o s s  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e ,  d o es  i t  mean th a t  he i s  th e  v ic t im  o f  c o e r c io n  o r
some stra ta g em  o f  th e  p ic k e t ,  o r  has th e  le g e n d  conveyed  a s ig n a l  to  th e  
v iew er?  In  th e  normal c a se  when th e  v ie w er  r e f u s e s  to  c r o s s  th e  p ic k e t
l i n e  th e  p ic k e t  le g e n d  a c t s  a s  a s ig n a l  th a t  th e  em ployer i s  u n f a ir — n o t
th a t  th e  v iew er  has been  co erced  by a grim  lo o k  o r  an e v i l  e y e . I f ,  on  
th e  o th e r  hand, th e  v iew er  ig n o r e s  th e  p ic k e t ,  th e  p ic k e t in g , however  
c o e r c iv e ,  f a i l s  i t s  im m ediate p u rp ose . Any e lem en t o f  c o e r c io n  i n  
p ic k e t in g ,  th e r e fo r e ,  must d e r iv e  from th e  f i r s t  c a se  w here th e  p ic k e t ­
in g  su c ce e d s  in  changing th e  mind o f  th e  -viewer o r  a t  l e a s t  in  changing  
h i s  a t t i t u d e .^  In  th e  t y p ic a l  s i t u a t io n  p ic k e t in g  r e s u l t s  in  one o f
®For exam ple, s e e  Truax v . C orrigan , 257 U.S.  321. and M ilkwagon 
D r iv e r s  Union v . Meadowmoor D a ir ie s . 312 U.S.  287-
9 A change o f  a t t i t u d e  co u ld  be c o n s id e re d  an " in t e l l e c t u a l  
v i c t o r y . "
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s e v e r a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s :  (1 ) th e  v iew er  sim p ly  ig n o r e s  th e  p ic k e t ,  (2 ) th e  
v iew er  r e f u s e s  to  c r o s s  th e  p ic k e t  l i n e ,  (3 )  th e  v iew er  ig n o r e s  th e  
p ic k e t  and c r o s s e s  th e  l i n e ,  and (h ) th e  v iew er  r e f u s e s  to  c r o s s  th e  
p ic k e t  o u t o f  f e a r  o f  p er so n a l or  eoonomic r e t a l i a t i o n .  I t  i s ,  th e r e ­
f o r e ,  q u ite  u n r e a l i s t i c  to  m ain ta in  th a t  a l l  p ic k e t in g  c o n ta in s  an 
elem en t o f  c o e r c io n .
The a n a ly s is  o f  th e  v ie w e r 's  r e a c t io n  to  a p ic k e t  l i n e  g a in s  
a d d it io n a l  p e r s p e c t iv e  when th e  r e c i p i e n t ' s  a l le g ia n c e  i s  d eterm ined .
The r e a c t io n  in  t h i s  c a se  would depend on w hether th e  v iew er  i s  (1 )  a 
member o f  th e  same u n ion , (2 )  a member o f  a r iv a l  u n ion , (3 )  a nonunion  
d eliverym an , or (^ ) an in n o ce n t consumer. The o n ly  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
c o er c io n  would be in  s i t u a t io n s  (3 ) and ( h ) ,  and i t  i s  p rob ab le th a t  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t — th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  v iew er— w i l l  be more dominant than  
any fe a r  o f  c o e r c io n .
S u b sec tio n  (C) o f  th e  LMRDA, ( th e  p u b l ic i t y  p r o v iso )  i m p l i c i t l y  
assum es th a t  any elem ent o f  c o e r c io n  i s  a b sen t from t r u t h f u l  consumer 
p ic k e t in g . Consumer p ic k e t in g  i s  d e s ig n ed  to  app eal to  th e  s e l f -  
in t e r e s t  o f  th e  v iew er  In  an a ttem p t to  persu ade him to  a c c e p t th e  
u n io n 's  p o s i t io n .  I f  th e  consumer o r  secondary em ployee a c q u ie sc e s  to  
th e  u n io n 1s le g en d , d oes t h i s  c o n s t i t u t e  c o e r c io n  o f  th e  p ic k e te d  
em ployer? To answ er t h i s  q u e s t io n  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to  c o n s id e r  th e  t o t a l  
r e la t io n s h ip .  What i s  th e  u lt im a te  g o a l o f  th e  p ic k e tin g ?  ’With few  
e x c e p t io n s  p ic k e t in g  i s  a study in  econom ic p r e ssu r e — p ressu re  v ia  
second ary em ployees or  v ia  consumers w hich, i f  th e  p ic k e t in g  i s  s u c c e s s ­
f u l ,  w i l l  be tr a n s fe r r e d  to  th e  em ployer. Does t h i s  t r a n s fe r r a l  o f
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p r e ssu r e  by a p p ea lin g  to  th e  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  v iew er  r e s u l t  in  
co erc io n ?  Or d oes t h i s  p r e ssu r e  or  p r o c e ss  o f  p ersu a sio n  produce th e  
sane kind o f  p r e ssu r e  which r e s u l t s  from a d v e r t is in g  th e  s u p e r io r i ty  o f  
a new p ro d u ct, o r  th a t  which r e s u l t s  from p r ic e  c u t t in g , o r  p r e ssu r e  
a g a in s t  s u p p lie r s , or  r e t a i l  o u t l e t s  o r  p ressu re  in  p o l i t i c a l  c i r c le s ?
Are th e s e  in s ta n c e s  a study in  c o e r c io n , a stu d y  in  p e r su a sio n , a stu d y  
in  econom ic p r e ssu r e , or  do th ey  c o n s t i t u t e  a l e g i t im a t e  appeal to  s e l f -  
in t e r e s t ?  In  each c a se  i t  i s  a q u e s t io n  o f  sem a n tics , but i s  th e  ap p ea l 
o f  p e a c e fu l p ic k e t in g  so d i f f e r e n t  from o th er  form s o f  co m p etit io n  th a t  
i t  must be r e g u la te d  by f e d e r a l  and s t a t e  codes o f  p e r m is s ib le  conduct?  
Why must la b o r  u n ion s be su b je c te d  to  r e s t r i c t i v e  p ic k e t in g  l e g i s l a t i o n  
w h ile  em ployers remain r e l a t i v e l y  f r e e  in  t h e ir  s tr u g g le  a g a in s t  
u n ion s?10 Although i t  i s  n ot th e  purpose o f  t h i s  study to  in q u ir e  
in t o  th e  s o c ia l  v a lu e s  o f  th e  f r e e  e n te r p r is e  system , i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
to  r e c o g n iz e  th e  s im i la r i t y  betw een p ressu re  through p ic k e t in g  and 
p r e ssu r e  in  s im ila r  forms o f  c o m p e tit io n . In  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  e s t a b l i s h ­
in g  ch eck s on th e  c o m p e tit iv e  p r o c e ss  a dem ocratic  s o c ie t y  should  r e f r a in  
from r e g u la t in g  le g i t im a t e  means o f  p ressu re  which d ev e lo p  in  resp on se  
to  th e  e x is t e n c e  o f  o r ig in a l  market power. P e a c e fu l p ic k e t in g  a s  a 
form o f  c o u n te r v a ilin g  power shou ld  be p r o te c te d  a s  a means o f  k eep in g  
th e  em ployer in  a s t a t e  o f  u n c e r ta in ty  regard in g  th e  in t e n t io n s
10For a l i s t  o f  em ployer u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e s  se e  th e  NLRB, 
a s  amended, U.S.  5t a t .  XLIX, 449 .
o f  th e  u n ion .'1'1
The n e c e s s i t y  o f  p r o te c t in g  th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  has assumed 
a d d it io n a l im portance w ith  th e  enactment o f  S ec tio n  70^ o f  th e  LMRDA 
which r e s t r i c t s  th e  employment o f  "hot cargo" p r o v is io n s  in  la b o r  con­
t r a c t s .  For a p eriod  o f  tim e a f t e r  th e  p assage o f  the LMRA (19^7) 
u n ion s were a b le  to  avoid  th e sa n c tio n  o f  th e  la b o r  in ju n c t io n  by 
in c lu d in g  "hot cargo" c la u se s  in  c o l l e c t iv e  b arga in in g  c o n tr a c ts .
U nions c o u ld  th u s  engage in  a form o f  second ary  p r e ssu r e  by r e f u s in g  to  
h a n d le  goods o f  nonunion em p lo y ers. The r e f u s a l  to  h a n d le  nonunion  
goods became an im p ortan t so u r ce  o f  econom ic p r e ssu r e  in  th e  hands o f  
t r a n s p o r ta t io n  and c o n s tr u c t io n  u n io n s . W ith th e  o u tla w in g  o f  "hot 
cargo" c la u s e s  by S e c t io n  70h, th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  a g a in s t  nonunion  
goods o r  em ployers i s  th e  o n ly  rem ain in g form o f  open c o m p e tit io n  a v a i l ­
a b le  in  th e s e  in d u s t r i e s .  I t  i s  th e r e fo r e  i m p l i c i t  th a t  th e  r ig h t  t o  
p ic k e t  even  i n  a r e s t r i c t e d  form sh ou ld  be p r o te c te d  a s  a means o f  
c o u n te r a c tin g  th e  market power o f  em p loyers.
Apart from th e  l e g a l  con seq u en ces  o f  th e  problem , w hat e f f e c t  
h as th e  changing s t a t u s  o f  p ic k e t in g  had on th e  condu ct o f  s t r i k e s ,  th e  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  u n ion  m em bership, and th e  su b seq u en t l o s s  in  b a r g a in in g  
power? As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  q u e s t io n s ,  what a re  th e  p ro b a b le  im p lic a ­
t io n s  in  term s o f  consumer w e lfa r e ,  governm ent p a r t ic ip a t io n  i n  la b o r  
r e l a t i o n s ,  and th e  fu tu r e  o f  tr a d e  u n io n s . The econom ic a s p e c t s  o f  th e
^ F o r  an e x p l i c i t  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  ooncept o f  c o u n te r v a ilin g  
power, see  John X. G a lb ra ith , American C ap ita lism  (B oston: Houghton 
M iff l in  Company, 1952).
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changing s t a tu s  o f  p lo k e tln g  a ra  im p o rta n t h i s t o r i c a l l y  a s  w a ll a s  I n  
contem porary a n a ly s i s .  For a  b r i e f  p e rio d  o f  time* p ic k e tin g —-a s  a  
means o f  p r o te s t - e n jo y e d  an  e q u a l i ty  w ith  f r e e  speech a s  p ro te c te d  by 
th e  C o n s t i tu t io n . A lthough th e  t o r t  o r  s e p a ra te  fu n c tio n  t h e s i s  soon 
r e a s s e r te d  I t s  dominance o v e r th e  law  o f  p ic k e tin g , th e  T h o rn h ill  e ra  
s tro n g ly  dem onstra ted  th e  economic consequences o f  p ic k e tin g . The 
emergence o f  p ic k e tin g  a s  an  e x te n s io n  o f  a  la b o r  d is p u te  co in c id e d  w ith  
th e  r i s e  o f  th e  contem porary la b o r  movement. I n  th e  p e rio d  fo llo w in g  
th e  enactm ent o f  th e  N orris-L aG uard ia  Act, th e  NLRA, and th e  F a i r  Labor 
S tandards Act, p ic k e tin g  under th e  T h o rn h ill  D o c trin e  became a s i g n i f i ­
c a n t fo rc e  f o r  th e  r e s t iv e  lo c a l s  o f  th e  newly o rg an ized  Congress o f  
I n d u s t r i a l  O rg an iza tio n  and th e  r e v i t a l i z e d  American F e d e ra tio n  o f  
L abor. The d e s t r u c t iv e  power o f  th e  s t r i k e  when suppo rted  by unregu­
l a t e d  p ic k e tin g  i s  ex em p lified  by Mllkwagon D riv e rs  Union v. Meadowmoor 
12D a ir ie s . I t  was th u s  e v id e n t th a t  p ic k e tin g  under g iven  c o n d itio n s  
cou ld  f o s t e r  u n d e s ira b le  a c t io n s  which were in  c o n f l i c t  w ith  government 
p o lic y  and p u b lic  o p in io n . The subsequen t r e g u la t io n  o f  p ic k e tin g  by 
th e  WRA < 1 W ) . S ec tio n  8 (b ) (*0, and by S e c tio n  8 (b )(7 )  o f  th e  LMRDA 
r a is e d  some p e rp le x in g  problem s reg a rd in g  th e  c o n d itio n s  under which 
p ic k e tin g  was co n sid e red  to  be an u n f a i r  la b o r  p r a c t ic e .  The d i f f i c u l t y  
o f  e v a lu a tin g  th e s e  two s e c t io n s  has been com plica ted  by th e  resu rg en ce  
o f  th e  t o r t  th e o ry  o f  p ic k e tin g  and by th e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  s t a t e  
l e g i s l a t i o n  seek ing  to  p la c e  sev ere  s a n c tio n s  on th e  r i g h t  to  p ic k e t .
12312 U.S. 287.
209
The co n seq u en ces  o f  t h i s  p e r io d  o f  r e in t e r p r e t a t io n  i n  th e  law  
o f  p ic k e t in g  can be seen  in  (1 )  th e  d e c l in e  in  b a r g a in in g  s tr e n g th  o f  
unions* (2 )  th e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  u n ion  membership* (3 )  th e  i n e f f e c t i v e ­
n e s s  o f  s t r i k e s ,  and (*0 th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  w in n in g  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  
e l e c t i o n s  and th e  i n a b i l i t y  to  p r o t e s t  th e  l o s s  o f  a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  
e l e c t i o n .  W hile th e  d e c l in e  i n  th e  b a r g a in in g  s tr e n g th  o f  u n io n s  and  
th e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  u n ion  membership have c e r t a in ly  b een  a f f e c t e d  by  
o th e r  f a c t o r s ;  i . e . *  th a t  u n ion  membership i s  n o t  a s  im p o rta n t a s  i t  
was in  th e  1 9 3 0 's ,  th e  d isa p p ea ra n ce  o f  th e  t r a d i t io n  o f  id ea lism *  th e  
r e l a t i v e  p e r io d  o f  p r o s p e r ity  s in c e  19^5. e t c . ,  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e
r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  have p la y ed  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  i n  th o se  in d u s t r ia l  and
11g e o g r a p h ic a l a r e a s  where th e  fu tu r e  o f  un ion ism  i s  a t  s ta k e .
The e f f e c t s  o f  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on p ic k e t in g  a s  a p p lie d  
to  s t r i k e s  or o th e r  d is p u te s  and in  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t i o n s  may be seen  
through th e  g u is e  o f  a h y p o th e t ic a l  u n io n . For exam ple, by c o n s id e r in g  
L o ca l 300 o f  th e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  Watchmakers r e p r e s e n tin g  
th e  em ployees o f  th e  F u lton  Watch C orp oration , i t  I s  p o s s ib le  t o  
v i s u a l i z e  th o se  s i t u a t io n s  in  w hich  L oca l 300 would be a f f e c t e d  by th e  
p ic k e t in g  r e g u la t io n s .  I f  L oca l 300, f o r  exam ple, i s  a m ature un ion  
w ith  a u n ion  shop c o n tr a c t ,  th e  p ic k e t in g  r e g u la t io n s  would o n ly  be  
e f f e c t i v e  i f  th e  L ocal sh ou ld  p ro p o se  to  o r g a n iz e  a b a r g a in in g  u n it  in
^ o r  an e x c e l l e n t  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  f a c t o r s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  
d e c l in e  i n  th e  American la b o r  movement, see  SaQlin T h o rsten  ( e d . ) ,  "The 
C r is i s  i n  th e  Am erican Trade-O nion M ovem ent," The A nnals o f  th e  Am erican  
Academy o f  P o l i t i c a l  and S o c ia l  S c ie n c e , XXX (November, 1 9 ^ 3 ).  
P h ila d e lp h ia , P en n sy lv a n ia .
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another watch corporation. But i t  seems u n lik e ly  that Local 300 would 
encounter any serious problems in  extending i t s  ju r isd ic tio n  to an 
unorganized corporation un less the corporation in  question should choose 
to r e s is t  the organizing p e t it io n  o f  the watchmakers. Even i f  Local 300 
encounters resistan ce  i t  i s  probable that the Local would be able to  
en ro ll a majority o f the employer's employees. Thus, in  a s itu a tio n  o f  
a mature union in  an id e n t if ia b le  cra ft, i t  i s  extremely doubtful that 
the p icketing regu lations would have any economic e f fe c t s  on the bar­
gaining a b i l i ty  o f  Local 300. These conclusions would a lso  apply i f  
Local 300 was an a f f i l ia t e d  member o f the In ternational Brotherhood o f  
Teamsters or even i f  Local 300 was independent o f  the national union.
I f ,  instead  o f a union shop contract, Local 300 has a one year 
open shop agreement with the Fulton Watch Corporation, i t  i s  quite  
probable that the economic e f fe c t s  o f  the p icketing regu lations would 
have important r e f le c t io n s  on the future o f Local 300. I f  Local 300 and 
the Fulton Corporation are unable to reach a new agreement and a str ik e  
ensues, the right to  p icket i s  tantamount to  the conduct o f  a success­
fu l s tr ik e . For the str ik e  to be e f fe c t iv e , Local 300 must ad vertise  
i t s  dispute to  F ulton's strikebreakers, F u lton 's suppliers, and to the  
consuming pu blic. The righ t to  engage in  peaceful p icketing in  th ese  
in stan ces i s  an indispensable form o f economic oonqietition which should 
str ik e  a responsive cord in  F ulton 's f in a n cia l p o s itio n . Although i t  
may be unfair to c lo se  Fulton down, i t  i s  equally unfair to c lo se  the  
union down. While the p icketing regu lations under the LMRA as amended 
by Section 8(b)(7)  would not in  the normal course o f events r e s t r ic t  the
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r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  in  sup p ort o f  an econom ic s t r ik e ,  th e  p ic k e t in g  co u ld  
become an u n f a ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  i f  i t  i s  secon d ary  in  e f f e c t ,  i . e . ,  p ic k ­
e t in g  a t  a s i t u s  o th e r  than  th a t  o f  th e  prim ary em ployer1^ o r  p ic k e t in g  
a t  a common situs.'*'-* W hile th e  econom ic con seq u en ces  o f  l im i t in g  th e  
r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  i n  t h e s e  c a s e s  h a s c e r t a in ly  been d e tr im e n ta l to  u n io n s  
i n  th e  c o n s tr u c t io n  in d u s tr y  and th e  tr a n s p o r ta t io n  in d u s tr y , th e  s t a t e ­
ment o f  p r in c ip le s  announced by th e  NLRB in  th e  Moore Dry Dock case^-6 
p r e s e n t s  an e q u it a b le  s o lu t io n  to  t h i s  c o n tr o v e r s ia l  i s s u e .
I f  L oca l 300 i s  u n ab le  t o  s e t t l e  i t s  d i f f e r e n c e s  w ith  th e  F u lto n  
C orp oration  and th e  C orporation  p e t i t i o n s  f o r  a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t i o n  
to  t e s t  th e  m a jo r ity  s t a t u s  o f  th e  w atchm akers, w hat a r e  th e  econom ic  
co n seq u en ces  o f  t h i s  a c t io n ?  P r io r  to  1959 th e  l o s s  o f  m a jo r ity  s t a t u s  
w ould have p rec lu d ed  L oca l 300 from p ic k e t in g  f o r  a p e r io d  o f  one y e a r .  
S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  d oes n o t change t h i s  r e s u l t  u n le s s  th e  u n ion  can demon­
s t r a t e  e v id e n c e  o f  a n o n r e c o g n it io n a l m o tiv e . A lthough th e  law  e s ta b ­
l i s h e s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  consumer p ic k e t in g , i t  would be ex trem e ly  
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  u n ion  to  e s t a b l i s h  e v id e n c e  o f  a n o n r e c o g n it io n a l  
m otive  under th e s e  c ircu m sta n ces- In  e i t h e r  ca se  th e  l o s s  o f  th e  r ig h t  
to  p ic k e t  fo r  a p er io d  o f  one y ea r  s e r io u s ly  l i m i t s  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
u n ion  i n  m a in ta in in g  c o n ta c t  w ith  th e  em p lo y ees. The e x c lu s io n  o f  th e
■^See I n te r n a t io n a l  B rotherhood o f  T eam sters v .  S c h u ltz  R e fr ig ­
e r a te d  S e r v ic e . ^ 7  NLRB 502.
^ S e e  NLRB v .  Denver B u ild in g  and C o n stru c tio n  T rades C o u n c il.
341 U.S.  675'
•^ S e e  Chapter I I I ,  p . 123*
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union le a v e s  the employer r e la t iv e ly  fr e e  to e s ta b lish  h is  own formula 
o f  in d u str ia l democracy. The assumption th at the employer i s  in  a 
b etter  p o s itio n  to manage the p ro test o f  h is  employees aga in st arb itrary  
p r a c tic e s  (d isc ip lin a r y  tra n sfers , se n io r ity  r ig h ts , e t c . )  i s  not 
supported by a n a ly s is  o f  In d u str ia l r e la t io n s . I t  i s  improbable to  
expect the employer to a n tic ip a te  and equitab ly  reso lve  d isputes which 
normally require tr i-p a r ty  adjudication  between the employer, the unions, 
and the government. Continual resort to  the n ineteenth-century brand o f  
personal democracy cannot be expected to s u f f ic e  in  current in d u str ia l  
r e la t io n s . The in d u str ia l and p o l i t ic a l  spheres must seek to  develop a 
system o f  regu la tion s which w i l l  enable unions and employers to dev ise  
equ itab le  so lu tio n s to th e ir  mutual problems.
Although i t  i s  im possible to s c ie n t i f i c a l ly  reso lve  the question  
o f  employer democracy versus union democracy, i t  i s  questionable whether 
the union should be le g a l ly  r e s tr ic te d  from p ick etin g  during th is  
cru cia l period. I f  there was some rea l evidence o f  'co erc io n ," r e s tr ic ­
t io n s  on the r igh t to  p ick et oould be ju s t if ie d ;  but in  the absence o f  
coercion, should the employer be given a period o f  tw elve months to  
s o l id i fy  h is  p o s itio n  w hile the union i s  excluded from the realm o f  
competition? I s  th is  s itu a tio n  somehow d iffe r e n t  from that o f  p r ice  
wars, p ricin g  agreements, or mutual friendships? To deny the righ t o f  
peacefu l p ro test a f te r  the lo s s  o f a d e c e r t if ic a t io n  e le c t io n  temporar­
i l y  s e t t l e s  the i s s u e  in  favor o f  th e  employer, and i t  re in fo rces the  
market power o f  the employer aga in st the countervailin g  power o f p ick et­
in g . This r e su lt  i s  detrim ental to  both the union and u ltim ate consumers
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b eca u se  i t  g iv e s  a fu r th e r  advantage t o  th e  em ployer.
I f  L ocal J00 h as r e c e n t ly  won a c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e l e c t io n  a t  th e  
F u lton  Corporation# th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  r e s t r i c t io n s  would n o t  
s u b s t a n t ia l ly  d i f f e r  from th e  oonsequence8 o f  p ic k e t in g  in  supp ort o f  
an econom ic s t r ik e .  The union co u ld  c o n tin u e  to p ic k e t  u n t i l  th e  
s u c c e s s f u l  n e g o t ia t io n  o f  a c o n tr a c t  w ith  th e  F u lton  C orporation  or  u n t i l  
such p e r io d  a s  th e  C orporation  sh ou ld  f i l e  a d e c e r t i f i c a t io n  p e t i t i o n .
The econom ic s ig n if ic a n c e #  however, i s  to  encourage a n tiu n io n  em ployers 
to  c o n tin u e  to  b a rg a in  w ith  th e  un ion  w ith  th e  hope o f  e v e n tu a lly  
im posing th e  p ic k e t in g  r e s t r i c t i o n s .
I f  L ocal 300 were a m in o r ity  u n ion , th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  p r io r  to  
a r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e l e c t io n  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  t h i r t y  days by S e c tio n  8 (b)  
( 7 ) .  and th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  a f t e r  th e  l o s s  o f  an e l e c t io n  or  in  th e  
ab sen ce  o f  an e le c t io n  p e t i t i o n  depends on th e  NLRB or  th e  c o u r ts '  
in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  in t e n t  or  m otive  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g . Thus# in  t h i s  
c r u c ia l  area# th e  f a t e  o f  p ic k e t in g  a s  a form o f  econom ic r e p r is a l  
depends on a l e g a l  t e c h n ic a l i t y — in t e r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  m o tiv e . A lthough  
th e  f i n a l  co u rse  o f  t h i s  i s s u e  i s  y e t  undeterm ined, i t  i s  probab le  th a t  
th e  low er c o u r ts  w i l l  e l e c t  to  r e s t r i c t  m in o r ity  p ic k e t in g  to  a nom inal 
form .1 ?
In  summary, th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  p ic k e t in g  r e s t r i c t i o n s  under th e  
LMRA (19^7) and th e LMRDA (1959) p layed  a s ig n i f i c a n t  r o le  (1 )  in
1 ?F or e x a m p le , s e e  P M i l l p a  v . I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a d ie s  Garm ent 
W orkers U n io n , i+5 L. R. R. M.  2263-
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l im i t in g  th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  in  support o f  an econom ic s t r ik e  (a )  a t  th e  
second ary  s i t u s  and (b ) a t  th e  common s i t u s ,  (2 )  in  r e s t r i c t in g  th e  
l i g h t  to  p ic k e t  p r io r  to  and a f t e r  a r e p r e se n ta t io n  e l e c t i o n  and a f t e r  
th e  l o s s  o f  a  d e c e r t i f i c a t io n  e l e c t io n ,  and (3 )  by l im it in g  th e  r ig h t  
to  p ic k e t  where th e  u n ion  i s  a m in o r ity . These r e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  r ig h t  
to  p ic k e t  have p la y ed  an im p ortan t r o le  i n  red u cin g  th e  econom ic e f f e c ­
t iv e n e s s  o f  s t r ik e s  in  th o se  in d u s t r ie s  d i r e c t ly  a f f e c t e d  by second ary  
r e la t io n s h ip s ,  and th e y  have d e c i s i v e ly  reduced th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
w inn ing r e p r e s e n ta t io n  e le c t io n s  and th e  a b i l i t y  to  r e s i s t  d e c e r t i f i c a ­
t io n  p e t i t i o n s .
The s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e s e  developm ents in  th e  law  o f  p ic k e t in g  
a s  supported  by th e  record  o f  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  and d e c e r t i f i c a t io n  e l e c ­
t io n s  h as caused  both  la b o r  eco n o m ists  and r e s p o n s ib le  union le a d e r s  to  
ex p r ess  th e  fe a r  th a t  u n ion s may e v e n tu a lly  c e a se  to  fu n c t io n  a s  an 
e f f e c t i v e  fo r c e  in  in d u s t r ia l  s o c ie t y .  A lthough i t  I s  im p o ss ib le  to  
a c c u r a te ly  a n t ic ip a t e  th e  fu tu r e , i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  s t a t e  th a t  th e  
p r e se n t  tren d  i s  a j u s t i f i a b l e  ca u se  fo r  alarm  in  th e  tr a d e  union move­
ment. The im p lic a t io n s  o f  t h i s  s h i f t  in  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  power su g g e st  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an e v en tu a l c h o ic e  betw een th e  p r e se n t t r i - p a r t y  
economy (u n io n s , management, and th e  p u b lic )  and th a t o f  a b l- p o la r  
s o c ie t y  (management and th e  p u b l ic ) .  The d e c l in e  o f  tra d e  u n ion s a s  a 
p a r t ic ip a t in g  fo r c e  in  an I n d u s t r ia l  s o c ie t y  can o n ly  ser v e  to  com pli­
c a te  th e  problem s o f  d i s t r ib u t io n .  The d isa p p earan ce  o f  tra d e  u n ion s  
would n e c e s s i t a t e  th e  s u b s t i t u t io n  o f  governm ent r e g u la t io n s  c o n t r o l l in g  
th e  d i s t r ib u t io n  o f  power and w ea lth  c u r r e n t ly  a d m in istered  by u n io n s.
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W hile i t  i s  d o u b tfu l th a t  such a s u b s t i t u t io n  would enhance consumer 
w e lfa r e , i t  i s  apparent th a t  i t  would r e s u l t  in  p r ic e  and wage c o n tr o ls  
which a r e  th e  a n t i t h e s e s  o f  a m arket economy.
In  view  o f  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  on th e  s ta tu s  o f  
p ic k e t in g , what a re  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e s  to  th e s e  r e g u la t io n s?  From th e  
s ta n d p o in t o f  th e  j u d ic ia l  ex p e r ie n c e  o f  S e c tio n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  i t  would seem 
p la u s ib le  to  e i t h e r  (1 )  ban a l l  forms o f  p ic k e t in g  ex o ep t p ic k e t in g  in  
support o f  a le g i t im a t e  s t r ik e ,  o r  (2 )  p erm it p ic k e t in g  by a m in o r ity  
union w ith o u t r e s t r i c t i o n s  in  r e s p e c t  to  tim e o r  c ircu m stan ce  i f  th e  
p ic k e t in g  d id  n o t in t e r f e r e  w ith  d e l i v e r i e s  or d is r u p t  th e  normal 
r o u tin e  o f  th e  em p lo y er 's  b u s in e s s . Banning o f  a l l  p ic k e t in g  e x ce p t  
th a t  in  supp ort o f  an econom ic s t r ik e  amounts to  an i m p l i c i t  a ccep ta n ce  
o f  th e  th eo ry  th a t  p ic k e t in g  i s  c o e r c iv e  p er  s e .  Or in  th e  same se n se  
i t  assum es th a t  p ic k e t in g  i s  an u n d e s ir a b le  form o f  econom ic p r e ssu r e  
which by some means p la c e s  th e  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  nonunion em ployee 
o r  th e  secondary em ployee i n  jeop ard y . W hile i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  con­
c e iv e  o f  s i t u a t io n s  in  which th e  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o f  in d iv id u a ls  m ight be  
in t im id a te d  by p ic k e t in g , i t  i s  n o t d i f f i c u l t  to  e v a lu a te  th e  e f f e c t  o f  
t h i s  p r o h ib it io n  on tra d e  u n io n s . A lthough t h i s  ban would n o t appre­
c ia b ly  a f f e c t  th e  e s t a b l is h e d  u n io n s , such a r e s t r i c t io n  would s e v e r e ly  
l i m i t  th o se  u n ion s who a re  a ttem p tin g  to  ex ten d  th e  in d u s t r ia l  f r o n t ie r .  
By l im it in g  p ic k e t in g  to  th e  support o f  econom ic s t r ik e s ,  m in o r ity  
u n ion s would be fo r c e d  to  r e s o r t  to  o th e r  t a c t i c s  in  b r in g in g  econom ic 
p r e ssu r e  to  b ea r  on em ployers. In  th e  f i n a l  a n a ly s is  th e  p r e se r v a t io n  
o f  th e  r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  a s  a means o f  c o m p etit io n  seem s p r e fe r a b le  to  th e
developm ent o f  o th e r  form s o f  econom ic p r e ss u r e . The p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  
r ig h t  to  p ic k e t  even  i n  a r e g u la te d  sen se  " . . .  shou ld  be an o c c a s io n  
fo r  m ild  r e j o ic in g  in  th e  c o n se r v a tiv e  press."-*-®
I f  th e  r ig h t  t o  p ic k e t  i s  upheld  in  p r e fe r e n c e  to  a p ro p o sa l 
ou tlaw in g  p ic k e t in g , i s  i t  c o n c e iv a b le  to  d e v is e  a r e g u la t io n  which  
w i l l  a v o id  th e  c o m p lic a tio n s  o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 ) ?  The c o m p lica tio n s  o f  
S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  cou ld  be overcome by e i t h e r  (1 )  adop ting  P r o fe s so r  Cox' s  
p rop osa l th a t  u n ion s be req u ired  to  prove th a t  th e  p ic k e t in g  i s  in f o r ­
m ation a l in  n a tu re , o r  (2 )  by a c c e p tin g  th e  Kennedy-Gox in t e r p r e t a t io n  
o f  S e c t io n  8 ( b ) ( 7 )  th a t  th e  un ion  may p ic k e t  in  th e  ab sen ce o f  a c e r t i ­
f i c a t i o n  p e t i t io n  i f  th e  p ic k e t in g  does n o t in t e r f e r e  w ith  d e l iv e r i e s  or  
w ith  th e  em p lo y er 's  em p loyees. Of th e s e  two p ro p o sa ls  th e  l a t t e r  would  
a v o id  th e  co m p lica tio n  o f  d eterm in in g  w hether th e  p ic k e t in g  i s  r e o o g n i-  
t io n a l  or  in fo r m a tio n a l, or  w hether th e  p ic k e t in g  was in  p r o te s t  o f  an 
em ployer u n fa ir  la b o r  p r a c t ic e  or  p r o te s t  o f  th e  em ployer1s r e f u s a l  to  
r e h ir e  econom ic s t r ik e r s ,  or  some o th e r  form o f  p r o t e s t .  T h is pro­
p o sa l would th us overcome th e  " in te r p r e ta tio n "  problem o f  S e c t io n  8 (b )  
( 7 )  w h ile  r e ta in in g  th e  "rule o f  r e a so n 1' th a t  le g i t im a t e  p ic k e t in g  must 
be p e a c e fu l in  scope a s  w e l l  a s  in  con d u ct. At th e  same tim e th e  
f e d e r a l  government should  amend th e  liLRA to  p rec lu d e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  th e  s t a t e s  fa sh io n in g  r e g u la t io n s  which su p p ress th e  r ig h t  t o  p ic k e t  
a s  a v io la t io n  o f  p u b lic  p o l ic y ,  s t a t e  law , or  community i n t e r e s t .
^ G alb ra ith , p. 133*
The e f f e c t  o f  s t a t e  r e g u la t io n  on p ic k e t in g  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by I n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  T eam sters v . V ogt h a s been  to  a llo w  th e  s t a t e s  1 • • . t o  
d e c id e  w h eth er to  p erm it o r  su p p ress  any p a r t ic u la r  p ic k e t  l i n e  . . ."19  
Thus u n io n s  under s t a t e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  have been  fo r c e d  to  wage l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  a s  w e l l  a s  econom ic b a t t l e s  i n  o rd er  t o  r e t a in  th e  r ig h t  t o  p ic k e t .  
The p r o te c t io n  o f  p e a c e fu l  p ic k e t in g  by f e d e r a l  s t a t u t e  would p erm it  
u n io n s  t o  a d v e r t is e  th e  sou rce  and rea so n  o f  t h e ir  d is p u te  w ith  th e  
em ployer* and i t  would p r e se r v e  th e  c h a r a c te r  o f  open c o m p e tit io n  
betw een  u n io n s  and em p loyers. The a d o p tio n  o f  t h i s  amendment i n  r e s p e c t  
t o  p ic k e t in g  co u ld  become th e  f i r s t  o f  a s e r i e s  o f  s t e p s  w hich  m ight 
le a d  to  o th e r  c o n s tr u c t iv e  im provem ents i n  th e  body o f  la b o r  law .
1 9 3 5 4  U.S. 2 9 7 , m in o r ity  o p in io n  o f  J u s t ic e  D ou glas.
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